Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-862

Allowed-with-Review

Missing Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

20286 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-VP55-5C2V-3597

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-15 12:32 – Updated: 2026-10-08 21:58
Withdrawn 2026-10-08 VLAI
Summary
Duplicate Advisory: PraisonAI: Platform members can rewrite shared labels and owner issue labels without owner/admin authorization
Details

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-xxgv-vgvj-qvxh. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

PraisonAI Platform before 0.1.9 fails to properly authorize label and issue-label mutations, allowing workspace members to rename and recolor shared labels and add or remove labels on owner-created issues. Attackers with workspace member privileges can exploit PATCH and POST/DELETE endpoints to alter shared label taxonomy and manipulate issue-label associations without owner or admin authorization.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai-platform"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.1.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T21:58:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T12:18:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-xxgv-vgvj-qvxh. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n### Original Description\nPraisonAI Platform before 0.1.9 fails to properly authorize label and issue-label mutations, allowing workspace members to rename and recolor shared labels and add or remove labels on owner-created issues. Attackers with workspace member privileges can exploit PATCH and POST/DELETE endpoints to alter shared label taxonomy and manipulate issue-label associations without owner or admin authorization.",
  "id": "GHSA-vp55-5c2v-3597",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T21:58:19Z",
  "published": "2026-07-15T12:32:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-xxgv-vgvj-qvxh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61440"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-platform-before-authorization-bypass-via-label-endpoints"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: PraisonAI: Platform members can rewrite shared labels and owner issue labels without owner/admin authorization",
  "withdrawn": "2026-10-08T21:58:19Z"
}

GHSA-VP5Q-FF62-JWQV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 22:59 – Updated: 2026-10-30 22:59
VLAI
Summary
russh: Agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without confirmation
Details

Summary

The agent server in russh::keys::agent::server never calls Agent::confirm before signing with a key that was added with the confirm constraint. That constraint is SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM (RFC 9987 §5.2.7.2), which is what ssh-add -c sends.

The call was replaced by a hard-coded true in 3e04597 ("Native async traits encore", #455), first released in 0.50.0-beta.12. Every release since, up to and including 0.64.1, signs requests for confirm-constrained keys without asking the Agent implementation. A user who added a key with -c is therefore never asked to confirm.

Details

Connection::try_sign notes that the key needs confirmation, then awaits a ready future instead of the agent (server.rs L348-L360 at v0.64.1):

let agent = if needs_confirm {
    let (agent, ok) = {
        let _pk = key.clone();
        Box::new(futures::future::ready((agent, true)))
    }
    .await;
    if !ok {
        return Ok((agent, false));
    }
    agent
} else {
    agent
};

Before 3e04597 the first statement was let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;.

try_sign was checked in the published crates on crates.io: - Every russh release from 0.50.0-beta.12 to 0.64.1 (52 versions) has the hard-coded true. - russh 0.50.0-beta.8 to beta.11 call agent.confirm. - Earlier russh releases have no agent server. It lived in russh-keys, and no russh-keys release is affected.

Not affected: - Agent implementations that keep the default confirm, which returns true anyway. - Checks made in Agent::confirm_request, which is still called with MessageType::Sign for every sign request (L158-L159). - The agent client, and the SSH client and server.

PoC

  1. Add this test to mod test in russh/src/keys/mod.rs. It uses the module's existing Incoming helper and ED25519_KEY.
  2. Run cargo test -p russh --lib keys::test::test_agent_confirms_keys_added_with_the_confirm_constraint.
#[tokio::test]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn test_agent_confirms_keys_added_with_the_confirm_constraint() {
    use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};

    // An agent whose user refuses every confirmation prompt.
    #[derive(Clone)]
    struct Refuse(std::sync::Arc<AtomicUsize>);
    impl agent::server::Agent for Refuse {
        fn confirm(
            self,
            _: std::sync::Arc<PrivateKey>,
        ) -> Box<dyn Future<Output = (Self, bool)> + Send + Unpin> {
            self.0.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
            Box::new(futures::future::ready((self, false)))
        }
    }

    let prompts = std::sync::Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
    let agent_path = dir.path().join("agent");
    let mut listener = tokio::net::UnixListener::bind(&agent_path).unwrap();
    let agent = Refuse(prompts.clone());
    tokio::spawn(async move {
        agent::server::serve(
            Incoming {
                listener: &mut listener,
            },
            agent,
        )
        .await
    });

    let key = decode_secret_key(ED25519_KEY, Some("blabla")).unwrap();
    let public = key.public_key().clone();
    let stream = tokio::net::UnixStream::connect(&agent_path).await.unwrap();
    let mut client = agent::client::AgentClient::connect(stream);
    // What `ssh-add -c` sends.
    client
        .add_identity(&key, &[agent::Constraint::Confirm])
        .await
        .unwrap();

    let signed = client
        .sign_request(&AgentIdentity::from(public), None, b"data".to_vec())
        .await;
    let confirm_calls = prompts.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
    assert!(
        signed.is_err(),
        "the agent signed with a confirm-constrained key without asking: \
         Agent::confirm was called {confirm_calls} time(s)"
    );
    assert_eq!(
        confirm_calls, 1,
        "Agent::confirm should be asked exactly once"
    );
}

On v0.64.1 (e5d80a0) the test fails:

the agent signed with a confirm-constrained key without asking: Agent::confirm was called 0 time(s)

With the fix below it passes, and so do all 46 keys:: tests.

Impact

A russh-based agent whose Agent::confirm asks the user, or applies any other check, signs every request for a confirm-constrained key without running that check. Anyone who can talk to the agent can then use the key without the user's approval: - other local processes of the user; - the remote host, when the agent is forwarded (ssh -A).

Preventing exactly this is the purpose of the confirm constraint. RFC 9987 §10 names it as what stops an attacker with access to the agent from "stealing use of those keys".

Because the agent accepts the constraint, ssh-add -c reports success and the user believes the key is protected. RFC 9987 §5.2.7 says an agent that does not support a constraint MUST refuse the key instead.

The private key itself is not exposed. The impact is unauthorized use of it for as long as the attacker can reach the agent: logging in to other hosts as the user, or signing data such as git commits.

Known affected downstream user (from its public code; not tested): Proton Pass desktop, which uses russh 0.62.7. - It adds every key with Constraint::Confirm (mod.rs L332). - It uses Agent::confirm as its "Pass is unlocked" check before signing, and defers MessageType::Sign from confirm_request to it (L75-L100). That check never runs. - Proton also removes keys from the agent on lock and logout (ssh-agent.middleware.ts L23-L27).

So the exposure there is limited to states in which keys stay loaded while Pass is not unlocked. Their own code notes, for example, that the agent persists across renderer reloads and account switches.

Suggested fix

--- a/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs
+++ b/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs
@@ -346,11 +346,7 @@ impl<S: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Send + Unpin + 'static, A: Agent + Send + Sync
             }
         };
         let agent = if needs_confirm {
-            let (agent, ok) = {
-                let _pk = key.clone();
-                Box::new(futures::future::ready((agent, true)))
-            }
-            .await;
+            let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;
             if !ok {
                 return Ok((agent, false));
             }

When confirm returns false, try_sign returns false and the agent answers SSH_AGENT_FAILURE, as it did before the regression.

Compatibility note for the release notes: confirm is called again for confirm-constrained keys, so implementations that stub it out will now hit that stub. - For example, Litterbox implements confirm as todo!() (agent.rs L81-L87). - Each connection runs in its own task, so such a panic ends only that connection.

Related but separate: with the default confirm, the agent still accepts the confirm constraint without enforcing it. Given RFC 9987 §5.2.7, refusing such keys when the application does not implement confirm may be worth considering.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "russh"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.65"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-116794"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-30T22:59:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-28T18:17:14Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe agent server in `russh::keys::agent::server` never calls `Agent::confirm` before signing with a key that was added with the confirm constraint. That constraint is `SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM` (RFC 9987 \u00a75.2.7.2), which is what `ssh-add -c` sends.\n\nThe call was replaced by a hard-coded `true` in 3e04597 (\"Native async traits encore\", #455), first released in 0.50.0-beta.12. Every release since, up to and including 0.64.1, signs requests for confirm-constrained keys without asking the `Agent` implementation. A user who added a key with `-c` is therefore never asked to confirm.\n\n### Details\n\n`Connection::try_sign` notes that the key needs confirmation, then awaits a ready future instead of the agent ([server.rs L348-L360 at v0.64.1](https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/blob/e5d80a07dc554480b6ea3b2e14adfc190407b627/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs#L348-L360)):\n\n```rust\nlet agent = if needs_confirm {\n    let (agent, ok) = {\n        let _pk = key.clone();\n        Box::new(futures::future::ready((agent, true)))\n    }\n    .await;\n    if !ok {\n        return Ok((agent, false));\n    }\n    agent\n} else {\n    agent\n};\n```\n\nBefore [3e04597](https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/3e04597dc54e36bfc85c21996f7d8d9d224e9826) the first statement was `let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;`.\n\n`try_sign` was checked in the published crates on crates.io:\n- Every russh release from 0.50.0-beta.12 to 0.64.1 (52 versions) has the hard-coded `true`.\n- russh 0.50.0-beta.8 to beta.11 call `agent.confirm`.\n- Earlier russh releases have no agent server. It lived in russh-keys, and no russh-keys release is affected.\n\nNot affected:\n- `Agent` implementations that keep the default `confirm`, which returns `true` anyway.\n- Checks made in `Agent::confirm_request`, which is still called with `MessageType::Sign` for every sign request ([L158-L159](https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/blob/e5d80a07dc554480b6ea3b2e14adfc190407b627/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs#L158-L159)).\n- The agent client, and the SSH client and server.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Add this test to `mod test` in `russh/src/keys/mod.rs`. It uses the module\u0027s existing `Incoming` helper and `ED25519_KEY`.\n2. Run `cargo test -p russh --lib keys::test::test_agent_confirms_keys_added_with_the_confirm_constraint`.\n\n```rust\n#[tokio::test]\n#[cfg(unix)]\nasync fn test_agent_confirms_keys_added_with_the_confirm_constraint() {\n    use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};\n\n    // An agent whose user refuses every confirmation prompt.\n    #[derive(Clone)]\n    struct Refuse(std::sync::Arc\u003cAtomicUsize\u003e);\n    impl agent::server::Agent for Refuse {\n        fn confirm(\n            self,\n            _: std::sync::Arc\u003cPrivateKey\u003e,\n        ) -\u003e Box\u003cdyn Future\u003cOutput = (Self, bool)\u003e + Send + Unpin\u003e {\n            self.0.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);\n            Box::new(futures::future::ready((self, false)))\n        }\n    }\n\n    let prompts = std::sync::Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));\n    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();\n    let agent_path = dir.path().join(\"agent\");\n    let mut listener = tokio::net::UnixListener::bind(\u0026agent_path).unwrap();\n    let agent = Refuse(prompts.clone());\n    tokio::spawn(async move {\n        agent::server::serve(\n            Incoming {\n                listener: \u0026mut listener,\n            },\n            agent,\n        )\n        .await\n    });\n\n    let key = decode_secret_key(ED25519_KEY, Some(\"blabla\")).unwrap();\n    let public = key.public_key().clone();\n    let stream = tokio::net::UnixStream::connect(\u0026agent_path).await.unwrap();\n    let mut client = agent::client::AgentClient::connect(stream);\n    // What `ssh-add -c` sends.\n    client\n        .add_identity(\u0026key, \u0026[agent::Constraint::Confirm])\n        .await\n        .unwrap();\n\n    let signed = client\n        .sign_request(\u0026AgentIdentity::from(public), None, b\"data\".to_vec())\n        .await;\n    let confirm_calls = prompts.load(Ordering::SeqCst);\n    assert!(\n        signed.is_err(),\n        \"the agent signed with a confirm-constrained key without asking: \\\n         Agent::confirm was called {confirm_calls} time(s)\"\n    );\n    assert_eq!(\n        confirm_calls, 1,\n        \"Agent::confirm should be asked exactly once\"\n    );\n}\n```\n\nOn v0.64.1 (e5d80a0) the test fails:\n\n```\nthe agent signed with a confirm-constrained key without asking: Agent::confirm was called 0 time(s)\n```\n\nWith the fix below it passes, and so do all 46 `keys::` tests.\n\n### Impact\n\nA russh-based agent whose `Agent::confirm` asks the user, or applies any other check, signs every request for a confirm-constrained key without running that check. Anyone who can talk to the agent can then use the key without the user\u0027s approval:\n- other local processes of the user;\n- the remote host, when the agent is forwarded (`ssh -A`).\n\nPreventing exactly this is the purpose of the confirm constraint. RFC 9987 \u00a710 names it as what stops an attacker with access to the agent from \"stealing use of those keys\".\n\nBecause the agent accepts the constraint, `ssh-add -c` reports success and the user believes the key is protected. RFC 9987 \u00a75.2.7 says an agent that does not support a constraint MUST refuse the key instead.\n\nThe private key itself is not exposed. The impact is unauthorized use of it for as long as the attacker can reach the agent: logging in to other hosts as the user, or signing data such as git commits.\n\n**Known affected downstream user** (from its public code; not tested): Proton Pass desktop, which uses russh 0.62.7.\n- It adds every key with `Constraint::Confirm` ([mod.rs L332](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients/blob/64862561fea883c1b4360b7338a0102eaad5c0fb/applications/pass-desktop/native/napi/src/ssh_agent/mod.rs#L332)).\n- It uses `Agent::confirm` as its \"Pass is unlocked\" check before signing, and defers `MessageType::Sign` from `confirm_request` to it ([L75-L100](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients/blob/64862561fea883c1b4360b7338a0102eaad5c0fb/applications/pass-desktop/native/napi/src/ssh_agent/mod.rs#L75-L100)). That check never runs.\n- Proton also removes keys from the agent on lock and logout ([ssh-agent.middleware.ts L23-L27](https://github.com/ProtonMail/WebClients/blob/64862561fea883c1b4360b7338a0102eaad5c0fb/applications/pass/src/app/Store/ssh-agent.middleware.ts#L23-L27)).\n\nSo the exposure there is limited to states in which keys stay loaded while Pass is not unlocked. Their own code notes, for example, that the agent persists across renderer reloads and account switches.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\n```diff\n--- a/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs\n+++ b/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs\n@@ -346,11 +346,7 @@ impl\u003cS: AsyncRead + AsyncWrite + Send + Unpin + \u0027static, A: Agent + Send + Sync\n             }\n         };\n         let agent = if needs_confirm {\n-            let (agent, ok) = {\n-                let _pk = key.clone();\n-                Box::new(futures::future::ready((agent, true)))\n-            }\n-            .await;\n+            let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;\n             if !ok {\n                 return Ok((agent, false));\n             }\n```\n\nWhen `confirm` returns `false`, `try_sign` returns `false` and the agent answers `SSH_AGENT_FAILURE`, as it did before the regression.\n\n**Compatibility note for the release notes:** `confirm` is called again for confirm-constrained keys, so implementations that stub it out will now hit that stub.\n- For example, Litterbox implements `confirm` as `todo!()` ([agent.rs L81-L87](https://github.com/Gerharddc/Litterbox/blob/c2cc67b80926affecbaa5905a7480af17b1270f2/litterbox/src/agent.rs#L81-L87)).\n- Each connection runs in its own task, so such a panic ends only that connection.\n\n**Related but separate:** with the default `confirm`, the agent still accepts the confirm constraint without enforcing it. Given RFC 9987 \u00a75.2.7, refusing such keys when the application does not implement `confirm` may be worth considering.",
  "id": "GHSA-vp5q-ff62-jwqv",
  "modified": "2026-10-30T22:59:08Z",
  "published": "2026-10-30T22:59:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-vp5q-ff62-jwqv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116794"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/3e04597dc54e36bfc85c21996f7d8d9d224e9826"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/62db6e7defd6d244159da962ccccb029e785ce0f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.65.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "russh: Agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without confirmation"
}

GHSA-VP66-4GGH-RG32

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-10 21:30 – Updated: 2023-03-16 18:30
VLAI
Details

In telephony service, there is a missing permission check. This could lead to local denial of service in telephone service with no additional execution privileges needed.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-47484"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-10T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In telephony service, there is a missing permission check. This could lead to local denial of service in telephone service with no additional execution privileges needed.",
  "id": "GHSA-vp66-4ggh-rg32",
  "modified": "2023-03-16T18:30:32Z",
  "published": "2023-03-10T21:30:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-47484"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.unisoc.com/en_us/secy/announcementDetail/1632612109718192129"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VP68-5Q7H-58F3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-31 12:30 – Updated: 2025-10-31 12:30
VLAI
Details

The ERI File Library plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the 'erifl_file' AJAX action in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.0. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to download files restricted to specific user roles.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-12041"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-31T10:15:42Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The ERI File Library plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the \u0027erifl_file\u0027 AJAX action in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.0. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to download files restricted to specific user roles.",
  "id": "GHSA-vp68-5q7h-58f3",
  "modified": "2025-10-31T12:30:20Z",
  "published": "2025-10-31T12:30:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12041"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3385895%40eri-file-library\u0026new=3385895%40eri-file-library"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/16e1d37a-4eb7-45dc-8993-a501fb2aaf73?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VP68-FM96-7V79

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-28 00:00 – Updated: 2024-01-03 13:31
VLAI
Summary
Jenkins Android Signing Plugin allows attackers to check whether attacker-specified file patterns match workspace contents
Details

Jenkins Android Signing Plugin 2.2.5 and earlier does not perform a permission check in a method implementing form validation.

This allows attackers with Item/Read permission but without Item/Workspace or Item/Configure permission to check whether attacker-specified file patterns match workspace contents. A sequence of requests can be used to effectively list workspace contents.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:android-signing"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.2.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-36915"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-08-11T15:52:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-07-27T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Jenkins Android Signing Plugin 2.2.5 and earlier does not perform a permission check in a method implementing form validation.\n\nThis allows attackers with Item/Read permission but without Item/Workspace or Item/Configure permission to check whether attacker-specified file patterns match workspace contents. A sequence of requests can be used to effectively list workspace contents.",
  "id": "GHSA-vp68-fm96-7v79",
  "modified": "2024-01-03T13:31:24Z",
  "published": "2022-07-28T00:00:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36915"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/android-signing-plugin/commit/33162c65c9f52ca5fa85609bdb652a5d1feda95b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2022-07-27/#SECURITY-2404"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/07/27/1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Jenkins Android Signing Plugin allows attackers to check whether attacker-specified file patterns match workspace contents"
}

GHSA-VPCR-FQPC-386H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-11 21:31 – Updated: 2025-08-11 22:47
VLAI
Summary
Mattermost Confluence Plugin has Missing Authorization vulnerability
Details

Mattermost Confluence Plugin versions < 1.5.0 fail to check user access to the channel, which allows attackers to get channel subscription details without proper access to the channel via an API call to the Get Channel Subscriptions details endpoint.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost-plugin-confluence"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-44001"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-11T22:47:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-11T19:15:27Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Mattermost Confluence Plugin versions \u003c 1.5.0 fail to check user access to the channel, which allows attackers to get channel subscription details without proper access to the channel via an API call to the Get Channel Subscriptions details endpoint.",
  "id": "GHSA-vpcr-fqpc-386h",
  "modified": "2025-08-11T22:47:52Z",
  "published": "2025-08-11T21:31:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-44001"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost-plugin-confluence"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Mattermost Confluence Plugin has Missing Authorization vulnerability"
}

GHSA-VPF2-G667-2XXM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-11 00:01 – Updated: 2022-05-18 00:00
VLAI
Details

In getNodeValue of USCCDMPlugin.java, there is a possible disclosure of ICCID due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android kernelAndroid ID: A-212573046References: N/A

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-20121"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-05-10T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In getNodeValue of USCCDMPlugin.java, there is a possible disclosure of ICCID due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android kernelAndroid ID: A-212573046References: N/A",
  "id": "GHSA-vpf2-g667-2xxm",
  "modified": "2022-05-18T00:00:49Z",
  "published": "2022-05-11T00:01:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20121"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2022-05-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VPF4-7PCH-F7PH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-07 03:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:37
VLAI
Details

The ListingPro - WordPress Directory & Listing Theme for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary Plugin Installation, Activation and Deactivation in versions before 2.6.1. This is due to a missing capability check on the lp_cc_addons_actions function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to arbitrarily install, activate and deactivate any plugin.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-36719"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-06-07T02:15:12Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The ListingPro - WordPress Directory \u0026 Listing Theme for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary Plugin Installation, Activation and Deactivation in versions before 2.6.1. This is due to a missing capability check on the lp_cc_addons_actions function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to arbitrarily install, activate and deactivate any plugin.",
  "id": "GHSA-vpf4-7pch-f7ph",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T04:37:39Z",
  "published": "2023-06-07T03:30:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-36719"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.nintechnet.com/wordpress-listingpro-theme-fixed-a-critical-vulnerability"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://themeforest.net/item/listingpro-multipurpose-directory-theme/19386460"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a08fa649-3092-4c26-a009-2dd576b9b1ac?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VPF5-H5RH-88HF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-03 15:30 – Updated: 2025-12-03 15:30
VLAI
Details

The Tag, Category, and Taxonomy Manager – AI Autotagger with OpenAI plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 3.40.1. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action in the "taxopress_merge_terms_batch" function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber level access and above, to merge or delete arbitrary taxonomy terms.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-13354"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-03T14:15:46Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Tag, Category, and Taxonomy Manager \u2013 AI Autotagger with OpenAI plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 3.40.1. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action in the \"taxopress_merge_terms_batch\" function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber level access and above, to merge or delete arbitrary taxonomy terms.",
  "id": "GHSA-vpf5-h5rh-88hf",
  "modified": "2025-12-03T15:30:29Z",
  "published": "2025-12-03T15:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13354"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TaxoPress/TaxoPress/commit/5eb2cee861ebd109152eea968aca0259c078c8b0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/05c1ee52-02c9-440b-9269-14ea8b73be45?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VPF7-Q2RX-26MH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-28 00:00 – Updated: 2022-12-12 21:17
VLAI
Summary
Jenkins HashiCorp Vault Plugin does not perform permission checks in several HTTP endpoints that perform Vault connection tests
Details

A missing permission check in Jenkins HashiCorp Vault Plugin 354.vdb_858fd6b_f48 and earlier allows attackers with Overall/Read permission to obtain credentials stored in Vault with attacker-specified path and keys.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 354.vdb"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.datapipe.jenkins.plugins:hashicorp-vault-plugin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "355.v3b_38d767a_b_a_8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-36888"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-08-11T15:16:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-07-27T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A missing permission check in Jenkins HashiCorp Vault Plugin 354.vdb_858fd6b_f48 and earlier allows attackers with Overall/Read permission to obtain credentials stored in Vault with attacker-specified path and keys.",
  "id": "GHSA-vpf7-q2rx-26mh",
  "modified": "2022-12-12T21:17:14Z",
  "published": "2022-07-28T00:00:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36888"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/hashicorp-vault-plugin/commit/3b38d767aba8bd98d6f4fb53c1f1678d95b5e752"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/hashicorp-vault-plugin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2022-07-27/#SECURITY-2593"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/07/27/1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Jenkins HashiCorp Vault Plugin does not perform permission checks in several HTTP endpoints that perform Vault connection tests"
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.