CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
9644 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-P853-83GJ-WJJ3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 18:30 – Updated: 2026-08-20 18:30Summary
NocoBase @nocobase/plugin-backups 2.0.57 restores PostgreSQL backups by interpolating the backup metadata schema name into shell command strings that are executed with Node.js child_process.exec(). A backup-management user who can restore an uploaded PostgreSQL backup with forced schema restore can place shell metacharacters in _metadata.json under database.schema, causing arbitrary commands to execute as the NocoBase server process during restore.
The vulnerable plugin is included in the default @nocobase/preset-nocobase package and is guarded by the backup-management ACL snippet (backups:* / backup:*). This is not unauthenticated; the attacker must have backup restore privileges or equivalent access to the restore API/CLI.
Details
Affected product evidence:
- Ecosystem/package: npm package @nocobase/plugin-backups from packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/package.json.
- Tested vulnerable version: 2.0.57 (packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/package.json:1-16).
- Tested commit: e03d267362b3426f484c28783020b4a2a08911e8.
- Default/common inclusion: @nocobase/preset-nocobase depends on and lists @nocobase/plugin-backups 2.0.57 as built in (packages/presets/nocobase/package.json:22-24, packages/presets/nocobase/package.json:115-128).
- Affected range estimate: at least the tested 2.0.57 checkout. Earlier/later versions were not tested.
- Patched version: unknown/not available in this local checkout.
Source-to-sink path:
- The plugin registers backup-management snippets for backups:* and backup:*, so the restore API is intended for roles granted backup-management permissions (packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/plugin.ts:51-59).
- The backup restore-upload action accepts request body/query force and passes it as forceSchemaRestore to RestoreManager.restore() (packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/resourcers/backup-cli.ts:40-42, packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/resourcers/backup-cli.ts:200-211).
- RestoreManager decompresses the uploaded backup archive, reads _metadata.json, and parses attacker-controlled JSON metadata (packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/managers/restore.ts:203-215, packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/managers/restore.ts:257-267).
- When forceSchemaRestore is true and the database dialect is PostgreSQL, the schema-mismatch check is skipped (packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/managers/restore.ts:270-300). Existing tests confirm forced schema restore intentionally allows a metadata schema mismatch (packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/__tests__/managers/restore.test.ts:336-356) and that the API passes forceSchemaRestore: true when force=true is supplied (packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/__tests__/managers/restore.test.ts:377-409).
- The parsed metadata.database.schema is passed into this.#dbAdapter.restore(path.join(extractedDir, dbFile), metadata.database.schema) (packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/managers/restore.ts:427-448).
- For PostgreSQL, if the backup schema differs from the target schema, PostgresAdapter.restore() assigns srcSchema = schema || 'public' and builds pgRestoreCommand using -n ${srcSchema} with no quoting or argument array (packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/adapters/database.ts:350-420).
- #restoreSchema() also interpolates srcSchema and targetSchema directly into SQL strings and then calls run(pgRestoreCommand, ...) (packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/adapters/database.ts:423-451).
- run() executes the assembled string through child_process.exec(), which invokes a shell (packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/adapters/database.ts:1-31).
A schema value such as safe; touch /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker # produces a restore command of this form:
pg_restore -U u -h localhost -p 5432 -n safe; touch /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker # -d db --clean --if-exists --no-owner -j 1 /tmp/backup-data
The semicolon terminates the intended pg_restore command and starts a new shell command.
False-positive screening:
- This report does not claim unauthenticated exploitation. The route is gated by backup-management permissions through the registered ACL snippet.
- The older backups.upload resource path was reviewed and does not pass forceSchemaRestore; the directly confirmed force path is the backup.restoreUpload / backup-CLI API path (packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/resourcers/backups.ts:54-77, packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/resourcers/backup-cli.ts:200-211).
- The schema mismatch check blocks mismatched metadata by default, but it is deliberately bypassed for PostgreSQL when the supported force option is true.
- The command injection is in the shell command itself before any PostgreSQL connection or valid backup file is required; the safe PoC proves shell metacharacter execution locally without connecting to a database.
- The finding is not based on existing reports or generated writeups.
PoC
The following local-only PoC renders the same vulnerable pg_restore command shape built by PostgresAdapter.restore() and executes it through Node.js child_process.exec(), the sink used by the plugin. It uses a harmless marker file under /tmp, does not contact external services, and cleans up after itself.
From a clean checkout of the tested commit:
cd nocobase
rm -f /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker
node - <<'NODE'
const { exec } = require('child_process');
const schemaFromBackupMetadata = 'safe; touch /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker #';
const command = `pg_restore -U u -h localhost -p 5432 -n ${schemaFromBackupMetadata} -d db --clean --if-exists --no-owner -j 1 /tmp/backup-data`;
exec(command, () => {
const fs = require('fs');
console.log(fs.existsSync('/tmp/nocobase-cve-marker') ? 'marker-created' : 'marker-missing');
fs.rmSync('/tmp/nocobase-cve-marker', { force: true });
});
NODE
Observed output in this environment:
marker-created
Expected vulnerable output: marker-created, proving the schema value starts a second shell command.
Negative/control case: replace schemaFromBackupMetadata with safe_schema; the same harness should print marker-missing because no shell metacharacter starts the touch command.
Maintainer-runnable application-level trigger:
1. Run NocoBase 2.0.57 with PostgreSQL and the built-in @nocobase/plugin-backups enabled.
2. Use a role granted the backup-management snippet/actions (backups:* / backup:*).
3. Create a NocoBase backup archive containing a data member and _metadata.json with matching dialect/table settings but database.schema set to safe; touch /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker #.
4. Restore the uploaded backup through the backup restore-upload path with force=true so PostgreSQL schema mismatch is allowed.
5. Vulnerable behavior: /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker exists on the server after restore begins, even if pg_restore or database connection later fails.
6. Cleanup: remove /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker and discard the test database/container.
Impact
A user with backup restore privileges can execute arbitrary shell commands as the NocoBase server OS user. In a typical server or container deployment, this can read application configuration and environment secrets, modify application files or database backups, run network clients from the server, and disrupt service availability.
The required application privilege is high because backup restore is an administrative operation. However, backup-management permission is still an application-level role boundary; it should not imply arbitrary operating-system command execution.
Suggested remediation
Do not execute database tools through shell-interpreted command strings. Use spawn() or execFile() with an argument array for pg_restore, psql, pg_dump, mysql, and related tools. Validate PostgreSQL schema identifiers from backup metadata against PostgreSQL identifier rules or quote them using the database driver's identifier-quoting facilities before using them in SQL.
For this specific path:
- Pass pg_restore arguments as an array, for example ['-U', username, '-h', host, '-p', String(port), '-n', srcSchema, '-d', database, ...].
- Reject schema names containing shell metacharacters, quotes, whitespace, comments, or characters outside accepted PostgreSQL identifier syntax unless they are safely handled as identifiers.
- Replace dynamic SQL string interpolation in #restoreSchema() with identifier-safe quoting (format('%I', ...) in PostgreSQL or equivalent server-side parameters) and string-literal escaping where literals are required.
- Add regression tests that restore a backup whose metadata schema contains ; touch /tmp/should-not-exist # and assert no marker file is created and the request is rejected.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@nocobase/plugin-backups"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55410"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-20T18:30:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T21:16:55Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nNocoBase `@nocobase/plugin-backups` 2.0.57 restores PostgreSQL backups by interpolating the backup metadata schema name into shell command strings that are executed with Node.js `child_process.exec()`. A backup-management user who can restore an uploaded PostgreSQL backup with forced schema restore can place shell metacharacters in `_metadata.json` under `database.schema`, causing arbitrary commands to execute as the NocoBase server process during restore.\n\nThe vulnerable plugin is included in the default `@nocobase/preset-nocobase` package and is guarded by the backup-management ACL snippet (`backups:*` / `backup:*`). This is not unauthenticated; the attacker must have backup restore privileges or equivalent access to the restore API/CLI.\n\n### Details\nAffected product evidence:\n- Ecosystem/package: npm package `@nocobase/plugin-backups` from `packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/package.json`.\n- Tested vulnerable version: `2.0.57` (`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/package.json:1-16`).\n- Tested commit: `e03d267362b3426f484c28783020b4a2a08911e8`.\n- Default/common inclusion: `@nocobase/preset-nocobase` depends on and lists `@nocobase/plugin-backups` 2.0.57 as built in (`packages/presets/nocobase/package.json:22-24`, `packages/presets/nocobase/package.json:115-128`).\n- Affected range estimate: at least the tested `2.0.57` checkout. Earlier/later versions were not tested.\n- Patched version: unknown/not available in this local checkout.\n\nSource-to-sink path:\n- The plugin registers backup-management snippets for `backups:*` and `backup:*`, so the restore API is intended for roles granted backup-management permissions (`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/plugin.ts:51-59`).\n- The `backup` restore-upload action accepts request body/query `force` and passes it as `forceSchemaRestore` to `RestoreManager.restore()` (`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/resourcers/backup-cli.ts:40-42`, `packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/resourcers/backup-cli.ts:200-211`).\n- `RestoreManager` decompresses the uploaded backup archive, reads `_metadata.json`, and parses attacker-controlled JSON metadata (`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/managers/restore.ts:203-215`, `packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/managers/restore.ts:257-267`).\n- When `forceSchemaRestore` is true and the database dialect is PostgreSQL, the schema-mismatch check is skipped (`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/managers/restore.ts:270-300`). Existing tests confirm forced schema restore intentionally allows a metadata schema mismatch (`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/__tests__/managers/restore.test.ts:336-356`) and that the API passes `forceSchemaRestore: true` when `force=true` is supplied (`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/__tests__/managers/restore.test.ts:377-409`).\n- The parsed `metadata.database.schema` is passed into `this.#dbAdapter.restore(path.join(extractedDir, dbFile), metadata.database.schema)` (`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/managers/restore.ts:427-448`).\n- For PostgreSQL, if the backup schema differs from the target schema, `PostgresAdapter.restore()` assigns `srcSchema = schema || \u0027public\u0027` and builds `pgRestoreCommand` using `-n ${srcSchema}` with no quoting or argument array (`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/adapters/database.ts:350-420`).\n- `#restoreSchema()` also interpolates `srcSchema` and `targetSchema` directly into SQL strings and then calls `run(pgRestoreCommand, ...)` (`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/adapters/database.ts:423-451`).\n- `run()` executes the assembled string through `child_process.exec()`, which invokes a shell (`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/adapters/database.ts:1-31`).\n\nA schema value such as `safe; touch /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker #` produces a restore command of this form:\n\n```text\npg_restore -U u -h localhost -p 5432 -n safe; touch /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker # -d db --clean --if-exists --no-owner -j 1 /tmp/backup-data\n```\n\nThe semicolon terminates the intended `pg_restore` command and starts a new shell command.\n\nFalse-positive screening:\n- This report does not claim unauthenticated exploitation. The route is gated by backup-management permissions through the registered ACL snippet.\n- The older `backups.upload` resource path was reviewed and does not pass `forceSchemaRestore`; the directly confirmed force path is the `backup.restoreUpload` / backup-CLI API path (`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/resourcers/backups.ts:54-77`, `packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-backups/src/server/resourcers/backup-cli.ts:200-211`).\n- The schema mismatch check blocks mismatched metadata by default, but it is deliberately bypassed for PostgreSQL when the supported force option is true.\n- The command injection is in the shell command itself before any PostgreSQL connection or valid backup file is required; the safe PoC proves shell metacharacter execution locally without connecting to a database.\n- The finding is not based on existing reports or generated writeups.\n\n### PoC\nThe following local-only PoC renders the same vulnerable `pg_restore` command shape built by `PostgresAdapter.restore()` and executes it through Node.js `child_process.exec()`, the sink used by the plugin. It uses a harmless marker file under `/tmp`, does not contact external services, and cleans up after itself.\n\nFrom a clean checkout of the tested commit:\n\n```bash\ncd nocobase\nrm -f /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker\nnode - \u003c\u003c\u0027NODE\u0027\nconst { exec } = require(\u0027child_process\u0027);\n\nconst schemaFromBackupMetadata = \u0027safe; touch /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker #\u0027;\nconst command = `pg_restore -U u -h localhost -p 5432 -n ${schemaFromBackupMetadata} -d db --clean --if-exists --no-owner -j 1 /tmp/backup-data`;\n\nexec(command, () =\u003e {\n const fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\n console.log(fs.existsSync(\u0027/tmp/nocobase-cve-marker\u0027) ? \u0027marker-created\u0027 : \u0027marker-missing\u0027);\n fs.rmSync(\u0027/tmp/nocobase-cve-marker\u0027, { force: true });\n});\nNODE\n```\n\nObserved output in this environment:\n\n```text\nmarker-created\n```\n\nExpected vulnerable output: `marker-created`, proving the schema value starts a second shell command.\n\nNegative/control case: replace `schemaFromBackupMetadata` with `safe_schema`; the same harness should print `marker-missing` because no shell metacharacter starts the `touch` command.\n\nMaintainer-runnable application-level trigger:\n1. Run NocoBase 2.0.57 with PostgreSQL and the built-in `@nocobase/plugin-backups` enabled.\n2. Use a role granted the backup-management snippet/actions (`backups:*` / `backup:*`).\n3. Create a NocoBase backup archive containing a `data` member and `_metadata.json` with matching dialect/table settings but `database.schema` set to `safe; touch /tmp/nocobase-cve-marker #`.\n4. Restore the uploaded backup through the `backup` restore-upload path with `force=true` so PostgreSQL schema mismatch is allowed.\n5. Vulnerable behavior: `/tmp/nocobase-cve-marker` exists on the server after restore begins, even if `pg_restore` or database connection later fails.\n6. Cleanup: remove `/tmp/nocobase-cve-marker` and discard the test database/container.\n\n### Impact\nA user with backup restore privileges can execute arbitrary shell commands as the NocoBase server OS user. In a typical server or container deployment, this can read application configuration and environment secrets, modify application files or database backups, run network clients from the server, and disrupt service availability.\n\nThe required application privilege is high because backup restore is an administrative operation. However, backup-management permission is still an application-level role boundary; it should not imply arbitrary operating-system command execution.\n\n### Suggested remediation\nDo not execute database tools through shell-interpreted command strings. Use `spawn()` or `execFile()` with an argument array for `pg_restore`, `psql`, `pg_dump`, `mysql`, and related tools. Validate PostgreSQL schema identifiers from backup metadata against PostgreSQL identifier rules or quote them using the database driver\u0027s identifier-quoting facilities before using them in SQL.\n\nFor this specific path:\n- Pass `pg_restore` arguments as an array, for example `[\u0027-U\u0027, username, \u0027-h\u0027, host, \u0027-p\u0027, String(port), \u0027-n\u0027, srcSchema, \u0027-d\u0027, database, ...]`.\n- Reject schema names containing shell metacharacters, quotes, whitespace, comments, or characters outside accepted PostgreSQL identifier syntax unless they are safely handled as identifiers.\n- Replace dynamic SQL string interpolation in `#restoreSchema()` with identifier-safe quoting (`format(\u0027%I\u0027, ...)` in PostgreSQL or equivalent server-side parameters) and string-literal escaping where literals are required.\n- Add regression tests that restore a backup whose metadata schema contains `; touch /tmp/should-not-exist #` and assert no marker file is created and the request is rejected.",
"id": "GHSA-p853-83gj-wjj3",
"modified": "2026-08-20T18:30:15Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T18:30:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/security/advisories/GHSA-p853-83gj-wjj3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55410"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/commit/0e1aba1b7b112ffc841588963f7343c00edd9806"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/releases/tag/v2.1.19"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "NocoBase backup restore schema name allows command injection"
}
GHSA-P86M-HP2V-H8W9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-14 18:30 – Updated: 2025-10-14 18:30An Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability [CWE-78] in FortiSOAR 7.6.0 through 7.6.1, 7.5.0 through 7.5.1, 7.4 all versions, 7.3 all versions may allow an attacker who has already obtained a non-login low privileged shell access (via another hypothetical vulnerability) to perform a local privilege escalation via crafted commands.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-48891"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-14T16:15:35Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027) vulnerability [CWE-78] in FortiSOAR 7.6.0 through 7.6.1, 7.5.0 through 7.5.1, 7.4 all versions, 7.3 all versions may allow an attacker who has already obtained a non-login low privileged shell access (via another hypothetical vulnerability) to perform a local privilege escalation via crafted commands.",
"id": "GHSA-p86m-hp2v-h8w9",
"modified": "2025-10-14T18:30:27Z",
"published": "2025-10-14T18:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-48891"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-412"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P872-99GJ-2VW3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-07 06:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:32ASUS RT-AC86U Adaptive QoS - Web History function has insufficient filtering of special character. A remote attacker with regular user privilege can exploit this vulnerability to perform command injection attack to execute arbitrary commands, disrupt system or terminate services.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-38031"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-07T04:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "\nASUS RT-AC86U Adaptive QoS - Web History function has insufficient filtering of special character. A remote attacker with regular user privilege can exploit this vulnerability to perform command injection attack to execute arbitrary commands, disrupt system or terminate services.\n\n\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-p872-99gj-2vw3",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:32:27Z",
"published": "2023-09-07T06:30:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-38031"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-7348-56989-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P894-4749-F3JH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-29 03:02 – Updated: 2022-04-29 03:02nbmember.cgi in Netbilling 2.0 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via the cmd=test option, which can be leveraged to determine the access key.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2004-2732"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2004-12-31T05:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "nbmember.cgi in Netbilling 2.0 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via the cmd=test option, which can be leveraged to determine the access key.",
"id": "GHSA-p894-4749-f3jh",
"modified": "2022-04-29T03:02:00Z",
"published": "2022-04-29T03:02:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2004-2732"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/17865"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securitytracker.com/id?1011881"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://web.archive.org/web/20041106200147/http://www.it-helpnet.de/bugless/bugs.php?mode=show\u0026id=8\u0026SID="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.osvdb.org/10902"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/11504"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-P896-3284-96MX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-03-05 15:30API endpoint for user synchronization in 2N Access Commander version 3.4.1 did not have a sufficient input validation allowing for OS command injection. This vulnerability can only be exploited after authenticating with administrator privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59783"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-04T16:16:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "API endpoint for user synchronization in 2N Access Commander version 3.4.1 did not have a sufficient input validation allowing for OS command injection. \nThis vulnerability can only be exploited after authenticating with administrator privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-p896-3284-96mx",
"modified": "2026-03-05T15:30:35Z",
"published": "2026-03-04T18:31:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59783"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.2n.com/en-GB/download/cve_2025_59783_acom_3_5_v1pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-P8C5-HRRV-66PW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-09 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:44A SQL injection vulnerability exists in the “reporting job editor” feature of the ScienceLogic SL1 that takes unsanitized user?controlled input and passes it directly to a SQL query. This allows for the injection of arbitrary SQL before being executed against the database.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-48589"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78",
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-09T18:15:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A SQL injection vulnerability exists in the \u201creporting job editor\u201d feature of the ScienceLogic SL1 that takes unsanitized user?controlled input and passes it directly to a SQL query. This allows for the injection of arbitrary SQL before being executed against the database.",
"id": "GHSA-p8c5-hrrv-66pw",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:44:57Z",
"published": "2023-08-09T18:30:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48589"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.securifera.com/advisories/cve-2022-48589"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P8C6-R53P-Q435
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-27 03:30 – Updated: 2026-02-27 03:30An OS command injection
vulnerability exists in XWEB Pro version 1.12.1 and prior, enabling an authenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution on the system by injecting malicious input into the devices field of the firmware update apply action.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24689"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-27T01:16:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An OS command injection \n\nvulnerability exists in XWEB Pro version 1.12.1 and prior, enabling an \nauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution on the system by\n injecting malicious input into the devices field of the firmware update\n apply action.",
"id": "GHSA-p8c6-r53p-q435",
"modified": "2026-02-27T03:30:26Z",
"published": "2026-02-27T03:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24689"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-057-10.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://webapps.copeland.com/Dixell/Pages/SystemSoftwareUpdate"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-057-10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P8F5-HQP5-3GQ7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-20 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-20 18:31Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.6, LTS2025 release version 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.20, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.60 contain an OS command injection vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to arbitrary command execution with root privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26943"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-20T17:16:32Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.6, LTS2025 release version 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.20, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.60 contain an OS command injection vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to arbitrary command execution with root privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-p8f5-hqp5-3gq7",
"modified": "2026-04-20T18:31:49Z",
"published": "2026-04-20T18:31:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26943"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000450699/dsa-2026-060-security-update-for-dell-powerprotect-data-domain-multiple-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P8FP-8747-QJ72
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:13 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:13An issue was discovered on AudioCodes 450HD IP Phone devices with firmware 3.0.0.535.106. The traceroute and ping functionality, which uses a parameter in a request to command.cgi from the Monitoring page in the web UI, unsafely puts user-alterable data directly into an OS command, leading to Remote Code Execution via shell metacharacters in the query string.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-5757"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-04-01T17:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered on AudioCodes 450HD IP Phone devices with firmware 3.0.0.535.106. The traceroute and ping functionality, which uses a parameter in a request to command.cgi from the Monitoring page in the web UI, unsafely puts user-alterable data directly into an OS command, leading to Remote Code Execution via shell metacharacters in the query string.",
"id": "GHSA-p8fp-8747-qj72",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:13:14Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:13:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-5757"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/CVEs/tree/master/CVE-2018-5757"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P8GC-JWRX-PF65
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-09 09:31 – Updated: 2025-01-09 15:31Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability allows OS Command Injection as root This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers before version 24120701.
Likelihood: Moderate – The binary does not seem to be used by the web interface, so it might be more difficult to find. It seems to be largely the same binary as used by the Iocharger Pedestal charging station, however. The attacker will also need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the binary, or convince a user with such access to execute a crafted HTTP request.
Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and delete files and services.
CVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, but the level of authentication does not matter (PR:L), nor is any user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a full compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), and compromised devices can be used to pivot into networks that should potentially not be accessible (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43653"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-09T08:15:27Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command (\u0027Command Injection\u0027) vulnerability\u00a0 allows OS Command Injection as root\nThis issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers before version 24120701.\n\nLikelihood: Moderate \u2013 The \u003credacted\u003e binary does not seem to be used by the web interface, so it might be more difficult to find. It seems to be largely the same binary as used by the Iocharger Pedestal charging station, however. The attacker will also need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the \u003credacted\u003e binary, or convince a user with such access to execute a crafted HTTP request.\n\nImpact: Critical \u2013 The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and delete\nfiles and services.\n\nCVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, but the level of authentication does not matter (PR:L), nor is any user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a full compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), and compromised devices can be used to pivot into networks that should potentially not be accessible (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y).",
"id": "GHSA-p8gc-jwrx-pf65",
"modified": "2025-01-09T15:31:51Z",
"published": "2025-01-09T09:31:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43653"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://csirt.divd.nl/CVE-2024-43653"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://csirt.divd.nl/DIVD-2024-00035"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://iocharger.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:P/AU:Y/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.