CWE-89
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.
29430 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-Q2PJ-6V73-8RGJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-29 18:30 – Updated: 2025-10-31 17:38Summary
SQL Injection vulnerability in TypeORM before 0.3.26 via crafted request to repository.save or repository.update due to the sqlstring call using stringifyObjects default to false.
Details
Vulnerable Code:
const { username, city, name} = req.body;
const updateData = {
username,
city,
name,
id:userId
}; // Developer aims to only allow above three fields to be updated
const result = await userRepo.save(updateData);
Intended Payload (non-malicious):
username=myusername&city=Riga&name=Javad
OR
{username:\"myusername\",phone:12345,name:\"Javad\"}
SQL query produced:
UPDATE `user`
SET `username` = 'myusername',
`city` = 'Riga',
`name` = 'Javad'
WHERE `id` IN (1);
Malicious Payload:
username=myusername&city[name]=Riga&city[role]=admin
OR
{username:\"myusername\",city:{name:\"Javad\",role:\"admin\"}}
SQL query produced with Injected Column:
UPDATE `user`
SET `username` = 'myusername',
`city` = `name` = 'Javad',
`role` = 'admin'
WHERE `id` IN (1);
Above query is valid as city = name = Javad is a boolean expression resulting in city = 1 (false). “role” column is injected and updated.
Underlying issue was due to TypeORM using mysql2 without specifying a value for the stringifyObjects option. In both mysql and mysql2 this option defaults to false. This option is then passed into SQLString library as false. This results in sqlstring parsing objects in a strange way using objectToValues.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "typeorm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.26"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-60542"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-31T17:38:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-29T16:15:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nSQL Injection vulnerability in TypeORM before 0.3.26 via crafted request to repository.save or repository.update due to the sqlstring call using stringifyObjects default to false.\n\n### Details\n\nVulnerable Code:\n\n```js\nconst { username, city, name} = req.body;\nconst updateData = {\n username,\n city,\n name,\n id:userId\n }; // Developer aims to only allow above three fields to be updated \nconst result = await userRepo.save(updateData);\n```\n\nIntended Payload (non-malicious):\n\n\n`\nusername=myusername\u0026city=Riga\u0026name=Javad\n`\n\n_OR_\n\n`{username:\\\"myusername\\\",phone:12345,name:\\\"Javad\\\"}\n`\n\nSQL query produced:\n\n```sql\nUPDATE `user` \nSET `username` = \u0027myusername\u0027, \n `city` = \u0027Riga\u0027, \n `name` = \u0027Javad\u0027 \nWHERE `id` IN (1);\n\n```\n\nMalicious Payload:\n\n`username=myusername\u0026city[name]=Riga\u0026city[role]=admin\n`\n\n_OR_\n\n`{username:\\\"myusername\\\",city:{name:\\\"Javad\\\",role:\\\"admin\\\"}}\n`\n\nSQL query produced with Injected Column:\n\n```sql\nUPDATE `user` \nSET `username` = \u0027myusername\u0027, \n `city` = `name` = \u0027Javad\u0027, \n `role` = \u0027admin\u0027 \nWHERE `id` IN (1);\n\n```\n_Above query is valid as `city` = `name` = `Javad` is a boolean expression resulting in `city` = 1 (false). \u201crole\u201d column is injected and updated._\n\nUnderlying issue was due to TypeORM using mysql2 [without specifying a value for the stringifyObjects option](https://github.com/typeorm/typeorm/blob/0.3.25/src/driver/mysql/MysqlConnectionOptions.ts). In both mysql and mysql2 this [option defaults to false](https://github.com/sidorares/node-mysql2/blob/e359f454a76ba5dc31b91adf7bdb4099ca317bb5/lib/connection_config.js#L124). This option is then passed into [SQLString library as false](https://github.com/sidorares/node-mysql2/blob/e359f454a76ba5dc31b91adf7bdb4099ca317bb5/lib/base/connection.js#L524). This results in sqlstring [parsing objects in a strange way using objectToValues.](https://github.com/mysqljs/sqlstring/blob/cd528556b4b6bcf300c3db515026935dedf7cfa1/lib/SqlString.js#L54)",
"id": "GHSA-q2pj-6v73-8rgj",
"modified": "2025-10-31T17:38:00Z",
"published": "2025-10-29T18:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-60542"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/typeorm/typeorm/pull/11574"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/typeorm/typeorm/commit/d57fe3bd8578b0b8f9847647fd046bccf825a7ef"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mysqljs/sqlstring/blob/cd528556b4b6bcf300c3db515026935dedf7cfa1/lib/SqlString.js#L54"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sidorares/node-mysql2/blob/e359f454a76ba5dc31b91adf7bdb4099ca317bb5/lib/base/connection.js#L524"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sidorares/node-mysql2/blob/e359f454a76ba5dc31b91adf7bdb4099ca317bb5/lib/connection_config.js#L124"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/typeorm/typeorm/blob/0.3.25/src/driver/mysql/MysqlConnectionOptions.ts"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/typeorm/typeorm/releases/tag/0.3.26"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/typeorm/typeorm/releases?q=security\u0026expanded=true"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://medium.com/@alizada.cavad/cve-2025-60542-typeorm-mysql-sqli-0-3-25-a1b32bc60453"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "http://github.com/typeorm/typeorm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:L/SI:H/SA:L/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "TypeORM vulnerable to SQL injection via crafted request to repository.save or repository.update"
}
GHSA-Q2PX-HMJ5-5V2M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:12 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:12An issue was discovered in PvPGN Stats 2.4.6. SQL Injection exists in ladder/stats.php via the GET user parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-18291"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-06-12T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in PvPGN Stats 2.4.6. SQL Injection exists in ladder/stats.php via the GET user parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-q2px-hmj5-5v2m",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:12:14Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:12:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-18291"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rchase.com/blog/posts/pvpgn-stats-multiple-sql-injection-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q2QC-FW8V-W87W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-22 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:48Projectworldsl Assets-management-system-in-php 1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the "id" parameter in delete.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-43144"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-22T15:15:12Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Projectworldsl Assets-management-system-in-php 1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the \"id\" parameter in delete.php.",
"id": "GHSA-q2qc-fw8v-w87w",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:48:24Z",
"published": "2023-09-22T15:30:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43144"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/projectworldsofficial/Assets-management-system-in-php/issues/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q2QW-QJGF-3HWM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-12 00:30 – Updated: 2023-09-12 00:30SQL Injection in GitHub repository mintplex-labs/anything-llm prior to 0.0.1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-4899"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-12T00:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": " SQL Injection in GitHub repository mintplex-labs/anything-llm prior to 0.0.1.",
"id": "GHSA-q2qw-qjgf-3hwm",
"modified": "2023-09-12T00:30:26Z",
"published": "2023-09-12T00:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4899"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/dc3dfbf31495fe316b21ee184b9317b38101d30e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/70a2fb18-f030-4abb-9ddc-13f94107ac9d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q2R7-2HCJ-H5F3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:09 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:09The get_ays_popupboxes() and get_popup_categories() functions of the Popup box WordPress plugin before 2.3.4 did not use whitelist or validate the orderby parameter before using it in SQL statements passed to the get_results() DB calls, leading to SQL injection issues in the admin dashboard
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-24458"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-02T11:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The get_ays_popupboxes() and get_popup_categories() functions of the Popup box WordPress plugin before 2.3.4 did not use whitelist or validate the orderby parameter before using it in SQL statements passed to the get_results() DB calls, leading to SQL injection issues in the admin dashboard",
"id": "GHSA-q2r7-2hcj-h5f3",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:09:39Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:09:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-24458"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/8a588266-54cd-4779-adcf-f9b9e226c297"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-Q2R8-99FJ-X7QV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-14 18:30 – Updated: 2024-05-14 18:30Vulnerability in School ERP Pro+Responsive 1.0 that allows SQL injection through the '/SchoolERP/office_admin/' index in the parameters groups_id, examname, classes_id, es_voucherid, es_class, etc. This vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to send a specially crafted SQL query to the server and retrieve all the information stored in the database.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-4824"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-14T15:45:15Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in School ERP Pro+Responsive 1.0 that allows SQL injection through the \u0027/SchoolERP/office_admin/\u0027 index in the parameters groups_id, examname, classes_id, es_voucherid, es_class, etc. This vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to send a specially crafted SQL query to the server and retrieve all the information stored in the database.",
"id": "GHSA-q2r8-99fj-x7qv",
"modified": "2024-05-14T18:30:57Z",
"published": "2024-05-14T18:30:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4824"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/multiple-vulnerabilities-school-erp-proresponsive-arox-solution"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q2R8-GXCQ-M473
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 06:17 – Updated: 2022-05-02 06:17SQL injection vulnerability in profil.php in Bigforum 4.5, when magic_quotes_gpc is disabled, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the id parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-0948"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-03-10T20:14:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "SQL injection vulnerability in profil.php in Bigforum 4.5, when magic_quotes_gpc is disabled, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the id parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-q2r8-gxcq-m473",
"modified": "2022-05-02T06:17:19Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T06:17:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-0948"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/56723"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/62778"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.org/1003-exploits/bigforum-sql.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/38872"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/11646"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/38597"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-Q2RH-XRFV-8X3M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-20 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-20 09:30EasyFlow .NET developed by Digiwin has a SQL Injection vulnerability, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to inject arbitrary SQL commands to read, modify, and delete database contents.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-5963"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-20T08:16:10Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "EasyFlow .NET developed by Digiwin has a SQL Injection vulnerability, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to inject arbitrary SQL commands to read, modify, and delete database contents.",
"id": "GHSA-q2rh-xrfv-8x3m",
"modified": "2026-04-20T09:30:45Z",
"published": "2026-04-20T09:30:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5963"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/en/cp-139-10832-05f3a-2.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-10831-a734d-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q2VG-7QGX-X5FC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 22:27 – Updated: 2026-09-03 22:27CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72811.
Summary
The backlink/mention search query (kernel/model/backlink.go) concatenates stored block metadata (title, name, alias, anchor text) and the client-supplied keyword into a SQL MATCH/search statement, escaping only the double-quote character (") and not the single quote ('). A single quote in either the client keyword or in stored document metadata breaks out of the string literal. The query runs on the main read-write siyuan.db handle through a statement-stacking-capable driver.
This yields two vectors:
- First-order: a client-supplied keyword containing ' injects directly. This path is reachable by an anonymous reader on the publish surface.
- Second-order: a document whose title/name/alias contains ' is stored safely (indexing uses parameterized inserts) but detonates when that stored value is later concatenated into the backlink query including on another user's kernel that has ingested the malicious document.
Details
Storage is safe; reuse is not. Indexing INSERTs (kernel/sql/upsert.go) are parameterized ((?,?,…) with bound arguments for Name/Content/Markdown/IAL), so malicious .sy content is stored intact and safely. The injection is in the reuse path: the backlink/mention MATCH query (kernel/model/backlink.go, around line 980) builds its condition by concatenating the stored title/name/alias/anchor and the client keyword, applying only "→escaping and not '. A ' in either source terminates the literal and lands in SQL context.
Sink / handle. The concatenated statement reaches SelectBlocksRawStmtNoParse → query() on the global read-write siyuan.db handle (DSN has no mode=ro/_query_only), driven by the vendored 88250/go-sqlite3 fork whose connection query loops over ;-separated statements (stacking possible). Ceiling is arbitrary SQL cross-notebook read and write.
Route / auth tier. The backlink/mention family (getBacklink, getBacklink2, getBacklinkDoc, getBackmentionDoc) is CheckAuth-only, so the first-order client-keyword vector is reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false.
Scope of the injection surface (confirmed the only second-order sink). A sweep of the query paths that reuse stored content confirmed this is the sole injectable reuse sink: indexing INSERTs are parameterized, tag search uses content LIKE ? with pattern escaping, virtual refs use in-memory matching (no SQL), IN(...) joins use node-IDs/hex-hashes/ROWIDs (no quote surface), and the graph name/content filter escapes '. Only the backlink/mention MATCH path concatenates with ' unescaped.
Proof of Concept
Reproduced on a local instance (SiYuan running locally, publish mode enabled on port 6808, publish Basic Auth disabled). Strictly non-destructive verification, a syntax-error probe and a stored-value observation; no UNION exfiltration, no write, no DDL.
First-order (client keyword), anonymous reader on port 6808:
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/ref/getBacklink2
{"id":"<block id>","k":"a'b","mk":""}
The keyword a'b reaches the concatenated MATCH condition and produces a SQL parse error, confirming the single quote breaks out of the literal and the client keyword lands in SQL context.
Second-order (stored title), setup via admin then observed anonymously:
A document whose title contains a single quote e.g. ("locked-doc") style metadata is stored safely by the parameterized indexer, then appears at the exact unescaped position in the backlink query when that document participates in a backlink/mention lookup, breaking the query the same way. This demonstrates that stored document metadata detonates on reuse, independent of the client keyword.
Verification was limited to the syntax-error probe and the stored-value position observation; no exfiltration or write statement was executed. Full reproduction detail available privately on request.
Impact
First-order: an anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader injects arbitrary SQL into the backlink/mention query via the keyword parameter, on the read-write main handle: cross-notebook read disclosure and, via statement stacking, write and ATTACH. This is the same anonymous-arbitrary-SQL severity as the search/embed injection findings, on a different sink.
Second-order: a document whose title/name/alias contains injection content is stored safely but executes when that stored value is concatenated into the backlink query. This fires on any kernel that has ingested the malicious document for example via a shared or imported .sy file, sync, or an opened .sy.zip. The precondition here is content delivery into the victim workspace (not a direct anonymous request), so it is a distinct, delivery-dependent threat model from the first-order vector.
Encrypted notebooks are out of scope; code execution is not reachable in the default build (no load_extension).
Distinctness from the other SQL findings: this is a different sink (backlink.go MATCH query) from the searchDocs (LIKE keyword), searchEmbedBlock (verbatim stmt), and getEmbedBlock (IN-clause ID array) findings, and it is the only one with a second-order (stored-content) vector. A fix to any of those does not remediate this path.
Suggested fix
Parameterize the backlink/mention query bind the keyword and any stored metadata as placeholders rather than concatenating or escape ' (and use LIKE-pattern escaping) consistently, matching the tag-search and graph-filter paths that already do so. The second-order vector specifically requires that stored metadata be bound rather than concatenated, since escaping at storage time is not the defense (storage is already safe); the fix must be at the query-construction site.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260723004839-1a5b3431d5ab"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72811"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-03T22:27:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72811](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72811).\n\n### Summary\n\nThe backlink/mention search query (`kernel/model/backlink.go`) concatenates stored block metadata (title, name, alias, anchor text) and the client-supplied keyword into a SQL `MATCH`/search statement, escaping only the double-quote character (`\"`) and not the single quote (`\u0027`). A single quote in either the client keyword or in stored document metadata breaks out of the string literal. The query runs on the main read-write `siyuan.db` handle through a statement-stacking-capable driver.\n\nThis yields two vectors:\n- **First-order:** a client-supplied keyword containing `\u0027` injects directly. This path is reachable by an anonymous reader on the publish surface.\n- **Second-order:** a document whose title/name/alias contains `\u0027` is stored safely (indexing uses parameterized inserts) but detonates when that stored value is later concatenated into the backlink query including on another user\u0027s kernel that has ingested the malicious document.\n\n### Details\n\n**Storage is safe; reuse is not.** Indexing INSERTs (`kernel/sql/upsert.go`) are parameterized (`(?,?,\u2026)` with bound arguments for `Name`/`Content`/`Markdown`/`IAL`), so malicious `.sy` content is stored intact and safely. The injection is in the *reuse* path: the backlink/mention MATCH query (`kernel/model/backlink.go`, around line 980) builds its condition by concatenating the stored title/name/alias/anchor and the client keyword, applying only `\"`\u2192escaping and not `\u0027`. A `\u0027` in either source terminates the literal and lands in SQL context.\n\n**Sink / handle.** The concatenated statement reaches `SelectBlocksRawStmtNoParse` \u2192 `query()` on the global read-write `siyuan.db` handle (DSN has no `mode=ro`/`_query_only`), driven by the vendored `88250/go-sqlite3` fork whose connection `query` loops over `;`-separated statements (stacking possible). Ceiling is arbitrary SQL cross-notebook read and write.\n\n**Route / auth tier.** The backlink/mention family (`getBacklink`, `getBacklink2`, `getBacklinkDoc`, `getBackmentionDoc`) is `CheckAuth`-only, so the first-order client-keyword vector is reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`.\n\n**Scope of the injection surface (confirmed the only second-order sink).** A sweep of the query paths that reuse stored content confirmed this is the sole injectable reuse sink: indexing INSERTs are parameterized, tag search uses `content LIKE ?` with pattern escaping, virtual refs use in-memory matching (no SQL), `IN(...)` joins use node-IDs/hex-hashes/ROWIDs (no quote surface), and the graph name/content filter escapes `\u0027`. Only the backlink/mention MATCH path concatenates with `\u0027` unescaped.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nReproduced on a local instance (SiYuan running locally, publish mode enabled on port 6808, publish Basic Auth disabled). Strictly non-destructive verification, a syntax-error probe and a stored-value observation; no UNION exfiltration, no write, no DDL.\n\n**First-order (client keyword), anonymous reader on port 6808:**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/ref/getBacklink2\n{\"id\":\"\u003cblock id\u003e\",\"k\":\"a\u0027b\",\"mk\":\"\"}\n```\nThe keyword `a\u0027b` reaches the concatenated `MATCH` condition and produces a SQL parse error, confirming the single quote breaks out of the literal and the client keyword lands in SQL context.\n\n**Second-order (stored title), setup via admin then observed anonymously:**\nA document whose title contains a single quote e.g. `(\"locked-doc\")` style metadata is stored safely by the parameterized indexer, then appears at the exact unescaped position in the backlink query when that document participates in a backlink/mention lookup, breaking the query the same way. This demonstrates that stored document metadata detonates on reuse, independent of the client keyword.\n\nVerification was limited to the syntax-error probe and the stored-value position observation; no exfiltration or write statement was executed. Full reproduction detail available privately on request.\n\n### Impact\n\n**First-order:** an anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader` injects arbitrary SQL into the backlink/mention query via the keyword parameter, on the read-write main handle: cross-notebook read disclosure and, via statement stacking, write and `ATTACH`. This is the same anonymous-arbitrary-SQL severity as the search/embed injection findings, on a different sink.\n\n**Second-order:** a document whose title/name/alias contains injection content is stored safely but executes when that stored value is concatenated into the backlink query. This fires on any kernel that has ingested the malicious document for example via a shared or imported `.sy` file, sync, or an opened `.sy.zip`. The precondition here is content delivery into the victim workspace (not a direct anonymous request), so it is a distinct, delivery-dependent threat model from the first-order vector.\n\nEncrypted notebooks are out of scope; code execution is not reachable in the default build (no `load_extension`).\n\n**Distinctness from the other SQL findings:** this is a different sink (`backlink.go` MATCH query) from the `searchDocs` (`LIKE` keyword), `searchEmbedBlock` (verbatim stmt), and `getEmbedBlock` (`IN`-clause ID array) findings, and it is the only one with a second-order (stored-content) vector. A fix to any of those does not remediate this path.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nParameterize the backlink/mention query bind the keyword and any stored metadata as placeholders rather than concatenating or escape `\u0027` (and use `LIKE`-pattern escaping) consistently, matching the tag-search and graph-filter paths that already do so. The second-order vector specifically requires that stored metadata be bound rather than concatenated, since escaping at storage time is not the defense (storage is already safe); the fix must be at the query-construction site.",
"id": "GHSA-q2vg-7qgx-x5fc",
"modified": "2026-09-03T22:27:50Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T22:27:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-q2vg-7qgx-x5fc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72811"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/1a5b3431d5ab3036b19c1cc79486fedd6906fb57"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-sql-injection-via-backlink-search"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan: SQL injection in backlink/mention search via unescaped stored and client input (publish mode): first-order (client keyword) and second-order (stored document title) breakout on read-write handle"
}
GHSA-Q2W4-425R-5CXW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-06 21:31 – Updated: 2023-11-14 18:30The History Log by click5 WordPress plugin before 1.0.13 does not properly sanitise and escape a parameter before using it in a SQL statement, leading to a SQL injection exploitable by admin users when using the Smash Balloon Social Photo Feed plugin alongside it.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-5082"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-06T21:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The History Log by click5 WordPress plugin before 1.0.13 does not properly sanitise and escape a parameter before using it in a SQL statement, leading to a SQL injection exploitable by admin users when using the Smash Balloon Social Photo Feed plugin alongside it.",
"id": "GHSA-q2w4-425r-5cxw",
"modified": "2023-11-14T18:30:23Z",
"published": "2023-11-06T21:31:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5082"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/13a196ba-49c7-4575-9a49-3ef9eb2348f3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
- Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
- While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
- Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the "'" apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded.
- When feasible, it may be safest to disallow meta-characters entirely, instead of escaping them. This will provide some defense in depth. After the data is entered into the database, later processes may neglect to escape meta-characters before use, and you may not have control over those processes.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-109: Object Relational Mapping Injection
An attacker leverages a weakness present in the database access layer code generated with an Object Relational Mapping (ORM) tool or a weakness in the way that a developer used a persistence framework to inject their own SQL commands to be executed against the underlying database. The attack here is similar to plain SQL injection, except that the application does not use JDBC to directly talk to the database, but instead it uses a data access layer generated by an ORM tool or framework (e.g. Hibernate). While most of the time code generated by an ORM tool contains safe access methods that are immune to SQL injection, sometimes either due to some weakness in the generated code or due to the fact that the developer failed to use the generated access methods properly, SQL injection is still possible.
CAPEC-110: SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering
An attacker modifies the parameters of the SOAP message that is sent from the service consumer to the service provider to initiate a SQL injection attack. On the service provider side, the SOAP message is parsed and parameters are not properly validated before being used to access a database in a way that does not use parameter binding, thus enabling the attacker to control the structure of the executed SQL query. This pattern describes a SQL injection attack with the delivery mechanism being a SOAP message.
CAPEC-470: Expanding Control over the Operating System from the Database
An attacker is able to leverage access gained to the database to read / write data to the file system, compromise the operating system, create a tunnel for accessing the host machine, and use this access to potentially attack other machines on the same network as the database machine. Traditionally SQL injections attacks are viewed as a way to gain unauthorized read access to the data stored in the database, modify the data in the database, delete the data, etc. However, almost every data base management system (DBMS) system includes facilities that if compromised allow an attacker complete access to the file system, operating system, and full access to the host running the database. The attacker can then use this privileged access to launch subsequent attacks. These facilities include dropping into a command shell, creating user defined functions that can call system level libraries present on the host machine, stored procedures, etc.
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the application intended. SQL Injection results from failure of the application to appropriately validate input.
CAPEC-7: Blind SQL Injection
Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.