Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-862

Allowed-with-Review

Missing Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

18003 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-GH98-4PHW-6FMW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 20:36 – Updated: 2026-10-07 20:36
VLAI
Summary
Langflow : Cross-user flow access and vertex execution via deprecated /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/vertices endpoints
Details

Summary

Before Langflow 1.10.1, two deprecated but still-routed endpoints in the chat API did not check that the authenticated caller owns the flow referenced in the URL path:

  • POST /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/vertices (retrieve_vertices_order)
  • POST /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/vertices/{vertex_id} (build_vertex)

Any authenticated user who knows (or obtains) another user's flow_id could load that user's private flow graph, enumerate its vertex IDs, and build (execute) individual vertices of it, receiving the vertex results in the response.

Both routes are declared with deprecated=True, include_in_schema=False, so they do not appear in the OpenAPI docs, but they remained registered on the router. The Langflow UI no longer calls them (it uses POST /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/flow), so they are only reachable by direct HTTP requests.

The issue is fixed in Langflow 1.10.1 (langflow-base 0.10.1) by #13153.

Details

In affected versions, both handlers go straight to the graph loader:

  • retrieve_vertices_order (src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/chat.py, lines 81-159 in 1.9.1) only required authentication via dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)]. The user was never injected into the handler, and the flow was loaded with build_graph_from_db(flow_id=flow_id, ...).
  • build_vertex (chat.py, lines 320-491 in 1.9.1) receives current_user, but only uses it for variable resolution (user_id=str(current_user.id)). It is never used to scope the flow lookup. The graph is taken from the chat-service cache keyed by flow_id, or rebuilt with build_graph_from_db on a cache miss.
  • build_graph_from_db_no_cache (src/backend/base/langflow/api/utils/flow_utils.py) does a bare primary-key lookup, session.get(Flow, flow_id), with no owner filter.

The supported replacement, POST /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/flow, already restricted the lookup to the owner or a PUBLIC flow (added in #12305 for GHSA-qj98-rhf8-v93f). The deprecated siblings were not covered by that fix, nor by the _read_flow fix for GHSA-8c4j-f57c-35cf.

Additional side effects in affected versions:

  • retrieve_vertices_order stores the graph in the chat-service cache under the victim's flow_id (chat_service.set_cache(str(flow_id), graph)). When the request includes a data body, the cached graph is attacker-supplied.
  • build_vertex schedules log_vertex_build for the victim's flow_id, so attacker-triggered builds are recorded in the victim flow's vertex build history.

Note on older versions: up to and including 1.7.1, these two routes had no authentication dependency at all. Authentication was added in 1.7.2 by #10977, but no ownership check was added. This advisory covers the missing ownership check, which is present in every release from 1.0.0 (when the routes were introduced) through 1.10.0.

Attack scenario

  1. The attacker authenticates as any valid user.
  2. The attacker obtains a victim flow_id (shared URLs, exported flow files, logs, screenshots, etc.).
  3. POST /api/v1/build/{victim_flow_id}/vertices returns 200 OK with {"ids": [...], "run_id": "...", "vertices_to_run": [...]} listing the victim flow's vertex IDs (component type plus suffix, e.g. ChatInput-abc12).
  4. The attacker calls POST /api/v1/build/{victim_flow_id}/vertices/{vertex_id} for a returned ID. The victim's graph is loaded and the vertex is built. Its results, outputs and artifacts are returned to the attacker.

Impact

  • Confidentiality (Low): Discloses the structure of private flows (vertex IDs and component types) and the outputs of vertices the attacker chooses to build. That includes values hardcoded in node configuration, such as prompt text or fixed inputs.
  • Global variables and credentials in the variable store are not exposed, because variable resolution uses the caller's user_id.
  • The victim's stored flow definition is not returned wholesale.
  • Integrity (Low): The attacker can trigger execution of the victim's nodes, including any side effects baked into their configuration (fixed endpoints, webhooks, hardcoded API keys). Build records are written under the victim's flow_id. The attacker cannot modify the stored flow.
  • Availability: None.

The attacker must be authenticated and must know the target flow UUID. Flow UUIDs are random v4 values, so blind enumeration is not practical.

Proof of concept

Observed on langflow==1.9.1 using the project's test client and in-memory SQLite fixtures (see the attached poc.zip):

Request Expected (hardened) Observed on 1.9.1
Attacker → POST /api/v1/build/{victim_flow_id}/vertices 404 Not Found 200 OK with vertex order payload
Attacker → POST /api/v1/build/{victim_flow_id}/vertices/<bogus-id> 404 Not Found 500 {"detail":"Vertex <id> not found"}: the victim graph was loaded before the vertex lookup failed
Owner (control) → same endpoints non-404 non-404

On 1.10.1 and later, the attacker requests return 404 Not Found. This is covered by regression tests in src/backend/tests/unit/test_endpoints.py:

  • test_get_vertices_returns_404_for_other_users_private_flow
  • test_get_vertices_with_supplied_data_returns_404_for_other_users_private_flow
  • test_build_vertex_returns_404_for_other_users_private_flow

Patches

Fixed in Langflow 1.10.1 (langflow-base 0.10.1) by #13153 (merge commit fb3d6ec90b). Both handlers now:

  1. inject current_user (for retrieve_vertices_order, this replaces the dependencies-only declaration),
  2. load the flow with an owner-scoped query and return 404 when it is not found, so a flow you don't own looks the same as a missing flow, and
  3. call ensure_flow_permission(current_user, FlowAction.EXECUTE, ...) before building or caching any graph.
# retrieve_vertices_order / build_vertex (1.10.1)
stmt = (
    select(Flow)
    .where(Flow.id == flow_id)
    .where((Flow.user_id == current_user.id) | (Flow.access_type == AccessTypeEnum.PUBLIC))
)
flow = (await session.exec(stmt)).first()
if not flow:
    raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Flow with id {flow_id} not found")
await ensure_flow_permission(
    current_user,
    FlowAction.EXECUTE,
    flow_id=flow_id,
    flow_user_id=flow.user_id,
    workspace_id=flow.workspace_id,
    folder_id=flow.folder_id,
)

Related hardening in later releases:

  • #14342 (1.11.2) applies the same guard to the sibling GET /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/{vertex_id}/stream route.
  • #14497 (1.12.0) makes all three deprecated vertex routes owner-only, dropping the PUBLIC exception, because their graph cache is keyed by flow UUID rather than by the executing user.

Users should upgrade to 1.10.1 or later. The latest release is recommended.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, block POST /api/v1/build/*/vertices and POST /api/v1/build/*/vertices/* (and GET /api/v1/build/*/*/stream) at a reverse proxy. The Langflow UI does not use these routes.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "langflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.10.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "langflow-base"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-105698"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T20:36:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-05T21:16:35Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nBefore **Langflow 1.10.1**, two deprecated but still-routed endpoints in the chat API did not check that the authenticated caller owns the flow referenced in the URL path:\n\n- `POST /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/vertices` (`retrieve_vertices_order`)\n- `POST /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/vertices/{vertex_id}` (`build_vertex`)\n\nAny authenticated user who knows (or obtains) another user\u0027s `flow_id` could load that user\u0027s private flow graph, enumerate its vertex IDs, and build (execute) individual vertices of it, receiving the vertex results in the response.\n\nBoth routes are declared with `deprecated=True, include_in_schema=False`, so they do not appear in the OpenAPI docs, but they remained registered on the router. The Langflow UI no longer calls them (it uses `POST /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/flow`), so they are only reachable by direct HTTP requests.\n\nThe issue is fixed in **Langflow 1.10.1** (`langflow-base` 0.10.1) by [#13153](https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/13153).\n\n### Details\n\nIn affected versions, both handlers go straight to the graph loader:\n\n- `retrieve_vertices_order` (`src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/chat.py`, lines 81-159 in 1.9.1) only required authentication via `dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)]`. The user was never injected into the handler, and the flow was loaded with `build_graph_from_db(flow_id=flow_id, ...)`.\n- `build_vertex` (`chat.py`, lines 320-491 in 1.9.1) receives `current_user`, but only uses it for variable resolution (`user_id=str(current_user.id)`). It is never used to scope the flow lookup. The graph is taken from the chat-service cache keyed by `flow_id`, or rebuilt with `build_graph_from_db` on a cache miss.\n- `build_graph_from_db_no_cache` (`src/backend/base/langflow/api/utils/flow_utils.py`) does a bare primary-key lookup, `session.get(Flow, flow_id)`, with no owner filter.\n\nThe supported replacement, `POST /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/flow`, already restricted the lookup to the owner or a `PUBLIC` flow (added in #12305 for GHSA-qj98-rhf8-v93f). The deprecated siblings were not covered by that fix, nor by the `_read_flow` fix for GHSA-8c4j-f57c-35cf.\n\nAdditional side effects in affected versions:\n\n- `retrieve_vertices_order` stores the graph in the chat-service cache under the victim\u0027s `flow_id` (`chat_service.set_cache(str(flow_id), graph)`). When the request includes a `data` body, the cached graph is attacker-supplied.\n- `build_vertex` schedules `log_vertex_build` for the victim\u0027s `flow_id`, so attacker-triggered builds are recorded in the victim flow\u0027s vertex build history.\n\nNote on older versions: up to and including **1.7.1**, these two routes had no authentication dependency at all. Authentication was added in 1.7.2 by #10977, but no ownership check was added. This advisory covers the missing ownership check, which is present in every release from 1.0.0 (when the routes were introduced) through 1.10.0.\n\n### Attack scenario\n\n1. The attacker authenticates as any valid user.\n2. The attacker obtains a victim `flow_id` (shared URLs, exported flow files, logs, screenshots, etc.).\n3. `POST /api/v1/build/{victim_flow_id}/vertices` returns **200 OK** with `{\"ids\": [...], \"run_id\": \"...\", \"vertices_to_run\": [...]}` listing the victim flow\u0027s vertex IDs (component type plus suffix, e.g. `ChatInput-abc12`).\n4. The attacker calls `POST /api/v1/build/{victim_flow_id}/vertices/{vertex_id}` for a returned ID. The victim\u0027s graph is loaded and the vertex is built. Its results, outputs and artifacts are returned to the attacker.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Confidentiality (Low):** Discloses the structure of private flows (vertex IDs and component types) and the outputs of vertices the attacker chooses to build. That includes values hardcoded in node configuration, such as prompt text or fixed inputs.\n  - Global variables and credentials in the variable store are **not** exposed, because variable resolution uses the caller\u0027s `user_id`.\n  - The victim\u0027s stored flow definition is not returned wholesale.\n- **Integrity (Low):** The attacker can trigger execution of the victim\u0027s nodes, including any side effects baked into their configuration (fixed endpoints, webhooks, hardcoded API keys). Build records are written under the victim\u0027s `flow_id`. The attacker cannot modify the stored flow.\n- **Availability:** None.\n\nThe attacker must be authenticated and must know the target flow UUID. Flow UUIDs are random v4 values, so blind enumeration is not practical.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nObserved on `langflow==1.9.1` using the project\u0027s test client and in-memory SQLite fixtures (see the attached `poc.zip`):\n\n| Request | Expected (hardened) | Observed on 1.9.1 |\n|---|---|---|\n| Attacker \u2192 `POST /api/v1/build/{victim_flow_id}/vertices` | `404 Not Found` | `200 OK` with vertex order payload |\n| Attacker \u2192 `POST /api/v1/build/{victim_flow_id}/vertices/\u003cbogus-id\u003e` | `404 Not Found` | `500` `{\"detail\":\"Vertex \u003cid\u003e not found\"}`: the victim graph was loaded before the vertex lookup failed |\n| Owner (control) \u2192 same endpoints | non-404 | non-404 |\n\nOn 1.10.1 and later, the attacker requests return `404 Not Found`. This is covered by regression tests in `src/backend/tests/unit/test_endpoints.py`:\n\n- `test_get_vertices_returns_404_for_other_users_private_flow`\n- `test_get_vertices_with_supplied_data_returns_404_for_other_users_private_flow`\n- `test_build_vertex_returns_404_for_other_users_private_flow`\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **Langflow 1.10.1** (`langflow-base` 0.10.1) by [#13153](https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/13153) (merge commit `fb3d6ec90b`). Both handlers now:\n\n1. inject `current_user` (for `retrieve_vertices_order`, this replaces the dependencies-only declaration),\n2. load the flow with an owner-scoped query and return `404` when it is not found, so a flow you don\u0027t own looks the same as a missing flow, and\n3. call `ensure_flow_permission(current_user, FlowAction.EXECUTE, ...)` before building or caching any graph.\n\n```python\n# retrieve_vertices_order / build_vertex (1.10.1)\nstmt = (\n    select(Flow)\n    .where(Flow.id == flow_id)\n    .where((Flow.user_id == current_user.id) | (Flow.access_type == AccessTypeEnum.PUBLIC))\n)\nflow = (await session.exec(stmt)).first()\nif not flow:\n    raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f\"Flow with id {flow_id} not found\")\nawait ensure_flow_permission(\n    current_user,\n    FlowAction.EXECUTE,\n    flow_id=flow_id,\n    flow_user_id=flow.user_id,\n    workspace_id=flow.workspace_id,\n    folder_id=flow.folder_id,\n)\n```\n\nRelated hardening in later releases:\n\n- [#14342](https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/14342) (1.11.2) applies the same guard to the sibling `GET /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/{vertex_id}/stream` route.\n- [#14497](https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/14497) (1.12.0) makes all three deprecated vertex routes owner-only, dropping the `PUBLIC` exception, because their graph cache is keyed by flow UUID rather than by the executing user.\n\nUsers should upgrade to **1.10.1 or later**. The latest release is recommended.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, block `POST /api/v1/build/*/vertices` and `POST /api/v1/build/*/vertices/*` (and `GET /api/v1/build/*/*/stream`) at a reverse proxy. The Langflow UI does not use these routes.",
  "id": "GHSA-gh98-4phw-6fmw",
  "modified": "2026-10-07T20:36:25Z",
  "published": "2026-10-07T20:36:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-gh98-4phw-6fmw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105698"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/13153"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/fb3d6ec90b1e4d52eaa40915a64b1f86b6542f55"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases/tag/v1.10.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Langflow : Cross-user flow access and vertex execution via deprecated /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/vertices endpoints"
}

GHSA-GH9M-CJ69-97GH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-23 15:31 – Updated: 2026-01-26 21:30
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in sumup SumUp Payment Gateway For WooCommerce sumup-payment-gateway-for-woocommerce allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects SumUp Payment Gateway For WooCommerce: from n/a through <= 2.7.9.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-24583"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-23T15:16:16Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in sumup SumUp Payment Gateway For WooCommerce sumup-payment-gateway-for-woocommerce allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects SumUp Payment Gateway For WooCommerce: from n/a through \u003c= 2.7.9.",
  "id": "GHSA-gh9m-cj69-97gh",
  "modified": "2026-01-26T21:30:36Z",
  "published": "2026-01-23T15:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24583"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/sumup-payment-gateway-for-woocommerce/vulnerability/wordpress-sumup-payment-gateway-for-woocommerce-plugin-2-7-9-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GHC4-9M25-367H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 18:31
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization in the drop handling path of the drag and drop protocol in kitty from 0.47.0 before 0.49.0 allows a program writing to the terminal to obtain the contents of files dragged over the window even when the user never completes the drop, because drop_enqueue_request() in kitty/dnd.c serves a drag data request without first checking the drop state of the window, so a client that issues the request while a drag is merely hovering receives the data offered for the drag. In the same file, drop_left_child(), which runs when the drag leaves the window without a drop having occurred, releases the offered MIME list but retains the pending request state, the open file descriptor and its main loop transfer timer, the directory handles, the URI list and the pending MIME name, so a client can continue to read through a retained directory handle, and an in-flight file transfer continues to stream, when no drag is in progress. The file contents are read from the filesystem by the kitty process itself using the paths the drag source offered. This results in disclosure of the contents of files the user moved over the window without ever releasing them into it.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-80432"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T17:17:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization in the drop handling path of the drag and drop protocol in kitty from 0.47.0 before 0.49.0 allows a program writing to the terminal to obtain the contents of files dragged over the window even when the user never completes the drop, because drop_enqueue_request() in kitty/dnd.c serves a drag data request without first checking the drop state of the window, so a client that issues the request while a drag is merely hovering receives the data offered for the drag. In the same file, drop_left_child(), which runs when the drag leaves the window without a drop having occurred, releases the offered MIME list but retains the pending request state, the open file descriptor and its main loop transfer timer, the directory handles, the URI list and the pending MIME name, so a client can continue to read through a retained directory handle, and an in-flight file transfer continues to stream, when no drag is in progress. The file contents are read from the filesystem by the kitty process itself using the paths the drag source offered. This results in disclosure of the contents of files the user moved over the window without ever releasing them into it.",
  "id": "GHSA-ghc4-9m25-367h",
  "modified": "2026-09-25T18:31:27Z",
  "published": "2026-09-25T18:31:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80432"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/commit/026d11f517da17bfd3c35ea502057babdfbe5828"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/releases/tag/v0.49.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://secur0.com/en/cna/cve-list/cve-2026-80432-kitty-dnd-data-before-drop"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GHFG-9R57-CHQV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:34
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in Joao Romao Social Share Buttons & Analytics Plugin – GetSocial.io allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects Social Share Buttons & Analytics Plugin – GetSocial.io: from n/a through 4.5.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-32239"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-04T16:15:33Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Joao Romao Social Share Buttons \u0026 Analytics Plugin \u2013 GetSocial.io allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects Social Share Buttons \u0026 Analytics Plugin \u2013 GetSocial.io: from n/a through 4.5.",
  "id": "GHSA-ghfg-9r57-chqv",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:34:32Z",
  "published": "2025-04-04T18:31:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32239"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/wp-share-buttons-analytics-by-getsocial/vulnerability/wordpress-social-share-buttons-analytics-plugin-plugin-4-5-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GHG6-RFG3-53G7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-02 18:31 – Updated: 2024-10-02 18:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the REST API endpoints of Cisco NDFC could allow an authenticated, low-privileged, remote attacker to read or write files on an affected device.

This vulnerability exists because of missing authorization controls on some REST API endpoints. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted API requests to an affected endpoint. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to perform limited network-admin functions such as reading device configuration information, uploading files, and modifying uploaded files. Note: This vulnerability only affects a subset of REST API endpoints and does not affect the web-based management interface.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-20438"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-02T17:15:15Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the REST API endpoints of Cisco NDFC could allow an authenticated, low-privileged, remote attacker to read or write files on an affected device.\n\nThis vulnerability exists because of missing authorization controls on some REST API endpoints. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted API requests to an affected endpoint. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to perform limited network-admin functions such as reading device configuration information, uploading files, and modifying uploaded files.\nNote: This vulnerability only affects a subset of REST API endpoints and does not affect the web-based management interface.",
  "id": "GHSA-ghg6-rfg3-53g7",
  "modified": "2024-10-02T18:31:32Z",
  "published": "2024-10-02T18:31:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20438"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ndhs-uaapi-Jh4V6zpN"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GHGW-M72F-XX8V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-09 12:30 – Updated: 2024-06-09 12:30
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in MainWP MainWP UpdraftPlus Extension.This issue affects MainWP UpdraftPlus Extension: from n/a through 4.0.6.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-23640"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-09T10:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in MainWP MainWP UpdraftPlus Extension.This issue affects MainWP UpdraftPlus Extension: from n/a through 4.0.6.",
  "id": "GHSA-ghgw-m72f-xx8v",
  "modified": "2024-06-09T12:30:51Z",
  "published": "2024-06-09T12:30:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23640"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/mainwp-updraftplus-extension/wordpress-mainwp-updraftplus-extension-plugin-4-0-6-subscriber-arbitrary-plugin-activation-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GHH4-X4M2-G9RC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-11 00:31 – Updated: 2026-10-11 00:31
VLAI
Details

JeecgBoot through 3.9.5 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in GET /sys/api/getUserByName that allows low-privileged authenticated users to retrieve any user's stored password value. Attackers can decrypt the AES-CBC protected response using the hard-coded key exposed by /sys/getEncryptedString to obtain administrators' password ciphertexts for offline guessing.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-108677"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-10T22:16:44Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "JeecgBoot through 3.9.5 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in GET /sys/api/getUserByName that allows low-privileged authenticated users to retrieve any user\u0027s stored password value. Attackers can decrypt the AES-CBC protected response using the hard-coded key exposed by /sys/getEncryptedString to obtain administrators\u0027 password ciphertexts for offline guessing.",
  "id": "GHSA-ghh4-x4m2-g9rc",
  "modified": "2026-10-11T00:31:00Z",
  "published": "2026-10-11T00:31:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-108677"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AnkesKasty/cve-request-poc/blob/a7b6d1423555812d8efa26c91c5d0683164b31e5/JeecgBoot/poc_sys_api_credential_family.py"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jeecgboot/JeecgBoot/blob/e3b9dc0aefe1943d9772b026f64ed671a7c82802/jeecg-boot/jeecg-module-system/jeecg-system-biz/src/main/java/org/jeecg/modules/api/controller/SystemApiController.java#L100-L110"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/jeecgboot-through-3.9.5-missing-authorization-via-sys-api-getuserbyname"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GHHH-C933-5QF5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-30 18:33 – Updated: 2026-09-30 18:33
VLAI
Details

Unauthenticated Broken Access Control in Ultimate Maps by Supsystic <= 1.5.5 versions.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-102397"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-30T18:18:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Unauthenticated Broken Access Control in Ultimate Maps by Supsystic \u003c= 1.5.5 versions.",
  "id": "GHSA-ghhh-c933-5qf5",
  "modified": "2026-09-30T18:33:50Z",
  "published": "2026-09-30T18:33:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102397"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/ultimate-maps-by-supsystic/vulnerability/wordpress-ultimate-maps-by-supsystic-plugin-1-5-5-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GHJ3-QM3P-98MW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 21:31 – Updated: 2026-03-13 21:31
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in WPClever WPC Smart Wishlist for WooCommerce woo-smart-wishlist allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects WPC Smart Wishlist for WooCommerce: from n/a through <= 5.0.8.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32407"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-13T19:54:57Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in WPClever WPC Smart Wishlist for WooCommerce woo-smart-wishlist allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects WPC Smart Wishlist for WooCommerce: from n/a through \u003c= 5.0.8.",
  "id": "GHSA-ghj3-qm3p-98mw",
  "modified": "2026-03-13T21:31:49Z",
  "published": "2026-03-13T21:31:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32407"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/woo-smart-wishlist/vulnerability/wordpress-wpc-smart-wishlist-for-woocommerce-plugin-5-0-8-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GHJH-7RVR-7JMM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-10 09:31 – Updated: 2024-06-10 09:31
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in RabbitLoader.This issue affects RabbitLoader: from n/a through 2.19.13.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-21751"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-10T08:15:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in RabbitLoader.This issue affects RabbitLoader: from n/a through 2.19.13.",
  "id": "GHSA-ghjh-7rvr-7jmm",
  "modified": "2024-06-10T09:31:03Z",
  "published": "2024-06-10T09:31:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21751"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/rabbit-loader/wordpress-rabbitloader-plugin-2-19-13-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.