CWE-73
AllowedExternal Control of File Name or Path
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
1428 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-X5WV-6F33-PH3P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-14 00:32 – Updated: 2026-08-14 00:32luci-app-openvpn fails to properly validate the instance_name2 parameter during file upload, allowing authenticated users to perform path traversal and write arbitrary files outside the intended directory. Attackers can upload malicious payloads to gain persistent root code execution by placing SSH keys in system directories accessible on reboot.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72841"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-13T22:17:23Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "luci-app-openvpn fails to properly validate the instance_name2 parameter during file upload, allowing authenticated users to perform path traversal and write arbitrary files outside the intended directory. Attackers can upload malicious payloads to gain persistent root code execution by placing SSH keys in system directories accessible on reboot.",
"id": "GHSA-x5wv-6f33-ph3p",
"modified": "2026-08-14T00:32:01Z",
"published": "2026-08-14T00:32:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openwrt/luci/security/advisories/GHSA-jjcx-c284-2qv8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72841"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/luci-app-openvpn-path-traversal-rce-via-instance-name2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-X66J-2FJ9-7C64
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-23 18:31 – Updated: 2024-07-23 18:31An issue was discovered in provd before version 0.1.5 with a setuid binary, which allows a local attacker to escalate their privilege.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-6714"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-23T16:15:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in provd before version 0.1.5 with a setuid binary, which allows a local attacker to escalate their privilege.",
"id": "GHSA-x66j-2fj9-7c64",
"modified": "2024-07-23T18:31:07Z",
"published": "2024-07-23T18:31:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6714"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/ubuntu-desktop-provision/commit/8d9086de0f82894ff27a9e429ff4f45231020092"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/provd/+bug/2071574"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-6714"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X6P5-565V-25PR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-13 15:31 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:39An incomplete filtering of one or more instances of special elements vulnerability [CWE-792] in the command line interpreter of FortiAP-U 7.0.0, 6.2.0 through 6.2.5, 6.0 all versions, 5.4 all versions may allow an authenticated attacker to list and delete arbitrary files and directory via specially crafted command arguments.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-36634"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-13T13:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An incomplete filtering of one or more instances of special elements vulnerability [CWE-792] in the command line interpreter of FortiAP-U 7.0.0, 6.2.0 through 6.2.5, 6.0 all versions, 5.4 all versions may allow an authenticated attacker to list and delete arbitrary files and directory via specially crafted command arguments.",
"id": "GHSA-x6p5-565v-25pr",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:39:10Z",
"published": "2023-09-13T15:31:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36634"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-23-123"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X83P-5C62-2G52
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-30 15:31 – Updated: 2026-09-30 15:31OpenSave through 2.4.0 fails to properly validate save paths supplied by paired peers in the manifest request handler. Attackers can specify arbitrary directories outside configured save locations to read and write files through manifest and sync routes.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-103398"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-30T15:22:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "OpenSave through 2.4.0 fails to properly validate save paths supplied by paired peers in the manifest request handler. Attackers can specify arbitrary directories outside configured save locations to read and write files through manifest and sync routes.",
"id": "GHSA-x83p-5c62-2g52",
"modified": "2026-09-30T15:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-09-30T15:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-103398"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/mansurmavlankulov/2ca66f95965fb9d4aab353bcf2434cdb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Liquid-co/OpenSave"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Liquid-co/OpenSave/blob/v2.4.0/internal/delta/rootguard.go#L16-L30"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Liquid-co/OpenSave/blob/v2.4.0/internal/p2p/routes.go#L555-L566"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/opensave-through-2.4.0-arbitrary-file-read-and-write-via-peer-controlled-save-path"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-X89H-7H96-V88F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-09 22:40 – Updated: 2026-11-09 22:40Summary
croc is an end-to-end encrypted peer-to-peer file transfer tool. On the receiving side, the confirmation that normally protects an existing file from being overwritten or resumed is skipped whenever the received file's name starts with croc-stdin-, regardless of whether the incoming transfer is actually a text transfer. A sender can therefore name a file croc-stdin-<existing-name> and silently overwrite, truncate, or replace an existing file of that name in the receiver's working directory - including removing the existing file and substituting a symlink - without the Overwrite? prompt that the standard path requires. The exemption was introduced to keep croc's internal text-transfer artifacts from triggering prompts, but it is keyed on the filename prefix rather than on the transfer type, so any ordinary file transfer can claim the exemption.
Vulnerability Details
Affected code at commit b6f27da9401f2c3647c1adb6b77a46bb8c0923d2 (HEAD, v11.5.1+1):
The receive-side file-readiness loop in src/croc/croc.go decides whether to prompt before overwriting or resuming an existing destination file. The decision is made around line 3413:
isStdinName := strings.HasPrefix(path.Base(fileInfo.Name), "croc-stdin-")
...
if destinationExists && !c.Options.Overwrite && !c.Options.Rename && !isStdinName {
resumable := fileInfo.Size > 0 && fileInfo.Symlink == "" && recipientFileInfo.Mode().IsRegular()
overwrite, promptErr := askReceiveOverwrite(c.clientContext(), fileInfo, resumable)
if promptErr != nil {
return promptErr
}
if !overwrite {
continue
}
}
isStdinName is derived purely from the received file's basename. The prompt is suppressed for any such name, even when c.Options.SendingText is false and the transfer is an ordinary file transfer whose name the sender chose.
When the prompt is skipped and the transfer declares fileInfo.Size == 0 or a symlink (fileInfo.Symlink != ""), the loop calls createEmptyFileAndFinish() (src/croc/croc.go:3245), which - before creating the new entry - removes any existing file at the destination:
if fileInfo.Symlink != "" {
if err = validateReceiveSymlinkTarget(fileInfo.FolderRemote, fileInfo.Symlink); err != nil {
return
}
log.Debug("creating symlink")
// remove symlink if it exists
if _, errExists := root.Lstat(pathToFile); errExists == nil {
if err = root.Remove(pathToFile); err != nil {
return err
}
}
err = root.Symlink(fileInfo.Symlink, pathToFile)
...
}
For a normal (non-croc-stdin-) name, the overwrite prompt runs first, so the remove/replace step only happens with the user's explicit y. For a croc-stdin- name the entire prompt is bypassed: an existing croc-stdin-* file is deleted and replaced with the attacker's symlink (or, for Size == 0, truncated to an empty file) with no confirmation.
For a non-empty regular-file transfer with a croc-stdin- name, the same missing prompt lets the receive path proceed through recipientInitializeFile() (src/croc/croc.go:3109; the os.O_RDWR open is at 3136-3138): the existing file is opened O_RDWR (no O_EXCL), truncated to the sender-declared size when the sizes differ, and the sender's chunks are written at the declared offsets - a silent overwrite of the existing file's content.
Why the check is missing: the exemption was added deliberately so that croc's own croc-stdin-* text artifacts (created by os.CreateTemp(".", "croc-stdin-") for croc send --text / piped stdin) do not trigger an overwrite question every time. History: commit b687778d "bug fix: doesn't ask overwrite text Fixes #384" (2021-04-29) introduced the prefix-based skip, keyed on the filename and not on the transfer's SendingText flag. The branch that handles Size == 0 || Symlink != "" via createEmptyFileAndFinish() predates that (6386e4a8, 2019) and at the time ran unconditionally for every received name; the refactor 615af377 "fix: gate overwrites and receive hash algorithms" (2026-08-29, first released in v11.3.6) moved it below the overwrite-prompt gate, so after v11.3.6 the empty-file/symlink replacement reaches the remove-and-replace step without user confirmation only through the croc-stdin- exemption. The refactor extracted the prefix test into isStdinName and kept it filename-only, dropping the explicit !c.Options.SendingText conjunct that the pre-refactor prompt conditions still carried (615af377~1); the original intent was to suppress the prompt only for transfers actually marked as text. Because the exemption is keyed on a filename prefix the sender fully controls, any peer a user receives from can claim it.
The same prefix exemption also suppresses the --rename side of the decision (if destinationExists && !isStdinName && c.Options.Rename), so --rename receivers silently keep the attacker-chosen name and overwrite too.
This is distinct from the previously reported croc-marked-files.txt arbitrary file deletion (oss-sec 2026/Q3 #497, fixed in 11.0.3 by commit c0d51f0, which removed the on-disk cleanup list). That defect reached deletion through RemoveMarkedFiles(); this one reaches silent overwrite/replacement through the filename-keyed prompt exemption in the receive loop, which the 11.0.3 fix did not touch and which remains live at HEAD.
Impact
An attacker who can send a file to a victim (croc's sender-is-untrusted model; the receiver accepts a transfer from them) can silently overwrite, truncate, or delete-and-replace an existing croc-stdin-* file in the receiver's working directory without the confirmation every other received name triggers. The attack needs the colliding file to already exist with an exact name the sender can predict; receiver-side text artifacts get unpredictable os.CreateTemp-style suffixes, so the practical target is a name the attacker knows (e.g. a file the user deliberately kept, or a name pattern from an earlier transfer the same peer sent). With the noisy prompt gone, the substitution is invisible to the user. Severity is bounded because the vulnerable names must start with the croc-stdin- prefix (dotfiles such as .bashrc cannot be named this way), so the attack cannot reach outside that namespace.
CVSS 3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L - base score 5.4 (Medium).
- Attack Vector (AV): Network - the sender is a remote peer; no local access needed.
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low - a crafted basename and a normal file transfer; no special conditions.
- Privileges Required (PR): None - the sender has no account on the receiver.
- User Interaction (UI): Required - the victim must run croc receive and accept the transfer.
- Scope (S): Unchanged - the vulnerable component is the croc receiver itself.
- Confidentiality (C): None - no read primitive; planted symlink targets are confined to the receive directory.
- Integrity (I): Low - the modification is limited to files whose names carry the croc-stdin- prefix, and it requires an exact-name collision with a pre-existing file; per CVSS 3.1, "can modify only certain files" is I:L - dotfiles such as .bashrc are unreachable.
- Availability (A): Low - the truncate-to-empty and remove-and-replace branches leave the previous file unavailable or destroyed. CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure) is the root-cause classification: the overwrite protection mechanism is bypassed by a sender-controlled filename; CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path) is the companion classification and is the GHSA-selectable one (CWE-693 is not in GitHub's selectable set), while CWE-22 (path traversal) is not accurate here because writes stay confined to the receive root. Alternative reading: if the bounded namespace is scored as full integrity within reach - total content replacement of every colliding croc-stdin-* file - Integrity: High yields CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L = 7.1 (High).
Reproduction Steps
Prerequisite: a Go toolchain satisfying go.mod (go 1.27) and a checkout of croc at commit b6f27da9401f2c3647c1adb6b77a46bb8c0923d2. The repro is a self-contained Go test that reuses the project's own in-process loopback test relay - the same harness as TestCrocLocal in src/croc/croc_test.go - so it requires no network, no third party, and no separately installed binary; it drives the exact production receive path (NewCtx + Receive -> receive-ready loop -> the gate at src/croc/croc.go:3413).
- Save the following as
src/croc/repro_overwrite_bypass_test.goin the checkout:
package croc
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
log "github.com/schollz/croc/v11/src/logger"
)
// Repro: overwrite-confirmation bypass via a crafted "croc-stdin-" filename on receive.
func TestOverwriteConfirmationBypass(t *testing.T) {
log.SetLevel("warn")
localPorts := freeConsecutiveTestPorts(t, 2)
localAddress := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", localPorts[0])
victim := t.TempDir()
attacker := t.TempDir()
mustWrite := func(path, content string) {
t.Helper()
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
attackerStdin := filepath.Join(attacker, "croc-stdin-notes.txt")
attackerCtrl := filepath.Join(attacker, "notes.txt")
mustWrite(attackerStdin, "ATTACKER-REPLACEMENT\n")
mustWrite(attackerCtrl, "ATTACKER-CONTROL\n")
victimStdin := filepath.Join(victim, "croc-stdin-notes.txt")
victimCtrl := filepath.Join(victim, "notes.txt")
mustWrite(victimStdin, "ORIGINAL-CONTENT\n")
mustWrite(victimCtrl, "ORIGINAL-CONTROL\n")
// Receiver writes into its working directory (like `croc <code>` run in a folder).
oldWD, err := os.Getwd()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.Chdir(victim); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer func() { _ = os.Chdir(oldWD) }()
sender, err := NewCtx(context.Background(), Options{
IsSender: true,
SharedSecret: "8123-testingthecroc",
RelayAddress: localAddress,
RelayPorts: append([]string(nil), localPorts...),
RelayPassword: "pass123",
NoPrompt: true,
DisableLocal: false,
OnlyLocal: true,
Curve: "ed25519",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Default receive options: Overwrite=false, Rename=false. NoPrompt only
// auto-accepts the transfer itself; it does NOT suppress the per-file
// overwrite prompt (the code under test).
receiver, err := NewCtx(context.Background(), Options{
IsSender: false,
SharedSecret: "8123-testingthecroc",
RelayAddress: localAddress,
IP: localAddress,
RelayPassword: "pass123",
NoPrompt: true,
DisableLocal: false,
Curve: "ed25519",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
results := make(chan error, 2)
go func() {
filesInfo, emptyFolders, total, errGet := GetFilesInfo([]string{attackerStdin, attackerCtrl}, false, false, []string{})
if errGet != nil {
results <- errGet
return
}
results <- sender.Send(filesInfo, emptyFolders, total)
}()
waitForRelayPorts(t, localPorts)
go func() { results <- receiver.Receive() }()
for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
select {
case err := <-results:
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("transfer %d failed: %v", i, err)
}
case <-time.After(60 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("transfer timed out")
}
}
time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
gotStdin, _ := os.ReadFile(victimStdin)
gotCtrl, _ := os.ReadFile(victimCtrl)
fmt.Printf("OBSERVED croc-stdin-notes.txt: %q (no prompt)\n", string(gotStdin))
fmt.Printf("OBSERVED notes.txt: %q (prompt fired; retained)\n", string(gotCtrl))
if string(gotStdin) != "ATTACKER-REPLACEMENT\n" {
t.Errorf("croc-stdin-notes.txt = %q, want %q (silent overwrite did not occur)", string(gotStdin), "ATTACKER-REPLACEMENT\n")
}
if string(gotCtrl) != "ORIGINAL-CONTROL\n" {
t.Errorf("notes.txt = %q, want %q (prompt did not protect the control file)", string(gotCtrl), "ORIGINAL-CONTROL\n")
}
}
- Run it:
go test -count=1 -run TestOverwriteConfirmationBypass -v -timeout 150s ./src/croc/ </dev/null
- Test output at pin
b6f27da9401f2c3647c1adb6b77a46bb8c0923d2(2026-09-08):
Resume 'notes.txt' (0.0%)? (y/N) (use --overwrite to omit) Skipping 'notes.txt'
OBSERVED croc-stdin-notes.txt: "ATTACKER-REPLACEMENT\n" (no prompt)
OBSERVED notes.txt: "ORIGINAL-CONTROL\n" (prompt fired; retained)
--- PASS: TestOverwriteConfirmationBypass (1.04s)
PASS
What the differential shows: the transfer carries two ordinary files (not a text transfer - SendingText is false). One is named croc-stdin-notes.txt and collides with a pre-existing file in the receiver's directory; the other is named notes.txt and collides with another pre-existing file. For notes.txt the code printed the resume/overwrite confirmation (Resume 'notes.txt' (0.0%)? (y/N) (use --overwrite to omit)); with stdin closed (</dev/null, answer EOF) it skipped the file, which keeps its original content (ORIGINAL-CONTROL). For croc-stdin-notes.txt no prompt is printed at all, the loop falls through to recipientInitializeFile (src/croc/croc.go:3109), which opens the existing file O_RDWR (croc.go:3136-3138) and truncates/writes the sender's chunks - the file ends up holding exactly the attacker's content (ATTACKER-REPLACEMENT). The receiver here uses NoPrompt=true (the CLI --yes equivalent), which does not suppress this prompt: askReceiveOverwrite (src/croc/croc.go:3301) runs regardless of NoPrompt; only --overwrite, --rename, or the crafted croc-stdin- prefix suppress it.
Symlink / empty-file variant (v11.3.6 and later): with sender-declared metadata fileInfo.Size == 0 or fileInfo.Symlink != "" for a file named croc-stdin-<name>, the skipped gate hands control to createEmptyFileAndFinish (src/croc/croc.go:3245), which removes any existing file at the destination (root.Remove, no prompt) and then creates an empty file or a symlink to the sender-supplied target. To exercise it, replace the attacker's regular file with an empty file or an in-directory symlink on the sender's side (e.g. ln -s notes.txt src/croc-stdin-notes.txt; note the target is validated by validateReceiveSymlinkTarget, croc.go:892, and must stay inside the receive directory) and re-run the same test; the regular-file case above already demonstrates the identical prompt-skip.
Recommendations
Gate the exemption on the transfer actually being a text transfer, not on the received filename. In src/croc/croc.go the cleanest fix is to require both conditions before suppressing the prompt, e.g.:
isStdinName := strings.HasPrefix(path.Base(fileInfo.Name), "croc-stdin-") && c.Options.SendingText
and make the empty-file/symlink branch (createEmptyFileAndFinish) and the --rename branch honor the same combined condition, so a regular file transfer can never claim the text-transfer exemption. As defense-in-depth, apply the same SendingText gate wherever a received croc-stdin-* name short-circuits a user confirmation, and document that the prefix is reserved for transfers the sender marked as text.
Resources
- Source at pinned commit: https://github.com/schollz/croc/blob/b6f27da9401f2c3647c1adb6b77a46bb8c0923d2/src/croc/croc.go (prompt-gate ~L3405-3430;
createEmptyFileAndFinishL3245-3280;recipientInitializeFileL3109-3160 (os.O_RDWRopen at L3136-3138)) - Exemption origin: https://github.com/schollz/croc/commit/b687778d ("bug fix: doesn't ask overwrite text Fixes #384", 2021-04-29)
createEmptyFileAndFinishorigin (pre-gate, name-unrestricted until 615af377): https://github.com/schollz/croc/commit/6386e4a8- Refactor that kept the exemption filename-only: https://github.com/schollz/croc/commit/615af377 ("fix: gate overwrites and receive hash algorithms", 2026-08-29, first released v11.3.6)
- Prior related disclosure (arbitrary file deletion via
croc-marked-files.txt, fixed 11.0.3 by c0d51f0, different sink and mechanism): oss-sec 2026/Q3 #497 - https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2026/q3/497 - Related prior advisory in the same class (sender-controlled names reaching the filesystem, fixed 9.6.16, does not cover this prompt bypass): GHSA-ppjh-xp5v-46wc (CVE-2023-43619)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/schollz/croc/v11"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.5.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/schollz/croc/v10"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "10.7.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/schollz/croc/v9"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "9.6.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/schollz/croc/v8"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "8.6.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/schollz/croc/v6"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "6.4.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/schollz/croc"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.0.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-119298"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-09T22:40:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-30T17:17:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\ncroc is an end-to-end encrypted peer-to-peer file transfer tool. On the receiving side, the confirmation that normally protects an existing file from being overwritten or resumed is skipped whenever the received file\u0027s name starts with `croc-stdin-`, regardless of whether the incoming transfer is actually a text transfer. A sender can therefore name a file `croc-stdin-\u003cexisting-name\u003e` and silently overwrite, truncate, or replace an existing file of that name in the receiver\u0027s working directory - including removing the existing file and substituting a symlink - without the `Overwrite?` prompt that the standard path requires. The exemption was introduced to keep croc\u0027s internal text-transfer artifacts from triggering prompts, but it is keyed on the filename prefix rather than on the transfer type, so any ordinary file transfer can claim the exemption.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nAffected code at commit `b6f27da9401f2c3647c1adb6b77a46bb8c0923d2` (HEAD, v11.5.1+1):\n\nThe receive-side file-readiness loop in `src/croc/croc.go` decides whether to prompt before overwriting or resuming an existing destination file. The decision is made around line 3413:\n\n```go\nisStdinName := strings.HasPrefix(path.Base(fileInfo.Name), \"croc-stdin-\")\n...\nif destinationExists \u0026\u0026 !c.Options.Overwrite \u0026\u0026 !c.Options.Rename \u0026\u0026 !isStdinName {\n resumable := fileInfo.Size \u003e 0 \u0026\u0026 fileInfo.Symlink == \"\" \u0026\u0026 recipientFileInfo.Mode().IsRegular()\n overwrite, promptErr := askReceiveOverwrite(c.clientContext(), fileInfo, resumable)\n if promptErr != nil {\n return promptErr\n }\n if !overwrite {\n continue\n }\n}\n```\n\n`isStdinName` is derived purely from the received file\u0027s basename. The prompt is suppressed for any such name, even when `c.Options.SendingText` is false and the transfer is an ordinary file transfer whose name the sender chose.\n\nWhen the prompt is skipped and the transfer declares `fileInfo.Size == 0` or a symlink (`fileInfo.Symlink != \"\"`), the loop calls `createEmptyFileAndFinish()` (src/croc/croc.go:3245), which - before creating the new entry - removes any existing file at the destination:\n\n```go\nif fileInfo.Symlink != \"\" {\n if err = validateReceiveSymlinkTarget(fileInfo.FolderRemote, fileInfo.Symlink); err != nil {\n return\n }\n log.Debug(\"creating symlink\")\n // remove symlink if it exists\n if _, errExists := root.Lstat(pathToFile); errExists == nil {\n if err = root.Remove(pathToFile); err != nil {\n return err\n }\n }\n err = root.Symlink(fileInfo.Symlink, pathToFile)\n ...\n}\n```\n\nFor a normal (non-`croc-stdin-`) name, the overwrite prompt runs first, so the remove/replace step only happens with the user\u0027s explicit `y`. For a `croc-stdin-` name the entire prompt is bypassed: an existing `croc-stdin-*` file is deleted and replaced with the attacker\u0027s symlink (or, for `Size == 0`, truncated to an empty file) with no confirmation.\n\nFor a non-empty regular-file transfer with a `croc-stdin-` name, the same missing prompt lets the receive path proceed through `recipientInitializeFile()` (src/croc/croc.go:3109; the `os.O_RDWR` open is at 3136-3138): the existing file is opened `O_RDWR` (no `O_EXCL`), truncated to the sender-declared size when the sizes differ, and the sender\u0027s chunks are written at the declared offsets - a silent overwrite of the existing file\u0027s content.\n\nWhy the check is missing: the exemption was added deliberately so that croc\u0027s own `croc-stdin-*` text artifacts (created by `os.CreateTemp(\".\", \"croc-stdin-\")` for `croc send --text` / piped stdin) do not trigger an overwrite question every time. History: commit b687778d \"bug fix: doesn\u0027t ask overwrite text Fixes #384\" (2021-04-29) introduced the prefix-based skip, keyed on the filename and not on the transfer\u0027s `SendingText` flag. The branch that handles `Size == 0 || Symlink != \"\"` via `createEmptyFileAndFinish()` predates that (6386e4a8, 2019) and at the time ran unconditionally for every received name; the refactor 615af377 \"fix: gate overwrites and receive hash algorithms\" (2026-08-29, first released in v11.3.6) moved it below the overwrite-prompt gate, so after v11.3.6 the empty-file/symlink replacement reaches the remove-and-replace step without user confirmation only through the `croc-stdin-` exemption. The refactor extracted the prefix test into `isStdinName` and kept it filename-only, dropping the explicit `!c.Options.SendingText` conjunct that the pre-refactor prompt conditions still carried (615af377~1); the original intent was to suppress the prompt only for transfers actually marked as text. Because the exemption is keyed on a filename prefix the sender fully controls, any peer a user receives from can claim it.\n\nThe same prefix exemption also suppresses the `--rename` side of the decision (`if destinationExists \u0026\u0026 !isStdinName \u0026\u0026 c.Options.Rename`), so `--rename` receivers silently keep the attacker-chosen name and overwrite too.\n\nThis is distinct from the previously reported `croc-marked-files.txt` arbitrary file deletion (oss-sec 2026/Q3 #497, fixed in 11.0.3 by commit c0d51f0, which removed the on-disk cleanup list). That defect reached deletion through `RemoveMarkedFiles()`; this one reaches silent overwrite/replacement through the filename-keyed prompt exemption in the receive loop, which the 11.0.3 fix did not touch and which remains live at HEAD.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can send a file to a victim (croc\u0027s sender-is-untrusted model; the receiver accepts a transfer from them) can silently overwrite, truncate, or delete-and-replace an existing `croc-stdin-*` file in the receiver\u0027s working directory without the confirmation every other received name triggers. The attack needs the colliding file to already exist with an exact name the sender can predict; receiver-side text artifacts get unpredictable `os.CreateTemp`-style suffixes, so the practical target is a name the attacker knows (e.g. a file the user deliberately kept, or a name pattern from an earlier transfer the same peer sent). With the noisy prompt gone, the substitution is invisible to the user. Severity is bounded because the vulnerable names must start with the `croc-stdin-` prefix (dotfiles such as `.bashrc` cannot be named this way), so the attack cannot reach outside that namespace.\n\nCVSS 3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L` - base score 5.4 (Medium).\n- **Attack Vector (AV): Network** - the sender is a remote peer; no local access needed.\n- **Attack Complexity (AC): Low** - a crafted basename and a normal file transfer; no special conditions.\n- **Privileges Required (PR): None** - the sender has no account on the receiver.\n- **User Interaction (UI): Required** - the victim must run croc receive and accept the transfer.\n- **Scope (S): Unchanged** - the vulnerable component is the croc receiver itself.\n- **Confidentiality (C): None** - no read primitive; planted symlink targets are confined to the receive directory.\n- **Integrity (I): Low** - the modification is limited to files whose names carry the `croc-stdin-` prefix, and it requires an exact-name collision with a pre-existing file; per CVSS 3.1, \"can modify only certain files\" is I:L - dotfiles such as `.bashrc` are unreachable.\n- **Availability (A): Low** - the truncate-to-empty and remove-and-replace branches leave the previous file unavailable or destroyed. CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure) is the root-cause classification: the overwrite protection mechanism is bypassed by a sender-controlled filename; CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path) is the companion classification and is the GHSA-selectable one (CWE-693 is not in GitHub\u0027s selectable set), while CWE-22 (path traversal) is not accurate here because writes stay confined to the receive root. Alternative reading: if the bounded namespace is scored as full integrity within reach - total content replacement of every colliding `croc-stdin-*` file - Integrity: High yields `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L` = 7.1 (High).\n\n## Reproduction Steps\n\nPrerequisite: a Go toolchain satisfying `go.mod` (`go 1.27`) and a checkout of croc at commit `b6f27da9401f2c3647c1adb6b77a46bb8c0923d2`. The repro is a self-contained Go test that reuses the project\u0027s own in-process loopback test relay - the same harness as `TestCrocLocal` in `src/croc/croc_test.go` - so it requires no network, no third party, and no separately installed binary; it drives the exact production receive path (`NewCtx` + `Receive` -\u003e receive-ready loop -\u003e the gate at `src/croc/croc.go:3413`).\n\n1. Save the following as `src/croc/repro_overwrite_bypass_test.go` in the checkout:\n\n```go\npackage croc\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\tlog \"github.com/schollz/croc/v11/src/logger\"\n)\n\n// Repro: overwrite-confirmation bypass via a crafted \"croc-stdin-\" filename on receive.\nfunc TestOverwriteConfirmationBypass(t *testing.T) {\n\tlog.SetLevel(\"warn\")\n\tlocalPorts := freeConsecutiveTestPorts(t, 2)\n\tlocalAddress := net.JoinHostPort(\"127.0.0.1\", localPorts[0])\n\n\tvictim := t.TempDir()\n\tattacker := t.TempDir()\n\tmustWrite := func(path, content string) {\n\t\tt.Helper()\n\t\tif err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0o644); err != nil {\n\t\t\tt.Fatal(err)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tattackerStdin := filepath.Join(attacker, \"croc-stdin-notes.txt\")\n\tattackerCtrl := filepath.Join(attacker, \"notes.txt\")\n\tmustWrite(attackerStdin, \"ATTACKER-REPLACEMENT\\n\")\n\tmustWrite(attackerCtrl, \"ATTACKER-CONTROL\\n\")\n\tvictimStdin := filepath.Join(victim, \"croc-stdin-notes.txt\")\n\tvictimCtrl := filepath.Join(victim, \"notes.txt\")\n\tmustWrite(victimStdin, \"ORIGINAL-CONTENT\\n\")\n\tmustWrite(victimCtrl, \"ORIGINAL-CONTROL\\n\")\n\n\t// Receiver writes into its working directory (like `croc \u003ccode\u003e` run in a folder).\n\toldWD, err := os.Getwd()\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := os.Chdir(victim); err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tdefer func() { _ = os.Chdir(oldWD) }()\n\n\tsender, err := NewCtx(context.Background(), Options{\n\t\tIsSender: true,\n\t\tSharedSecret: \"8123-testingthecroc\",\n\t\tRelayAddress: localAddress,\n\t\tRelayPorts: append([]string(nil), localPorts...),\n\t\tRelayPassword: \"pass123\",\n\t\tNoPrompt: true,\n\t\tDisableLocal: false,\n\t\tOnlyLocal: true,\n\t\tCurve: \"ed25519\",\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\t// Default receive options: Overwrite=false, Rename=false. NoPrompt only\n\t// auto-accepts the transfer itself; it does NOT suppress the per-file\n\t// overwrite prompt (the code under test).\n\treceiver, err := NewCtx(context.Background(), Options{\n\t\tIsSender: false,\n\t\tSharedSecret: \"8123-testingthecroc\",\n\t\tRelayAddress: localAddress,\n\t\tIP: localAddress,\n\t\tRelayPassword: \"pass123\",\n\t\tNoPrompt: true,\n\t\tDisableLocal: false,\n\t\tCurve: \"ed25519\",\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\n\tresults := make(chan error, 2)\n\tgo func() {\n\t\tfilesInfo, emptyFolders, total, errGet := GetFilesInfo([]string{attackerStdin, attackerCtrl}, false, false, []string{})\n\t\tif errGet != nil {\n\t\t\tresults \u003c- errGet\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tresults \u003c- sender.Send(filesInfo, emptyFolders, total)\n\t}()\n\twaitForRelayPorts(t, localPorts)\n\tgo func() { results \u003c- receiver.Receive() }()\n\tfor i := 0; i \u003c 2; i++ {\n\t\tselect {\n\t\tcase err := \u003c-results:\n\t\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\t\tt.Fatalf(\"transfer %d failed: %v\", i, err)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\tcase \u003c-time.After(60 * time.Second):\n\t\t\tt.Fatal(\"transfer timed out\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\ttime.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)\n\n\tgotStdin, _ := os.ReadFile(victimStdin)\n\tgotCtrl, _ := os.ReadFile(victimCtrl)\n\tfmt.Printf(\"OBSERVED croc-stdin-notes.txt: %q (no prompt)\\n\", string(gotStdin))\n\tfmt.Printf(\"OBSERVED notes.txt: %q (prompt fired; retained)\\n\", string(gotCtrl))\n\n\tif string(gotStdin) != \"ATTACKER-REPLACEMENT\\n\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"croc-stdin-notes.txt = %q, want %q (silent overwrite did not occur)\", string(gotStdin), \"ATTACKER-REPLACEMENT\\n\")\n\t}\n\tif string(gotCtrl) != \"ORIGINAL-CONTROL\\n\" {\n\t\tt.Errorf(\"notes.txt = %q, want %q (prompt did not protect the control file)\", string(gotCtrl), \"ORIGINAL-CONTROL\\n\")\n\t}\n}\n```\n\n2. Run it:\n\n```bash\ngo test -count=1 -run TestOverwriteConfirmationBypass -v -timeout 150s ./src/croc/ \u003c/dev/null\n```\n\n3. Test output at pin `b6f27da9401f2c3647c1adb6b77a46bb8c0923d2` (2026-09-08):\n\n```text\nResume \u0027notes.txt\u0027 (0.0%)? (y/N) (use --overwrite to omit) Skipping \u0027notes.txt\u0027\nOBSERVED croc-stdin-notes.txt: \"ATTACKER-REPLACEMENT\\n\" (no prompt)\nOBSERVED notes.txt: \"ORIGINAL-CONTROL\\n\" (prompt fired; retained)\n--- PASS: TestOverwriteConfirmationBypass (1.04s)\nPASS\n```\n\nWhat the differential shows: the transfer carries two ordinary files (not a text transfer - `SendingText` is false). One is named `croc-stdin-notes.txt` and collides with a pre-existing file in the receiver\u0027s directory; the other is named `notes.txt` and collides with another pre-existing file. For `notes.txt` the code printed the resume/overwrite confirmation (`Resume \u0027notes.txt\u0027 (0.0%)? (y/N) (use --overwrite to omit)`); with stdin closed (`\u003c/dev/null`, answer EOF) it skipped the file, which keeps its original content (`ORIGINAL-CONTROL`). For `croc-stdin-notes.txt` no prompt is printed at all, the loop falls through to `recipientInitializeFile` (src/croc/croc.go:3109), which opens the existing file `O_RDWR` (croc.go:3136-3138) and truncates/writes the sender\u0027s chunks - the file ends up holding exactly the attacker\u0027s content (`ATTACKER-REPLACEMENT`). The receiver here uses `NoPrompt=true` (the CLI `--yes` equivalent), which does not suppress this prompt: `askReceiveOverwrite` (src/croc/croc.go:3301) runs regardless of `NoPrompt`; only `--overwrite`, `--rename`, or the crafted `croc-stdin-` prefix suppress it.\n\nSymlink / empty-file variant (v11.3.6 and later): with sender-declared metadata `fileInfo.Size == 0` or `fileInfo.Symlink != \"\"` for a file named `croc-stdin-\u003cname\u003e`, the skipped gate hands control to `createEmptyFileAndFinish` (src/croc/croc.go:3245), which removes any existing file at the destination (`root.Remove`, no prompt) and then creates an empty file or a symlink to the sender-supplied target. To exercise it, replace the attacker\u0027s regular file with an empty file or an in-directory symlink on the sender\u0027s side (e.g. `ln -s notes.txt src/croc-stdin-notes.txt`; note the target is validated by `validateReceiveSymlinkTarget`, croc.go:892, and must stay inside the receive directory) and re-run the same test; the regular-file case above already demonstrates the identical prompt-skip.\n\n## Recommendations\n\nGate the exemption on the transfer actually being a text transfer, not on the received filename. In `src/croc/croc.go` the cleanest fix is to require both conditions before suppressing the prompt, e.g.:\n\n```go\nisStdinName := strings.HasPrefix(path.Base(fileInfo.Name), \"croc-stdin-\") \u0026\u0026 c.Options.SendingText\n```\n\nand make the empty-file/symlink branch (`createEmptyFileAndFinish`) and the `--rename` branch honor the same combined condition, so a regular file transfer can never claim the text-transfer exemption. As defense-in-depth, apply the same `SendingText` gate wherever a received `croc-stdin-*` name short-circuits a user confirmation, and document that the prefix is reserved for transfers the sender marked as text.\n\n## Resources\n\n- Source at pinned commit: https://github.com/schollz/croc/blob/b6f27da9401f2c3647c1adb6b77a46bb8c0923d2/src/croc/croc.go (prompt-gate ~L3405-3430; `createEmptyFileAndFinish` L3245-3280; `recipientInitializeFile` L3109-3160 (`os.O_RDWR` open at L3136-3138))\n- Exemption origin: https://github.com/schollz/croc/commit/b687778d (\"bug fix: doesn\u0027t ask overwrite text Fixes #384\", 2021-04-29)\n- `createEmptyFileAndFinish` origin (pre-gate, name-unrestricted until 615af377): https://github.com/schollz/croc/commit/6386e4a8\n- Refactor that kept the exemption filename-only: https://github.com/schollz/croc/commit/615af377 (\"fix: gate overwrites and receive hash algorithms\", 2026-08-29, first released v11.3.6)\n- Prior related disclosure (arbitrary file deletion via `croc-marked-files.txt`, fixed 11.0.3 by c0d51f0, different sink and mechanism): oss-sec 2026/Q3 #497 - https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2026/q3/497\n- Related prior advisory in the same class (sender-controlled names reaching the filesystem, fixed 9.6.16, does not cover this prompt bypass): GHSA-ppjh-xp5v-46wc (CVE-2023-43619)",
"id": "GHSA-x89h-7h96-v88f",
"modified": "2026-11-09T22:40:12Z",
"published": "2026-11-09T22:40:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/schollz/croc/security/advisories/GHSA-x89h-7h96-v88f"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119298"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/schollz/croc/pull/1327"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/schollz/croc/commit/25fe49b6f14db99f517e902cfef76299ad0a95a3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/schollz/croc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/schollz/croc/releases/tag/v11.5.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "croc: Overwrite-confirmation bypass via a crafted \"croc-stdin-\" filename on receive"
}
GHSA-X997-VVM5-QVCR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-26 03:30 – Updated: 2025-12-03 18:30Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion (upgrade_contents.php) in DB Electronica Telecomunicazioni S.p.A. Mozart FM Transmitter versions 30, 50, 100, 300, 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 3500, 6000, 7000 allows an attacker to perform The deleteupgrade parameter allows unauthenticated deletion of arbitrary files.
The deleteupgrade parameter in /var/www/upgrade_contents.php allows unauthenticated deletion of arbitrary files in /var/www/upload/ without any extension restriction or path sanitization, enabling attackers to remove critical system files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-66254"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-26T01:16:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion (upgrade_contents.php) in DB Electronica Telecomunicazioni S.p.A. Mozart FM Transmitter versions 30, 50, 100, 300, 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 3500, 6000, 7000 allows an attacker to perform The deleteupgrade parameter allows unauthenticated deletion of arbitrary files.\u00a0\n\nThe `deleteupgrade` parameter in `/var/www/upgrade_contents.php` allows unauthenticated deletion of arbitrary files in `/var/www/upload/` without any extension restriction or path sanitization, enabling attackers to remove critical system files.",
"id": "GHSA-x997-vvm5-qvcr",
"modified": "2025-12-03T18:30:21Z",
"published": "2025-11-26T03:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66254"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.abdulmhsblog.com/posts/webfmvulns"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-X99G-7WH9-WHR2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-19 18:32 – Updated: 2026-08-19 21:30As part of Cisco's ongoing commitment to proactive security and product quality, the Cisco Crosswork engineering team has conducted a comprehensive internal security review. This review resulted in a software hardening release that addresses multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities.
The vulnerabilities tracked by CVE-2026-20358 are related to external control of the file system issues that are grouped Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) CWE-73.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-20358"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T17:18:40Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "As part of Cisco\u0027s ongoing commitment to proactive security and product quality, the Cisco Crosswork engineering team has conducted a comprehensive internal security review. This review resulted in a software hardening release that addresses multiple internally discovered vulnerabilities.\n\nThe vulnerabilities tracked by CVE-2026-20358 are related to external control of the file system issues that are grouped Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)\u0026nbsp;CWE-73.",
"id": "GHSA-x99g-7wh9-whr2",
"modified": "2026-08-19T21:30:29Z",
"published": "2026-08-19T18:32:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20358"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-hardening-crosswork-UzDTU9Vh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/Media/News/item/blog/2026/06/16/Preserving-Vulnerability-Level-Identification"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X9F4-V83P-9C3C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-11 18:32 – Updated: 2025-03-11 18:32External control of file name or path in Windows NTLM allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-24996"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-11T17:16:36Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "External control of file name or path in Windows NTLM allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-x9f4-v83p-9c3c",
"modified": "2025-03-11T18:32:18Z",
"published": "2025-03-11T18:32:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24996"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-24996"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XC87-V37H-P529
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-08 18:32External control of file name or path in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-62804"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-08T18:18:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "External control of file name or path in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally.",
"id": "GHSA-xc87-v37h-p529",
"modified": "2026-09-08T18:32:07Z",
"published": "2026-09-08T18:32:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62804"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-62804"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XC9G-J69Q-37XW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 18:35 – Updated: 2026-08-25 18:35Impact
An arbitrary file write vulnerability (CWE-73, External Control of File Name or Path) exists in the consciousness-explorer component of sublinear-time-solver. The MCP export_state (and import_state) tool accepted a user-supplied filepath argument and passed it directly to fs.writeFileSync / fs.readFileSync without constraining the destination or rejecting path traversal. An attacker able to invoke the MCP tool could write or overwrite any file accessible to the server process (e.g. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, application files), leading to integrity loss and potential service disruption.
The same sink class was present in the main solver MCP server (saveVectorToFile / loadVectorFromFile).
Affected versions
consciousness-explorer< 1.1.2sublinear-time-solver< 1.6.0sublinear(crates.io) < 0.2.0
Patches
consciousness-explorer@1.1.2sublinear-time-solver@1.6.0sublinear@0.2.0
State/vector files are now confined to a dedicated directory (overridable via $CONSCIOUSNESS_EXPLORER_STATE_DIR / $SUBLINEAR_SOLVER_VECTOR_DIR), a basename-only contract is enforced (rejecting separators, .., NUL/control chars, hidden files, and Windows reserved names), and files are opened with O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC mode 0o600. Covered by 14 regression tests in tests/consciousness/safe-path.test.mjs.
Breaking change: callers must now pass a basename, not an absolute path.
Workarounds
Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted clients; restrict export_state to trusted local users; run the server under a low-privilege account with a restricted working directory.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "consciousness-explorer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "sublinear-time-solver"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55609"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T18:35:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nAn arbitrary file write vulnerability (CWE-73, External Control of File Name or Path) exists in the `consciousness-explorer` component of `sublinear-time-solver`. The MCP `export_state` (and `import_state`) tool accepted a user-supplied `filepath` argument and passed it directly to `fs.writeFileSync` / `fs.readFileSync` without constraining the destination or rejecting path traversal. An attacker able to invoke the MCP tool could write or overwrite any file accessible to the server process (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, application files), leading to integrity loss and potential service disruption.\n\nThe same sink class was present in the main solver MCP server (`saveVectorToFile` / `loadVectorFromFile`).\n\n### Affected versions\n- `consciousness-explorer` \u003c 1.1.2\n- `sublinear-time-solver` \u003c 1.6.0\n- `sublinear` (crates.io) \u003c 0.2.0\n\n### Patches\n- `consciousness-explorer@1.1.2`\n- `sublinear-time-solver@1.6.0`\n- `sublinear@0.2.0`\n\nState/vector files are now confined to a dedicated directory (overridable via `$CONSCIOUSNESS_EXPLORER_STATE_DIR` / `$SUBLINEAR_SOLVER_VECTOR_DIR`), a basename-only contract is enforced (rejecting separators, `..`, NUL/control chars, hidden files, and Windows reserved names), and files are opened with `O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC` mode `0o600`. Covered by 14 regression tests in `tests/consciousness/safe-path.test.mjs`.\n\n**Breaking change:** callers must now pass a basename, not an absolute path.\n\n### Workarounds\nDo not expose the MCP server to untrusted clients; restrict `export_state` to trusted local users; run the server under a low-privilege account with a restricted working directory.",
"id": "GHSA-xc9g-j69q-37xw",
"modified": "2026-08-25T18:35:32Z",
"published": "2026-08-25T18:35:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/sublinear-time-solver/security/advisories/GHSA-xc9g-j69q-37xw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/BruceJqs/public_exp/issues/32"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/sublinear-time-solver/issues/19"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/sublinear-time-solver/pull/20"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/sublinear-time-solver/commit/a701296e363192be863e79d788fa268095e3d229"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/sublinear-time-solver/commit/ea9a212b69e4449ec443fe088a7aec7546f70b4a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/sublinear-time-solver"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/sublinear-time-solver/releases/tag/v1.6.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "consciousness-explorer / sublinear-time-solver MCP export_state has an arbitrary file write"
}
Mitigation
When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
Mitigation
- Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
- Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
Mitigation
Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
Mitigation
If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
Mitigation
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding
An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-72: URL Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.