Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-757

Allowed

Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation ('Algorithm Downgrade')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

A protocol or its implementation supports interaction between multiple actors and allows those actors to negotiate which algorithm should be used as a protection mechanism such as encryption or authentication, but it does not select the strongest algorithm that is available to both parties.

74 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-V97F-7X7P-G6CQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-31 21:31 – Updated: 2025-10-31 21:31
VLAI
Details

When SmartStart Inclusion fails during the onboarding of a Z-Wave PIR sensor, the sensor will join the network as a non-secure device. This vulnerability exists in Silicon Labs' Z-Wave PIR Sensor Reference design delivered as part of SiSDK v2025.6.0 and v2025.6.1.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-10693"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-757"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-31T20:15:41Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "When SmartStart Inclusion fails during the onboarding of a Z-Wave PIR sensor, the sensor will join the network as a non-secure device. This vulnerability exists in Silicon Labs\u0027 Z-Wave PIR Sensor Reference design delivered as part of SiSDK v2025.6.0 and v2025.6.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-v97f-7x7p-g6cq",
  "modified": "2025-10-31T21:31:03Z",
  "published": "2025-10-31T21:31:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10693"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://community.silabs.com/068Vm00000WN3J0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VQ75-425F-VQ6R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:28 – Updated: 2025-06-05 00:31
VLAI
Details

Philips Clinical Collaboration Platform, Versions 12.2.1 and prior. The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an attacker to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-16200"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-757"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-09-18T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Philips Clinical Collaboration Platform, Versions 12.2.1 and prior. The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an attacker to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources.",
  "id": "GHSA-vq75-425f-vq6r",
  "modified": "2025-06-05T00:31:18Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:28:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-16200"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/icsma-20-261-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.philips.com/a-w/security/security-advisories/product-security-2020.html#2020_archive"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W44R-93J7-QV28

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-27 16:08 – Updated: 2026-10-27 16:08
VLAI
Summary
rustls: An unauthenticated ServerHello poisons the per-name key-exchange record, so later ClientHellos carry only a classical X25519 share
Details

Summary

The client records the server-selected key-exchange group per server name when it processes the ServerHello, before the server is authenticated. A network attacker can answer one connection attempt for a target name with a ServerHello that selects X25519 and close the connection. Later ClientHellos for that name carry one X25519 share while supported_groups still lists X25519MLKEM768 first. If the server accepts that share instead of sending a HelloRetryRequest, the handshake completes with classical key exchange only and no error.

An attacker that answers one connection attempt for the target name with a ServerHello selecting X25519 changes every later ClientHello of that client for that name, for as long as the entry stays in the store. No certificate or completed handshake is needed: it parses the ClientHello, sends the ServerHello, and closes.

TLS 1.3 transcript binding stops an on-path attacker from editing the ClientHello of one connection. It does not stop the attacker from steering the client's prediction state beforehand, because that state is written from an unauthenticated message.

What does not trigger it

  • Servers that send a HelloRetryRequest. The connection stays hybrid and costs one extra round trip.
  • A client configuration with resumption disabled: nothing is stored.
  • A different server name: the record is per name.

Impact

If the genuine server picks the group for which a share is present, instead of sending a HelloRetryRequest for its preferred hybrid group, the handshake completes with classical key exchange only, between two peers that both support the hybrid group. No error is raised. The confidentiality of recorded sessions against a future quantum adversary is lost for those connections (harvest now, decrypt later). There is no key compromise and no authentication bypass.

Note that this behaviour is discussed at length in draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction so the actual security impact is largely down to a server policy decision.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "rustls"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.23.46"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "rustls"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.24.0-dev.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.24.0-dev.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-757"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-27T16:08:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe client records the server-selected key-exchange group per server name when it processes the ServerHello, before the server is authenticated. A network attacker can answer one connection attempt for a target name with a ServerHello that selects X25519 and close the connection. Later ClientHellos for that name carry one X25519 share while supported_groups still lists X25519MLKEM768 first. If the server accepts that share instead of sending a HelloRetryRequest, the handshake completes with classical key exchange only and no error.\n\nAn attacker that answers one connection attempt for the target name with a ServerHello selecting X25519 changes every later ClientHello of that client for that name, for as long as the entry stays in the store. No certificate or completed handshake is needed: it parses the ClientHello, sends the ServerHello, and closes.\n\nTLS 1.3 transcript binding stops an on-path attacker from editing the ClientHello of one connection. It does not stop the attacker from steering the client\u0027s prediction state beforehand, because that state is written from an unauthenticated message.\n\n## What does not trigger it\n\n- Servers that send a HelloRetryRequest. The connection stays hybrid and costs one extra round trip.\n- A client configuration with resumption disabled: nothing is stored.\n- A different server name: the record is per name.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf the genuine server picks the group for which a share is present, instead of sending a HelloRetryRequest for its preferred hybrid group, the handshake completes with classical key exchange only, between two peers that both support the hybrid group. No error is raised. The confidentiality of recorded sessions against a future quantum adversary is lost for those connections (harvest now, decrypt later). There is no key compromise and no authentication bypass.\n\nNote that this behaviour is discussed at length in [draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction-01.html#name-security-considerations) so the actual security impact is largely down to a server policy decision.",
  "id": "GHSA-w44r-93j7-qv28",
  "modified": "2026-10-27T16:08:54Z",
  "published": "2026-10-27T16:08:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rustls/rustls/security/advisories/GHSA-w44r-93j7-qv28"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rustls/rustls/pull/3355"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rustls/rustls/commit/8fa0dc5d517a63411ad1e528249bdf5b098ae5e4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rustls/rustls/commit/f04804fa13341a9b1dc02b5d1dd8a746f2c4b7fb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rustls/rustls"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rustls/rustls/releases/tag/v/0.23.46"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0349.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "rustls: An unauthenticated ServerHello poisons the per-name key-exchange record, so later ClientHellos carry only a classical X25519 share"
}

GHSA-WJ64-GH9J-XM82

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 21:31 – Updated: 2026-03-17 18:30
VLAI
Details

Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword.

Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server.

If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported.

As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction).

OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included.

The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group.

The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'.

No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary.

OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue.

OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released.

OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-2673"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-757"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-13T19:54:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected\npreferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes\nthe default by using the \u0027DEFAULT\u0027 keyword.\n\nImpact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more\npreferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group\nwas not included among the client\u0027s initial predicated keyshares.\nThis will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups,\nif the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by\nthe server.\n\nIf an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server\u0027s configuration uses the \u0027DEFAULT\u0027 keyword to\ninterpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps\nadding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the\n\u0027DEFAULT\u0027 list to lose its \u0027tuple\u0027 structure, and all server-supported groups\nwere treated as a single sufficiently secure \u0027tuple\u0027, with the server not\nsending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple\nwas mutually supported.\n\nAs a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported\npost-quantum key agreement group, such as \u0027X25519MLKEM768\u0027, if the client\u0027s\nconfiguration results in only \u0027classical\u0027 groups (such as \u0027X25519\u0027 being the\nonly ones in the client\u0027s initial keyshare prediction).\n\nOpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS\n1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers.  The old syntax had a single \u0027flat\u0027\nlist of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure.\nIf any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server\nthe most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by\nthe client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been\nmore preferred, if included.\n\nThe new syntax partitions the groups into distinct \u0027tuples\u0027 of roughly\nequivalent security.  Within each tuple the most preferred group included among\nthe client\u0027s predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group\nfrom a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares,\nthe server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello\nRetry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group.\n\nThe above works as expected when the server\u0027s configuration uses the built-in\ndefault group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the\nvarious desired groups and group \u0027tuples\u0027.\n\nNo OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies\noutside the FIPS boundary.\n\nOpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue.\n\nOpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released.\nOpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released.\n\nOpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-wj64-gh9j-xm82",
  "modified": "2026-03-17T18:30:32Z",
  "published": "2026-03-13T21:31:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2673"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/2157c9d81f7b0bd7dfa25b960e928ec28e8dd63f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/85977e013f32ceb96aa034c0e741adddc1a05e34"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260313.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/03/13/3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-220: Client-Server Protocol Manipulation

An adversary takes advantage of weaknesses in the protocol by which a client and server are communicating to perform unexpected actions. Communication protocols are necessary to transfer messages between client and server applications. Moreover, different protocols may be used for different types of interactions.

CAPEC-606: Weakening of Cellular Encryption

An attacker, with control of a Cellular Rogue Base Station or through cooperation with a Malicious Mobile Network Operator can force the mobile device (e.g., the retransmission device) to use no encryption (A5/0 mode) or to use easily breakable encryption (A5/1 or A5/2 mode).

CAPEC-620: Drop Encryption Level

An attacker forces the encryption level to be lowered, thus enabling a successful attack against the encrypted data.