Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-862

Allowed-with-Review

Missing Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

20296 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-V63X-FJ84-MCJF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 00:31 – Updated: 2026-09-16 00:31
VLAI
Details

The myPRO Manager notification gateway exposes an unauthenticated HTTP endpoint used to send SMS messages through a connected GSM modem. The endpoint is accessible over the network and does not require authentication before accepting a phone number and message from a request and sending the specified SMS message. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the notification gateway could exploit this vulnerability to send arbitrary SMS messages through the connected modem.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-82567"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-15T22:17:03Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The myPRO Manager notification gateway exposes an unauthenticated HTTP endpoint used to send SMS messages through a connected GSM modem. The endpoint is accessible over the network and does not require authentication before accepting a phone number and message from a request and sending the specified SMS message. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the notification gateway could exploit this vulnerability to send arbitrary SMS messages through the connected modem.",
  "id": "GHSA-v63x-fj84-mcjf",
  "modified": "2026-09-16T00:31:31Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T00:31:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82567"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-258-03.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-258-03"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.myscada.org/downloads/mySCADAPROManager"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V64G-F7QF-63XM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-15 18:30 – Updated: 2023-12-15 18:30
VLAI
Details

An issue has been discovered in GitLab affecting all versions starting from 9.3 before 16.4.4, all versions starting from 16.5 before 16.5.4, all versions starting from 16.6 before 16.6.2. In certain situations, it may have been possible for developers to override predefined CI variables via the REST API.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-5061"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-15T16:15:45Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue has been discovered in GitLab affecting all versions starting from 9.3 before 16.4.4, all versions starting from 16.5 before 16.5.4, all versions starting from 16.6 before 16.6.2. In certain situations, it may have been possible for developers to override predefined CI variables via the REST API.",
  "id": "GHSA-v64g-f7qf-63xm",
  "modified": "2023-12-15T18:30:28Z",
  "published": "2023-12-15T18:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5061"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/2125189"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/425521"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V64Q-W7F2-VCG7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 21:32 – Updated: 2026-10-30 21:32
VLAI
Details

Subscriber Broken Access Control in Booking and Rental Manager <= 2.8.2 versions.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54850"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-30T19:18:25Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Subscriber Broken Access Control in Booking and Rental Manager \u003c= 2.8.2 versions.",
  "id": "GHSA-v64q-w7f2-vcg7",
  "modified": "2026-10-30T21:32:20Z",
  "published": "2026-10-30T21:32:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54850"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/booking-and-rental-manager-for-woocommerce/vulnerability/wordpress-booking-and-rental-manager-plugin-2-8-2-broken-access-control-vulnerability-2?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V657-8CRH-GPM6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-23 03:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:17
VLAI
Details

Operation restriction bypass vulnerability in Message and Bulletin of Cybozu Garoon 4.6.0 to 5.9.2 allows a remote authenticated attacker to alter the data of Message and/or Bulletin.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-27304"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-23T02:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Operation restriction bypass vulnerability in Message and Bulletin of Cybozu Garoon 4.6.0 to 5.9.2 allows a remote authenticated attacker to alter the data of Message and/or Bulletin.",
  "id": "GHSA-v657-8crh-gpm6",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T04:17:53Z",
  "published": "2023-05-23T03:30:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27304"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cs.cybozu.co.jp/2023/007698.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN41694426"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V65C-235X-CVQH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-04 03:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:23
VLAI
Details

In vowifiservice, there is a possible missing permission check.This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-38456"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-09-04T02:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In vowifiservice, there is a possible missing permission check.This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges",
  "id": "GHSA-v65c-235x-cvqh",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T07:23:44Z",
  "published": "2023-09-04T03:30:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-38456"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.unisoc.com/en_us/secy/announcementDetail/https://www.unisoc.com/en_us/secy/announcementDetail/1698296481653522434"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V65R-WC6R-R9X8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:43 – Updated: 2022-08-31 00:00
VLAI
Details

A missing user check in Nextcloud prior to 20.0.6 inadvertently populates a user's own credentials for other users external storage configuration when not already configured yet.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-22877"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-03-03T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A missing user check in Nextcloud prior to 20.0.6 inadvertently populates a user\u0027s own credentials for other users external storage configuration when not already configured yet.",
  "id": "GHSA-v65r-wc6r-r9x8",
  "modified": "2022-08-31T00:00:19Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:43:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22877"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nextcloud/server/issues/24600"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nextcloud/server/pull/25224"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/1061591"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/L6BO6P6MP2MOWA6PZRXX32PLWPXN5O4S"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nextcloud.com/security/advisory/?id=NC-SA-2021-004"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V673-63F5-WPV8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-26 21:36 – Updated: 2026-10-30 21:31
VLAI
Details

An authorization issue was addressed with improved access control. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27.2, macOS Sequoia 15.8.2, macOS Tahoe 26.7.2. An application may be able to execute arbitrary code with system privileges.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-112677"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-26T21:18:01Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An authorization issue was addressed with improved access control. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27.2, macOS Sequoia 15.8.2, macOS Tahoe 26.7.2. An application may be able to execute arbitrary code with system privileges.",
  "id": "GHSA-v673-63f5-wpv8",
  "modified": "2026-10-30T21:31:59Z",
  "published": "2026-10-26T21:36:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112677"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/149521"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/149522"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/149523"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V684-Q882-JGMQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 17:56 – Updated: 2026-09-08 17:56
VLAI
Summary
SiYuan: The publish-access gate treats encrypted notebooks as publicly accessible by default, allowing anonymous readers to retrieve fully decrypted document content while a notebook is unlocked
Details

CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72789.

Summary

publishAccess.json is an opt-out list. The publish gate returns accessible for anything not explicitly listed in it. Encrypted notebooks are never written into that file, because only the administrator-gated setPublishAccess writes it and no part of the encryption subsystem does. Consequently every encrypted notebook is publish-accessible as far as the gate is concerned.

While an encrypted notebook is unlocked, an anonymous reader in publish mode can list it, enumerate its documents, and retrieve their fully decrypted content. No key material, no password, and no cracking is involved. The kernel decrypts the data and serves it because the authorization layer never asks whether the notebook is encrypted.

This is reported as a defect in the gate rather than in any individual handler. Endpoints that were previously reviewed and found to apply the correct checks do apply them. The checks return true.

Details

The gate defaults to accessible. CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(box, path, ignore) iterates the ignore list and returns false only on a match:

for _, item := range publishIgnore {
    if item.ID == box || strings.Contains(path, item.ID) {
        return false
    }
}
return true   // unlisted means accessible

Encrypted notebooks are never listed. publishAccess.json is written only by setPublishAccess (kernel/api/router.go:169), which carries CheckAdminRole and CheckReadonly. Nothing in crypto.go, encrypted_ops.go or notebook_crypto.go writes to it. An administrator would have to manually add each encrypted notebook to the ignore list to protect it, and nothing in the product prompts or documents that.

Neither core gate rejects them. On both eef105683 and v3.7.4-alpha.1:

func checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess(...) bool {
    return CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) &&
           (password == "" || CheckPublishAuthCookie(c, passwordID, password))
}

For an encrypted notebook the first term is true because it is unlisted, and the second is true because encrypted notebooks carry no publish password. The conjunction returns true.

IsEncryptedBox does not appear in kernel/model/publish_access.go at all on master. On the development branch it appears once, inside parseAttributeViewForPublishAccess, where it routes into encrypted boxes rather than excluding them. The publish authorization layer has no concept of an encrypted notebook.

The chain. Verified on the development branch, which is the harder target because the block-metadata, attribute-view, path-resolution and encrypted-notebook-status fixes have all landed there.

  1. lsNotebooks calls ListNotebooks(), which includes encrypted notebooks and reports Encrypted: boxConf.Encrypted without filtering on it. The reader filter skips only notebooks that are Closed or publish-invisible. An unlocked encrypted notebook is neither, so it is returned to an anonymous reader together with its identifier.
  2. listDocsByPath{notebook: <encrypted box id>, path: "/"} applies only CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore, which passes, returning the document identifiers and titles inside the encrypted notebook.
  3. getDoc routes to GetDocInBox(...), after which FilterContentByPublishAccess(...) returns the content unmodified because the box is unlisted. The response is the fully decrypted document. getBlockKramdown reaches GetBlockKramdownInBox for the same result in Markdown.

Handlers reach the decrypted store through encryptedNotebookFromArg(arg) on a client-supplied notebook argument. This function predates the current release and is not a recent addition.

The precondition is the unlock window. GetBlockTreeInBox returns nil while a notebook is locked, treating it as nonexistent, and non-nil once unlocked. So the exposure is bounded to the period during which the legitimate user has the notebook open, which is precisely the period in which they are working in it. No action by the attacker triggers or extends that window, but no unusual condition is required either.

On endpoints previously assessed as correctly gated. getBlockDOM and getBlockKramdown apply password and visibility checks. exportPreview applies FilterContentByPublishAccess. Those assessments are accurate and this report does not contradict them. The checks execute and return true, because the visibility term resolves to accessible for an unlisted box and the password term is vacuous for a notebook that has no publish password. Patching any individual handler would not change that result.

Proof of Concept

Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808), anonymous when Publish.Auth.Enable is false, otherwise any publish reader account. An encrypted notebook that is currently unlocked by the legitimate user.

Step 1, obtain the encrypted notebook's identifier:

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/notebook/lsNotebooks
{}

→ 200. The list includes the encrypted notebook, with encrypted: true and its id.

Step 2, enumerate its documents:

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/listDocsByPath
{"notebook":"<encrypted box id>","path":"/"}

→ 200, document identifiers and titles from inside the encrypted notebook

Step 3, retrieve decrypted content:

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/getDoc
{"id":"<document id from step 2>"}

→ 200, the fully decrypted document

getBlockKramdown returns the same content as decrypted Markdown. Repeating step 3 while the notebook is locked returns not-found, which confirms the unlock window is the only thing standing between an anonymous reader and the plaintext.

Impact

The confidentiality guarantee of the encrypted-notebook feature is defeated against a remote, unauthenticated attacker for as long as the notebook is unlocked. A user who encrypts a notebook is expressing that its contents should be protected beyond the ordinary publish boundary. The publish gate does not recognise that intent, and instead treats the notebook as publicly readable because nobody added it to an opt-out list that the encryption feature does not write to.

The exposure is full document content rather than metadata, and it applies to every document in the notebook. It requires no key material, no password, no offline work and no interaction with the encryption subsystem at all.

Suggested fix

Fail closed on encryption, independently of publishAccess.json:

if IsEncryptedBox(bt.BoxID) {
    return false
}

in both checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess and CheckBlockTreeMetadataAccessableByPublishAccess, and exclude encrypted notebooks from lsNotebooks and listDocsByPath for read-only roles.

The broader point is the default. An opt-out authorization list means every future notebook type, storage backend or content class is publicly accessible until somebody remembers to add it. Encrypted notebooks are the case where that default is most clearly wrong, but they are unlikely to be the only one.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260726020813-a25c2dd06aae"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-72789"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T17:56:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72789](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72789).\n\n### Summary\n\n`publishAccess.json` is an opt-out list. The publish gate returns *accessible* for anything not explicitly listed in it. Encrypted notebooks are never written into that file, because only the administrator-gated `setPublishAccess` writes it and no part of the encryption subsystem does. Consequently every encrypted notebook is publish-accessible as far as the gate is concerned.\n\nWhile an encrypted notebook is unlocked, an anonymous reader in publish mode can list it, enumerate its documents, and retrieve their fully decrypted content. No key material, no password, and no cracking is involved. The kernel decrypts the data and serves it because the authorization layer never asks whether the notebook is encrypted.\n\nThis is reported as a defect in the gate rather than in any individual handler. Endpoints that were previously reviewed and found to apply the correct checks do apply them. The checks return true.\n\n### Details\n\n**The gate defaults to accessible.** `CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(box, path, ignore)` iterates the ignore list and returns false only on a match:\n\n```go\nfor _, item := range publishIgnore {\n    if item.ID == box || strings.Contains(path, item.ID) {\n        return false\n    }\n}\nreturn true   // unlisted means accessible\n```\n\n**Encrypted notebooks are never listed.** `publishAccess.json` is written only by `setPublishAccess` (`kernel/api/router.go:169`), which carries `CheckAdminRole` and `CheckReadonly`. Nothing in `crypto.go`, `encrypted_ops.go` or `notebook_crypto.go` writes to it. An administrator would have to manually add each encrypted notebook to the ignore list to protect it, and nothing in the product prompts or documents that.\n\n**Neither core gate rejects them.** On both `eef105683` and `v3.7.4-alpha.1`:\n\n```go\nfunc checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess(...) bool {\n    return CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) \u0026\u0026\n           (password == \"\" || CheckPublishAuthCookie(c, passwordID, password))\n}\n```\n\nFor an encrypted notebook the first term is true because it is unlisted, and the second is true because encrypted notebooks carry no publish password. The conjunction returns true.\n\n`IsEncryptedBox` does not appear in `kernel/model/publish_access.go` at all on master. On the development branch it appears once, inside `parseAttributeViewForPublishAccess`, where it routes *into* encrypted boxes rather than excluding them. The publish authorization layer has no concept of an encrypted notebook.\n\n**The chain.** Verified on the development branch, which is the harder target because the block-metadata, attribute-view, path-resolution and encrypted-notebook-status fixes have all landed there.\n\n1. `lsNotebooks` calls `ListNotebooks()`, which includes encrypted notebooks and reports `Encrypted: boxConf.Encrypted` without filtering on it. The reader filter skips only notebooks that are `Closed` or publish-invisible. An unlocked encrypted notebook is neither, so it is returned to an anonymous reader together with its identifier.\n2. `listDocsByPath{notebook: \u003cencrypted box id\u003e, path: \"/\"}` applies only `CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore`, which passes, returning the document identifiers and titles inside the encrypted notebook.\n3. `getDoc` routes to `GetDocInBox(...)`, after which `FilterContentByPublishAccess(...)` returns the content unmodified because the box is unlisted. The response is the fully decrypted document. `getBlockKramdown` reaches `GetBlockKramdownInBox` for the same result in Markdown.\n\nHandlers reach the decrypted store through `encryptedNotebookFromArg(arg)` on a client-supplied notebook argument. This function predates the current release and is not a recent addition.\n\n**The precondition is the unlock window.** `GetBlockTreeInBox` returns nil while a notebook is locked, treating it as nonexistent, and non-nil once unlocked. So the exposure is bounded to the period during which the legitimate user has the notebook open, which is precisely the period in which they are working in it. No action by the attacker triggers or extends that window, but no unusual condition is required either.\n\n**On endpoints previously assessed as correctly gated.** `getBlockDOM` and `getBlockKramdown` apply password and visibility checks. `exportPreview` applies `FilterContentByPublishAccess`. Those assessments are accurate and this report does not contradict them. The checks execute and return true, because the visibility term resolves to accessible for an unlisted box and the password term is vacuous for a notebook that has no publish password. Patching any individual handler would not change that result.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nPrecondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808), anonymous when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`, otherwise any publish reader account. An encrypted notebook that is currently unlocked by the legitimate user.\n\nStep 1, obtain the encrypted notebook\u0027s identifier:\n\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/notebook/lsNotebooks\n{}\n\n\u2192 200. The list includes the encrypted notebook, with encrypted: true and its id.\n```\n\nStep 2, enumerate its documents:\n\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/listDocsByPath\n{\"notebook\":\"\u003cencrypted box id\u003e\",\"path\":\"/\"}\n\n\u2192 200, document identifiers and titles from inside the encrypted notebook\n```\n\nStep 3, retrieve decrypted content:\n\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/filetree/getDoc\n{\"id\":\"\u003cdocument id from step 2\u003e\"}\n\n\u2192 200, the fully decrypted document\n```\n\n`getBlockKramdown` returns the same content as decrypted Markdown. Repeating step 3 while the notebook is locked returns not-found, which confirms the unlock window is the only thing standing between an anonymous reader and the plaintext.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe confidentiality guarantee of the encrypted-notebook feature is defeated against a remote, unauthenticated attacker for as long as the notebook is unlocked. A user who encrypts a notebook is expressing that its contents should be protected beyond the ordinary publish boundary. The publish gate does not recognise that intent, and instead treats the notebook as publicly readable because nobody added it to an opt-out list that the encryption feature does not write to.\n\nThe exposure is full document content rather than metadata, and it applies to every document in the notebook. It requires no key material, no password, no offline work and no interaction with the encryption subsystem at all.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nFail closed on encryption, independently of `publishAccess.json`:\n\n```go\nif IsEncryptedBox(bt.BoxID) {\n    return false\n}\n```\n\nin both `checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess` and `CheckBlockTreeMetadataAccessableByPublishAccess`, and exclude encrypted notebooks from `lsNotebooks` and `listDocsByPath` for read-only roles.\n\nThe broader point is the default. An opt-out authorization list means every future notebook type, storage backend or content class is publicly accessible until somebody remembers to add it. Encrypted notebooks are the case where that default is most clearly wrong, but they are unlikely to be the only one.",
  "id": "GHSA-v684-q882-jgmq",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T17:56:07Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T17:56:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-v684-q882-jgmq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72789"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/a25c2dd06aae13d1de70cc61cbf98169689c9d86"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-authentication-bypass-via-encrypted-notebooks"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan: The publish-access gate treats encrypted notebooks as publicly accessible by default, allowing anonymous readers to retrieve fully decrypted document content while a notebook is unlocked"
}

GHSA-V68F-887P-PHW7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-01 15:31 – Updated: 2024-11-01 15:31
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in MagePeople Team WpTravelly allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs.This issue affects WpTravelly: from n/a through 1.7.7.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-43212"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-01T15:15:41Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in MagePeople Team WpTravelly allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs.This issue affects WpTravelly: from n/a through 1.7.7.",
  "id": "GHSA-v68f-887p-phw7",
  "modified": "2024-11-01T15:31:59Z",
  "published": "2024-11-01T15:31:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43212"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/tour-booking-manager/wordpress-wptravelly-plugin-1-7-7-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V699-7HV5-HCCX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-07 06:31 – Updated: 2026-11-07 06:31
VLAI
Details

IBM API Connect 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow low-privileged users to query arbitrary indices and read sensitive data due to missing authorization.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-19131"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-07T05:19:01Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM API Connect 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow low-privileged users to query arbitrary indices and read sensitive data due to missing authorization.",
  "id": "GHSA-v699-7hv5-hccx",
  "modified": "2026-11-07T06:31:23Z",
  "published": "2026-11-07T06:31:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19131"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7295635"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.