CWE-639
AllowedAuthorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
5933 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-P5V5-V74Q-W38H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-30 21:31 – Updated: 2026-06-30 21:31IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 voice mode contains improper shared-state handling that allows reuse of API clients across tenant boundaries. An authenticated attacker can manipulate cache state to cause requests from other users to be processed using incorrect upstream API credentials, leading to cross-tenant billing and accountability misattribution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-10140"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T20:17:27Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 voice mode contains improper shared-state handling that allows reuse of API clients across tenant boundaries. An authenticated attacker can manipulate cache state to cause requests from other users to be processed using incorrect upstream API credentials, leading to cross-tenant billing and accountability misattribution.",
"id": "GHSA-p5v5-v74q-w38h",
"modified": "2026-06-30T21:31:44Z",
"published": "2026-06-30T21:31:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10140"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7278209"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P5VG-V7MJ-F6Q4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-18 17:17 – Updated: 2026-09-18 17:17Summary
frain-dev/convoy (all versions up to and including v26.6.2, no patch available) lets any authenticated caller who is authorized on at least one project read ANY OTHER project's "Source" record by ID via GET /api/v1/projects/{projectID}/sources/{sourceID} -- regardless of whether that Source actually belongs to the project named in the URL. The response includes the Source's full PubSub broker configuration in plaintext (AMQP/Kafka/SQS/Google credentials), with no redaction.
Details
Handler.GetSource (api/handlers/source.go) resolves the caller's
authorization against the {projectID} in the URL via retrieveProject(), then
calls sources.Service.FindSourceByID(ctx, project.UID, sourceID)
(internal/sources/impl.go). That function accepts a projectID parameter but
never uses it:
func (s *Service) FindSourceByID(ctx context.Context, projectID, id string) (*datastore.Source, error) {
row, err := s.repo.FetchSourceByID(ctx, common.StringToPgText(id))
...
}
The underlying SQL query (internal/sources/repo/queries.sql,
fetchSourceByID) has no project_id predicate at all:
SELECT ... FROM convoy.sources AS s
LEFT JOIN convoy.source_verifiers sv ON s.source_verifier_id = sv.id
WHERE s.id = $1 AND s.deleted_at IS NULL
So the {projectID} in the URL only gates "is the caller authorized to view
a project" -- it never re-validates that the fetched Source actually
belongs to that project. LoadSourcesPaged (the list endpoint) does
correctly scope by project; only the single-item GetSource lookup is
affected. SourceResponse{*datastore.Source} embeds the full database
record with no redaction, so if the leaked Source is an AMQP/Kafka type, its
pub_sub.*.auth.password field (a live, plaintext broker credential) is
returned verbatim.
Proof of Concept
- As a test account, create "Victim Project" and an AMQP Source in it with a known broker password (verified against a real RabbitMQ broker, not just stored -- Convoy performs a live connectivity check before persisting an AMQP source).
- As the same or a different authenticated caller, create a completely separate "Attacker Project".
- Call GET /api/v1/projects/{attacker_project_id}/sources/{victim_source_id} -- i.e. a request whose URL and authorization check only ever resolve the Attacker project.
- Verified in a Docker lab (convoy v26.6.2): the request returns 200 with
the Victim project's full Source object, including
pub_sub.amqp.auth.password matching the secret set in step 1 exactly.
The response's own
project_idfield is the Victim project's id, never the Attacker project id used in the URL/authorization check. - Negative control: an otherwise-identical request for a made-up source id under the same Attacker project returns 404, confirming this is a real, ID-specific hit and not a blanket-200 endpoint.
(Community Edition license-gates org_limit=1/user_limit=1, so this PoC used one account with two projects rather than two separate companies -- the vulnerable query performs no project-ownership check regardless of license tier, so a licensed multi-org deployment has the identical exposure between genuinely different tenants.)
Impact
Any authenticated user or project-scoped API key holder who has legitimate access to at least one project on a Convoy instance can read any other project's Source configuration by ID, including plaintext third-party message-broker credentials (AMQP/Kafka/SQS/Google PubSub). In a multi-tenant deployment this is a direct cross-customer credential leak.
Fix
Add a project_id predicate to the fetchSourceByID query (and audit other
single-item repository lookups reachable via a {projectID} route for the
same pattern), or re-check source.ProjectID == project.UID in the handler
before returning the record.
Affected / Patched
Affected: <= v26.6.2 (latest release at time of report). No patched version available.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/frain-dev/convoy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.3-0.20260724092134-1cc67cd16fb1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81505"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-18T17:17:45Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\nfrain-dev/convoy (all versions up to and including v26.6.2, no patch\navailable) lets any authenticated caller who is authorized on at least one\nproject read ANY OTHER project\u0027s \"Source\" record by ID via\nGET /api/v1/projects/{projectID}/sources/{sourceID} -- regardless of whether\nthat Source actually belongs to the project named in the URL. The response\nincludes the Source\u0027s full PubSub broker configuration in plaintext\n(AMQP/Kafka/SQS/Google credentials), with no redaction.\n\n## Details\n`Handler.GetSource` (api/handlers/source.go) resolves the caller\u0027s\nauthorization against the {projectID} in the URL via retrieveProject(), then\ncalls `sources.Service.FindSourceByID(ctx, project.UID, sourceID)`\n(internal/sources/impl.go). That function accepts a projectID parameter but\nnever uses it:\n\n func (s *Service) FindSourceByID(ctx context.Context, projectID, id string) (*datastore.Source, error) {\n row, err := s.repo.FetchSourceByID(ctx, common.StringToPgText(id))\n ...\n }\n\nThe underlying SQL query (internal/sources/repo/queries.sql,\n`fetchSourceByID`) has no project_id predicate at all:\n\n SELECT ... FROM convoy.sources AS s\n LEFT JOIN convoy.source_verifiers sv ON s.source_verifier_id = sv.id\n WHERE s.id = $1 AND s.deleted_at IS NULL\n\nSo the {projectID} in the URL only gates \"is the caller authorized to view\n*a* project\" -- it never re-validates that the fetched Source actually\nbelongs to that project. `LoadSourcesPaged` (the list endpoint) does\ncorrectly scope by project; only the single-item GetSource lookup is\naffected. `SourceResponse{*datastore.Source}` embeds the full database\nrecord with no redaction, so if the leaked Source is an AMQP/Kafka type, its\n`pub_sub.*.auth.password` field (a live, plaintext broker credential) is\nreturned verbatim.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n1. As a test account, create \"Victim Project\" and an AMQP Source in it\n with a known broker password (verified against a real RabbitMQ broker,\n not just stored -- Convoy performs a live connectivity check before\n persisting an AMQP source).\n2. As the same or a different authenticated caller, create a completely\n separate \"Attacker Project\".\n3. Call GET /api/v1/projects/{attacker_project_id}/sources/{victim_source_id}\n -- i.e. a request whose URL and authorization check only ever resolve\n the Attacker project.\n4. Verified in a Docker lab (convoy v26.6.2): the request returns 200 with\n the Victim project\u0027s full Source object, including\n pub_sub.amqp.auth.password matching the secret set in step 1 exactly.\n The response\u0027s own `project_id` field is the Victim project\u0027s id, never\n the Attacker project id used in the URL/authorization check.\n5. Negative control: an otherwise-identical request for a made-up source id\n under the same Attacker project returns 404, confirming this is a real,\n ID-specific hit and not a blanket-200 endpoint.\n\n(Community Edition license-gates org_limit=1/user_limit=1, so this PoC used\none account with two projects rather than two separate companies -- the\nvulnerable query performs no project-ownership check regardless of license\ntier, so a licensed multi-org deployment has the identical exposure between\ngenuinely different tenants.)\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1100\" height=\"830\" alt=\"1_live_poc_evidence\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b2d18d3f-8e70-40ec-ad7f-7f0ac1fdebe0\" /\u003e\n\n\n## Impact\nAny authenticated user or project-scoped API key holder who has legitimate\naccess to at least one project on a Convoy instance can read any other\nproject\u0027s Source configuration by ID, including plaintext third-party\nmessage-broker credentials (AMQP/Kafka/SQS/Google PubSub). In a\nmulti-tenant deployment this is a direct cross-customer credential leak.\n\n## Fix\nAdd a project_id predicate to the fetchSourceByID query (and audit other\nsingle-item repository lookups reachable via a {projectID} route for the\nsame pattern), or re-check `source.ProjectID == project.UID` in the handler\nbefore returning the record.\n\n## Affected / Patched\nAffected: \u003c= v26.6.2 (latest release at time of report). No patched version\navailable.",
"id": "GHSA-p5vg-v7mj-f6q4",
"modified": "2026-09-18T17:17:45Z",
"published": "2026-09-18T17:17:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/frain-dev/convoy/security/advisories/GHSA-p5vg-v7mj-f6q4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/frain-dev/convoy/pull/2755"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/frain-dev/convoy/commit/1cc67cd16fb1f8890cc83a3998d3f92dceb7fd06"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/frain-dev/convoy"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/frain-dev/convoy/releases/tag/v26.6.8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Convoy: Cross-Tenant Source IDOR Leaks Plaintext Message Broker Credentials"
}
GHSA-P628-386J-64H8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:32 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:32An Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerability in Citadel WebCit through 926 allows authenticated remote attackers to read someone else's emails via the msg_confirm_move template. NOTE: this was reported to the vendor in a publicly archived "Multiple Security Vulnerabilities in WebCit 926" thread.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-27742"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-10-28T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerability in Citadel WebCit through 926 allows authenticated remote attackers to read someone else\u0027s emails via the msg_confirm_move template. NOTE: this was reported to the vendor in a publicly archived \"Multiple Security Vulnerabilities in WebCit 926\" thread.",
"id": "GHSA-p628-386j-64h8",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:32:37Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:32:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-27742"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.citadel.org"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://uncensored.citadel.org/readfwd?go=Citadel%20Security?start_reading_at=4592834"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-P652-XCGX-F85M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-29 17:59 – Updated: 2024-08-30 14:33An issue was discovered in powermail extension through 12.3.5 for TYPO3. It fails to validate the mail parameter of the confirmationAction, resulting in Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). An unauthenticated attacker can use this to display the user-submitted data of all forms persisted by the extension. This can only be exploited when the extension is configured to save submitted form data to the database (plugin.tx_powermail.settings.db.enable=1), which however is the default setting of the extension. The fixed versions are 7.5.0, 8.5.0, 10.9.0, and 12.4.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "in2code/powermail"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "12.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "in2code/powermail"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "in2code/powermail"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "in2code/powermail"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-45232"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-08-29T17:59:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-29T00:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in powermail extension through 12.3.5 for TYPO3. It fails to validate the mail parameter of the confirmationAction, resulting in Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). An unauthenticated attacker can use this to display the user-submitted data of all forms persisted by the extension. This can only be exploited when the extension is configured to save submitted form data to the database (`plugin.tx_powermail.settings.db.enable=1`), which however is the default setting of the extension. The fixed versions are 7.5.0, 8.5.0, 10.9.0, and 12.4.0.",
"id": "GHSA-p652-xcgx-f85m",
"modified": "2024-08-30T14:33:54Z",
"published": "2024-08-29T17:59:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45232"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/in2code-de/powermail/commit/061756732357206f2f13bf39a0676dd266ec9586"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/in2code-de/powermail/commit/ac402d4972c77dd119c8db6ffe594c15e8ae0bc5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/in2code-de/powermail/commit/e2ddfaa06d29019d60be02b5a3da04b237ed760b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/in2code-de/powermail/commit/f58d70311799ae5f6acbec52ea9206d21eba91bb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/in2code/powermail/CVE-2024-45232.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/in2code-de/powermail"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-ext-sa-2024-006"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L/E:F/RL:O/RC:C",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "\"powermail\" (powermail) Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)"
}
GHSA-P65H-4XV9-C744
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-06 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-06 09:31Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in Wappointment <= 2.7.7 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39756"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T09:17:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in Wappointment \u003c= 2.7.7 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-p65h-4xv9-c744",
"modified": "2026-10-06T09:31:26Z",
"published": "2026-10-06T09:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39756"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/wappointment/vulnerability/wordpress-wappointment-plugin-2-7-7-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P6PH-3JX2-3337
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 22:32 – Updated: 2026-07-24 22:32Summary
An authorization bypass and information disclosure vulnerability exists in the search API of Openlist. Due to a non-separator-aware path check and unfiltered backend counting, a low-privileged user can bypass their assigned BasePath restrictions to discover and access metadata of files residing in unauthorized sibling directories.
Details
This vulnerability stems from two combined logic flaws when the bleve search engine is utilized:
-
Insecure Path Prefix Validation: In the search handler (
server/handles/search.go), the application attempts to restrict search results to the user's allowed namespace using a simple prefix check:strings.HasPrefix(node.Parent, user.BasePath). Because this function is not path-separator aware, a user with aBasePathrestricted to/basewill successfully pass the authorization check for a completely separate directory named/base2(since "/base2" starts with "/base"). -
Unfiltered Total Count Leakage: The
blevebackend (internal/search/bleve/search.go) searches the index globally and ignores thereq.Parentboundary. Even if the application later successfully filters out unauthorized items from theContentarray (e.g., viaCanAccessmeta password checks), it still returns the rawTotalcount provided by the search backend. This allows an attacker to perform blind data-enumeration, confirming the existence of sensitive files outside their namespace by observing theTotalcount.
PoC
Prerequisites:
1. Log in as an administrator and set the Search Index Mode to bleve. Build the index.
2. Create two directories at the root level: /base and /base2.
3. Upload a sensitive file into the unauthorized directory: /base2/secret_financial_report.pdf.
4. Create a low-privileged test user and strictly set their Base path to /base.
Exploitation Steps: 1. Authenticate as the newly created low-privileged user. 2. Send the following HTTP request to the search API:
POST /api/fs/search HTTP/1.1
Host: <your-openlist-host>
Authorization: <test-user-token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"parent": "/",
"keywords": "secret",
"page": 1,
"per_page": 20,
"scope": 0
}
- Observe the response: Due to the prefix bypass (
strings.HasPrefix("/base2", "/base") == true), the metadata forsecret_financial_report.pdfwill be leaked in the response Content.- Alternatively, even if access is further blocked by folder-level passwords, the Total field will return > 0, allowing the attacker to blindly confirm the existence of the keyword "secret" in unauthorized global directories.
Impact
This is an Information Disclosure and Horizontal/Vertical Privilege Escalation vulnerability. Any authenticated user can enumerate hidden infrastructure, verify the existence of sensitive files (e.g., passwords, internal documents), and extract file metadata across the entire storage namespace, completely defeating the BasePath isolation mechanism.
Remediation Recommendations
- Separator-Aware Path Containment: Replace strings.HasPrefix with a robust path containment check. For example: target == base || strings.HasPrefix(target, base + "/"), or use a dedicated utility like utils.IsSubPath().
- Backend-Level Filtering: Enforce the path boundary within the bleve query itself (e.g., using indexed parent path hashes) rather than relying solely on post-query API filtering.
- Accurate Total Calculation: Compute the Total count only after all authorization and path filters have been applied to the result set.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T22:32:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn authorization bypass and information disclosure vulnerability exists in the search API of `Openlist`. Due to a non-separator-aware path check and unfiltered backend counting, a low-privileged user can bypass their assigned `BasePath` restrictions to discover and access metadata of files residing in unauthorized sibling directories.\n\n### Details\nThis vulnerability stems from two combined logic flaws when the `bleve` search engine is utilized:\n\n1. **Insecure Path Prefix Validation:** In the search handler (`server/handles/search.go`), the application attempts to restrict search results to the user\u0027s allowed namespace using a simple prefix check: `strings.HasPrefix(node.Parent, user.BasePath)`. Because this function is not path-separator aware, a user with a `BasePath` restricted to `/base` will successfully pass the authorization check for a completely separate directory named `/base2` (since \"/base2\" starts with \"/base\").\n\n2. **Unfiltered Total Count Leakage:** The `bleve` backend (`internal/search/bleve/search.go`) searches the index globally and ignores the `req.Parent` boundary. Even if the application later successfully filters out unauthorized items from the `Content` array (e.g., via `CanAccess` meta password checks), it still returns the raw `Total` count provided by the search backend. This allows an attacker to perform blind data-enumeration, confirming the existence of sensitive files outside their namespace by observing the `Total` count.\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites:**\n1. Log in as an administrator and set the Search Index Mode to `bleve`. Build the index.\n2. Create two directories at the root level: `/base` and `/base2`.\n3. Upload a sensitive file into the unauthorized directory: `/base2/secret_financial_report.pdf`.\n4. Create a low-privileged test user and strictly set their `Base path` to `/base`.\n\n**Exploitation Steps:**\n1. Authenticate as the newly created low-privileged user.\n2. Send the following HTTP request to the search API:\n```http\nPOST /api/fs/search HTTP/1.1\nHost: \u003cyour-openlist-host\u003e\nAuthorization: \u003ctest-user-token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n \"parent\": \"/\",\n \"keywords\": \"secret\",\n \"page\": 1,\n \"per_page\": 20,\n \"scope\": 0\n}\n```\n3. Observe the response: Due to the prefix bypass (`strings.HasPrefix(\"/base2\", \"/base\") == true`), the metadata for `secret_financial_report.pdf` will be leaked in the response Content.\n - Alternatively, even if access is further blocked by folder-level passwords, the Total field will return \u003e 0, allowing the attacker to blindly confirm the existence of the keyword \"secret\" in unauthorized global directories.\n \n\u003cimg width=\"2112\" height=\"1381\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9f8c5e18-8744-4363-8d3f-5e6cf691f061\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\nThis is an Information Disclosure and Horizontal/Vertical Privilege Escalation vulnerability. Any authenticated user can enumerate hidden infrastructure, verify the existence of sensitive files (e.g., passwords, internal documents), and extract file metadata across the entire storage namespace, completely defeating the BasePath isolation mechanism.\n\n### Remediation Recommendations\n1. Separator-Aware Path Containment: Replace strings.HasPrefix with a robust path containment check. For example: target == base || strings.HasPrefix(target, base + \"/\"), or use a dedicated utility like utils.IsSubPath().\n2. Backend-Level Filtering: Enforce the path boundary within the bleve query itself (e.g., using indexed parent path hashes) rather than relying solely on post-query API filtering.\n3. Accurate Total Calculation: Compute the Total count only after all authorization and path filters have been applied to the result set.",
"id": "GHSA-p6ph-3jx2-3337",
"modified": "2026-07-24T22:32:17Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T22:32:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/security/advisories/GHSA-p6ph-3jx2-3337"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/commit/59bd3431408578f420895457554700cc9a52375a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/commit/84ecda35aae2bd0020474086e6ddfd3aa2340679"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/releases/tag/v4.2.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenList: Search metadata/count disclosure via Non-Separator-Aware Path Check in Bleve Search"
}
GHSA-P6PV-Q7RC-G4H9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-05 21:13 – Updated: 2026-02-13 17:16Unauthenticated users can view completed guest orders by Order ID (GHSL-2026-029)
The OrdersController#show action permits viewing completed guest orders by order number alone, without requiring the associated order token.
Order lookup without enforcing token requirement in OrdersController#show:
@order = complete_order_finder.new(number: params[:id], token: params[:token], store: current_store).execute.first
Authorization bypass for guest orders in authorize_access:
def authorize_access
return true if @order.user_id.nil?
@order.user == try_spree_current_user
end
If the attacker is in possession of a leaked Order ID, they might look it up directly via this API. Alternatively, brute forcing all or parts of the possible Order IDs might be feasible for an attacker. (The Order IDs themselves are securely generated, but with relatively low entropy: by default an order ID has a length of 9 and a base of 10, that would require an attacker to perform 1 billion requests to gather all guest orders. (At an assumed constant rate of 100 requests per second it would take 115 days.)
Proof of Concept
- As a guest create a complete order.
- Fetch the latest Order ID from the database (Table:
spree_orders). - In another clean browser access following URL:
<SPREE-HOST>/orders/<ORDER-ID>. (Sample:http://localhost:3000/orders/R496592563)
=> Full guest order details are disclosed including names, addresses and limited payment info.
Impact
This issue may lead to disclosure of PII of guest users (including names, addresses and phone numbers).
CWEs
- CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Credit
This issue was discovered with the GitHub Security Lab Taskflow Agent and manually verified by GHSL team members @p- (Peter Stöckli) and @m-y-mo (Man Yue Mo).
Disclosure Policy
This report is subject to a 90-day disclosure deadline, as described in more detail in our coordinated disclosure policy.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "spree_storefront"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "spree_storefront"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.1.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "spree_storefront"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.2.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "spree_storefront"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25757"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-05T21:13:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-06T23:15:54Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Unauthenticated users can view completed guest orders by Order ID (`GHSL-2026-029`)\n\nThe `OrdersController#show` action permits viewing completed guest orders by order number alone, without requiring the associated order token.\n\nOrder lookup without enforcing token requirement in [`OrdersController#show`](https://github.com/spree/spree/blob/1341623f2ae92685cdbe232885bf5808fc8f9ca8/storefront/app/controllers/spree/orders_controller.rb#L14):\n\n```ruby\n@order = complete_order_finder.new(number: params[:id], token: params[:token], store: current_store).execute.first\n```\n\nAuthorization bypass for guest orders in [`authorize_access`](https://github.com/spree/spree/blob/1341623f2ae92685cdbe232885bf5808fc8f9ca8/storefront/app/controllers/spree/orders_controller.rb#L51C1-L55C8):\n```ruby\ndef authorize_access\n return true if @order.user_id.nil?\n\n @order.user == try_spree_current_user\nend\n```\n\nIf the attacker is in possession of a leaked Order ID, they might look it up directly via this API.\nAlternatively, brute forcing all or parts of the possible Order IDs might be feasible for an attacker. (The Order IDs themselves are [securely generated](https://github.com/spree/spree/blob/a878eb4a782ce0445d218ea86fb12075b0e3d7cc/core/lib/spree/core/number_generator.rb#L45), but with relatively low entropy: by default an order ID has a length of 9 and a base of 10, that would require an attacker to perform 1 billion requests to gather all guest orders. (At an assumed constant rate of 100 requests per second it would take 115 days.)\n\n\n#### Proof of Concept\n\n1. As a guest create a complete order.\n2. Fetch the latest Order ID from the database (Table: `spree_orders`).\n3. In another clean browser access following URL: `\u003cSPREE-HOST\u003e/orders/\u003cORDER-ID\u003e`. (Sample: `http://localhost:3000/orders/R496592563`)\n\n=\u003e Full guest order details are disclosed including names, addresses and limited payment info.\n\n#### Impact\n\nThis issue may lead to disclosure of PII of guest users (including names, addresses and phone numbers).\n\n#### CWEs\n\n- CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key\n\n### Credit\n\nThis issue was discovered with the [GitHub Security Lab Taskflow Agent](https://github.com/GitHubSecurityLab/seclab-taskflow-agent) and manually verified by GHSL team members [@p- (Peter St\u00f6ckli)](https://github.com/p-) and [@m-y-mo (Man Yue Mo)](https://github.com/m-y-mo).\n\n### Disclosure Policy\n\nThis report is subject to a 90-day disclosure deadline, as described in more detail in our [coordinated disclosure policy](https://securitylab.github.com/advisories#policy).",
"id": "GHSA-p6pv-q7rc-g4h9",
"modified": "2026-02-13T17:16:21Z",
"published": "2026-02-05T21:13:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spree/spree/security/advisories/GHSA-p6pv-q7rc-g4h9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25757"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spree/spree/commit/3e00be64c128ef4bd4b99731f0c3ab469509cfab"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spree/spree/commit/6b32ed7d474aa55fa441990e6aa39740152aa1be"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spree/spree/commit/6f6b8a7a28a8bff24a6e20eab04b4bbbdf39384d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spree/spree/commit/ea4a5db590ca753dbc986f2a4e818d9e0edfb1ad"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/spree_storefront/CVE-2026-25757.yml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/spree/spree"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spree/spree/blob/1341623f2ae92685cdbe232885bf5808fc8f9ca8/storefront/app/controllers/spree/orders_controller.rb#L14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spree/spree/blob/1341623f2ae92685cdbe232885bf5808fc8f9ca8/storefront/app/controllers/spree/orders_controller.rb#L51C1-L55C8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spree/spree/blob/a878eb4a782ce0445d218ea86fb12075b0e3d7cc/core/lib/spree/core/number_generator.rb#L45"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Unauthenticated Spree Commerce users can view completed guest orders by Order ID"
}
GHSA-P6WV-4RVR-M4FH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-11 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33The Unlimited Theme Addon For Elementor and WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.1 via the 'uta-template' shortcode due to insufficient restrictions on which posts can be included. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to extract data from private or draft posts created by Elementor that they should not have access to.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-12116"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-11T08:15:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Unlimited Theme Addon For Elementor and WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.1 via the \u0027uta-template\u0027 shortcode due to insufficient restrictions on which posts can be included. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to extract data from private or draft posts created by Elementor that they should not have access to.",
"id": "GHSA-p6wv-4rvr-m4fh",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:47Z",
"published": "2025-01-11T09:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12116"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3220786%40unlimited-theme-addons\u0026new=3220786%40unlimited-theme-addons\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/unlimited-theme-addons"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9dbdb6cc-2a00-4d34-9c11-62f3d1b51c73?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P6XJ-35FM-QGMF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-11 21:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:33Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in shanebp BP Email Assign Templates allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects BP Email Assign Templates: from n/a through 1.6.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-28874"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-11T21:15:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in shanebp BP Email Assign Templates allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects BP Email Assign Templates: from n/a through 1.6.",
"id": "GHSA-p6xj-35fm-qgmf",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:33:56Z",
"published": "2025-03-11T21:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-28874"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/bp-email-assign-templates/vulnerability/wordpress-bp-email-assign-templates-by-shanebp-plugin-1-6-arbitrary-content-deletion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-P76G-9C4W-2889
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-27 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-13 03:31A flaw was found in Foreman. The template revision endpoint does not enforce object-level authorization when retrieving an audited template revision. An authenticated, low privileged user with a template-related permission, such as view_ptables, can obtain historical template contents belonging to another organization or location by supplying the corresponding audit ID. This can result in unauthorized disclosure of historical template contents, which may contain sensitive configuration information, credentials, or other secrets. The REST API revision endpoints correctly restrict this lookup.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81658"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-27T13:18:42Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in Foreman. The template revision endpoint does not enforce object-level authorization when retrieving an audited template revision. An authenticated, low privileged user with a template-related permission, such as view_ptables, can obtain historical template contents belonging to another organization or location by supplying the corresponding audit ID. This can result in unauthorized disclosure of historical template contents, which may contain sensitive configuration information, credentials, or other secrets. The REST API revision endpoints correctly restrict this lookup.",
"id": "GHSA-p76g-9c4w-2889",
"modified": "2026-11-13T03:31:55Z",
"published": "2026-08-27T15:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81658"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:99949"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:99950"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:99952"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-81658"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2524899"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.
Mitigation
Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.
Mitigation
Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.