Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-696

Allowed-with-Review

Incorrect Behavior Order

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product performs multiple related behaviors, but the behaviors are performed in the wrong order in ways that may produce resultant weaknesses.

121 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-8F9R-GR6R-X63Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 00:30 – Updated: 2026-04-10 20:21
Withdrawn 2026-04-10 VLAI
Summary
Duplicate Advisory: OpenClaw: Feishu webhook reads and parses unauthenticated request bodies before signature validation
Details

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-3h52-cx59-c456. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

OpenClaw before 2026.3.25 parses JSON request bodies before validating webhook signatures, allowing unauthenticated attackers to force resource-intensive parsing operations. Remote attackers can send malicious webhook requests to trigger denial of service by exhausting server resources through forced JSON parsing before signature rejection.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.28"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-696"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T20:21:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T22:16:33Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-3h52-cx59-c456. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n### Original Description\nOpenClaw before 2026.3.25 parses JSON request bodies before validating webhook signatures, allowing unauthenticated attackers to force resource-intensive parsing operations. Remote attackers can send malicious webhook requests to trigger denial of service by exhausting server resources through forced JSON parsing before signature rejection.",
  "id": "GHSA-8f9r-gr6r-x63q",
  "modified": "2026-04-10T20:21:21Z",
  "published": "2026-04-10T00:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-3h52-cx59-c456"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35640"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5e8cb22176e9235e224be0bc530699261eb60e53"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-denial-of-service-via-unauthenticated-webhook-request-parsing"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: OpenClaw: Feishu webhook reads and parses unauthenticated request bodies before signature validation",
  "withdrawn": "2026-04-10T20:21:21Z"
}

GHSA-9264-JVGF-6W2F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-13 19:20 – Updated: 2026-11-13 19:20
VLAI
Summary
russh kex_done: Shared-secret callback runs before server host-key verification
Details

Summary

A malicious SSH server whose host key is rejected can still cause russh's client::Handler::kex_done() callback to execute with the raw key-exchange shared secret. Applications using the callback for its documented protocol-bridging purpose may derive keys, initialize a secondary data channel, or perform another externally visible action before russh calls check_server_key() and rejects the server.

Details

During the initial key exchange, russh calls kex_done() immediately after the server proves possession of the presented host key, but before the application decides whether that key belongs to the intended server:

let shared_secret = newkeys.kex.shared_secret_bytes();
handler
    .kex_done(shared_secret, &newkeys.names, session)
    .await?;

// Initial KEX only checks trust afterwards.
if let Some(certificate) = server_host_certificate {
    if !handler.check_server_key(&certificate.into()).await? {
        return Err(crate::Error::UnknownKey.into());
    }
} else if let Some(server_host_key) = server_host_key {
    let check = handler.check_server_key(&server_host_key.into()).await?;
    if !check {
        return Err(crate::Error::UnknownKey.into());
    }
}

This is in russh/src/client/mod.rs at lines 2036-2078 of commit 183a22e8f8f490fa09b6eb7bd044ef99d8c4414f.

The API documentation describes check_server_key() as the important trust decision that prevents man-in-the-middle attacks. It describes kex_done() as the callback for deriving keys for secondary encrypted channels. The feature request that introduced the callback specifically lists VPN-over-SSH, UDP data planes, file transfer, and custom enterprise transports as intended uses.

Cryptographic verification of the KEX signature does not establish peer identity: an attacker operating its own SSH server can always produce a valid signature with its own host key. Identity is established only when check_server_key() accepts that key or certificate.

Expected behavior

For the initial key exchange, check_server_key() should accept the server identity before kex_done() exposes the shared secret for secondary-channel initialization.

Actual behavior

kex_done() runs first. An untrusted server can therefore trigger application-defined secondary-channel actions even though check_server_key() subsequently rejects it with UnknownKey.

The callback was introduced by commit 500bef1eccc1c48ac674e2a262aa7887777431eb and is present from v0.55.0 through current v0.65.0.

Proof of concept

The following self-contained Cargo project starts a local russh server with a fresh, untrusted host key. The client models the documented bridge use case by exporting the shared secret in kex_done(), while check_server_key() rejects the server. It asserts both the failed connection and the callback order.

Create an empty directory and add Cargo.toml:

[package]
name = "russh-kex-before-host-trust-poc"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2024"

[dependencies]
rand = { version = "0.10", features = ["thread_rng"] }
russh = "=0.65.0"
tokio = { version = "1", features = ["macros", "net", "rt-multi-thread"] }

Create src/main.rs:

use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};

use russh::keys::{Algorithm, PrivateKey, PublicKeyOrCertificate};
use russh::{Names, client, server};

#[derive(Clone)]
struct TestServer;

impl server::Handler for TestServer {
    type Error = russh::Error;
}

#[derive(Clone)]
struct RejectingClient {
    events: Arc<Mutex<Vec<&'static str>>>,
    exported_secret: Arc<Mutex<Option<Vec<u8>>>>,
}

impl client::Handler for RejectingClient {
    type Error = russh::Error;

    async fn kex_done(
        &mut self,
        shared_secret: Option<&[u8]>,
        _names: &Names,
        _session: &mut client::Session,
    ) -> Result<(), Self::Error> {
        self.events.lock().unwrap().push("kex_done");

        // Model a bridge exporting KEX material to a secondary protocol.
        *self.exported_secret.lock().unwrap() = shared_secret.map(ToOwned::to_owned);
        Ok(())
    }

    async fn check_server_key(
        &mut self,
        _server_public_key: &PublicKeyOrCertificate,
    ) -> Result<bool, Self::Error> {
        self.events.lock().unwrap().push("check_server_key");
        Ok(false)
    }
}

#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
    let mut server_config = server::Config::default();
    server_config.inactivity_timeout = None;
    server_config
        .keys
        .push(PrivateKey::random(&mut rand::rng(), Algorithm::Ed25519).unwrap());
    let server_config = Arc::new(server_config);

    let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
    let address = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
    tokio::spawn(async move {
        let (stream, _) = listener.accept().await.unwrap();
        let _ = server::run_stream(server_config, stream, TestServer).await;
    });

    let events = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
    let exported_secret = Arc::new(Mutex::new(None));
    let client = RejectingClient {
        events: events.clone(),
        exported_secret: exported_secret.clone(),
    };

    let result = client::connect(
        Arc::new(client::Config::default()),
        address,
        client,
    )
    .await;

    println!("connection accepted: {}", result.is_ok());
    println!("callback order: {:?}", events.lock().unwrap());
    println!(
        "secret exported before rejection: {}",
        exported_secret.lock().unwrap().is_some()
    );

    assert!(matches!(result, Err(russh::Error::UnknownKey)));
    assert_eq!(
        events.lock().unwrap().as_slice(),
        &["kex_done", "check_server_key"]
    );
    assert!(exported_secret.lock().unwrap().is_some());
}

Run:

cargo run --quiet

Observed with russh v0.65.0:

connection accepted: false
callback order: ["kex_done", "check_server_key"]
secret exported before rejection: true

The connection fails with russh::Error::UnknownKey, but the security-sensitive callback and its modeled external side effect have already occurred.

Impact

Applications overriding kex_done() to bootstrap a secondary encrypted transport are affected. An unauthenticated attacker who can impersonate the SSH endpoint can complete KEX with an attacker-owned host key and trigger secondary channel initialization before that key is rejected. Depending on the bridge, this can expose early secondary-channel data or make the application act on a session established with an untrusted peer.

Ordinary clients that leave kex_done() at its no-op default, or implementations that independently defer all callback-derived actions until host trust has been confirmed, are not affected.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "russh"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.55.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.65.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-128087"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-696",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-13T19:20:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA malicious SSH server whose host key is rejected can still cause russh\u0027s `client::Handler::kex_done()` callback to execute with the raw key-exchange shared secret. Applications using the callback for its documented protocol-bridging purpose may derive keys, initialize a secondary data channel, or perform another externally visible action before russh calls `check_server_key()` and rejects the server.\n\n### Details\n\nDuring the initial key exchange, russh calls `kex_done()` immediately after the server proves possession of the presented host key, but before the application decides whether that key belongs to the intended server:\n\n```rust\nlet shared_secret = newkeys.kex.shared_secret_bytes();\nhandler\n    .kex_done(shared_secret, \u0026newkeys.names, session)\n    .await?;\n\n// Initial KEX only checks trust afterwards.\nif let Some(certificate) = server_host_certificate {\n    if !handler.check_server_key(\u0026certificate.into()).await? {\n        return Err(crate::Error::UnknownKey.into());\n    }\n} else if let Some(server_host_key) = server_host_key {\n    let check = handler.check_server_key(\u0026server_host_key.into()).await?;\n    if !check {\n        return Err(crate::Error::UnknownKey.into());\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThis is in `russh/src/client/mod.rs` at lines 2036-2078 of commit `183a22e8f8f490fa09b6eb7bd044ef99d8c4414f`.\n\nThe API documentation describes `check_server_key()` as the important trust decision that prevents man-in-the-middle attacks. It describes `kex_done()` as the callback for deriving keys for secondary encrypted channels. The feature request that introduced the callback specifically lists VPN-over-SSH, UDP data planes, file transfer, and custom enterprise transports as intended uses.\n\nCryptographic verification of the KEX signature does not establish peer identity: an attacker operating its own SSH server can always produce a valid signature with its own host key. Identity is established only when `check_server_key()` accepts that key or certificate.\n\n### Expected behavior\n\nFor the initial key exchange, `check_server_key()` should accept the server identity before `kex_done()` exposes the shared secret for secondary-channel initialization.\n\n### Actual behavior\n\n`kex_done()` runs first. An untrusted server can therefore trigger application-defined secondary-channel actions even though `check_server_key()` subsequently rejects it with `UnknownKey`.\n\nThe callback was introduced by commit `500bef1eccc1c48ac674e2a262aa7887777431eb` and is present from `v0.55.0` through current `v0.65.0`.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nThe following self-contained Cargo project starts a local russh server with a fresh, untrusted host key. The client models the documented bridge use case by exporting the shared secret in `kex_done()`, while `check_server_key()` rejects the server. It asserts both the failed connection and the callback order.\n\nCreate an empty directory and add `Cargo.toml`:\n\n```toml\n[package]\nname = \"russh-kex-before-host-trust-poc\"\nversion = \"0.1.0\"\nedition = \"2024\"\n\n[dependencies]\nrand = { version = \"0.10\", features = [\"thread_rng\"] }\nrussh = \"=0.65.0\"\ntokio = { version = \"1\", features = [\"macros\", \"net\", \"rt-multi-thread\"] }\n```\n\nCreate `src/main.rs`:\n\n```rust\nuse std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};\n\nuse russh::keys::{Algorithm, PrivateKey, PublicKeyOrCertificate};\nuse russh::{Names, client, server};\n\n#[derive(Clone)]\nstruct TestServer;\n\nimpl server::Handler for TestServer {\n    type Error = russh::Error;\n}\n\n#[derive(Clone)]\nstruct RejectingClient {\n    events: Arc\u003cMutex\u003cVec\u003c\u0026\u0027static str\u003e\u003e\u003e,\n    exported_secret: Arc\u003cMutex\u003cOption\u003cVec\u003cu8\u003e\u003e\u003e\u003e,\n}\n\nimpl client::Handler for RejectingClient {\n    type Error = russh::Error;\n\n    async fn kex_done(\n        \u0026mut self,\n        shared_secret: Option\u003c\u0026[u8]\u003e,\n        _names: \u0026Names,\n        _session: \u0026mut client::Session,\n    ) -\u003e Result\u003c(), Self::Error\u003e {\n        self.events.lock().unwrap().push(\"kex_done\");\n\n        // Model a bridge exporting KEX material to a secondary protocol.\n        *self.exported_secret.lock().unwrap() = shared_secret.map(ToOwned::to_owned);\n        Ok(())\n    }\n\n    async fn check_server_key(\n        \u0026mut self,\n        _server_public_key: \u0026PublicKeyOrCertificate,\n    ) -\u003e Result\u003cbool, Self::Error\u003e {\n        self.events.lock().unwrap().push(\"check_server_key\");\n        Ok(false)\n    }\n}\n\n#[tokio::main]\nasync fn main() {\n    let mut server_config = server::Config::default();\n    server_config.inactivity_timeout = None;\n    server_config\n        .keys\n        .push(PrivateKey::random(\u0026mut rand::rng(), Algorithm::Ed25519).unwrap());\n    let server_config = Arc::new(server_config);\n\n    let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(\"127.0.0.1:0\").await.unwrap();\n    let address = listener.local_addr().unwrap();\n    tokio::spawn(async move {\n        let (stream, _) = listener.accept().await.unwrap();\n        let _ = server::run_stream(server_config, stream, TestServer).await;\n    });\n\n    let events = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));\n    let exported_secret = Arc::new(Mutex::new(None));\n    let client = RejectingClient {\n        events: events.clone(),\n        exported_secret: exported_secret.clone(),\n    };\n\n    let result = client::connect(\n        Arc::new(client::Config::default()),\n        address,\n        client,\n    )\n    .await;\n\n    println!(\"connection accepted: {}\", result.is_ok());\n    println!(\"callback order: {:?}\", events.lock().unwrap());\n    println!(\n        \"secret exported before rejection: {}\",\n        exported_secret.lock().unwrap().is_some()\n    );\n\n    assert!(matches!(result, Err(russh::Error::UnknownKey)));\n    assert_eq!(\n        events.lock().unwrap().as_slice(),\n        \u0026[\"kex_done\", \"check_server_key\"]\n    );\n    assert!(exported_secret.lock().unwrap().is_some());\n}\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```sh\ncargo run --quiet\n```\n\nObserved with russh `v0.65.0`:\n\n```text\nconnection accepted: false\ncallback order: [\"kex_done\", \"check_server_key\"]\nsecret exported before rejection: true\n```\n\nThe connection fails with `russh::Error::UnknownKey`, but the security-sensitive callback and its modeled external side effect have already occurred.\n\n### Impact\n\nApplications overriding `kex_done()` to bootstrap a secondary encrypted transport are affected. An unauthenticated attacker who can impersonate the SSH endpoint can complete KEX with an attacker-owned host key and trigger secondary channel initialization before that key is rejected. Depending on the bridge, this can expose early secondary-channel data or make the application act on a session established with an untrusted peer.\n\nOrdinary clients that leave `kex_done()` at its no-op default, or implementations that independently defer all callback-derived actions until host trust has been confirmed, are not affected.",
  "id": "GHSA-9264-jvgf-6w2f",
  "modified": "2026-11-13T19:20:16Z",
  "published": "2026-11-13T19:20:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-9264-jvgf-6w2f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/pull/808"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/43a46d67a80a7355fcd2fb25e7e00d79aec8184c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.65.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "russh kex_done: Shared-secret callback runs before server host-key verification"
}

GHSA-96R2-52XR-8X9X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-12 15:37 – Updated: 2025-02-06 18:31
VLAI
Details

An Incorrect Behavior Order in the routing engine (RE) of Juniper Networks Junos OS on EX4300 Series allows traffic intended to the device to reach the RE instead of being discarded when the discard term is set in loopback (lo0) interface. The intended function is that the lo0 firewall filter takes precedence over the revenue interface firewall filter. 

This issue affects only IPv6 firewall filter.

This issue only affects the EX4300 switch. No other products or platforms are affected by this vulnerability. 

This issue affects Juniper Networks Junos OS:

  • All versions before 20.4R3-S10,
  • from 21.2 before 21.2R3-S7,
  • from 21.4 before 21.4R3-S6. 
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-30410"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-696"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-12T15:15:25Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An Incorrect Behavior Order in the routing engine (RE) of Juniper Networks Junos OS on EX4300 Series allows traffic intended to the device to reach the RE\u00a0instead of being discarded when the\u00a0discard term is set in loopback (lo0) interface. The intended function is that the lo0 firewall filter takes precedence over the revenue interface firewall filter.\u00a0\n\nThis issue affects only IPv6 firewall filter.\n\nThis issue only affects the EX4300 switch.  No other products or platforms are affected by this vulnerability.\u00a0\n\nThis issue affects Juniper Networks Junos OS:\n\n  *  All versions before 20.4R3-S10,\n  *  from 21.2 before 21.2R3-S7,\n  *  from 21.4 before 21.4R3-S6.\u00a0",
  "id": "GHSA-96r2-52xr-8x9x",
  "modified": "2025-02-06T18:31:01Z",
  "published": "2024-04-12T15:37:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-30410"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://supportportal.juniper.net/JSA79100"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0#CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-9CCR-R5HG-74GF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 16:16 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:56
VLAI
Summary
GitHub Copilot CLI: Nested Bare Repository Can Execute Arbitrary Commands via core.fsmonitor
Details

Summary

A security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub Copilot CLI where a malicious bare git repository nested inside a project directory can achieve arbitrary code execution when the agent performs git operations. By exploiting git's automatic bare repository discovery during directory traversal, an attacker can set core.fsmonitor or other executable config keys to run arbitrary commands without user awareness or approval.

Details

Git supports bare repositories — repositories without a working tree — which can be discovered automatically when git traverses the directory hierarchy looking for a .git directory. When git discovers a bare repository, it reads and applies its configuration, including keys that specify external commands to execute.

The vulnerability arises because git's core.fsmonitor config key (and 15+ similar keys such as core.hookspath, diff.external, merge.tool, etc.) can specify arbitrary shell commands that git will execute as part of normal operations like status, diff, or rev-parse.

Attack Scenario

An attacker can exploit this by:

  1. Creating a bare git repository nested inside a seemingly normal project directory (e.g., vendor/malicious.git/ or a deeply nested subdirectory)
  2. Configuring core.fsmonitor (or similar keys) in that bare repository to execute a malicious command
  3. When GitHub Copilot CLI performs any git operation that traverses into or through that directory, git auto-discovers the bare repository, reads its config, and executes the attacker's command

This can occur when: - The agent navigates into a subdirectory containing the buried bare repo - The agent runs git status, git diff, or other routine git commands - The agent uses tools like grep or glob that may trigger git operations in subdirectories

Prior to the fix, the CLI had no protection against git auto-discovering bare repositories during directory traversal.

Impact

An attacker who can place a malicious bare repository inside a project — for example, through: - A pull request adding a directory that contains a bare repository - A compromised or malicious dependency that includes a bare repository - A cloned repository that already contains nested bare repositories

— could achieve arbitrary code execution on the user's workstation whenever GitHub Copilot CLI performs git operations in or near the malicious directory.

Successful exploitation could lead to data exfiltration, credential theft, file modification, or further system compromise.

Affected Versions

  • GitHub Copilot CLI versions prior to 1.0.42

Remediation and Mitigation

Fix

The fix sets safe.bareRepository=explicit via git's GIT_CONFIG_COUNT / GIT_CONFIG_KEY_* / GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_* environment variable mechanism, which has the highest precedence over all config file sources. This prevents git from automatically discovering and using bare repositories during directory traversal — only explicitly allowlisted bare repositories will be used.

User Actions

  1. Upgrade GitHub Copilot CLI to 1.0.43 or later.
  2. Exercise caution when working in repositories that contain nested bare git repositories.
  3. Review project directories for unexpected bare repositories, especially in vendor/, third_party/, or deeply nested subdirectories.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.42"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@github/copilot"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.43"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45033"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-696"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-11T16:16:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T16:17:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub Copilot CLI where a malicious bare git repository nested inside a project directory can achieve arbitrary code execution when the agent performs git operations. By exploiting git\u0027s automatic bare repository discovery during directory traversal, an attacker can set `core.fsmonitor` or other executable config keys to run arbitrary commands without user awareness or approval.\n\n## Details\n\nGit supports bare repositories \u2014 repositories without a working tree \u2014 which can be discovered automatically when git traverses the directory hierarchy looking for a `.git` directory. When git discovers a bare repository, it reads and applies its configuration, including keys that specify external commands to execute.\n\nThe vulnerability arises because git\u0027s `core.fsmonitor` config key (and 15+ similar keys such as `core.hookspath`, `diff.external`, `merge.tool`, etc.) can specify arbitrary shell commands that git will execute as part of normal operations like `status`, `diff`, or `rev-parse`.\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\nAn attacker can exploit this by:\n\n1. Creating a bare git repository nested inside a seemingly normal project directory (e.g., `vendor/malicious.git/` or a deeply nested subdirectory)\n2. Configuring `core.fsmonitor` (or similar keys) in that bare repository to execute a malicious command\n3. When GitHub Copilot CLI performs any git operation that traverses into or through that directory, git auto-discovers the bare repository, reads its config, and executes the attacker\u0027s command\n\nThis can occur when:\n- The agent navigates into a subdirectory containing the buried bare repo\n- The agent runs `git status`, `git diff`, or other routine git commands\n- The agent uses tools like `grep` or `glob` that may trigger git operations in subdirectories\n\nPrior to the fix, the CLI had no protection against git auto-discovering bare repositories during directory traversal.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can place a malicious bare repository inside a project \u2014 for example, through:\n- A pull request adding a directory that contains a bare repository\n- A compromised or malicious dependency that includes a bare repository\n- A cloned repository that already contains nested bare repositories\n\n\u2014 could achieve arbitrary code execution on the user\u0027s workstation whenever GitHub Copilot CLI performs git operations in or near the malicious directory.\n\nSuccessful exploitation could lead to data exfiltration, credential theft, file modification, or further system compromise.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- GitHub Copilot CLI versions prior to 1.0.42\n\n## Remediation and Mitigation\n\n### Fix\n\nThe fix sets `safe.bareRepository=explicit` via git\u0027s `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT` / `GIT_CONFIG_KEY_*` / `GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_*` environment variable mechanism, which has the highest precedence over all config file sources. This prevents git from automatically discovering and using bare repositories during directory traversal \u2014 only explicitly allowlisted bare repositories will be used.\n\n### User Actions\n\n1. **Upgrade** GitHub Copilot CLI to **1.0.43** or later.\n2. **Exercise caution** when working in repositories that contain nested bare git repositories.\n3. **Review** project directories for unexpected bare repositories, especially in `vendor/`, `third_party/`, or deeply nested subdirectories.",
  "id": "GHSA-9ccr-r5hg-74gf",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T10:56:45Z",
  "published": "2026-05-11T16:16:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/github/copilot-cli/security/advisories/GHSA-9ccr-r5hg-74gf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45033"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/github/copilot-cli"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "GitHub Copilot CLI: Nested Bare Repository Can Execute Arbitrary Commands via core.fsmonitor"
}

GHSA-9JXX-VJRV-H2RQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 20:40 – Updated: 2026-10-07 20:40
VLAI
Summary
Docling imports plugin entry points before the allow_external_plugins check
Details

Summary

allow_external_plugins=False (the default, and the CLI default) is meant to restrict docling to its own model plugins. However, docling's plugin factories call pluggy's load_setuptools_entrypoints(), which imports every module registered under docling's plugin entry-point group. Only afterwards does docling filter out modules outside the docling. namespace. Import-time code in any installed third-party plugin therefore runs even though external plugins are disabled.

Details

In docling/models/factories/base_factory.py, load_from_plugins() loads all entry points first and applies the allow_external_plugins check only to the already-imported modules. The CLI creates these factories when it starts, so running docling imports every registered plugin module. A log message says the plugin "will not be loaded", although its module has already been imported.

Affected configurations

Environments in which a package registering a docling plugin entry point is installed, for example an unvetted or compromised dependency, and which rely on allow_external_plugins=False to keep that code from running.

Impact

Execution of a third-party plugin module's import-time code in the docling process, contrary to the documented behaviour of allow_external_plugins=False.

Patches

Fixed in docling 2.131.0 by #4413. Plugin entry points are now filtered by module name before they are loaded, so with allow_external_plugins=False third-party plugin modules are no longer imported.

Workarounds

Upgrade to 2.131.0. For older versions:

Only install trusted packages in environments that run docling. Check which packages register docling plugin entry points with importlib.metadata.entry_points().

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "docling"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.27.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.131.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "docling-slim"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.92.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.131.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-105745"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-696",
      "CWE-829"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T20:40:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-05T22:16:57Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`allow_external_plugins=False` (the default, and the CLI default) is meant to restrict docling to its own model plugins. However, docling\u0027s plugin factories call pluggy\u0027s `load_setuptools_entrypoints()`, which imports every module registered under docling\u0027s plugin entry-point group. Only afterwards does docling filter out modules outside the `docling.` namespace. Import-time code in any installed third-party plugin therefore runs even though external plugins are disabled.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `docling/models/factories/base_factory.py`, `load_from_plugins()` loads all entry points first and applies the `allow_external_plugins` check only to the already-imported modules. The CLI creates these factories when it starts, so running `docling` imports every registered plugin module. A log message says the plugin \"will not be loaded\", although its module has already been imported.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\nEnvironments in which a package registering a docling plugin entry point is installed, for example an unvetted or compromised dependency, and which rely on `allow_external_plugins=False` to keep that code from running.\n\n### Impact\n\nExecution of a third-party plugin module\u0027s import-time code in the docling process, contrary to the documented behaviour of `allow_external_plugins=False`.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in docling 2.131.0 by [#4413](https://github.com/docling-project/docling/pull/4413). Plugin entry points are now filtered by module name before they are loaded, so with `allow_external_plugins=False` third-party plugin modules are no longer imported.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to 2.131.0. For older versions:\n\nOnly install trusted packages in environments that run docling. Check which packages register docling plugin entry points with `importlib.metadata.entry_points()`.",
  "id": "GHSA-9jxx-vjrv-h2rq",
  "modified": "2026-10-07T20:40:56Z",
  "published": "2026-10-07T20:40:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/docling-project/docling/security/advisories/GHSA-9jxx-vjrv-h2rq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105745"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/docling-project/docling/pull/4413"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/docling-project/docling/commit/0f443b3786e98688a2da3b7c8f56fe5e46af876c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/docling-project/docling"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/docling-project/docling/releases/tag/v2.131.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Docling imports plugin entry points before the allow_external_plugins check"
}

GHSA-9W5M-FV42-36CX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-16 15:32 – Updated: 2025-09-16 15:32
VLAI
Details

The improper order of AUTHORIZED_CTM_IP validation in the Control-M/Agent, where the Control-M/Server IP address is validated only after the SSL/TLS handshake is completed, exposes the Control-M/Agent to vulnerabilities in the SSL/TLS implementation under certain non-default conditions (e.g. CVE-2025-55117 or CVE-2025-55118) or potentially to resource exhaustion.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-55114"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-696"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-16T13:16:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The improper order of AUTHORIZED_CTM_IP validation in the Control-M/Agent, where the Control-M/Server IP address is validated only after the SSL/TLS handshake is completed, exposes the Control-M/Agent to vulnerabilities in the SSL/TLS implementation under certain non-default conditions (e.g. CVE-2025-55117 or CVE-2025-55118) or potentially to resource exhaustion.",
  "id": "GHSA-9w5m-fv42-36cx",
  "modified": "2025-09-16T15:32:36Z",
  "published": "2025-09-16T15:32:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55114"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bmcapps.my.site.com/casemgmt/sc_KnowledgeArticle?sfdcid=000441968"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bmcapps.my.site.com/casemgmt/sc_KnowledgeArticle?sfdcid=000442099"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-C6FQ-3MHW-8G4J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-29 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-29 12:31
VLAI
Details

Apache Traffic Server updates the HTTP/2 HPACK dynamic table before confirming the header block encoded successfully, so an encode failure leaves the encoder out of sync with the peer decoder and corrupts subsequent header blocks on the connection.

This issue affects Apache Traffic Server: from 8.0.0 through 8.1.9, from 9.0.0 through 9.2.14, from 10.0.0 through 10.1.3.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.2.15 or 10.1.4, which fix the issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-65100"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-696"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-29T10:16:44Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Apache Traffic Server updates the HTTP/2 HPACK dynamic table before confirming the header block encoded successfully, so an encode failure leaves the encoder out of sync with the peer decoder and corrupts subsequent header blocks on the connection.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Traffic Server: from 8.0.0 through 8.1.9, from 9.0.0 through 9.2.14, from 10.0.0 through 10.1.3.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 9.2.15 or 10.1.4, which fix the issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-c6fq-3mhw-8g4j",
  "modified": "2026-07-29T12:31:23Z",
  "published": "2026-07-29T12:31:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65100"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/5prl9glcm9g2swnq9hqxvnokylm1gr6d"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-CVP8-HM87-HR8X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-05 21:31 – Updated: 2024-09-12 18:31
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS before 2.28.9 and 3.x before 3.6.1, in which the user-selected algorithm is not used. Unlike previously documented, enabling MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE does not cause the PSA subsystem to use HMAC_DRBG: it uses HMAC_DRBG only when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG and MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C are disabled.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-45157"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-696"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-05T19:15:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS before 2.28.9 and 3.x before 3.6.1, in which the user-selected algorithm is not used. Unlike previously documented, enabling MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE does not cause the PSA subsystem to use HMAC_DRBG: it uses HMAC_DRBG only when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG and MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C are disabled.",
  "id": "GHSA-cvp8-hm87-hr8x",
  "modified": "2024-09-12T18:31:41Z",
  "published": "2024-09-05T21:31:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45157"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2024-08-1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FGCQ-9C7C-C4JV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-11 18:32 – Updated: 2025-03-11 18:32
VLAI
Details

Incorrect behavior order in some Zoom Workplace Apps for iOS before version 6.3.0 may allow an authenticated user to conduct a denial of service via network access.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-0150"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-696"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-11T18:15:29Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Incorrect behavior order in some Zoom Workplace Apps for iOS before version 6.3.0 may allow an authenticated user to conduct a denial of service via network access.",
  "id": "GHSA-fgcq-9c7c-c4jv",
  "modified": "2025-03-11T18:32:19Z",
  "published": "2025-03-11T18:32:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0150"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zoom.com/en/trust/security-bulletin/zsb-25009"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FJGV-863Q-H54R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-23 21:31 – Updated: 2025-06-23 21:31
VLAI
Details

In WhiteBeam 0.2.0 through 0.2.1 before 0.2.2, a user with local access to a server can bypass the allow-list functionality because a file can be truncated in the OpenFileDescriptor action before the VerifyCanWrite action is performed.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-47688"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-696"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-23T20:15:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In WhiteBeam 0.2.0 through 0.2.1 before 0.2.2, a user with local access to a server can bypass the allow-list functionality because a file can be truncated in the OpenFileDescriptor action before the VerifyCanWrite action is performed.",
  "id": "GHSA-fjgv-863q-h54r",
  "modified": "2025-06-23T21:31:56Z",
  "published": "2025-06-23T21:31:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WhiteBeamSec/WhiteBeam/security/advisories/GHSA-3f8r-9483-pfxj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47688"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WhiteBeamSec/WhiteBeam/pull/22"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WhiteBeamSec/WhiteBeam/security/policy"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-463: Padding Oracle Crypto Attack

An adversary is able to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key if a target system leaks data on whether or not a padding error happened while decrypting the ciphertext. A target system that leaks this type of information becomes the padding oracle and an adversary is able to make use of that oracle to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key by issuing on average 128*b calls to the padding oracle (where b is the number of bytes in the ciphertext block). In addition to performing decryption, an adversary is also able to produce valid ciphertexts (i.e., perform encryption) by using the padding oracle, all without knowing the encryption key.