CWE-863
Allowed-with-ReviewIncorrect Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
8384 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-VFW8-MW63-C6HV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:48 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:48NVIDIA GPU Display Driver for Windows and Linux, all versions, contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer (nvlddmkm.sys or nvidia.ko) where improper access control may lead to denial of service, information disclosure, or data corruption.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-1076"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-04-21T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "NVIDIA GPU Display Driver for Windows and Linux, all versions, contains a vulnerability in the kernel mode layer (nvlddmkm.sys or nvidia.ko) where improper access control may lead to denial of service, information disclosure, or data corruption.",
"id": "GHSA-vfw8-mw63-c6hv",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:48:16Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:48:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1076"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2022/01/msg00013.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5172"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202310-02"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VFXW-3X8P-2VJR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-09 20:52 – Updated: 2026-10-09 20:52Summary
A link-share token, the credential you hand out to let someone view a shared project, can call the v2 user-search endpoints, which it was never meant to reach. The v1 versions of the same endpoints correctly reject link-share tokens; the v2 versions don't. As a result, anyone with a share link can list every member of the shared project (and its parent projects), and can test whether any username exists anywhere on the instance.
Details
Two endpoints are affected:
GET /api/v2/projects/{id}/users/search only checks project.CanRead, which a link share satisfies on its own project. With no parameter it returns the full user list, walking up the parent-project chain.
GET /api/v2/users?q=<name> is a global search. It needs a query term, but any term works as an existence oracle: a hit confirms the username exists somewhere on the instance and returns the display name.
Emails are correctly stripped from these responses, so the exposure is limited to identities (usernames and display names), but that's still an instance-wide directory that a share-link holder should never see.
The fix is to resolve the caller with GetFromAuth in both handlers, so link-share tokens are rejected the same way v1 already rejects them.
PoC
- Get a link-share token. With any account that owns a project, create a read-only link share and note the hash, then exchange it:
POST /api/v1/shares/<hash>/auth
{"password":""}
The response contains a token, a link-share JWT.
- Confirm v1 blocks it (the fixed behavior). With that token:
GET /api/v1/projects/<id>/projectusers
Authorization: Bearer <link_share_token>
→ rejected: the token isn't a user token.
- Now the vulnerable v2 endpoints, same token:
GET /api/v2/projects/<id>/users/search
Authorization: Bearer <link_share_token>
→ 200, full list of everyone with access to the project and its parents (id, username, name).
GET /api/v2/users?q=admin
Authorization: Bearer <link_share_token>
→ 200, a non-empty result confirms the username exists on the instance. Iterate q over a wordlist to enumerate accounts.
Impact
Information disclosure. A link share is a low-trust credential meant to expose one project's contents; here it also exposes the membership of that project's parents and lets the holder probe for any username across the whole instance. Since share links are often forwarded or semi-public, this hands an untrusted recipient a map of internal users and a username-validation oracle useful for phishing and credential stuffing. No account is required beyond possessing a share link. Emails are not exposed.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.5.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "code.vikunja.io/api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-91981"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:52:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA link-share token, the credential you hand out to let someone view a shared project, can call the v2 user-search endpoints, which it was never meant to reach. The v1 versions of the same endpoints correctly reject link-share tokens; the v2 versions don\u0027t. As a result, anyone with a share link can list every member of the shared project (and its parent projects), and can test whether any username exists anywhere on the instance.\n\n### Details\nTwo endpoints are affected:\n\n`GET /api/v2/projects/{id}/users/search` only checks project.CanRead, which a link share satisfies on its own project. With no parameter it returns the full user list, walking up the parent-project chain.\n`GET /api/v2/users?q=\u003cname\u003e` is a global search. It needs a query term, but any term works as an existence oracle: a hit confirms the username exists somewhere on the instance and returns the display name.\n\nEmails are correctly stripped from these responses, so the exposure is limited to identities (usernames and display names), but that\u0027s still an instance-wide directory that a share-link holder should never see.\n\nThe fix is to resolve the caller with GetFromAuth in both handlers, so link-share tokens are rejected the same way v1 already rejects them.\n\n### PoC\n1. Get a link-share token. With any account that owns a project, create a read-only link share and note the hash, then exchange it:\n```\nPOST /api/v1/shares/\u003chash\u003e/auth\n{\"password\":\"\"}\n```\nThe response contains a token, a link-share JWT.\n\n2. Confirm v1 blocks it (the fixed behavior). With that token:\n```\nGET /api/v1/projects/\u003cid\u003e/projectusers\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003clink_share_token\u003e\n```\n\u2192 rejected: the token isn\u0027t a user token.\n\n3. Now the vulnerable v2 endpoints, same token:\n```\nGET /api/v2/projects/\u003cid\u003e/users/search\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003clink_share_token\u003e\n```\n\u2192 200, full list of everyone with access to the project and its parents (id, username, name).\n```\nGET /api/v2/users?q=admin\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003clink_share_token\u003e\n```\n\u2192 200, a non-empty result confirms the username exists on the instance. Iterate q over a wordlist to enumerate accounts.\n\n### Impact\nInformation disclosure. A link share is a low-trust credential meant to expose one project\u0027s contents; here it also exposes the membership of that project\u0027s parents and lets the holder probe for any username across the whole instance. Since share links are often forwarded or semi-public, this hands an untrusted recipient a map of internal users and a username-validation oracle useful for phishing and credential stuffing. No account is required beyond possessing a share link. Emails are not exposed.",
"id": "GHSA-vfxw-3x8p-2vjr",
"modified": "2026-10-09T20:52:39Z",
"published": "2026-10-09T20:52:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-vfxw-3x8p-2vjr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91981"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/3688"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.6.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vikunja-before-2.6.0-user-enumeration-via-v2-api"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Vikunja: Link-share token can enumerate users through the v2 API"
}
GHSA-VG66-2M2C-P54V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:09 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:09The Software Development Kit of the MiContact Center Business with Site Based Security 8.0 through 9.0.1.0 before KB496276 allows an authenticated user to access sensitive information. A successful exploit could allow unauthorized access to user conversations.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-9379"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-02-25T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Software Development Kit of the MiContact Center Business with Site Based Security 8.0 through 9.0.1.0 before KB496276 allows an authenticated user to access sensitive information. A successful exploit could allow unauthorized access to user conversations.",
"id": "GHSA-vg66-2m2c-p54v",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:09:39Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:09:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-9379"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mitel.com/support/security-advisories"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mitel.com/support/security-advisories/mitel-product-security-advisory-20-0003"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-VG6X-6PG9-6QWG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-16 20:08 – Updated: 2026-07-16 20:08Impact
The fix for CVE-2026-44221 (GHSA-fxc7-fm93-6q77) added an UPDATE_SCHEMA authorization check to a single schema-mutating method (LocalDocumentType.createProperty). The remaining public schema mutators were left unchecked, so an authenticated identity (including a read-only API token) that lacks the UPDATE_SCHEMA permission could still mutate the database schema on its own database:
DROP PROPERTY <type>.<property>ALTER TYPE <name> SUPERTYPE +<other>/-<other>(change the inheritance hierarchy)ALTER TYPE <name> NAME <newName>(rename a type)- type alias and bucket changes
ALTER PROPERTY <type>.<property> ...(MANDATORY, READONLY, NOTNULL, MIN, MAX, REGEXP, DEFAULT, OF, CUSTOM) — theLocalPropertysetters had no check at all
This does not directly disclose or write record data, but it corrupts the meaning of every stored record and breaches the documented permission model, which advertises UPDATE_SCHEMA as the gating right for schema mutation.
Affected component
Engine schema layer: engine/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/schema/LocalDocumentType.java and engine/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/schema/LocalProperty.java, reachable via the SQL DROP PROPERTY, ALTER TYPE, and ALTER PROPERTY statements over the database command/query HTTP endpoints.
Patches
Every public schema-mutating method on LocalDocumentType and LocalProperty now enforces checkPermissionsOnDatabase(UPDATE_SCHEMA) via a shared helper. The check is a no-op in embedded mode and in system contexts with no bound user (schema load at startup, HA replication apply), so internal paths and administrators are unaffected.
Workarounds
Grant write access only to trusted users and API tokens; treat all schema DDL as administrator-only at the application layer until upgraded.
Resources
Incomplete-fix sibling of CVE-2026-44221 / GHSA-fxc7-fm93-6q77.
Credit
Reported by Kai Aizen (SnailSploit).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.arcadedb:arcadedb-engine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "26.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54076"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-16T20:08:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe fix for CVE-2026-44221 (GHSA-fxc7-fm93-6q77) added an `UPDATE_SCHEMA` authorization check to a single schema-mutating method (`LocalDocumentType.createProperty`). The remaining public schema mutators were left unchecked, so an authenticated identity (including a **read-only API token**) that lacks the `UPDATE_SCHEMA` permission could still mutate the database schema on its own database:\n\n- `DROP PROPERTY \u003ctype\u003e.\u003cproperty\u003e`\n- `ALTER TYPE \u003cname\u003e SUPERTYPE +\u003cother\u003e` / `-\u003cother\u003e` (change the inheritance hierarchy)\n- `ALTER TYPE \u003cname\u003e NAME \u003cnewName\u003e` (rename a type)\n- type alias and bucket changes\n- `ALTER PROPERTY \u003ctype\u003e.\u003cproperty\u003e ...` (MANDATORY, READONLY, NOTNULL, MIN, MAX, REGEXP, DEFAULT, OF, CUSTOM) \u2014 the `LocalProperty` setters had no check at all\n\nThis does not directly disclose or write record data, but it corrupts the meaning of every stored record and breaches the documented permission model, which advertises `UPDATE_SCHEMA` as the gating right for schema mutation.\n\n### Affected component\n\nEngine schema layer: `engine/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/schema/LocalDocumentType.java` and `engine/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/schema/LocalProperty.java`, reachable via the SQL `DROP PROPERTY`, `ALTER TYPE`, and `ALTER PROPERTY` statements over the database command/query HTTP endpoints.\n\n### Patches\n\nEvery public schema-mutating method on `LocalDocumentType` and `LocalProperty` now enforces `checkPermissionsOnDatabase(UPDATE_SCHEMA)` via a shared helper. The check is a no-op in embedded mode and in system contexts with no bound user (schema load at startup, HA replication apply), so internal paths and administrators are unaffected.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nGrant write access only to trusted users and API tokens; treat all schema DDL as administrator-only at the application layer until upgraded.\n\n### Resources\n\nIncomplete-fix sibling of CVE-2026-44221 / GHSA-fxc7-fm93-6q77.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by Kai Aizen (SnailSploit).",
"id": "GHSA-vg6x-6pg9-6qwg",
"modified": "2026-07-16T20:08:24Z",
"published": "2026-07-16T20:08:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/security/advisories/GHSA-vg6x-6pg9-6qwg"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/releases/tag/26.6.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "ArcadeDB: Read-only users can mutate database schema (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-44221)"
}
GHSA-VG73-HFWM-24QF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-12 00:01 – Updated: 2022-06-02 00:00Insufficient checks in System Management Unit (SMU) FeatureConfig may result in reenabling features potentially resulting in denial of resources and/or denial of service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-26376"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-11T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insufficient checks in System Management Unit (SMU) FeatureConfig may result in reenabling features potentially resulting in denial of resources and/or denial of service.",
"id": "GHSA-vg73-hfwm-24qf",
"modified": "2022-06-02T00:00:30Z",
"published": "2022-05-12T00:01:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26376"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1027"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1028"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VG7P-2967-P5P3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:41 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:41An issue was discovered on FiberHome HG6245D devices through RP2613. It is possible to bypass authentication by sending the decoded value of the GgpoZWxwCmxpc3QKd2hvCg== string to the telnet server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-27177"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-10T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered on FiberHome HG6245D devices through RP2613. It is possible to bypass authentication by sending the decoded value of the GgpoZWxwCmxpc3QKd2hvCg== string to the telnet server.",
"id": "GHSA-vg7p-2967-p5p3",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:41:52Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:41:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27177"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2021-01-12-fiberhome-ont-0day-vulnerabilities.html#telnet-cli-auth-bypass"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-VG85-GMCC-WRQW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-27 00:31 – Updated: 2024-09-27 00:31Information disclosure in Gitlab EE/CE affecting all versions from 15.6 prior to 17.2.8, 17.3 prior to 17.3.4, and 17.4 prior to 17.4.1 in specific conditions it was possible to disclose to an unauthorised user the path of a private project."
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-8974"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-684",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-26T23:15:03Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Information disclosure in Gitlab EE/CE affecting all versions from 15.6 prior to 17.2.8, 17.3 prior to 17.3.4, and 17.4 prior to 17.4.1 in specific conditions it was possible to disclose to an unauthorised user the path of a private project.\"",
"id": "GHSA-vg85-gmcc-wrqw",
"modified": "2024-09-27T00:31:05Z",
"published": "2024-09-27T00:31:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8974"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/482843"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VG8Q-6F88-6VRH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:40 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:40GitLab Community and Enterprise Editions before 10.1.6, 10.2.6, and 10.3.4 are vulnerable to an authorization bypass issue in the Projects::MergeRequests::CreationsController component resulting in an attacker to see every project name and their respective namespace on a GitLab instance.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-0920"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-03-22T15:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "GitLab Community and Enterprise Editions before 10.1.6, 10.2.6, and 10.3.4 are vulnerable to an authorization bypass issue in the Projects::MergeRequests::CreationsController component resulting in an attacker to see every project name and their respective namespace on a GitLab instance.",
"id": "GHSA-vg8q-6f88-6vrh",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:40:53Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:40:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0920"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/301336"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://about.gitlab.com/2018/01/16/gitlab-10-dot-3-dot-4-released"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2018/dsa-4206"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VG95-5P98-2464
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:45 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:01An issue has been discovered in GitLab affecting all versions starting from 13.4. Improper access control allows unauthorized users to access details on analytic pages.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-22180"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-03-26T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue has been discovered in GitLab affecting all versions starting from 13.4. Improper access control allows unauthorized users to access details on analytic pages.",
"id": "GHSA-vg95-5p98-2464",
"modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:08Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:45:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22180"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/1064645"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/cves/-/blob/master/2021/CVE-2021-22180.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/295662"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VG99-7GJ7-2FR5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-01 16:29 – Updated: 2026-10-01 16:29Summary
/api/block/getRefIDs filters its results for reader roles through a helper that checks only the visibility tiers. The password tier is not checked, because the helper does not receive the request context and therefore cannot evaluate the publish auth cookie. A reader who has not entered a document's publish password learns that the document references a given block.
A function ten lines away in the same file does perform the full check, on the same input type.
Details
Route, identical at eef105683 (kernel/api/router.go:235) and dev a7ae96ce (:245):
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/block/getRefIDs", model.CheckAuth, getRefIDs)
No CheckReadonly, no CheckAdminRole.
The filter chain. getRefIDs (kernel/api/block.go:631) checks isEncryptedNotebookDeniedForPublish, calls model.GetBlockRefsInBox, then for read-only roles:
publishIgnore := model.GetInvisiblePublishAccess(publishAccess)
refDefs, originalRefBlockIDs = model.FilterRefDefsByPublishIgnore(publishIgnore, refDefs)
FilterRefDefsByPublishIgnore (kernel/model/publish_access.go:1324) collects the reference and definition identifiers, resolves their block trees, and delegates the decision to FilterBlockTreesByPublishIgnore (:1314), whose entire body is:
for id, bt := range bts {
if CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) {
ret[id] = bt
}
}
Inside that helper, CheckPublishAuthCookie, GetPathPasswordByPublishAccess, checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess and password all appear zero times.
The complete check exists in the same file. kernel/model/publish_access.go:431:
func checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess(c *gin.Context, publishAccess PublishAccess, bt *treenode.BlockTree) bool {
if bt == nil || IsEncryptedBoxDeniedByPublishAccess(bt.BoxID) {
return false
}
publishIgnore := filterDisablePublishAccess(publishAccess)
passwordID, password := GetPathPasswordByPublishAccess(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishAccess)
return CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) &&
(password == "" || CheckPublishAuthCookie(c, passwordID, password))
}
Same package, same file, same *treenode.BlockTree input. One takes the context and evaluates the password; the other does not receive it and structurally cannot.
Route-level contrast. The adjacent getChildBlocks and getTailChildBlocks both carry model.CheckAdminRole.
Note on a prior assessment. getRefIDs has been described as correctly filtered because it calls a publish-access filter. It does. The filter it calls covers the visibility tiers only.
Proof of Concept
Kernel 3.7.2, publish mode on port 6808, Publish.Auth.Enable false, anonymous client. A public document referenced from a second document whose publish tier was changed between runs. getRefIDs was called anonymously each time.
| Tier of the referring document | Anonymous result |
|---|---|
| Public | reference returned (baseline) |
| Password-protected | reference still returned |
| Hidden | [], filtered |
| Forbidden | [], filtered |
The hidden and forbidden rows confirm the filter runs and works. The password-protected row is the defect.
Impact
An anonymous reader in publish mode, or any publish RoleReader, learns that a password-protected document contains a reference to a given block, without entering that document's password, and receives the block identifiers involved.
Scoped precisely: the response carries identifiers only. type RefDefs { RefID string; DefIDs []string }, returned alongside originalRefBlockIDs, a map of identifier to identifier. There is no reference text, title or content. The disclosure is the existence of a relationship, plus identifiers usable as input to other endpoints.
Confidentiality only.
Suggested fix
Thread *gin.Context into FilterRefDefsByPublishIgnore and FilterBlockTreesByPublishIgnore, and use checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess in place of the bare CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore call, so the password tier and the encrypted-box check are both applied.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73606"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-01T16:29:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`/api/block/getRefIDs` filters its results for reader roles through a helper that checks only the visibility tiers. The password tier is not checked, because the helper does not receive the request context and therefore cannot evaluate the publish auth cookie. A reader who has not entered a document\u0027s publish password learns that the document references a given block.\n\nA function ten lines away in the same file does perform the full check, on the same input type.\n\n### Details\n\n**Route,** identical at `eef105683` (`kernel/api/router.go:235`) and dev `a7ae96ce` (`:245`):\n\n```go\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/block/getRefIDs\", model.CheckAuth, getRefIDs)\n```\n\nNo `CheckReadonly`, no `CheckAdminRole`.\n\n**The filter chain.** `getRefIDs` (`kernel/api/block.go:631`) checks `isEncryptedNotebookDeniedForPublish`, calls `model.GetBlockRefsInBox`, then for read-only roles:\n\n```go\npublishIgnore := model.GetInvisiblePublishAccess(publishAccess)\nrefDefs, originalRefBlockIDs = model.FilterRefDefsByPublishIgnore(publishIgnore, refDefs)\n```\n\n`FilterRefDefsByPublishIgnore` (`kernel/model/publish_access.go:1324`) collects the reference and definition identifiers, resolves their block trees, and delegates the decision to `FilterBlockTreesByPublishIgnore` (`:1314`), whose entire body is:\n\n```go\nfor id, bt := range bts {\n if CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) {\n ret[id] = bt\n }\n}\n```\n\nInside that helper, `CheckPublishAuthCookie`, `GetPathPasswordByPublishAccess`, `checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess` and `password` all appear zero times.\n\n**The complete check exists in the same file.** `kernel/model/publish_access.go:431`:\n\n```go\nfunc checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess(c *gin.Context, publishAccess PublishAccess, bt *treenode.BlockTree) bool {\n if bt == nil || IsEncryptedBoxDeniedByPublishAccess(bt.BoxID) {\n return false\n }\n publishIgnore := filterDisablePublishAccess(publishAccess)\n passwordID, password := GetPathPasswordByPublishAccess(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishAccess)\n return CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) \u0026\u0026\n (password == \"\" || CheckPublishAuthCookie(c, passwordID, password))\n}\n```\n\nSame package, same file, same `*treenode.BlockTree` input. One takes the context and evaluates the password; the other does not receive it and structurally cannot.\n\n**Route-level contrast.** The adjacent `getChildBlocks` and `getTailChildBlocks` both carry `model.CheckAdminRole`.\n\n**Note on a prior assessment.** `getRefIDs` has been described as correctly filtered because it calls a publish-access filter. It does. The filter it calls covers the visibility tiers only.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nKernel 3.7.2, publish mode on port 6808, `Publish.Auth.Enable` false, anonymous client. A public document referenced from a second document whose publish tier was changed between runs. `getRefIDs` was called anonymously each time.\n\n| Tier of the referring document | Anonymous result |\n|---|---|\n| Public | reference returned (baseline) |\n| Password-protected | **reference still returned** |\n| Hidden | `[]`, filtered |\n| Forbidden | `[]`, filtered |\n\nThe hidden and forbidden rows confirm the filter runs and works. The password-protected row is the defect.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn anonymous reader in publish mode, or any publish `RoleReader`, learns that a password-protected document contains a reference to a given block, without entering that document\u0027s password, and receives the block identifiers involved.\n\nScoped precisely: the response carries identifiers only. `type RefDefs { RefID string; DefIDs []string }`, returned alongside `originalRefBlockIDs`, a map of identifier to identifier. There is no reference text, title or content. The disclosure is the existence of a relationship, plus identifiers usable as input to other endpoints.\n\nConfidentiality only.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nThread `*gin.Context` into `FilterRefDefsByPublishIgnore` and `FilterBlockTreesByPublishIgnore`, and use `checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess` in place of the bare `CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore` call, so the password tier and the encrypted-box check are both applied.",
"id": "GHSA-vg99-7gj7-2fr5",
"modified": "2026-10-01T16:29:35Z",
"published": "2026-10-01T16:29:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-vg99-7gj7-2fr5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73606"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.8.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-information-disclosure-via-getrefids"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan: The reference filter for getRefIDs checks visibility but not the password tier, disclosing that password-protected documents reference a given block"
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.