Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-918

Allowed

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

6271 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-4W49-GWV8-FPJG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 21:57 – Updated: 2026-10-08 21:57
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI: Jobs API is unauthenticated by default and allows attacker-controlled webhook SSRF
Details

Summary

PraisonAI's Async Jobs API enables its API-key middleware only when PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY is set, so by default every endpoint is unauthenticated. An unauthenticated POST /api/v1/runs accepts an attacker-controlled webhook_url; on job completion the server POSTs the job payload to it via httpx. The webhook_url has an SSRF validator (gethostbyname + private-IP check), but it validates at request time while httpx re-resolves at connection time — a DNS-rebinding TOCTOU that reaches internal services. Runtime-confirmed as an unauthenticated, blind SSRF (the internal canary received the POST; the internal response is not returned to the attacker). Severity Medium.

Details

Affected component

  • Package: praisonai 4.6.63. Files: src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/server.py, jobs/router.py, jobs/executor.py, jobs/models.py.

Vulnerable code / root cause

Path: src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/server.py

Function: create_app

Snippet:

jobs_api_key = os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY")
# ...
if jobs_api_key:
    app.add_middleware(JobsAPIKeyMiddleware)   # auth ONLY when env var is set

Issue: with the env var unset (default), no auth middleware is added → all endpoints unauthenticated. Default bind is 127.0.0.1.

Path: src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/router.py

Function: submit_job

Snippet:

@router.post("", response_model=JobSubmitResponse, status_code=202)
async def submit_job(request, response, body: JobSubmitRequest, ...):
    # no auth dependency; body.webhook_url is attacker-controlled
    job = Job(prompt=body.prompt, webhook_url=body.webhook_url, ...)
    await executor.submit(job)

Issue: attacker-controlled webhook_url flows into the job with no authentication on the endpoint.

Path: src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py (validator) and src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py (sink)

Function: validate_webhook_url → _send_webhook

Snippet:

# models.py validate_webhook_url (CHECK time)
ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
if ipaddress.ip_address(ip).is_private or ...:
    raise ValueError("Webhook URL resolves to a private or restricted network address")

# executor.py _send_webhook (CONNECT time, re-resolves, no pinning)
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=30.0) as client:
    response = await client.post(job.webhook_url, json=payload, ...)

Issue: the validator resolves the hostname at validation time but does not pin the IP for the httpx.post connection → DNS rebinding (independent resolution at check vs connect) bypasses it and reaches internal services.

Attack flow

  1. Operator runs the Jobs API without PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY (default → unauth).
  2. Attacker POST /api/v1/runs with webhook_url = a rebinding domain.
  3. The validator(s) see a public IP (pass); on completion httpx.post re-resolves to an internal IP and connects → SSRF to internal.

Why existing protection is bypassed

Auth is opt-in (only when the env var is set). The webhook_url validator resolves at check time but does not pin the IP for the connection → DNS-rebinding TOCTOU. (Correction to an earlier static note: the guard exists but is bypassable.)

Security boundary

Unauthenticated network peer → server-side request to internal services (Scope: Changed). Default bind 127.0.0.1 limits remote reach unless the operator binds non-loopback.

Proof of Concept

Environment

Real Jobs API (python -m praisonai.jobs.server, no API key) in a local runtime (127.0.0.1:18085), resolver pointed at the controlled rebinding DNS, internal canary Docker-internal only. Runnable assets: PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\runtime-files\ (docker-compose.jobs.yml).

Steps to reproduce

  1. PRAI-04-01-Jobs-Submit-NoAuth: POST /api/v1/runs {"prompt":"hello"} → 202 (no auth).
  2. PRAI-04-02-Jobs-Webhook-SSRF-Blind: POST /api/v1/runs {"prompt":"hello","webhook_url":"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret"} → 202.

Expected result

Unauthenticated job submission should be rejected; the webhook SSRF guard should prevent reaching internal services regardless of DNS timing.

Impact

Unauthenticated job submission (LLM cost abuse); SSRF to internal services (blind, DNS-rebinding); exfiltration of the job result to an attacker-controlled webhook.

Suggested remediation

  • Authenticate the Jobs API by default (auto-generate a token / fail closed when binding non-loopback), like the gateway.
  • For webhook_url: resolve once, reject private/loopback/CGNAT/metadata, then pin and connect to the validated IP; disable redirects.
Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.77"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.78"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-60091"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-367",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T21:57:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T14:18:35Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s Async Jobs API enables its API-key middleware **only when `PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY` is set**, so by default every endpoint is unauthenticated. An unauthenticated `POST /api/v1/runs` accepts an attacker-controlled `webhook_url`; on job completion the server POSTs the job payload to it via `httpx`. The `webhook_url` has an SSRF validator (`gethostbyname` + private-IP check), but it validates at request time while `httpx` re-resolves at connection time \u2014 a DNS-rebinding TOCTOU that reaches internal services. Runtime-confirmed as an **unauthenticated, blind** SSRF (the internal canary received the POST; the internal response is not returned to the attacker). Severity Medium.\n\n## Details\n\n### Affected component\n- Package: `praisonai` 4.6.63. Files: `src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/server.py`, `jobs/router.py`, `jobs/executor.py`, `jobs/models.py`.\n\n### Vulnerable code / root cause\n\nPath:\n`src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/server.py`\n\nFunction:\n`create_app`\n\nSnippet:\n```python\njobs_api_key = os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY\")\n# ...\nif jobs_api_key:\n    app.add_middleware(JobsAPIKeyMiddleware)   # auth ONLY when env var is set\n```\nIssue: with the env var unset (default), no auth middleware is added \u2192 all endpoints unauthenticated. Default bind is `127.0.0.1`.\n\nPath:\n`src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/router.py`\n\nFunction:\n`submit_job`\n\nSnippet:\n```python\n@router.post(\"\", response_model=JobSubmitResponse, status_code=202)\nasync def submit_job(request, response, body: JobSubmitRequest, ...):\n    # no auth dependency; body.webhook_url is attacker-controlled\n    job = Job(prompt=body.prompt, webhook_url=body.webhook_url, ...)\n    await executor.submit(job)\n```\nIssue: attacker-controlled `webhook_url` flows into the job with no authentication on the endpoint.\n\nPath:\n`src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py` (validator) and `src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py` (sink)\n\nFunction:\n`validate_webhook_url` \u2192 `_send_webhook`\n\nSnippet:\n```python\n# models.py validate_webhook_url (CHECK time)\nip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)\nif ipaddress.ip_address(ip).is_private or ...:\n    raise ValueError(\"Webhook URL resolves to a private or restricted network address\")\n\n# executor.py _send_webhook (CONNECT time, re-resolves, no pinning)\nasync with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=30.0) as client:\n    response = await client.post(job.webhook_url, json=payload, ...)\n```\nIssue: the validator resolves the hostname at validation time but does not pin the IP for the `httpx.post` connection \u2192 DNS rebinding (independent resolution at check vs connect) bypasses it and reaches internal services.\n\n### Attack flow\n1. Operator runs the Jobs API without `PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY` (default \u2192 unauth).\n2. Attacker `POST /api/v1/runs` with `webhook_url` = a rebinding domain.\n3. The validator(s) see a public IP (pass); on completion `httpx.post` re-resolves to an internal IP and connects \u2192 SSRF to internal.\n\n### Why existing protection is bypassed\nAuth is opt-in (only when the env var is set). The `webhook_url` validator resolves at check time but does not pin the IP for the connection \u2192 DNS-rebinding TOCTOU. (Correction to an earlier static note: the guard exists but is bypassable.)\n\n### Security boundary\nUnauthenticated network peer \u2192 server-side request to internal services (Scope: Changed). Default bind `127.0.0.1` limits remote reach unless the operator binds non-loopback.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Environment\nReal Jobs API (`python -m praisonai.jobs.server`, no API key) in a local runtime (`127.0.0.1:18085`), resolver pointed at the controlled rebinding DNS, internal canary Docker-internal only. Runnable assets: `PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\\runtime-files\\` (`docker-compose.jobs.yml`).\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n1. `PRAI-04-01-Jobs-Submit-NoAuth`: `POST /api/v1/runs {\"prompt\":\"hello\"}` \u2192 `202` (no auth).\n2. `PRAI-04-02-Jobs-Webhook-SSRF-Blind`: `POST /api/v1/runs {\"prompt\":\"hello\",\"webhook_url\":\"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret\"}` \u2192 `202`.\n\n### Expected result\nUnauthenticated job submission should be rejected; the webhook SSRF guard should prevent reaching internal services regardless of DNS timing.\n\n## Impact\nUnauthenticated job submission (LLM cost abuse); SSRF to internal services (blind, DNS-rebinding); exfiltration of the job result to an attacker-controlled webhook.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n- Authenticate the Jobs API by default (auto-generate a token / fail closed when binding non-loopback), like the gateway.\n- For `webhook_url`: resolve once, reject private/loopback/CGNAT/metadata, then pin and connect to the validated IP; disable redirects.",
  "id": "GHSA-4w49-gwv8-fpjg",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T21:57:57Z",
  "published": "2026-10-08T21:57:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-4w49-gwv8-fpjg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60091"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62175"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-unauthenticated-ssrf-via-webhook-url"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: Jobs API is unauthenticated by default and allows attacker-controlled webhook SSRF"
}

GHSA-4W8P-X6G8-FV64

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-01 00:48 – Updated: 2024-11-19 19:23
VLAI
Summary
Server-Side Request Forgery in calibreweb
Details

calibreweb prior to version 0.6.16 contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "calibreweb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.6.16"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-0339"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-01-31T22:07:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-01-30T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "calibreweb prior to version 0.6.16 contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-4w8p-x6g8-fv64",
  "modified": "2024-11-19T19:23:22Z",
  "published": "2022-02-01T00:48:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0339"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/janeczku/calibre-web/commit/35f6f4c727c887f8f3607fe3233dbc1980d15020"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/janeczku/calibre-web/commit/3b216bfa07ec7992eff03e55d61732af6df9bb92"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/janeczku/calibre-web"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/janeczku/calibre-web/releases/tag/0.6.16"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/calibreweb/PYSEC-2022-23.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/499688c4-6ac4-4047-a868-7922c3eab369"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Server-Side Request Forgery in calibreweb"
}

GHSA-4W9W-3V73-2RH7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-04 19:01 – Updated: 2022-11-08 19:00
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco BroadWorks CommPilot application could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to perform a server-side request forgery (SSRF) attack on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request to the web interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to obtain confidential information from the BroadWorks server and other device on the network. {{value}} ["%7b%7bvalue%7d%7d"])}]]

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-20958"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-36",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-11-04T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco BroadWorks CommPilot application could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to perform a server-side request forgery (SSRF) attack on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request to the web interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to obtain confidential information from the BroadWorks server and other device on the network. {{value}} [\"%7b%7bvalue%7d%7d\"])}]]",
  "id": "GHSA-4w9w-3v73-2rh7",
  "modified": "2022-11-08T19:00:23Z",
  "published": "2022-11-04T19:01:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20958"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-broadworks-ssrf-BJeQfpp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-broadworks-ssrf-BJeQfpp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4WPP-W5R4-7V5V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 20:55 – Updated: 2022-05-24 20:55
VLAI
Summary
Server-Side Request Forgery in charm
Details

We've discovered a vulnerability in which attackers could forge HTTP requests to manipulate the charm data directory to access or delete anything on the server. This has been patched in https://github.com/charmbracelet/charm/commit/3c90668f955c7ce5ef721e4fc9faee7053232fd3 and is available in release v0.12.1. We recommend that all users running self-hosted charm instances update immediately.

This vulnerability was found in-house and we haven't been notified of any potential exploiters.

Additional notes

  • Encrypted user data uploaded to the Charm server is safe as Charm servers cannot decrypt user data. This includes filenames, paths, and all key-value data.
  • Users running the official Charm Docker images are at minimal risk because the exploit is limited to the containerized filesystem.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open a discussion * Email us at vt100@charm.sh * Chat with us on Slack

the Charm logo

Charm热爱开源 • Charm loves open source

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/charmbracelet/charm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.9.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.12.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-29180"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-05-24T20:55:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-05-07T04:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "We\u0027ve discovered a vulnerability in which attackers could forge HTTP requests to manipulate the `charm` data directory to access or delete anything on the server. This has been patched in https://github.com/charmbracelet/charm/commit/3c90668f955c7ce5ef721e4fc9faee7053232fd3 and is available in release [v0.12.1](https://github.com/charmbracelet/charm/releases/tag/v0.12.1). We recommend that all users running self-hosted `charm` instances update immediately.\n\nThis vulnerability was found in-house and we haven\u0027t been notified of any potential exploiters.\n\n### Additional notes\n\n* Encrypted user data uploaded to the Charm server is safe as Charm servers cannot decrypt user data. This includes filenames, paths, and all key-value data.\n* Users running the official Charm [Docker images](https://github.com/charmbracelet/charm/blob/main/docker.md) are at minimal risk because the exploit is limited to the containerized filesystem.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open a [discussion](https://github.com/charmbracelet/charm/discussions)\n* Email us at [vt100@charm.sh](mailto:vt100@charm.sh)\n* Chat with us on [Slack](https://charm.sh/slack)\n\n* * *\n\n\u003ca href=\"https://charm.sh/\"\u003e\u003cimg alt=\"the Charm logo\" src=\"https://stuff.charm.sh/charm-badge.jpg\" width=\"400\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\n\nCharm\u70ed\u7231\u5f00\u6e90 \u2022 Charm loves open source",
  "id": "GHSA-4wpp-w5r4-7v5v",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T20:55:22Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T20:55:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/charmbracelet/charm/security/advisories/GHSA-4wpp-w5r4-7v5v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29180"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/charmbracelet/charm/commit/3c90668f955c7ce5ef721e4fc9faee7053232fd3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/charmbracelet/charm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Server-Side Request Forgery in charm"
}

GHSA-4WQV-6439-QQQ3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:33 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:33
VLAI
Details

SAP Commerce Cloud (Accelerator Payment Mock), versions - 1808, 1811, 1905, 2005, allows an unauthenticated attacker to submit a crafted request over a network to a particular SAP Commerce module URL which will be processed without further interaction, the crafted request leads to Server Side Request Forgery attack which could lead to retrieval of limited pieces of information about the service with no impact on integrity or availability.

Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-26811"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-11-10T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "SAP Commerce Cloud (Accelerator Payment Mock), versions - 1808, 1811, 1905, 2005, allows an unauthenticated attacker to submit a crafted request over a network to a particular SAP Commerce module URL which will be processed without further interaction, the crafted request leads to Server Side Request Forgery attack which could lead to retrieval of limited pieces of information about the service with no impact on integrity or availability.",
  "id": "GHSA-4wqv-6439-qqq3",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:33:59Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:33:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26811"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/2975170"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wiki.scn.sap.com/wiki/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=562725571"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/163143/SAP-Hybris-eCommerce-Server-Side-Request-Forgery.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2021/Jun/26"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-4X48-CGF9-Q33F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 23:22 – Updated: 2026-04-14 23:22
VLAI
Summary
Novu has SSRF via conditions filter webhook bypasses validateUrlSsrf() protection
Details

Summary

The conditions filter webhook at libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts line 261 sends POST requests to user-configured URLs using raw axios.post() with no SSRF validation. The HTTP Request workflow step in the same codebase correctly uses validateUrlSsrf() which blocks private IP ranges. The conditions webhook was not included in this protection.

Root Cause

conditions-filter.usecase.ts line 261:

return await axios.post(child.webhookUrl, payload, config).then((response) => {
  return response.data as Record<string, unknown>;
});

No call to validateUrlSsrf(). The webhookUrl comes from the workflow condition configuration with zero validation.

Protected Code (for contrast)

execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts line 130:

const ssrfValidationError = await validateUrlSsrf(url);
if (ssrfValidationError) {
  // blocked
}

This function resolves DNS and checks against private ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16). It exists in the codebase but is not applied to the conditions webhook path.

Proof of Concept

  1. Create a workflow with a condition step
  2. Configure the condition's webhook URL to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
  3. Trigger the workflow by sending a notification event
  4. The worker evaluates the condition and calls axios.post() to the metadata endpoint
  5. The response data is stored in execution details and accessible via the execution details API

Impact

Full-read SSRF. The response body is returned as Record<string, unknown> for condition evaluation and stored in the execution details raw field. The GET /execution-details API returns this data.

The POST method limits some metadata endpoints (GCP requires GET, Azure requires GET), but AWS IMDSv1 accepts POST and returns credentials. Internal services accepting POST are also reachable.

Suggested Fix

Extract validateUrlSsrf() to a shared utility and call it before the axios.post in conditions-filter.usecase.ts:

const ssrfError = await validateUrlSsrf(child.webhookUrl);
if (ssrfError) {
  throw new Error('Webhook URL blocked by SSRF protection');
}
return await axios.post(child.webhookUrl, payload, config)...
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@novu/api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T23:22:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe conditions filter webhook at `libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts` line 261 sends POST requests to user-configured URLs using raw `axios.post()` with no SSRF validation. The HTTP Request workflow step in the same codebase correctly uses `validateUrlSsrf()` which blocks private IP ranges. The conditions webhook was not included in this protection.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`conditions-filter.usecase.ts` line 261:\n```typescript\nreturn await axios.post(child.webhookUrl, payload, config).then((response) =\u003e {\n  return response.data as Record\u003cstring, unknown\u003e;\n});\n```\n\nNo call to `validateUrlSsrf()`. The `webhookUrl` comes from the workflow condition configuration with zero validation.\n\n## Protected Code (for contrast)\n\n`execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts` line 130:\n```typescript\nconst ssrfValidationError = await validateUrlSsrf(url);\nif (ssrfValidationError) {\n  // blocked\n}\n```\n\nThis function resolves DNS and checks against private ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16). It exists in the codebase but is not applied to the conditions webhook path.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n1. Create a workflow with a condition step\n2. Configure the condition\u0027s webhook URL to `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/`\n3. Trigger the workflow by sending a notification event\n4. The worker evaluates the condition and calls `axios.post()` to the metadata endpoint\n5. The response data is stored in execution details and accessible via the execution details API\n\n## Impact\n\nFull-read SSRF. The response body is returned as `Record\u003cstring, unknown\u003e` for condition evaluation and stored in the execution details `raw` field. The `GET /execution-details` API returns this data.\n\nThe POST method limits some metadata endpoints (GCP requires GET, Azure requires GET), but AWS IMDSv1 accepts POST and returns credentials. Internal services accepting POST are also reachable.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nExtract `validateUrlSsrf()` to a shared utility and call it before the axios.post in conditions-filter.usecase.ts:\n\n```typescript\nconst ssrfError = await validateUrlSsrf(child.webhookUrl);\nif (ssrfError) {\n  throw new Error(\u0027Webhook URL blocked by SSRF protection\u0027);\n}\nreturn await axios.post(child.webhookUrl, payload, config)...\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f",
  "modified": "2026-04-14T23:22:48Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T23:22:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/novuhq/novu/security/advisories/GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/novuhq/novu/commit/87d965eb88340ac7cd262dd52c8015acd092dc68"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/novuhq/novu"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Novu has SSRF via conditions filter webhook bypasses validateUrlSsrf() protection"
}

GHSA-4X7W-PWQ5-598Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-01 21:31
VLAI
Details

n8n before 1.123.69, 2.33.4, and 2.34.1 contains an SSRF protection bypass in the OAuth2 credential authorization-code-to-access-token exchange. While OAuth2 discovery and dynamic-client-registration requests use n8n's SSRF-protected HTTP client, the token exchange uses a separate client with no SSRF guard. A user with credential-creation permissions can set the access-token URL to an internal address and complete the OAuth2 flow, causing n8n to send a fixed-shape token-exchange POST to that target and reflect its response body back to the attacker (limited to what the target returns to this specific request).

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
2.3 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-77069"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-20T12:16:38Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "n8n before 1.123.69, 2.33.4, and 2.34.1 contains an SSRF protection bypass in the OAuth2 credential authorization-code-to-access-token exchange. While OAuth2 discovery and dynamic-client-registration requests use n8n\u0027s SSRF-protected HTTP client, the token exchange uses a separate client with no SSRF guard. A user with credential-creation permissions can set the access-token URL to an internal address and complete the OAuth2 flow, causing n8n to send a fixed-shape token-exchange POST to that target and reflect its response body back to the attacker (limited to what the target returns to this specific request).",
  "id": "GHSA-4x7w-pwq5-598q",
  "modified": "2026-09-01T21:31:19Z",
  "published": "2026-08-20T12:31:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-c4f6-59xq-95ww"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77069"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/n8n-before-ssrf-protection-bypass-via-oauth2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4X9J-CJQ3-HXHF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-22 12:30 – Updated: 2024-07-22 12:30
VLAI
Details

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Noor alam Magical Addons For Elementor.This issue affects Magical Addons For Elementor: from n/a through 1.1.41.

Severity
4.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
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To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-38730"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-22T11:15:04Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Noor alam Magical Addons For Elementor.This issue affects Magical Addons For Elementor: from n/a through 1.1.41.",
  "id": "GHSA-4x9j-cjq3-hxhf",
  "modified": "2024-07-22T12:30:38Z",
  "published": "2024-07-22T12:30:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38730"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/magical-addons-for-elementor/wordpress-magical-addons-for-elementor-plugin-1-1-40-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4XHM-Q9H6-MQ38

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-13 03:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:33
VLAI
Details

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Dimitar Ivanov HTTP Headers.This issue affects HTTP Headers: from n/a through 1.18.11.

Severity
4.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-37978"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-13T03:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Dimitar Ivanov HTTP Headers.This issue affects HTTP Headers: from n/a through 1.18.11.",
  "id": "GHSA-4xhm-q9h6-mq38",
  "modified": "2026-04-28T21:33:07Z",
  "published": "2023-11-13T03:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37978"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/http-headers/wordpress-http-headers-plugin-1-18-11-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4XP8-858J-G46W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-03 21:31
VLAI
Details

A security vulnerability has been detected in jina-ai reader up to 1574bfd380d249c86c82db4dace0d9c8fe17e2b1. This issue affects the function isValidTLD of the file /backend/functions/src/cloud-functions/crawler.ts of the component Crawler/Puppeteer. The manipulation leads to server-side request forgery. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. This product follows a rolling release approach for continuous delivery, so version details for affected or updated releases are not provided. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Severity
7.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-18647"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-03T21:16:37Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A security vulnerability has been detected in jina-ai reader up to 1574bfd380d249c86c82db4dace0d9c8fe17e2b1. This issue affects the function isValidTLD of the file /backend/functions/src/cloud-functions/crawler.ts of the component Crawler/Puppeteer. The manipulation leads to server-side request forgery. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. This product follows a rolling release approach for continuous delivery, so version details for affected or updated releases are not provided. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-4xp8-858j-g46w",
  "modified": "2026-08-03T21:31:37Z",
  "published": "2026-08-03T21:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18647"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/orionyan520/cve_report/issues/8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-18647"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/855011"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/385566"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/385566/cti"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery

An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.

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