CWE-639
AllowedAuthorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
5933 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-JV8V-XQ2H-657V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 23:00 – Updated: 2026-09-03 23:00CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72802.
Summary
POST /api/asset/resolveAssetPath returns the resolved absolute filesystem path of an asset, unmodified. The route is CheckAuth-only, so it is reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. An anonymous reader who knows any asset's relative path trivially harvested from an <img src="assets/…"> in any published document receives the server's absolute workspace path, disclosing the operating-system username and the installation layout.
Details
// kernel/api/asset.go: resolveAssetPath
p, err := model.GetAssetAbsPathInBox(path, "") // boxID="" → absolute workspace path
...
ret.Data = p // returned raw, no stripping
GetAssetAbsPathInBox(path, "") resolves under util.DataDir / util.WorkspaceDir, producing a full host path such as C:\Users\<username>\SiYuan\data\assets\foo.png or /home/<user>/…. The handler returns it directly with no redaction and no publish-scope check.
This is data the project already treats as sensitive. getConf explicitly zeroes System.WorkspaceDir, AppDir, ConfDir, DataDir, and HomeDir when util.IsBrowserRequest(c), a change made specifically to avoid leaking the username (issue #17410). resolveAssetPath performs no equivalent stripping, so it re-exposes precisely the values getConf was patched to hide.
Related unfiltered siblings in the same file, also CheckAuth-only with no publish scoping:
- getMissingAssets: workspace-wide list of missing asset references
- getUnusedAssets: every unused asset filename in the assets directory
Both return asset inventory spanning all documents, including publish-forbidden ones.
Verified at origin/master: resolveAssetPath returns the absolute path with no redaction, getConf contains the IsBrowserRequest stripping; all three routes are registered CheckAuth without CheckAdminRole.
Proof of Concept
Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when Publish.Auth.Enable is false, otherwise any publish reader account.
1. Harvest an asset path: open any published document and read a relative asset path from its markup, e.g. assets/foo-20260101120000-abcdefg.png.
2. Resolve it as an anonymous reader:
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/asset/resolveAssetPath
{"path":"assets/foo-20260101120000-abcdefg.png"}
3. Result: the response returns the absolute host path, e.g.
C:\Users\<username>\SiYuan\data\assets\foo-...png disclosing the OS username and the full workspace/installation layout.
Control: getConf from the same anonymous session returns WorkspaceDir/DataDir/HomeDir blanked, confirming the project intends these values to be withheld from browser requests.
Related:
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/asset/getUnusedAssets {}
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/asset/getMissingAssets {}
Return workspace-wide asset inventory with no publish scoping.
Impact
An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader obtains the server's absolute workspace path, which typically embeds the OS username, plus the installation directory layout. This is useful for targeting subsequent attacks (path construction, user enumeration, social engineering) and directly contradicts the redaction the project applies in getConf. The related endpoints additionally disclose workspace-wide asset inventory, including assets referenced only by publish-forbidden documents. Confidentiality-only.
Suggested fix
Apply the same redaction getConf uses: for browser/reader requests, return the asset path relative to the workspace root rather than the absolute host path (or omit it entirely). Add publish-access scoping to getUnusedAssets and getMissingAssets so their results are limited to documents the caller may see.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260724095509-eee3410aa131"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72802"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-03T23:00:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72802](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72802).\n\n### Summary\n\n`POST /api/asset/resolveAssetPath` returns the resolved **absolute** filesystem path of an asset, unmodified. The route is `CheckAuth`-only, so it is reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. An anonymous reader who knows any asset\u0027s relative path trivially harvested from an `\u003cimg src=\"assets/\u2026\"\u003e` in any published document receives the server\u0027s absolute workspace path, disclosing the operating-system username and the installation layout.\n\n### Details\n\n```go\n// kernel/api/asset.go: resolveAssetPath\np, err := model.GetAssetAbsPathInBox(path, \"\") // boxID=\"\" \u2192 absolute workspace path\n...\nret.Data = p // returned raw, no stripping\n```\n\n`GetAssetAbsPathInBox(path, \"\")` resolves under `util.DataDir` / `util.WorkspaceDir`, producing a full host path such as `C:\\Users\\\u003cusername\u003e\\SiYuan\\data\\assets\\foo.png` or `/home/\u003cuser\u003e/\u2026`. The handler returns it directly with no redaction and no publish-scope check.\n\n**This is data the project already treats as sensitive.** `getConf` explicitly zeroes `System.WorkspaceDir`, `AppDir`, `ConfDir`, `DataDir`, and `HomeDir` when `util.IsBrowserRequest(c)`, a change made specifically to avoid leaking the username (issue #17410). `resolveAssetPath` performs no equivalent stripping, so it re-exposes precisely the values `getConf` was patched to hide.\n\n**Related unfiltered siblings** in the same file, also `CheckAuth`-only with no publish scoping:\n- `getMissingAssets`: workspace-wide list of missing asset references\n- `getUnusedAssets`: every unused asset filename in the assets directory\n\nBoth return asset inventory spanning all documents, including publish-forbidden ones.\n\nVerified at `origin/master`: `resolveAssetPath` returns the absolute path with no redaction, `getConf` contains the `IsBrowserRequest` stripping; all three routes are registered `CheckAuth` without `CheckAdminRole`.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nPrecondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`, otherwise any publish reader account.\n\n**1. Harvest an asset path**: open any published document and read a relative asset path from its markup, e.g. `assets/foo-20260101120000-abcdefg.png`.\n\n**2. Resolve it as an anonymous reader:**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/asset/resolveAssetPath\n{\"path\":\"assets/foo-20260101120000-abcdefg.png\"}\n```\n\n**3. Result:** the response returns the absolute host path, e.g.\n`C:\\Users\\\u003cusername\u003e\\SiYuan\\data\\assets\\foo-...png` disclosing the OS username and the full workspace/installation layout.\n\n**Control:** `getConf` from the same anonymous session returns `WorkspaceDir`/`DataDir`/`HomeDir` blanked, confirming the project intends these values to be withheld from browser requests.\n\n**Related:**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/asset/getUnusedAssets {}\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/asset/getMissingAssets {}\n```\nReturn workspace-wide asset inventory with no publish scoping.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader` obtains the server\u0027s absolute workspace path, which typically embeds the OS username, plus the installation directory layout. This is useful for targeting subsequent attacks (path construction, user enumeration, social engineering) and directly contradicts the redaction the project applies in `getConf`. The related endpoints additionally disclose workspace-wide asset inventory, including assets referenced only by publish-forbidden documents. Confidentiality-only.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nApply the same redaction `getConf` uses: for browser/reader requests, return the asset path relative to the workspace root rather than the absolute host path (or omit it entirely). Add publish-access scoping to `getUnusedAssets` and `getMissingAssets` so their results are limited to documents the caller may see.",
"id": "GHSA-jv8v-xq2h-657v",
"modified": "2026-09-03T23:00:52Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T23:00:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-jv8v-xq2h-657v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72802"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/eee3410aa131b76f1bd72e933d484cf1ece77e88"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-information-disclosure-via-resolveassetpath"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan: Absolute filesystem path and OS username disclosure via resolveAssetPath"
}
GHSA-JVGV-XRF5-MP7H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-14 12:31The Academy LMS – WordPress LMS Plugin for Complete eLearning Solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 3.8.0 via the 'save_lesson_note', 'get_lesson_note', and 'complete_lesson_video' AJAX handlers due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to read, overwrite, or delete the private lesson notes of any other user (including administrators), and to falsify lesson-completion progress for arbitrary users.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-9341"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T12:17:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Academy LMS \u2013 WordPress LMS Plugin for Complete eLearning Solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 3.8.0 via the \u0027save_lesson_note\u0027, \u0027get_lesson_note\u0027, and \u0027complete_lesson_video\u0027 AJAX handlers due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to read, overwrite, or delete the private lesson notes of any other user (including administrators), and to falsify lesson-completion progress for arbitrary users.",
"id": "GHSA-jvgv-xrf5-mp7h",
"modified": "2026-07-14T12:31:16Z",
"published": "2026-07-14T12:31:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9341"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/academy/tags/3.7.4/includes/ajax/lesson.php#L253"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/academy/tags/3.7.4/includes/ajax/lesson.php#L258"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/academy/tags/3.7.4/includes/ajax/lesson.php#L300"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/academy/tags/3.7.4/includes/classes/abstract-ajax-handler.php#L46"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3573111"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1e9b094a-29ba-4be3-9033-fd915fae1820?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JVM3-XFV6-2QC6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-13 18:30 – Updated: 2026-10-13 18:30PickMall lilishop through 4.4 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability that allows authenticated sellers to change other stores' product freight templates via PUT /store/goods/goods/freight. GoodsServiceImpl.freight and GoodsSkuServiceImpl.freight update goods and SKUs by id without store-scoped checks, letting sellers bind their own templates to competitors' products and alter shipping charges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-110122"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-13T17:17:36Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "PickMall lilishop through 4.4 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability that allows authenticated sellers to change other stores\u0027 product freight templates via PUT /store/goods/goods/freight. GoodsServiceImpl.freight and GoodsSkuServiceImpl.freight update goods and SKUs by id without store-scoped checks, letting sellers bind their own templates to competitors\u0027 products and alter shipping charges.",
"id": "GHSA-jvm3-xfv6-2qc6",
"modified": "2026-10-13T18:30:55Z",
"published": "2026-10-13T18:30:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-110122"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lilishop/lilishop/blob/v4.4/framework/src/main/java/cn/lili/modules/goods/serviceimpl/GoodsServiceImpl.java#L424-L442"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lilishop/lilishop/blob/v4.4/seller-api/src/main/java/cn/lili/controller/goods/GoodsStoreController.java#L177-L185"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackmd.io/@1ExmmukzRMWN7B4gQ4W-4Q/lilishop-seller-goods-cross-store-authz-bypass"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/pickmall-lilishop-through-4.4-idor-via-goods-freight-endpoint"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-JVQ8-W7QV-HQP6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-28 15:30 – Updated: 2023-01-10 15:46usememos/memos 0.9.0 and prior is vulnerable to Improper Authentication.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/usememos/memos"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-4799"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-12-30T19:57:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-28T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "usememos/memos 0.9.0 and prior is vulnerable to Improper Authentication.",
"id": "GHSA-jvq8-w7qv-hqp6",
"modified": "2023-01-10T15:46:13Z",
"published": "2022-12-28T15:30:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-4799"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/usememos/memos/commit/3556ae4e651d9443dc3bb8a170dd3cc726517a53"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/usememos/memos"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/c5d70f9d-b7a7-4418-9368-4566a8143e79"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "usememos/memos Improper Authentication vulnerability"
}
GHSA-JVR7-MRXH-7JRP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 09:30 – Updated: 2026-08-25 09:30The frontend company self-service editing feature relies on a template-level visibility flag to hide the edit form for company records a visitor does not own, but the corresponding write operation does not repeat this ownership check on the server side. As a result, a visitor who knows the identifier of a company record from the public directory can submit a modified update request for that record directly and overwrite its data, without the application ever confirming that the visitor owns it.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-77142"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-25T09:17:35Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The frontend company self-service editing feature relies on a template-level visibility flag to hide the edit form for company records a visitor does not own, but the corresponding write operation does not repeat this ownership check on the server side. As a result, a visitor who knows the identifier of a company record from the public directory can submit a modified update request for that record directly and overwrite its data, without the application ever confirming that the visitor owns it.",
"id": "GHSA-jvr7-mrxh-7jrp",
"modified": "2026-08-25T09:30:40Z",
"published": "2026-08-25T09:30:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77142"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-ext-sa-2026-020"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-JW76-HCP8-48R5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-05 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-05 12:31Plane through 1.4.2 fails to validate that issues belong to the deploy board's project in the public comment endpoint. Authenticated attackers can post comments to arbitrary issues across workspaces by supplying an issue_id parameter to the public deploy-board comment endpoint.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-86174"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-05T11:16:45Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Plane through 1.4.2 fails to validate that issues belong to the deploy board\u0027s project in the public comment endpoint. Authenticated attackers can post comments to arbitrary issues across workspaces by supplying an issue_id parameter to the public deploy-board comment endpoint.",
"id": "GHSA-jw76-hcp8-48r5",
"modified": "2026-09-05T12:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-09-05T12:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86174"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/makeplane/plane/issues/9441"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/makeplane/plane"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/makeplane/plane/blob/v1.4.2/apps/api/plane/space/views/issue.py#L258-L275"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/plane-through-1.4.2-arbitrary-comment-write-via-public-deploy-board"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-JW8W-84X3-C2R9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32An improper access control vulnerability in danny-avila/librechat versions prior to 0.7.6 allows authenticated users to delete other users' prompts via the groupid parameter. This issue occurs because the endpoint does not verify whether the provided prompt ID belongs to the current user.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-11167"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:24Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An improper access control vulnerability in danny-avila/librechat versions prior to 0.7.6 allows authenticated users to delete other users\u0027 prompts via the groupid parameter. This issue occurs because the endpoint does not verify whether the provided prompt ID belongs to the current user.",
"id": "GHSA-jw8w-84x3-c2r9",
"modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:41Z",
"published": "2025-03-20T12:32:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11167"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/danny-avila/librechat/commit/5071bdbf9ac621165f0e8d009818851f3951eee7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/298f5760-5797-4432-8b9e-544609d612c0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JWH8-4MW6-G2WQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-26 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-26 21:31Dell PowerProtect One, versions 20.1.0.0 and below, contain an Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Information tampering.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-74771"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-26T20:17:59Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Dell PowerProtect One, versions 20.1.0.0 and below, contain an Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Information tampering.",
"id": "GHSA-jwh8-4mw6-g2wq",
"modified": "2026-08-26T21:31:44Z",
"published": "2026-08-26T21:31:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74771"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000500902/dsa-2026-369-security-update-for-dell-powerprotect-one-multiple-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JWQ2-9QVC-8P98
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-15 03:30 – Updated: 2026-11-15 03:30Zr.Admin.NET commit af07ffc through commit eb9228a contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in SysProfileController.UpdateProfile that allows any authenticated user to modify other accounts via UserId. Attackers can set the administrator's phone number to one they control, request an SMS code via /checkMobile, and log in through /PhoneLogin to take over the administrator account.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-129465"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-15T02:17:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Zr.Admin.NET commit af07ffc through commit eb9228a contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in SysProfileController.UpdateProfile that allows any authenticated user to modify other accounts via UserId. Attackers can set the administrator\u0027s phone number to one they control, request an SMS code via /checkMobile, and log in through /PhoneLogin to take over the administrator account.",
"id": "GHSA-jwq2-9qvc-8p98",
"modified": "2026-11-15T03:30:44Z",
"published": "2026-11-15T03:30:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129465"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/izhaorui/Zr.Admin.NET/issues/27"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/izhaorui/Zr.Admin.NET/commit/af07ffc5d18e7876d3780d1ff5ee776b80950399"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/izhaorui/Zr.Admin.NET/blob/eb9228a23014f6000c06cab2f10ae0d44ecbbd3a/ZR.Admin.WebApi/Controllers/System/SysLoginController.cs#L516-L559"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/izhaorui/Zr.Admin.NET/blob/eb9228a23014f6000c06cab2f10ae0d44ecbbd3a/ZR.Admin.WebApi/Controllers/System/SysProfileController.cs#L62-L75"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/izhaorui/Zr.Admin.NET/blob/eb9228a23014f6000c06cab2f10ae0d44ecbbd3a/ZR.ServiceCore/Services/SysUserService.cs#L220-L236"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vul.yulun.ac.cn/20261114/zr-admin-net"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/zr-admin-net-commit-af07ffc-through-eb9228a-idor-via-system-user-profile"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-JXC9-XMC4-GR23
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 20:35 – Updated: 2026-08-04 20:35Summary
A user with write access to one knowledge base could delete directories, and drop file embeddings, belonging to knowledge bases they do not control. The sync cleanup endpoint verified write access on the knowledge base named in the URL and then acted on the directory and file ids supplied in the request body without checking that those objects belonged to that knowledge base.
Preconditions
Default configuration, no flags involved. The attacker needs write access to at least one knowledge base, which comes from owning one, from a write access grant, or from the admin role; workspace.knowledge is off by default, so an ordinary user cannot simply create one. They also need the victim's directory or file id, which are UUIDs and are not enumerable, so in practice the attacker is someone who can already see the target knowledge base, typically a read-only collaborator on a shared one. Deployments where no knowledge base is shared beyond its owner are not reachable.
Impact
The attacker deletes a target directory and, because the deletion runs without moving files to the parent, the knowledge_file associations for every file in that subtree are removed as well, so those documents silently drop out of the victim's knowledge base and out of its retrieval results. Separately, the per-file vector cleanup dropped the standalone file-<id> collection for any file id, breaking chat-with-file for that document. The stored files and their database rows survive, since that path was gated on file ownership, and an owner can restore the state by re-adding and reprocessing. Nothing about the target knowledge base's contents is disclosed to the attacker.
Fix
Fixed in https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/26722. Both request-body loops are now scoped to the knowledge base in the URL: a directory is resolved and skipped unless its knowledge_id matches, and the per-file vector cleanup runs only for files that are members of that knowledge base. Upgrading fully resolves the issue.
Root cause
Affected component: backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py, handler sync_knowledge_cleanup, endpoint POST /api/v1/knowledge/{id}/sync/cleanup. Affected setup: all builds from 0.9.6 onward, no optional dependency involved.
The handler treated the write-access check on the URL knowledge base as authorization for everything it went on to do, but the objects it acted on came from the request body and were addressed by primary key alone. Directory deletion at the model layer deletes by directory id and has no notion of a parent knowledge base, so the only thing that could have bound the two together was a membership check in the handler, and there was none. The explicit directory-delete endpoint in the same router already carried that check, which is what makes this a gap in one handler rather than a missing model-layer control.
Credits
Reported by @whyiug.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.10.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "open-webui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.9.6"
},
{
"fixed": "0.11.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-70488"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-04T20:35:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\nA user with write access to one knowledge base could delete directories, and drop file embeddings, belonging to knowledge bases they do not control. The sync cleanup endpoint verified write access on the knowledge base named in the URL and then acted on the directory and file ids supplied in the request body without checking that those objects belonged to that knowledge base.\n\n## Preconditions\nDefault configuration, no flags involved. The attacker needs write access to at least one knowledge base, which comes from owning one, from a write access grant, or from the admin role; `workspace.knowledge` is off by default, so an ordinary user cannot simply create one. They also need the victim\u0027s directory or file id, which are UUIDs and are not enumerable, so in practice the attacker is someone who can already see the target knowledge base, typically a read-only collaborator on a shared one. Deployments where no knowledge base is shared beyond its owner are not reachable.\n\n## Impact\nThe attacker deletes a target directory and, because the deletion runs without moving files to the parent, the knowledge_file associations for every file in that subtree are removed as well, so those documents silently drop out of the victim\u0027s knowledge base and out of its retrieval results. Separately, the per-file vector cleanup dropped the standalone `file-\u003cid\u003e` collection for any file id, breaking chat-with-file for that document. The stored files and their database rows survive, since that path was gated on file ownership, and an owner can restore the state by re-adding and reprocessing. Nothing about the target knowledge base\u0027s contents is disclosed to the attacker.\n\n## Fix\nFixed in https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/26722. Both request-body loops are now scoped to the knowledge base in the URL: a directory is resolved and skipped unless its `knowledge_id` matches, and the per-file vector cleanup runs only for files that are members of that knowledge base. Upgrading fully resolves the issue.\n\n## Root cause\nAffected component: `backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py`, handler `sync_knowledge_cleanup`, endpoint `POST /api/v1/knowledge/{id}/sync/cleanup`. Affected setup: all builds from 0.9.6 onward, no optional dependency involved.\n\nThe handler treated the write-access check on the URL knowledge base as authorization for everything it went on to do, but the objects it acted on came from the request body and were addressed by primary key alone. Directory deletion at the model layer deletes by directory id and has no notion of a parent knowledge base, so the only thing that could have bound the two together was a membership check in the handler, and there was none. The explicit directory-delete endpoint in the same router already carried that check, which is what makes this a gap in one handler rather than a missing model-layer control.\n\n## Credits\nReported by @whyiug.",
"id": "GHSA-jxc9-xmc4-gr23",
"modified": "2026-08-04T20:35:47Z",
"published": "2026-08-04T20:35:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-jxc9-xmc4-gr23"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/26722"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/707efeaed7992dd9896d5928559458f228b9a539"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.11.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Open WebUI: Deletion of directories and file embeddings in other knowledge bases via sync cleanup"
}
Mitigation
For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.
Mitigation
Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.
Mitigation
Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.