CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
9644 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-QCJQ-FF52-GPFQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 00:00 – Updated: 2022-05-24 00:01An OS command injection vulnerability exists in the httpd wlscan_ASP functionality of InHand Networks InRouter302 V3.5.4. A specially-crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary command execution. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-26085"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-12T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An OS command injection vulnerability exists in the httpd wlscan_ASP functionality of InHand Networks InRouter302 V3.5.4. A specially-crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary command execution. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-qcjq-ff52-gpfq",
"modified": "2022-05-24T00:01:33Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T00:00:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26085"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2022-1473"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.inhandnetworks.com/upload/attachment/202205/10/InHand-PSA-2022-01.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QCP8-W359-4V36
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-06 12:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:31Multiple TP-LINK products allow a network-adjacent unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands. Affected products/versions are as follows: TL-WR802N firmware versions prior to 'TL-WR802N(JP)_V4_221008', TL-WR841N firmware versions prior to 'TL-WR841N(JP)_V14_230506', and TL-WR902AC firmware versions prior to 'TL-WR902AC(JP)_V3_230506'.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-36489"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-06T10:15:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple TP-LINK products allow a network-adjacent unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands. Affected products/versions are as follows: TL-WR802N firmware versions prior to \u0027TL-WR802N(JP)_V4_221008\u0027, TL-WR841N firmware versions prior to \u0027TL-WR841N(JP)_V14_230506\u0027, and TL-WR902AC firmware versions prior to \u0027TL-WR902AC(JP)_V3_230506\u0027.",
"id": "GHSA-qcp8-w359-4v36",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:31:37Z",
"published": "2023-09-06T12:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36489"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/vu/JVNVU99392903"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tp-link.com/jp/support/download/tl-wr802n/#Firmware"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tp-link.com/jp/support/download/tl-wr841n/v14/#Firmware"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tp-link.com/jp/support/download/tl-wr902ac/#Firmware"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QCPP-8X79-HHP3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-17 16:36 – Updated: 2026-08-17 16:36Summary
The Glances action system lets an administrator configure shell commands that run
when a monitoring threshold is crossed. The command is a Mustache template whose
variables are filled with runtime stat fields such as a process name, a container
name or a filesystem mount point. Those fields are attacker-influenceable: a
local, unprivileged user who starts a process (or a container) controls its name
and command line. The rendered command is executed by secure_popen(), which
interprets &&, | and > as chaining / pipe / redirection operators.
glances/actions.py defends against this with _sanitize_mustache_dict(), which
strips those operators from each individual template value before rendering.
The sanitization is applied per field, but the operators are reconstructed
across the boundary of two adjacent template variables after Mustache
rendering. When an action template concatenates two unescaped variables
({{{a}}}{{{b}}} or {{&a}}{{&b}}) and the attacker makes the first value end
with & and the second begin with &, the rendered command contains a real
&&, and secure_popen() executes the injected command. The single-& in each
value passes the per-field filter untouched.
Affected versions
glances <= 4.5.5 (verified against the published PyPI release 4.5.5, the
latest at the time of writing; glances.__version__ == "4.5.5"). The
per-field sanitizer _sanitize_mustache_dict() is present and active in this
release. Not patched in any released version.
Privilege required
Two roles are involved:
- A local, unprivileged user (or a container the attacker can name) supplies the attacker-controlled stat values (process/container name, mount point, etc.). This is the same trust boundary the action-template command-injection class already recognises: the attacker controls the process name, not the configuration.
- An administrator has configured an action whose command template concatenates
two unescaped Mustache variables with no separating character
(
{{{name}}}{{{cmdline}}}). Unescaped Mustache ({{{ }}}/{{& }}) is a documented Chevron feature and is the natural choice when the operator wants a value that contains shell-significant characters to reach the command verbatim.
No network access to the target host is required beyond the ability to run a process (or start a named container) on it.
Vulnerable code (file:line)
glances/actions.py:25-46 — the per-field sanitizer:
# glances/actions.py:25
_SHELL_OPERATORS = ('&&', '|', '>>', '>')
def _sanitize_mustache_dict(mustache_dict):
"""Return a copy of mustache_dict with shell operators replaced by spaces."""
if not mustache_dict:
return mustache_dict
safe = {}
for k, v in mustache_dict.items():
if isinstance(v, str):
for op in _SHELL_OPERATORS:
v = v.replace(op, ' ') # per-field only
safe[k] = v
else:
safe[k] = v
return safe
glances/actions.py:100-111 — sanitize-then-render-then-execute:
# glances/actions.py:100
for cmd in commands:
if chevron_tag:
safe_dict = _sanitize_mustache_dict(mustache_dict)
cmd_full = chevron.render(cmd, safe_dict) # concatenation happens here
else:
cmd_full = cmd
ret = secure_popen(cmd_full) # operators interpreted
Root cause
_sanitize_mustache_dict() removes &&, |, >>, > from each value in
isolation. It does not remove a lone &, because a single & is not one of the
listed operators. When two values are rendered next to each other by
chevron.render(), a trailing & from the first value and a leading & from the
second value join into a literal && in cmd_full. secure_popen() then
cmd.split('&&') and runs the second half as a separate subprocess.Popen
(shell=False) process. The same reconstruction works for > written as two
adjacent > characters split across the boundary (...> + >... and the
>>/> stripping is per field), and the sanitizer's own choice to sanitize
before, rather than after, rendering is the defect.
This is an incomplete fix of the action-template command-injection issue
(CVE-2026-32608 / GHSA-vcv2-q258-wrg7): _sanitize_mustache_dict() closes the
single-field case but not the cross-field-reconstruction case. The correct place
to enforce the operator ban is on the fully rendered command string (or by never
letting template-variable data introduce operators), not on the pre-render values
one at a time.
Chevron HTML-escapes &, <, >, " inside standard double-brace {{ }}
sections, so double-brace templates neutralise the && reconstruction. The
reconstruction is reachable specifically through unescaped variables
({{{ }}} / {{& }}), which is why the per-field sanitizer is the sole
remaining control on that path.
Reachability / How input reaches sink
- A local unprivileged user starts a process (or a container) whose
nameends with&and whosecmdlinebegins with& <command>(both are stored verbatim in the plugin stat item). - When the plugin crosses a
warning/criticalthreshold,glances/plugins/plugin/model.pycallsself.actions.runwith the full stat item passed as themustache_dictargument. GlancesActions.runsanitizes each value with_sanitize_mustache_dict()(each keeps its single&), thenchevron.render()concatenates the two adjacent unescaped variables, producing a literal&&in the command string.secure_popen(cmd_full)splits on&&and runs the attacker's segment as a separatesubprocess.Popen(shell=False)process.
The trust boundary crossed is process-name / container-name → shell operator, exactly the boundary the sanitizer was introduced to close.
Reproduction (end-to-end, against pinned version glances==4.5.5)
# 1. Install the latest published release into a clean venv
python3.13 -m venv gv
./gv/bin/pip install "glances==4.5.5"
# 2. Run the reproducer, which drives the real
# glances.actions.GlancesActions.run() pipeline exactly as
# glances/plugins/plugin/model.py invokes it on an alert.
./gv/bin/python repro.py
repro.py:
import os, sys, time
sys.argv = ['glances']
from glances.actions import GlancesActions
MARK = "/tmp/glances_crossfield_pwned"
NEG = MARK + "_neg"
for f in (MARK, NEG):
try: os.remove(f)
except FileNotFoundError: pass
class Args:
time = 0
ga = GlancesActions(args=Args())
# A processlist stat item; a local low-privilege user controls both 'name' and
# 'cmdline' by spawning a process (the established GHSA-vcv2 threat model).
# 'name' ends with '&', 'cmdline' begins with '&' -> '&&' forms across the boundary.
item = {'name': 'evilproc&', 'cmdline': '& touch %s' % MARK,
'pid': 1337, 'cpu_percent': 99.0, 'key': 'pid'}
# NEGATIVE CONTROL: the same values under an ESCAPED double-brace template are
# neutralised by chevron HTML-escaping '&' -> '&'.
neg_item = dict(item); neg_item['cmdline'] = '& touch %s' % NEG
ga.status.clear(); ga.start_timer._start = time.time() - 999
ga.run("pl", "CRITICAL", ["logger p={{name}}{{cmdline}}"], repeat=True, mustache_dict=neg_item)
time.sleep(0.3)
print("NEGATIVE CONTROL (escaped {{name}}{{cmdline}}):",
"INJECTED" if os.path.exists(NEG) else "blocked (expected)")
# POSITIVE: an UNESCAPED template with two adjacent variables. Per-field
# _sanitize_mustache_dict leaves each single '&'; the '&&' operator is
# reconstructed after chevron.render, then split by secure_popen.
ga.status.clear(); ga.start_timer._start = time.time() - 999
ga.run("pl2", "CRITICAL", ["logger p={{{name}}}{{{cmdline}}}"], repeat=True, mustache_dict=item)
time.sleep(0.5)
print("POSITIVE (unescaped {{{name}}}{{{cmdline}}}):",
"INJECTED - 'touch' executed" if os.path.exists(MARK) else "blocked")
Captured output (glances 4.5.5, Python 3.13, x86_64 Linux):
NEGATIVE CONTROL (escaped {{name}}{{cmdline}}): blocked (expected)
POSITIVE (unescaped {{{name}}}{{{cmdline}}}): INJECTED - 'touch' executed
The negative control confirms that the same attacker values under a standard
double-brace template are blocked (chevron escapes &). The positive case shows
the injected touch executing when the template uses two adjacent unescaped
variables: the file /tmp/glances_crossfield_pwned is created by the injected
command, not by the intended logger action.
Impact
- Arbitrary command execution as the OS user running Glances (frequently root on monitored hosts) whenever an operator uses an unescaped, adjacent-variable action template and an attacker controls two neighbouring stat fields.
- The same reconstruction reaches
secure_popen()'s file-redirection (>) and pipe (|) handling, allowing arbitrary file write and output piping in addition to command chaining. - The bypass defeats the dedicated
_sanitize_mustache_dict()control that was added specifically to stop attacker-controlled stat values from injecting shell operators.
Suggested fix
Enforce the operator ban on the rendered command string that comes from
template-variable expansion, rather than on the pre-render values in isolation.
One approach that mirrors the existing helper: render each variable, then reject /
neutralise operators in the concatenated result, or strip lone &/redirection
characters that originate from variable data.
def _sanitize_mustache_dict(mustache_dict):
if not mustache_dict:
return mustache_dict
safe = {}
for k, v in mustache_dict.items():
if isinstance(v, str):
# Neutralise every shell-significant character that secure_popen
# can interpret, including a lone '&' that could pair with an
# adjacent variable to reconstruct '&&'.
for ch in ('&', '|', '>', '<'):
v = v.replace(ch, ' ')
safe[k] = v
else:
safe[k] = v
return safe
Neutralising the single & (and the single > / |) in each value removes the
cross-field reconstruction because no operator character survives on either side
of a variable boundary. Alternatively, sanitize cmd_full after
chevron.render(), or pass the template-derived data as secure_popen(...,
allow_operators=False) when the command originates from stat-field substitution.
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "glances"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68518"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-17T16:36:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe Glances action system lets an administrator configure shell commands that run\nwhen a monitoring threshold is crossed. The command is a Mustache template whose\nvariables are filled with runtime stat fields such as a process name, a container\nname or a filesystem mount point. Those fields are attacker-influenceable: a\nlocal, unprivileged user who starts a process (or a container) controls its name\nand command line. The rendered command is executed by `secure_popen()`, which\ninterprets `\u0026\u0026`, `|` and `\u003e` as chaining / pipe / redirection operators.\n\n`glances/actions.py` defends against this with `_sanitize_mustache_dict()`, which\nstrips those operators from **each individual** template value before rendering.\nThe sanitization is applied per field, but the operators are reconstructed\n**across the boundary of two adjacent template variables** after Mustache\nrendering. When an action template concatenates two unescaped variables\n(`{{{a}}}{{{b}}}` or `{{\u0026a}}{{\u0026b}}`) and the attacker makes the first value end\nwith `\u0026` and the second begin with `\u0026`, the rendered command contains a real\n`\u0026\u0026`, and `secure_popen()` executes the injected command. The single-`\u0026` in each\nvalue passes the per-field filter untouched.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`glances` `\u003c= 4.5.5` (verified against the published PyPI release `4.5.5`, the\nlatest at the time of writing; `glances.__version__ == \"4.5.5\"`). The\nper-field sanitizer `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` is present and active in this\nrelease. Not patched in any released version.\n\n### Privilege required\n\nTwo roles are involved:\n\n- A local, unprivileged user (or a container the attacker can name) supplies the\n attacker-controlled stat values (process/container name, mount point, etc.).\n This is the same trust boundary the action-template command-injection class\n already recognises: the attacker controls the process name, not the\n configuration.\n- An administrator has configured an action whose command template concatenates\n two **unescaped** Mustache variables with no separating character\n (`{{{name}}}{{{cmdline}}}`). Unescaped Mustache (`{{{ }}}` / `{{\u0026 }}`) is a\n documented Chevron feature and is the natural choice when the operator wants a\n value that contains shell-significant characters to reach the command verbatim.\n\nNo network access to the target host is required beyond the ability to run a\nprocess (or start a named container) on it.\n\n### Vulnerable code (file:line)\n\n`glances/actions.py:25-46` \u2014 the per-field sanitizer:\n\n```python\n# glances/actions.py:25\n_SHELL_OPERATORS = (\u0027\u0026\u0026\u0027, \u0027|\u0027, \u0027\u003e\u003e\u0027, \u0027\u003e\u0027)\n\ndef _sanitize_mustache_dict(mustache_dict):\n \"\"\"Return a copy of mustache_dict with shell operators replaced by spaces.\"\"\"\n if not mustache_dict:\n return mustache_dict\n safe = {}\n for k, v in mustache_dict.items():\n if isinstance(v, str):\n for op in _SHELL_OPERATORS:\n v = v.replace(op, \u0027 \u0027) # per-field only\n safe[k] = v\n else:\n safe[k] = v\n return safe\n```\n\n`glances/actions.py:100-111` \u2014 sanitize-then-render-then-execute:\n\n```python\n# glances/actions.py:100\nfor cmd in commands:\n if chevron_tag:\n safe_dict = _sanitize_mustache_dict(mustache_dict)\n cmd_full = chevron.render(cmd, safe_dict) # concatenation happens here\n else:\n cmd_full = cmd\n ret = secure_popen(cmd_full) # operators interpreted\n```\n\n### Root cause\n\n`_sanitize_mustache_dict()` removes `\u0026\u0026`, `|`, `\u003e\u003e`, `\u003e` from each value in\nisolation. It does not remove a lone `\u0026`, because a single `\u0026` is not one of the\nlisted operators. When two values are rendered next to each other by\n`chevron.render()`, a trailing `\u0026` from the first value and a leading `\u0026` from the\nsecond value join into a literal `\u0026\u0026` in `cmd_full`. `secure_popen()` then\n`cmd.split(\u0027\u0026\u0026\u0027)` and runs the second half as a separate `subprocess.Popen`\n(`shell=False`) process. The same reconstruction works for `\u003e` written as two\nadjacent `\u003e` characters split across the boundary (`...\u003e` + `\u003e...` and the\n`\u003e\u003e`/`\u003e` stripping is per field), and the sanitizer\u0027s own choice to sanitize\nbefore, rather than after, rendering is the defect.\n\nThis is an incomplete fix of the action-template command-injection issue\n(CVE-2026-32608 / GHSA-vcv2-q258-wrg7): `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` closes the\nsingle-field case but not the cross-field-reconstruction case. The correct place\nto enforce the operator ban is on the fully rendered command string (or by never\nletting template-variable data introduce operators), not on the pre-render values\none at a time.\n\nChevron HTML-escapes `\u0026`, `\u003c`, `\u003e`, `\"` inside standard double-brace `{{ }}`\nsections, so double-brace templates neutralise the `\u0026\u0026` reconstruction. The\nreconstruction is reachable specifically through **unescaped** variables\n(`{{{ }}}` / `{{\u0026 }}`), which is why the per-field sanitizer is the sole\nremaining control on that path.\n\n### Reachability / How input reaches sink\n\n1. A local unprivileged user starts a process (or a container) whose `name`\n ends with `\u0026` and whose `cmdline` begins with `\u0026 \u003ccommand\u003e` (both are stored\n verbatim in the plugin stat item).\n2. When the plugin crosses a `warning` / `critical` threshold,\n `glances/plugins/plugin/model.py` calls `self.actions.run` with the full stat\n item passed as the `mustache_dict` argument.\n3. `GlancesActions.run` sanitizes each value with `_sanitize_mustache_dict()`\n (each keeps its single `\u0026`), then `chevron.render()` concatenates the two\n adjacent unescaped variables, producing a literal `\u0026\u0026` in the command string.\n4. `secure_popen(cmd_full)` splits on `\u0026\u0026` and runs the attacker\u0027s segment as a\n separate `subprocess.Popen(shell=False)` process.\n\nThe trust boundary crossed is process-name / container-name \u2192 shell operator,\nexactly the boundary the sanitizer was introduced to close.\n\n### Reproduction (end-to-end, against pinned version `glances==4.5.5`)\n\n```bash\n# 1. Install the latest published release into a clean venv\npython3.13 -m venv gv\n./gv/bin/pip install \"glances==4.5.5\"\n\n# 2. Run the reproducer, which drives the real\n# glances.actions.GlancesActions.run() pipeline exactly as\n# glances/plugins/plugin/model.py invokes it on an alert.\n./gv/bin/python repro.py\n```\n\n`repro.py`:\n\n```python\nimport os, sys, time\nsys.argv = [\u0027glances\u0027]\nfrom glances.actions import GlancesActions\n\nMARK = \"/tmp/glances_crossfield_pwned\"\nNEG = MARK + \"_neg\"\nfor f in (MARK, NEG):\n try: os.remove(f)\n except FileNotFoundError: pass\n\nclass Args:\n time = 0\nga = GlancesActions(args=Args())\n\n# A processlist stat item; a local low-privilege user controls both \u0027name\u0027 and\n# \u0027cmdline\u0027 by spawning a process (the established GHSA-vcv2 threat model).\n# \u0027name\u0027 ends with \u0027\u0026\u0027, \u0027cmdline\u0027 begins with \u0027\u0026\u0027 -\u003e \u0027\u0026\u0026\u0027 forms across the boundary.\nitem = {\u0027name\u0027: \u0027evilproc\u0026\u0027, \u0027cmdline\u0027: \u0027\u0026 touch %s\u0027 % MARK,\n \u0027pid\u0027: 1337, \u0027cpu_percent\u0027: 99.0, \u0027key\u0027: \u0027pid\u0027}\n\n# NEGATIVE CONTROL: the same values under an ESCAPED double-brace template are\n# neutralised by chevron HTML-escaping \u0027\u0026\u0027 -\u003e \u0027\u0026amp;\u0027.\nneg_item = dict(item); neg_item[\u0027cmdline\u0027] = \u0027\u0026 touch %s\u0027 % NEG\nga.status.clear(); ga.start_timer._start = time.time() - 999\nga.run(\"pl\", \"CRITICAL\", [\"logger p={{name}}{{cmdline}}\"], repeat=True, mustache_dict=neg_item)\ntime.sleep(0.3)\nprint(\"NEGATIVE CONTROL (escaped {{name}}{{cmdline}}):\",\n \"INJECTED\" if os.path.exists(NEG) else \"blocked (expected)\")\n\n# POSITIVE: an UNESCAPED template with two adjacent variables. Per-field\n# _sanitize_mustache_dict leaves each single \u0027\u0026\u0027; the \u0027\u0026\u0026\u0027 operator is\n# reconstructed after chevron.render, then split by secure_popen.\nga.status.clear(); ga.start_timer._start = time.time() - 999\nga.run(\"pl2\", \"CRITICAL\", [\"logger p={{{name}}}{{{cmdline}}}\"], repeat=True, mustache_dict=item)\ntime.sleep(0.5)\nprint(\"POSITIVE (unescaped {{{name}}}{{{cmdline}}}):\",\n \"INJECTED - \u0027touch\u0027 executed\" if os.path.exists(MARK) else \"blocked\")\n```\n\nCaptured output (`glances` 4.5.5, Python 3.13, x86_64 Linux):\n\n```\nNEGATIVE CONTROL (escaped {{name}}{{cmdline}}): blocked (expected)\nPOSITIVE (unescaped {{{name}}}{{{cmdline}}}): INJECTED - \u0027touch\u0027 executed\n```\n\nThe negative control confirms that the same attacker values under a standard\ndouble-brace template are blocked (chevron escapes `\u0026`). The positive case shows\nthe injected `touch` executing when the template uses two adjacent unescaped\nvariables: the file `/tmp/glances_crossfield_pwned` is created by the injected\ncommand, not by the intended `logger` action.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Arbitrary command execution as the OS user running Glances (frequently root on\n monitored hosts) whenever an operator uses an unescaped, adjacent-variable\n action template and an attacker controls two neighbouring stat fields.\n- The same reconstruction reaches `secure_popen()`\u0027s file-redirection (`\u003e`) and\n pipe (`|`) handling, allowing arbitrary file write and output piping in\n addition to command chaining.\n- The bypass defeats the dedicated `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` control that was\n added specifically to stop attacker-controlled stat values from injecting shell\n operators.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nEnforce the operator ban on the **rendered** command string that comes from\ntemplate-variable expansion, rather than on the pre-render values in isolation.\nOne approach that mirrors the existing helper: render each variable, then reject /\nneutralise operators in the concatenated result, or strip lone `\u0026`/redirection\ncharacters that originate from variable data.\n\n```python\ndef _sanitize_mustache_dict(mustache_dict):\n if not mustache_dict:\n return mustache_dict\n safe = {}\n for k, v in mustache_dict.items():\n if isinstance(v, str):\n # Neutralise every shell-significant character that secure_popen\n # can interpret, including a lone \u0027\u0026\u0027 that could pair with an\n # adjacent variable to reconstruct \u0027\u0026\u0026\u0027.\n for ch in (\u0027\u0026\u0027, \u0027|\u0027, \u0027\u003e\u0027, \u0027\u003c\u0027):\n v = v.replace(ch, \u0027 \u0027)\n safe[k] = v\n else:\n safe[k] = v\n return safe\n```\n\nNeutralising the single `\u0026` (and the single `\u003e` / `|`) in each value removes the\ncross-field reconstruction because no operator character survives on either side\nof a variable boundary. Alternatively, sanitize `cmd_full` after\n`chevron.render()`, or pass the template-derived data as `secure_popen(...,\nallow_operators=False)` when the command originates from stat-field substitution.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.",
"id": "GHSA-qcpp-8x79-hhp3",
"modified": "2026-08-17T16:36:37Z",
"published": "2026-08-17T16:36:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-qcpp-8x79-hhp3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/commit/9c280eae5419da680827024b60f6265956e31994"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Glances has a command injection bypass of action-template sanitizer via cross-field shell-operator reconstruction"
}
GHSA-QCQ5-WW8J-M4M7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-12 15:30 – Updated: 2022-12-15 15:32Authenticated command injection vulnerabilities exist in the ArubaOS command line interface. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities results in the ability to execute arbitrary commands as a privileged user on the underlying operating system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-37898"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-12T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Authenticated command injection vulnerabilities exist in the ArubaOS command line interface. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities results in the ability to execute arbitrary commands as a privileged user on the underlying operating system.",
"id": "GHSA-qcq5-ww8j-m4m7",
"modified": "2022-12-15T15:32:13Z",
"published": "2022-12-12T15:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-37898"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.arubanetworks.com/assets/alert/ARUBA-PSA-2022-016.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QCR2-P2MJ-HCRM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-17 00:31 – Updated: 2025-09-17 00:31A vulnerable feature in the command line interface of EdgeConnect SD-WAN could allow an authenticated attacker to exploit built-in script execution capabilities. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system if the feature is enabled without proper security measures.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-37129"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-16T23:15:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerable feature in the command line interface of EdgeConnect SD-WAN could allow an authenticated attacker to exploit built-in script execution capabilities. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system if the feature is enabled without proper security measures.",
"id": "GHSA-qcr2-p2mj-hcrm",
"modified": "2025-09-17T00:31:11Z",
"published": "2025-09-17T00:31:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37129"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.hpe.com/hpesc/public/docDisplay?docId=hpesbnw04943en_us\u0026docLocale=en_US"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QCVV-68PQ-9WGW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-08-24 18:31Multiple DrayTek VigorSwitch models contain a command injection vulnerability in the webBackupAction function. The vulnerability is caused by insufficient filtering of the option, key, pw_encode, pathN, and valueN fields before command execution. A remote attacker can trigger this vulnerability via crafted input to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. Exploitation requires valid administrative credentials for the device's web management interface.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-71918"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-24T18:17:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple DrayTek VigorSwitch models contain a command injection vulnerability in the webBackupAction function. The vulnerability is caused by insufficient filtering of the option, key, pw_encode, pathN, and valueN fields before command execution. A remote attacker can trigger this vulnerability via crafted input to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. Exploitation requires valid administrative credentials for the device\u0027s web management interface.",
"id": "GHSA-qcvv-68pq-9wgw",
"modified": "2026-08-24T18:31:54Z",
"published": "2026-08-24T18:31:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71918"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.draytek.com/about/security-advisory/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-vigorswitch-series-august-2026"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/draytek-vigorswitch-multiple-models-os-command-injection-via-webbackupaction"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-QCW6-77MC-69MJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-04 15:31 – Updated: 2024-11-04 18:31DrayTek Vigor3900 1.5.1.3 contains a post-authentication command injection vulnerability. This vulnerability occurs when the action parameter in cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi is set to setSWMGroup.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-45884"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-04T15:15:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "DrayTek Vigor3900 1.5.1.3 contains a post-authentication command injection vulnerability. This vulnerability occurs when the `action` parameter in `cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi` is set to `setSWMGroup.`",
"id": "GHSA-qcw6-77mc-69mj",
"modified": "2024-11-04T18:31:21Z",
"published": "2024-11-04T15:31:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45884"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/N1nEmAn/wp/blob/main/test_v.zip"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fu37kola/cve/blob/main/DrayTek/Vigor3900/1.5.1.3/DrayTek_Vigor_3900_1.5.1.3.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QCXG-GW47-6C75
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:59 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:35An issue was discovered in rConfig 3.9.2. An attacker can directly execute system commands by sending a GET request to ajaxServerSettingsChk.php because the rootUname parameter is passed to the exec function without filtering, which can lead to command execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-16662"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-10-28T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in rConfig 3.9.2. An attacker can directly execute system commands by sending a GET request to ajaxServerSettingsChk.php because the rootUname parameter is passed to the exec function without filtering, which can lead to command execution.",
"id": "GHSA-qcxg-gw47-6c75",
"modified": "2024-04-04T02:35:20Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:59:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-16662"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bTpTn4-alJ8qGCEATLq-oVM6HbhE65iY/view?usp=sharing"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://drive.google.com/open?id=1OXI5cNuwWqc6y-7BgNCfYHgFPK2cpvnu"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/mhaskar/ceb65fa4ca57c3cdccc1edfe2390902e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rconfig.com/download"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://shells.systems/rconfig-v3-9-2-authenticated-and-unauthenticated-rce-cve-2019-16663-and-cve-2019-16662"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/154999/rConfig-3.9.2-Remote-Code-Execution.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/155186/rConfig-3.9.2-Command-Injection.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QF23-6CWX-8X7W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-12 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-23 00:00UUNIVERGE WA 1020 Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA 1510 Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA 1511 Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA 1512 Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA 2020 Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA 2021 Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA 2610-AP Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA 2611-AP Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA 2611E-AP Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA WA2612-AP Ver8.2.11 and prior allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-25621"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-11T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "UUNIVERGE WA 1020 Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA 1510 Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA 1511 Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA 1512 Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA 2020 Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA 2021 Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA 2610-AP Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA 2611-AP Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA 2611E-AP Ver8.2.11 and prior, UNIVERGE WA WA2612-AP Ver8.2.11 and prior allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands.",
"id": "GHSA-qf23-6cwx-8x7w",
"modified": "2022-03-23T00:00:51Z",
"published": "2022-03-12T00:00:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25621"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jpn.nec.com/security-info/secinfo/nv22-004_en.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QF3G-HGW2-8R8H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-22 00:24 – Updated: 2022-04-22 00:24vsftpd 2.3.4 downloaded between 20110630 and 20110703 contains a backdoor which opens a shell on port 6200/tcp.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2011-2523"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-11-27T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "vsftpd 2.3.4 downloaded between 20110630 and 20110703 contains a backdoor which opens a shell on port 6200/tcp.",
"id": "GHSA-qf3g-hgw2-8r8h",
"modified": "2022-04-22T00:24:20Z",
"published": "2022-04-22T00:24:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-2523"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2011-2523"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/102745/VSFTPD-2.3.4-Backdoor-Command-Execution.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2011-2523"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vigilance.fr/vulnerability/vsftpd-backdoor-in-version-2-3-4-10805"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/07/11/5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/162145/vsftpd-2.3.4-Backdoor-Command-Execution.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.