CWE-862
Allowed-with-ReviewMissing Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
20281 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-W89X-C962-C44G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 20:40 – Updated: 2026-09-22 20:40Summary
There is a privilege scope bypass in Cloudreve's admin API where two endpoints that mutate server state are missing the write-scope enforcement that their neighboring endpoints correctly apply. Specifically, the WOPI configuration fetch endpoint and the SMTP test/mail endpoint can both be triggered by an OAuth token that only has Admin.Read authorization — no Admin.Write needed. This breaks the intended OAuth scope boundary in a way that's subtle enough to have slipped through but meaningful enough to matter in a real deployment.
Details
The root cause is an inconsistency in how the admin tool routes are wired up in routers/router.go. The admin route group sets a baseline of ScopeAdminRead for everything underneath it (around line 868), and most write-capable endpoints inside the tool sub-group correctly layer on an additional RequiredScopes(types.ScopeAdminWrite) check on top of that. For example, the thumbnail executable setter (line 929) and the entity URL cache deletion (line 937) both do this properly.
The two endpoints that don't follow this pattern are tool.GET('wopi') (line 925) and tool.POST('mail') (line 933). Despite POST /mail clearly triggering an outbound email and GET /wopi fetching or probing WOPI service connectivity, neither has the ScopeAdminWrite guard. What that means in practice is that any OAuth application granted only Admin.Read — a scope that should be limited to inspecting configuration, not changing anything — can silently invoke both of these operations. The developer looking at the route definitions would reasonably assume all the write-adjacent tool endpoints were protected, because the ones right above and below them are. It's the kind of gap that's easy to miss in a code review.
PoC
# OAuth app with ONLY Admin.Read scope can send emails:
curl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <ADMIN_READ_ONLY_TOKEN>' \
'https://cloudreve.example.com/api/v4/admin/tool/mail' \
-d '{"settings":{"smtpHost":"smtp.gmail.com","smtpPort":"587",...},"to":"victim@example.com"}'
# Expected: 403 Forbidden (if Admin.Write was required)
# Actual: 200 OK, email is sent
Impact
An OAuth application or API key scoped to Admin.Read can send arbitrary emails through the server's configured SMTP account and probe internal WOPI service endpoints — both actions that should require elevated write authorization. In multi-party deployments where Admin.Read tokens are issued more liberally (e.g., to monitoring integrations or third-party plugins), a compromised or malicious token holder gains capabilities well beyond what the scope contract implies. Scope separation in OAuth 2.0 is a security boundary, not just a convention, and its violation here could factor into broader attack chains.
Fix
Add middleware.RequiredScopes(types.ScopeAdminWrite) as the first handler argument to both the tool.GET('wopi') and tool.POST('mail') route definitions in routers/router.go. This brings them in line with tool.POST('thumbExecutable') at line 929 and tool.DELETE('entityUrlCache') at line 937, which already follow the correct pattern. No logic changes are needed — it's purely an additive middleware insertion.
If possible, please apply for a CVE number when publishing. I would greatly appreciate it.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.0-20260715070110-bce08f88e9d8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-77637"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:40:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-22T16:17:55Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThere is a privilege scope bypass in Cloudreve\u0027s admin API where two endpoints that mutate server state are missing the write-scope enforcement that their neighboring endpoints correctly apply. Specifically, the WOPI configuration fetch endpoint and the SMTP test/mail endpoint can both be triggered by an OAuth token that only has Admin.Read authorization \u2014 no Admin.Write needed. This breaks the intended OAuth scope boundary in a way that\u0027s subtle enough to have slipped through but meaningful enough to matter in a real deployment.\n\n### Details\nThe root cause is an inconsistency in how the admin tool routes are wired up in `routers/router.go`. The admin route group sets a baseline of `ScopeAdminRead` for everything underneath it (around line 868), and most write-capable endpoints inside the `tool` sub-group correctly layer on an additional `RequiredScopes(types.ScopeAdminWrite)` check on top of that. For example, the thumbnail executable setter (line 929) and the entity URL cache deletion (line 937) both do this properly.\n\nThe two endpoints that don\u0027t follow this pattern are `tool.GET(\u0027wopi\u0027)` (line 925) and `tool.POST(\u0027mail\u0027)` (line 933). Despite `POST /mail` clearly triggering an outbound email and `GET /wopi` fetching or probing WOPI service connectivity, neither has the `ScopeAdminWrite` guard. What that means in practice is that any OAuth application granted only Admin.Read \u2014 a scope that should be limited to inspecting configuration, not changing anything \u2014 can silently invoke both of these operations. The developer looking at the route definitions would reasonably assume all the write-adjacent tool endpoints were protected, because the ones right above and below them are. It\u0027s the kind of gap that\u0027s easy to miss in a code review.\n\n### PoC\n```bash\n# OAuth app with ONLY Admin.Read scope can send emails:\ncurl -s -X POST -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer \u003cADMIN_READ_ONLY_TOKEN\u003e\u0027 \\\n \u0027https://cloudreve.example.com/api/v4/admin/tool/mail\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"settings\":{\"smtpHost\":\"smtp.gmail.com\",\"smtpPort\":\"587\",...},\"to\":\"victim@example.com\"}\u0027\n# Expected: 403 Forbidden (if Admin.Write was required)\n# Actual: 200 OK, email is sent\n```\n\n### Impact\nAn OAuth application or API key scoped to Admin.Read can send arbitrary emails through the server\u0027s configured SMTP account and probe internal WOPI service endpoints \u2014 both actions that should require elevated write authorization. In multi-party deployments where Admin.Read tokens are issued more liberally (e.g., to monitoring integrations or third-party plugins), a compromised or malicious token holder gains capabilities well beyond what the scope contract implies. Scope separation in OAuth 2.0 is a security boundary, not just a convention, and its violation here could factor into broader attack chains.\n\n### Fix\nAdd `middleware.RequiredScopes(types.ScopeAdminWrite)` as the first handler argument to both the `tool.GET(\u0027wopi\u0027)` and `tool.POST(\u0027mail\u0027)` route definitions in `routers/router.go`. This brings them in line with `tool.POST(\u0027thumbExecutable\u0027)` at line 929 and `tool.DELETE(\u0027entityUrlCache\u0027)` at line 937, which already follow the correct pattern. No logic changes are needed \u2014 it\u0027s purely an additive middleware insertion.\n\n**If possible, please apply for a CVE number when publishing. I would greatly appreciate it.**",
"id": "GHSA-w89x-c962-c44g",
"modified": "2026-09-22T20:40:35Z",
"published": "2026-09-22T20:40:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/security/advisories/GHSA-w89x-c962-c44g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77637"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/commit/bce08f88e9d8f881e78fd18e7a6598b31922c492"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/releases/tag/4.18.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Cloudreve: Privilege Scope Bypass: State-Mutating Admin Operations Accessible via Read-Only OAuth Scope"
}
GHSA-W8C6-JHX2-568H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-20 15:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:35Missing Authorization vulnerability in aguilatechnologies WP Customer Area allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects WP Customer Area: from n/a through 8.2.5.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-49982"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-20T15:15:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in aguilatechnologies WP Customer Area allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects WP Customer Area: from n/a through 8.2.5.",
"id": "GHSA-w8c6-jhx2-568h",
"modified": "2026-04-28T21:35:42Z",
"published": "2025-06-20T15:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49982"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/customer-area/vulnerability/wordpress-wp-customer-area-plugin-8-2-5-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W8FH-XX7F-5J67
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 18:31 – Updated: 2026-08-06 18:30Jenkins External Workspace Manager Plugin 1.4.1 and earlier does not perform a permission check (1.4.0 and earlier) or performs an improper permission check (1.4.1) when providing access to externally-managed workspaces through the workspace browser, allowing attackers with Overall/Read permission to read files in workspaces they are not authorized to access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-70436"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T18:17:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Jenkins External Workspace Manager Plugin 1.4.1 and earlier does not perform a permission check (1.4.0 and earlier) or performs an improper permission check (1.4.1) when providing access to externally-managed workspaces through the workspace browser, allowing attackers with Overall/Read permission to read files in workspaces they are not authorized to access.",
"id": "GHSA-w8fh-xx7f-5j67",
"modified": "2026-08-06T18:30:43Z",
"published": "2026-08-05T18:31:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-70436"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2026-08-05/#SECURITY-3907"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W8FQ-G7R4-9644
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-03 18:31 – Updated: 2026-11-03 18:31Missing Authorization vulnerability in WebberZone Better Search better-search allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Better Search: from n/a through 4.5.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-119495"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-03T17:18:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in WebberZone Better Search better-search allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Better Search: from n/a through 4.5.2.",
"id": "GHSA-w8fq-g7r4-9644",
"modified": "2026-11-03T18:31:08Z",
"published": "2026-11-03T18:31:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119495"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/better-search/vulnerability/wordpress-better-search-plugin-4-5-2-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W8GX-4R6W-3RX9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-28 00:00 – Updated: 2023-10-27 20:39Jenkins rhnpush-plugin Plugin 0.5.1 and earlier does not perform a permission check in a method implementing form validation.
This allows attackers with Item/Read permission but without Item/Workspace or Item/Configure permission to check whether attacker-specified file patterns match workspace contents. A sequence of requests can be used to effectively list workspace contents.
rhnpush-plugin Plugin 0.5.2 requires Item/Workspace permission to validate patterns with workspace contents.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:rhnpush-plugin"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-36892"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-08-10T21:20:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-27T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Jenkins rhnpush-plugin Plugin 0.5.1 and earlier does not perform a permission check in a method implementing form validation.\n\nThis allows attackers with Item/Read permission but without Item/Workspace or Item/Configure permission to check whether attacker-specified file patterns match workspace contents. A sequence of requests can be used to effectively list workspace contents.\n\nrhnpush-plugin Plugin 0.5.2 requires Item/Workspace permission to validate patterns with workspace contents.",
"id": "GHSA-w8gx-4r6w-3rx9",
"modified": "2023-10-27T20:39:25Z",
"published": "2022-07-28T00:00:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36892"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/rhnpush-plugin/commit/7827db39925d0fc8f5b95e013466987b513b3f3c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2022-07-27/#SECURITY-2402"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/07/27/1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Jenkins rhnpush-plugin does not perform a permission check in a method implementing form validation"
}
GHSA-W8HJ-6JQ5-PM9G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 18:33 – Updated: 2026-09-11 15:32The vulnerability, if exploited, could allow an unauthenticated miscreant to perform read operations intended only for PIMBoards users, resulting in information disclosure. Write operations are not impacted.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81823"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-08T18:20:57Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The vulnerability, if exploited, could allow an unauthenticated miscreant to perform read operations intended only for PIMBoards users, resulting in information disclosure. Write operations are not impacted.",
"id": "GHSA-w8hj-6jq5-pm9g",
"modified": "2026-09-11T15:32:30Z",
"published": "2026-09-08T18:33:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81823"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-253-01.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.aveva.com/content/dam/aveva/documents/support/cyber-security-updates/SecurityBulletin_AVEVA-2026-006.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-253-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-W8J2-252J-WP53
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-07 15:32 – Updated: 2026-07-07 15:32Ghostfolio's PUT /api/v1/portfolio/holding/:dataSource/:symbol/tags endpoint fails to verify Access.permissions field when processing the Impersonation-Id header, allowing read-only access grantees to modify portfolio holding tags. Attackers with valid read-only share tokens can assign or remove tags on victim holdings, corrupting portfolio categorization and reports.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59709"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-07T15:16:49Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Ghostfolio\u0027s PUT /api/v1/portfolio/holding/:dataSource/:symbol/tags endpoint fails to verify Access.permissions field when processing the Impersonation-Id header, allowing read-only access grantees to modify portfolio holding tags. Attackers with valid read-only share tokens can assign or remove tags on victim holdings, corrupting portfolio categorization and reports.",
"id": "GHSA-w8j2-252j-wp53",
"modified": "2026-07-07T15:32:57Z",
"published": "2026-07-07T15:32:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59709"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ghostfolio/ghostfolio/issues/7196"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ghostfolio/ghostfolio/commit/697ef59e3b58bebc5c21a9e482e4f5643390f316"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ghostfolio/ghostfolio"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/ghostfolio-unauthorized-portfolio-holding-tag-modification-via-missing-permission-check"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-W8JJ-CWMC-WGQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 19:49 – Updated: 2026-04-10 19:49Summary
The system log endpoints (GET /api/system/logs, GET /api/system/logs/stream, WS /ws/system/logs) lack authorization checks, allowing any authenticated non-admin user to read and stream all server logs. These logs contain error stack traces, internal file paths, module names, and arbitrary structured fields that facilitate reconnaissance for further attacks.
Details
The dashboard routes in internal/router/dashboard.go:7-8 register log endpoints on the AuthRouterGroup without any RequireScopes middleware:
// internal/router/dashboard.go
func setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs", h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs())
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs/stream", h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs())
appRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs", h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs())
}
Compare with other admin-only routes that properly use RequireScopes:
// internal/router/setting.go — every route has RequireScopes
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/settings",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.SettingHandler.GetSiteSettings())
The AuthRouterGroup only applies JWTAuthMiddleware() (router.go:36), which validates the JWT and sets the viewer context but does not check admin status. The WSRouterGroup (router.go:37) has no middleware at all — the WebSocket handler only calls ParseToken to verify the JWT signature (dashboard.go:74) without any role/scope validation.
The handler (internal/handler/dashboard/dashboard.go:29-62) and service (internal/service/dashboard/dashboard.go:21-27) contain zero authorization checks. Other services in the codebase properly enforce admin access:
- internal/service/inbox/inbox.go:132 — ensureAdmin()
- internal/service/migrator/migrator.go:360 — ensureAdmin()
- internal/service/comment/comment.go:719 — requireAdmin()
Non-admin users are created with IsAdmin: false and IsOwner: false (internal/service/user/user.go:220-221) via the public registration endpoint.
The LogEntry struct (internal/util/log/log.go:78-87) exposes:
type LogEntry struct {
Time string `json:"time"`
Level string `json:"level"`
Msg string `json:"msg"`
Module string `json:"module,omitempty"`
Caller string `json:"caller,omitempty"` // internal file paths
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"` // error stack traces
Fields map[string]any `json:"fields,omitempty"` // arbitrary structured data
Raw string `json:"raw,omitempty"` // raw log lines
}
PoC
# 1. Register a non-admin user (system allows up to 5 users by default)
curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/register \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Password123"}'
# 2. Login to get session token
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Password123"}' | jq -r '.data.token')
# 3. Read system logs — should require admin but doesn't
curl http://localhost:8080/api/system/logs \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# Returns: {"code":1,"data":[{"time":"...","level":"error","msg":"...","module":"...","caller":"internal/service/user/user.go:145","error":"...","fields":{...}},...]}
# 4. Subscribe to real-time log stream via SSE
curl -N "http://localhost:8080/api/system/logs/stream?token=$TOKEN"
# 5. Subscribe via WebSocket (WSRouterGroup has NO middleware)
# wscat -c "ws://localhost:8080/ws/system/logs?token=$TOKEN"
Impact
Any registered non-admin user can: - Read all historical system logs including error traces that reveal internal code paths, database errors, and application state - Stream real-time logs via SSE or WebSocket to monitor all server activity as it happens - Gather reconnaissance data — caller fields expose internal file paths and line numbers, error fields expose stack traces and database query failures, module fields map the internal architecture - Monitor other users' actions — authentication failures, registration events, and admin operations appear in logs
This information disclosure lowers the bar for chaining further attacks by revealing the application's internal structure, error handling patterns, and operational state.
Recommended Fix
Add RequireScopes middleware with an admin scope to the dashboard routes:
// internal/router/dashboard.go
func setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs())
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs/stream",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs())
appRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs())
}
Additionally, the WebSocket handler should validate admin scope after parsing the token, since the WSRouterGroup lacks middleware:
// internal/handler/dashboard/dashboard.go — WSSubscribeSystemLogs
claims, err := jwtUtil.ParseToken(token)
if err != nil {
ctx.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"msg": "invalid token"})
return
}
// Add admin check for WebSocket endpoint
if claims.TokenType == authModel.TokenTypeAccess && !containsScope(claims.Scopes, authModel.ScopeAdminSettings) {
ctx.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"msg": "admin access required"})
return
}
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/lin-snow/ech0"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.4.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T19:49:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe system log endpoints (`GET /api/system/logs`, `GET /api/system/logs/stream`, `WS /ws/system/logs`) lack authorization checks, allowing any authenticated non-admin user to read and stream all server logs. These logs contain error stack traces, internal file paths, module names, and arbitrary structured fields that facilitate reconnaissance for further attacks.\n\n## Details\n\nThe dashboard routes in `internal/router/dashboard.go:7-8` register log endpoints on the `AuthRouterGroup` without any `RequireScopes` middleware:\n\n```go\n// internal/router/dashboard.go\nfunc setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {\n\tappRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(\"/system/logs\", h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs())\n\tappRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(\"/system/logs/stream\", h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs())\n\tappRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET(\"/system/logs\", h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs())\n}\n```\n\nCompare with other admin-only routes that properly use `RequireScopes`:\n\n```go\n// internal/router/setting.go \u2014 every route has RequireScopes\nappRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(\"/settings\",\n middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),\n h.SettingHandler.GetSiteSettings())\n```\n\nThe `AuthRouterGroup` only applies `JWTAuthMiddleware()` (router.go:36), which validates the JWT and sets the viewer context but does **not** check admin status. The `WSRouterGroup` (router.go:37) has no middleware at all \u2014 the WebSocket handler only calls `ParseToken` to verify the JWT signature (dashboard.go:74) without any role/scope validation.\n\nThe handler (`internal/handler/dashboard/dashboard.go:29-62`) and service (`internal/service/dashboard/dashboard.go:21-27`) contain zero authorization checks. Other services in the codebase properly enforce admin access:\n- `internal/service/inbox/inbox.go:132` \u2014 `ensureAdmin()`\n- `internal/service/migrator/migrator.go:360` \u2014 `ensureAdmin()`\n- `internal/service/comment/comment.go:719` \u2014 `requireAdmin()`\n\nNon-admin users are created with `IsAdmin: false` and `IsOwner: false` (`internal/service/user/user.go:220-221`) via the public registration endpoint.\n\nThe `LogEntry` struct (`internal/util/log/log.go:78-87`) exposes:\n```go\ntype LogEntry struct {\n Time string `json:\"time\"`\n Level string `json:\"level\"`\n Msg string `json:\"msg\"`\n Module string `json:\"module,omitempty\"`\n Caller string `json:\"caller,omitempty\"` // internal file paths\n Error string `json:\"error,omitempty\"` // error stack traces\n Fields map[string]any `json:\"fields,omitempty\"` // arbitrary structured data\n Raw string `json:\"raw,omitempty\"` // raw log lines\n}\n```\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# 1. Register a non-admin user (system allows up to 5 users by default)\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/register \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"username\":\"attacker\",\"password\":\"Password123\"}\u0027\n\n# 2. Login to get session token\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/login \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"username\":\"attacker\",\"password\":\"Password123\"}\u0027 | jq -r \u0027.data.token\u0027)\n\n# 3. Read system logs \u2014 should require admin but doesn\u0027t\ncurl http://localhost:8080/api/system/logs \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\"\n# Returns: {\"code\":1,\"data\":[{\"time\":\"...\",\"level\":\"error\",\"msg\":\"...\",\"module\":\"...\",\"caller\":\"internal/service/user/user.go:145\",\"error\":\"...\",\"fields\":{...}},...]}\n\n# 4. Subscribe to real-time log stream via SSE\ncurl -N \"http://localhost:8080/api/system/logs/stream?token=$TOKEN\"\n\n# 5. Subscribe via WebSocket (WSRouterGroup has NO middleware)\n# wscat -c \"ws://localhost:8080/ws/system/logs?token=$TOKEN\"\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny registered non-admin user can:\n- **Read all historical system logs** including error traces that reveal internal code paths, database errors, and application state\n- **Stream real-time logs** via SSE or WebSocket to monitor all server activity as it happens\n- **Gather reconnaissance data** \u2014 caller fields expose internal file paths and line numbers, error fields expose stack traces and database query failures, module fields map the internal architecture\n- **Monitor other users\u0027 actions** \u2014 authentication failures, registration events, and admin operations appear in logs\n\nThis information disclosure lowers the bar for chaining further attacks by revealing the application\u0027s internal structure, error handling patterns, and operational state.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd `RequireScopes` middleware with an admin scope to the dashboard routes:\n\n```go\n// internal/router/dashboard.go\nfunc setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {\n\tappRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(\"/system/logs\",\n\t\tmiddleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),\n\t\th.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs())\n\tappRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(\"/system/logs/stream\",\n\t\tmiddleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),\n\t\th.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs())\n\tappRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET(\"/system/logs\",\n\t\tmiddleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),\n\t\th.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs())\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, the WebSocket handler should validate admin scope after parsing the token, since the `WSRouterGroup` lacks middleware:\n\n```go\n// internal/handler/dashboard/dashboard.go \u2014 WSSubscribeSystemLogs\nclaims, err := jwtUtil.ParseToken(token)\nif err != nil {\n ctx.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{\"msg\": \"invalid token\"})\n return\n}\n// Add admin check for WebSocket endpoint\nif claims.TokenType == authModel.TokenTypeAccess \u0026\u0026 !containsScope(claims.Scopes, authModel.ScopeAdminSettings) {\n ctx.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{\"msg\": \"admin access required\"})\n return\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-w8jj-cwmc-wgq2",
"modified": "2026-04-10T19:49:33Z",
"published": "2026-04-10T19:49:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/security/advisories/GHSA-w8jj-cwmc-wgq2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/releases/tag/v4.4.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Ech0\u0027s Missing Authorization on System Logs Allows Non-Admin Information Disclosure"
}
GHSA-W8M8-8QC2-4GPR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-23 09:33 – Updated: 2024-10-23 09:33Missing Authorization vulnerability in dFactory Responsive Lightbox allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs.This issue affects Responsive Lightbox: from n/a through 2.4.7.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43924"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-23T08:15:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in dFactory Responsive Lightbox allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs.This issue affects Responsive Lightbox: from n/a through 2.4.7.",
"id": "GHSA-w8m8-8qc2-4gpr",
"modified": "2024-10-23T09:33:12Z",
"published": "2024-10-23T09:33:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43924"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/responsive-lightbox/wordpress-responsive-lightbox-gallery-plugin-2-4-7-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W8MQ-5926-CX56
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-01 15:31 – Updated: 2024-11-01 15:31Missing Authorization vulnerability in Uncanny Owl Uncanny Automator Pro allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Uncanny Automator Pro: from n/a through 5.3.0.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-37119"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-01T15:15:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Uncanny Owl Uncanny Automator Pro allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Uncanny Automator Pro: from n/a through 5.3.0.0.",
"id": "GHSA-w8mq-5926-cx56",
"modified": "2024-11-01T15:31:57Z",
"published": "2024-11-01T15:31:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37119"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/uncanny-automator-pro/wordpress-uncanny-automator-pro-plugin-5-3-unauthenticated-license-settings-reset-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.