Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-625

Allowed

Permissive Regular Expression

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product uses a regular expression that does not sufficiently restrict the set of allowed values.

52 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-8XQM-FM8J-XV84

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-04 00:32 – Updated: 2026-11-09 21:31
VLAI
Details

CGI versions before 5.00 for Perl allow denial of service via submitted values used as a regex for optgroup selection in scrolling_list.

When rendering option groups, scrolling_list marks the selected options by interpolating each selected value, by default taken from the request parameters, unescaped into a substitution pattern.

A client can make the request die with an invalid pattern, or tie up the process with one that backtracks heavily.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-120645"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-625"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-04T00:17:26Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "CGI versions before 5.00 for Perl allow denial of service via submitted values used as a regex for optgroup selection in scrolling_list.\n\nWhen rendering option groups, scrolling_list marks the selected options by interpolating each selected value, by default taken from the request parameters, unescaped into a substitution pattern.\n\nA client can make the request die with an invalid pattern, or tie up the process with one that backtracks heavily.",
  "id": "GHSA-8xqm-fm8j-xv84",
  "modified": "2026-11-09T21:31:40Z",
  "published": "2026-11-04T00:32:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120645"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/leejo/CGI.pm/commit/824956fbb0c4eb77044ba2dc9180a30df12cb309.patch"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LEEJO/CGI-4.72/source/lib/CGI.pm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LEEJO/CGI-5.00/changes"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-CXHW-V53J-7RHQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 15:34 – Updated: 2026-11-06 18:34
VLAI
Details

CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl accept unintended values in form fields checked by createRxValidator.

createRxValidator() is documented to anchor the supplied pattern at both ends, but builds /^${rx}$/ without grouping the pattern. An alternation such as yes|no then accepts any value starting with yes or ending with no, and $ also accepts a value with one trailing newline.

An authenticated user can submit values the pattern was meant to reject, which an application may then write into generated configuration files.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-118995"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-625"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-30T13:18:32Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "CallBackery versions before 0.62.0 for Perl accept unintended values in form fields checked by createRxValidator.\n\ncreateRxValidator() is documented to anchor the supplied pattern at both ends, but builds /^${rx}$/ without grouping the pattern. An alternation such as yes|no then accepts any value starting with yes or ending with no, and $ also accepts a value with one trailing newline.\n\nAn authenticated user can submit values the pattern was meant to reject, which an application may then write into generated configuration files.",
  "id": "GHSA-cxhw-v53j-7rhq",
  "modified": "2026-11-06T18:34:59Z",
  "published": "2026-10-30T15:34:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118995"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/OETIKER/CallBackery-0.62.0/changes"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-F8R2-VG7X-GH8M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 20:55 – Updated: 2026-03-13 20:55
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: Exec approval allowlist patterns overmatched on POSIX paths
Details

Summary

matchesExecAllowlistPattern normalized patterns and targets with lowercasing and compiled glob matching too broadly on POSIX. In addition, the ? wildcard could match /, which allowed matches to cross path segments.

Impact

These matching rules could overmatch allowlist entries and permit commands or executable paths that an operator did not intend to approve.

Affected versions

openclaw <= 2026.3.8

Patch

Fixed in openclaw 2026.3.11 and included in later releases such as 2026.3.12. Exec allowlist matching now respects the intended path semantics, and regression tests cover the POSIX case-folding and slash-crossing cases.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-178",
      "CWE-625"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-13T20:55:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`matchesExecAllowlistPattern` normalized patterns and targets with lowercasing and compiled glob matching too broadly on POSIX. In addition, the `?` wildcard could match `/`, which allowed matches to cross path segments.\n\n### Impact\n\nThese matching rules could overmatch allowlist entries and permit commands or executable paths that an operator did not intend to approve.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`openclaw` `\u003c= 2026.3.8`\n\n### Patch\n\nFixed in `openclaw` `2026.3.11` and included in later releases such as `2026.3.12`. Exec allowlist matching now respects the intended path semantics, and regression tests cover the POSIX case-folding and slash-crossing cases.",
  "id": "GHSA-f8r2-vg7x-gh8m",
  "modified": "2026-03-13T20:55:03Z",
  "published": "2026-03-13T20:55:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-f8r2-vg7x-gh8m"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.11"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Exec approval allowlist patterns overmatched on POSIX paths"
}

GHSA-G6F8-C3X9-JV7F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-12 18:21 – Updated: 2026-11-12 18:21
VLAI
Summary
code16/sharp: Server-side request forgery through an unanchored autocomplete endpoint check
Details

Impact

An authenticated attacker can call the Autocomplete API with the configured endpoint as a substring to request another server-side route.

Patches

The problem has been patched in 9.23.0 and pre-release version 10.0.0-beta.4. The regex verifying the endpoint has been anchored to forbid substring injection.

Workarounds

Use SharpFormAutocompleteRemoteField::setRemoteCallback() instead of SharpFormAutocompleteRemoteField::setRemoteEndpoint().

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "code16/sharp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.23.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "code16/sharp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.0.0-beta.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.0.0-beta.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-84987"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-625",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-12T18:21:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nAn authenticated attacker can call the Autocomplete API with the configured endpoint as a substring to request another server-side route.\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been patched in 9.23.0 and pre-release version 10.0.0-beta.4. The regex verifying the endpoint has been anchored to forbid substring injection.\n\n### Workarounds\nUse `SharpFormAutocompleteRemoteField::setRemoteCallback()` instead of `SharpFormAutocompleteRemoteField::setRemoteEndpoint()`.",
  "id": "GHSA-g6f8-c3x9-jv7f",
  "modified": "2026-11-12T18:21:00Z",
  "published": "2026-11-12T18:21:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/code16/sharp/security/advisories/GHSA-g6f8-c3x9-jv7f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/code16/sharp/pull/748"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/code16/sharp/commit/339f89110f36d06eaad3f2b4bd048fa5424e5558"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/code16/sharp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/code16/sharp/releases/tag/v9.23.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/code16/sharp/tree/v10.0.0-beta.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "code16/sharp: Server-side request forgery through an unanchored autocomplete endpoint check"
}

GHSA-JF9X-2FG2-HX4W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-13 20:43 – Updated: 2026-11-13 20:43
VLAI
Summary
SvelteKit: Prerendered paths are interpreted as regular expressions in Vercel route config generated by @sveltejs/adapter-vercel and @sveltejs/adapter-static
Details

If an attacker could influence a link that was crawled during the prerender phase, that link could later be interpreted as a regex in the Vercel routing configuration.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@sveltejs/adapter-vercel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.3.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@sveltejs/adapter-static"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@sveltejs/adapter-vercel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0-next.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@sveltejs/adapter-static"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-128121"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-625"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-13T20:43:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "If an attacker could influence a link that was crawled during the prerender phase, that link could later be interpreted as a regex in the Vercel routing configuration.",
  "id": "GHSA-jf9x-2fg2-hx4w",
  "modified": "2026-11-13T20:43:23Z",
  "published": "2026-11-13T20:43:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/kit/security/advisories/GHSA-jf9x-2fg2-hx4w"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/kit/pull/17620"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/kit/commit/0a2e58cbccdd46cac20aa5af4e2edf17e0da11dd"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/kit/commit/2ed61a6aa3ac230b89e3528654c587847d1525a0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/kit"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/kit/releases/tag/@sveltejs/adapter-static@3.0.11"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/kit/releases/tag/@sveltejs/adapter-static@4.0.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/kit/releases/tag/@sveltejs/adapter-vercel@6.3.5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/kit/releases/tag/@sveltejs/adapter-vercel@7.0.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SvelteKit: Prerendered paths are interpreted as regular expressions in Vercel route config generated by @sveltejs/adapter-vercel and @sveltejs/adapter-static"
}

GHSA-JXJR-3G7G-3944

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 21:03 – Updated: 2026-09-08 21:03
VLAI
Summary
xmldom: requireWellFormed element/attribute name validation is bypassable via an embedded line terminator
Details

Summary

An embedded line terminator bypasses the requireWellFormed serializer check for element and attribute names. The check was added to fix GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj and GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm; a name whose first line is well-formed slips past it and is serialized verbatim, so the characters after the line terminator break out of the start/end tag or attribute. Callers who enabled requireWellFormed specifically to neutralize those name-injection issues remain exposed.

Details

xmldom builds every grammar production through a shared regexp builder that compiles with the m flag. The anchored full-string matcher used for element and attribute names, QName_exact = reg('^', QName, '$'), therefore inherits m. When it is applied as QName_exact.test(name) against an already-assembled node name, the m flag makes $ match at an interior line terminator, so the matcher accepts any value in which at least one line is a valid QName; the other lines are never constrained. A payload whose first line is a valid QName, followed by a line terminator and breakout markup, is what yields a working injection.

The serializer emits the accepted name verbatim into element start/end tags and attribute names, so the bytes after the line terminator break out of the intended syntactic position. The check is reached whenever a caller serializes, with requireWellFormed: true, a node whose name was set through programmatic DOM construction (createElement, createElementNS, createAttribute, createAttributeNS) with attacker-influenced input.

Root Cause

  1. A shared regexp builder compiles anchored productions with the m flag.
  2. ^…$ under m are line anchors, not string anchors.
  3. A full-string validator built on such a production (.test()) accepts any string with one conforming line, so a line terminator followed by breakout markup passes.

The triggering line terminators are the ECMAScript LineTerminator set: U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, U+2029.

Proof of Concept

const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');

// Element name carrying an embedded line terminator + breakout markup:
const doc = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, 'root', null);
const el = doc.createElement('a\n><script>alert(1)</script');
doc.documentElement.appendChild(el);

// Caller opted into well-formed serialization, expecting invalid names to be rejected:
console.log(new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true }));
// Observed on the affected version: NO throw; the output contains the injected `><script>…`
// breakout, because the name's first line ("a") satisfies the m-anchored QName check.
// Expected: InvalidStateError (the name is not a valid XML QName).

// Control — a single-line invalid name IS correctly rejected, proving the check is active and
// that only the line terminator defeats it:
const ctrl = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, 'root', null);
ctrl.documentElement.appendChild(ctrl.createElement('a b'));
new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(ctrl, { requireWellFormed: true });
// => throws InvalidStateError: The element name "a b" is not a valid XML QName

Impact

  • Bypass of a previously shipped security mitigation. Applications that adopted requireWellFormed: true specifically to neutralize GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj / GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm remain exposed to element/attribute name injection.
  • XML / markup structure injection, and, where the serialized output is placed into an HTML context, downstream XSS.

Fix Applied

The anchored XML Name/QName validators used by the requireWellFormed serializer no longer treat interior line terminators as satisfying the anchors, so a name is validated against the whole string. A name containing a line terminator is rejected with InvalidStateError, closing the bypass for element and attribute names. The default serialization path is unchanged.

⚠ Opt-in required. Protection is not automatic. Existing serialization calls remain vulnerable unless { requireWellFormed: true } is explicitly passed. Applications that serialize untrusted DOM content should audit all serializeToString() call sites and add it.

Proof of Concept - fixed path

const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');
const doc = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, 'root', null);
const el = doc.createElement('a\n><script>alert(1)</script');
doc.documentElement.appendChild(el);

// Default path (require-well-formed off) — unchanged, still emits the name verbatim,
// so the `><script>…` bytes break out of the start tag:
new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc);

// Opted-in path — now rejected:
new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true });
// throws InvalidStateError: The element name "a\n><script>alert(1)</script" is not a valid XML QName

Why the default stays verbatim

The W3C DOM Parsing require-well-formed flag defaults to false, and browser XMLSerializer emits names verbatim when it is unset. Throwing unconditionally would be an unjustified breaking change, so the check stays gated on the caller opting in with { requireWellFormed: true }.

Residual limitation

The default serialization path (no requireWellFormed) still emits names verbatim by design (above). Names introduced through createElement / setAttribute are never validated at creation — those APIs store the name unchecked by design — so the opt-in serializer check remains the only guard on that path.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@xmldom/xmldom"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.9.11"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.9.11"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-83617"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-625",
      "CWE-91"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T21:03:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-01T15:17:40Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAn embedded line terminator bypasses the `requireWellFormed` serializer check for element and\nattribute names. The check was added to fix GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj and GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm; a name whose\nfirst line is well-formed slips past it and is serialized verbatim, so the characters after the line\nterminator break out of the start/end tag or attribute. Callers who enabled `requireWellFormed`\nspecifically to neutralize those name-injection issues remain exposed.\n\n## Details\n\nxmldom builds every grammar production through a shared regexp builder that compiles with the `m`\nflag. The anchored full-string matcher used for element and attribute names, `QName_exact =\nreg(\u0027^\u0027, QName, \u0027$\u0027)`, therefore inherits `m`. When it is applied as `QName_exact.test(name)` against\nan already-assembled node name, the `m` flag makes `$` match at an interior line terminator, so the\nmatcher accepts any value in which **at least one line** is a valid `QName`; the other lines are never\nconstrained. A payload whose first line is a valid `QName`, followed by a line terminator and breakout\nmarkup, is what yields a working injection.\n\nThe serializer emits the accepted name verbatim into element start/end tags and attribute names, so\nthe bytes after the line terminator break out of the intended syntactic position. The check is\nreached whenever a caller serializes, with `requireWellFormed: true`, a node whose name was set\nthrough programmatic DOM construction (`createElement`, `createElementNS`, `createAttribute`,\n`createAttributeNS`) with attacker-influenced input.\n\n### Root Cause\n\n1. A shared regexp builder compiles anchored productions with the `m` flag.\n2. `^\u2026$` under `m` are line anchors, not string anchors.\n3. A full-string validator built on such a production (`.test()`) accepts any string with one\n   conforming line, so a line terminator followed by breakout markup passes.\n\nThe triggering line terminators are the ECMAScript `LineTerminator` set: U+000A, U+000D, U+2028, U+2029.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```js\nconst { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require(\u0027@xmldom/xmldom\u0027);\n\n// Element name carrying an embedded line terminator + breakout markup:\nconst doc = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, \u0027root\u0027, null);\nconst el = doc.createElement(\u0027a\\n\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(1)\u003c/script\u0027);\ndoc.documentElement.appendChild(el);\n\n// Caller opted into well-formed serialization, expecting invalid names to be rejected:\nconsole.log(new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true }));\n// Observed on the affected version: NO throw; the output contains the injected `\u003e\u003cscript\u003e\u2026`\n// breakout, because the name\u0027s first line (\"a\") satisfies the m-anchored QName check.\n// Expected: InvalidStateError (the name is not a valid XML QName).\n\n// Control \u2014 a single-line invalid name IS correctly rejected, proving the check is active and\n// that only the line terminator defeats it:\nconst ctrl = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, \u0027root\u0027, null);\nctrl.documentElement.appendChild(ctrl.createElement(\u0027a b\u0027));\nnew XMLSerializer().serializeToString(ctrl, { requireWellFormed: true });\n// =\u003e throws InvalidStateError: The element name \"a b\" is not a valid XML QName\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Bypass of a previously shipped security mitigation.** Applications that adopted\n  `requireWellFormed: true` specifically to neutralize GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj / GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm\n  remain exposed to element/attribute name injection.\n- **XML / markup structure injection**, and, where the serialized output is placed into an HTML\n  context, downstream XSS.\n\n## Fix Applied\n\nThe anchored XML `Name`/`QName` validators used by the `requireWellFormed` serializer no\nlonger treat interior line terminators as satisfying the anchors, so a name is validated against the\nwhole string. A name containing a line terminator is rejected with `InvalidStateError`, closing the\nbypass for element and attribute names. The default serialization path is unchanged.\n\n\u003e **\u26a0 Opt-in required.** Protection is not automatic. Existing serialization calls remain\n\u003e vulnerable unless `{ requireWellFormed: true }` is explicitly passed. Applications that\n\u003e serialize untrusted DOM content should audit all `serializeToString()` call sites and add it.\n\n### Proof of Concept - fixed path\n\n```js\nconst { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require(\u0027@xmldom/xmldom\u0027);\nconst doc = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, \u0027root\u0027, null);\nconst el = doc.createElement(\u0027a\\n\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(1)\u003c/script\u0027);\ndoc.documentElement.appendChild(el);\n\n// Default path (require-well-formed off) \u2014 unchanged, still emits the name verbatim,\n// so the `\u003e\u003cscript\u003e\u2026` bytes break out of the start tag:\nnew XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc);\n\n// Opted-in path \u2014 now rejected:\nnew XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true });\n// throws InvalidStateError: The element name \"a\\n\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(1)\u003c/script\" is not a valid XML QName\n```\n\n### Why the default stays verbatim\n\nThe W3C DOM Parsing require-well-formed flag defaults to false, and browser `XMLSerializer` emits\nnames verbatim when it is unset. Throwing unconditionally would be an unjustified breaking change, so\nthe check stays gated on the caller opting in with `{ requireWellFormed: true }`.\n\n### Residual limitation\n\nThe default serialization path (no `requireWellFormed`) still emits names verbatim by design (above).\nNames introduced through `createElement` / `setAttribute` are never validated at creation \u2014 those APIs\nstore the name unchecked by design \u2014 so the opt-in serializer check remains the only guard on that\npath.",
  "id": "GHSA-jxjr-3g7g-3944",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T21:03:17Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T21:03:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisories/GHSA-jxjr-3g7g-3944"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83617"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1071"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/7b2ec67e1750daadd0bb06c92e875e726544a362"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.12"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "xmldom: requireWellFormed element/attribute name validation is bypassable via an embedded line terminator"
}

GHSA-M4X6-WX7H-HWVH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 09:31 – Updated: 2026-08-10 09:31
VLAI
Details

Tegalog -Fumy Otegaru Memo Logger- provided by Nishishi Factory contains a vulnerability due to a permissive regular expression, which may allow an attacker who can access the affected product to log in to the management console. As a result, the attacker may perform any operations available from the management console.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64940"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-625"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T08:16:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Tegalog -Fumy Otegaru Memo Logger- provided by Nishishi Factory contains a vulnerability due to a permissive regular expression, which may allow an attacker who can access the affected product to log in to the management console. As a result, the attacker may perform any operations available from the management console.",
  "id": "GHSA-m4x6-wx7h-hwvh",
  "modified": "2026-08-10T09:31:23Z",
  "published": "2026-08-10T09:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64940"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN99975039"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.nishishi.com/cgi/tegalog/info/notice20260629.shtml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-PV25-75Q9-7735

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-06 00:31 – Updated: 2026-03-06 00:31
VLAI
Details

Permissive regular expression in Azure Compute Gallery allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-23651"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-625"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T23:16:19Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Permissive regular expression in Azure Compute Gallery allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.",
  "id": "GHSA-pv25-75q9-7735",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T00:31:34Z",
  "published": "2026-03-06T00:31:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23651"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-23651"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QV7J-4883-HWH7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-02 20:35 – Updated: 2026-05-13 16:18
VLAI
Summary
Rack::Sendfile header-based X-Accel-Mapping regex injection enables unauthorized X-Accel-Redirect
Details

Summary

Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path interpolates the value of the X-Accel-Mapping request header directly into a regular expression when rewriting file paths for X-Accel-Redirect. Because the header value is not escaped, an attacker who can supply X-Accel-Mapping to the backend can inject regex metacharacters and control the generated X-Accel-Redirect response header.

In deployments using Rack::Sendfile with x-accel-redirect, this can allow an attacker to cause nginx to serve unintended files from configured internal locations.

Details

Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path processes header-supplied mappings using logic equivalent to:

mapping.split(',').map(&:strip).each do |m|
  internal, external = m.split('=', 2).map(&:strip)
  new_path = path.sub(/\A#{internal}/i, external)
  return new_path unless path == new_path
end

Here, internal comes from the HTTP_X_ACCEL_MAPPING request header and is inserted directly into a regular expression without escaping. This gives the header value regex semantics rather than treating it as a literal prefix.

As a result, an attacker can supply metacharacters such as .* or capture groups to alter how the path substitution is performed. For example, a mapping such as:

X-Accel-Mapping: .*=/protected/secret.txt

causes the entire source path to match and rewrites the redirect target to a clean attacker-chosen internal path.

This differs from the documented behavior of the header-based mapping path, which is described as a simple substitution. While application-supplied mappings may intentionally support regular expressions, header-supplied mappings should be treated as literal path prefixes.

The issue is only exploitable when untrusted X-Accel-Mapping headers can reach Rack. One realistic case is a reverse proxy configuration that intends to set X-Accel-Mapping itself, but fails to do so on some routes, allowing a client-supplied header to pass through unchanged.

Impact

Applications using Rack::Sendfile with x-accel-redirect may be affected if the backend accepts attacker-controlled X-Accel-Mapping headers.

In affected deployments, an attacker may be able to control the X-Accel-Redirect response header and cause nginx to serve files from internal locations that were not intended to be reachable through the application. This can lead to unauthorized file disclosure.

The practical impact depends on deployment architecture. If the proxy always strips or overwrites X-Accel-Mapping, or if the application uses explicit configured mappings instead of the request header, exploitability may be eliminated.

Mitigation

  • Update to a patched version of Rack that treats header-supplied X-Accel-Mapping values as literal strings rather than regular expressions.
  • Strip or overwrite inbound X-Accel-Mapping headers at the reverse proxy so client-supplied values never reach Rack.
  • Prefer explicit application-configured sendfile mappings instead of relying on request-header mappings.
  • Review proxy sub-locations and inherited header settings to ensure X-Accel-Mapping is consistently set on all backend routes.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "rack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.23"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "rack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0.beta1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.21"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "rack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.2.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34830"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-625"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-02T20:35:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-02T17:16:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path` interpolates the value of the `X-Accel-Mapping` request header directly into a regular expression when rewriting file paths for `X-Accel-Redirect`. Because the header value is not escaped, an attacker who can supply `X-Accel-Mapping` to the backend can inject regex metacharacters and control the generated `X-Accel-Redirect` response header.\n\nIn deployments using `Rack::Sendfile` with `x-accel-redirect`, this can allow an attacker to cause nginx to serve unintended files from configured internal locations.\n\n## Details\n\n`Rack::Sendfile#map_accel_path` processes header-supplied mappings using logic equivalent to:\n\n```ruby\nmapping.split(\u0027,\u0027).map(\u0026:strip).each do |m|\n  internal, external = m.split(\u0027=\u0027, 2).map(\u0026:strip)\n  new_path = path.sub(/\\A#{internal}/i, external)\n  return new_path unless path == new_path\nend\n```\n\nHere, `internal` comes from the `HTTP_X_ACCEL_MAPPING` request header and is inserted directly into a regular expression without escaping. This gives the header value regex semantics rather than treating it as a literal prefix.\n\nAs a result, an attacker can supply metacharacters such as `.*` or capture groups to alter how the path substitution is performed. For example, a mapping such as:\n\n```http\nX-Accel-Mapping: .*=/protected/secret.txt\n```\n\ncauses the entire source path to match and rewrites the redirect target to a clean attacker-chosen internal path.\n\nThis differs from the documented behavior of the header-based mapping path, which is described as a simple substitution. While application-supplied mappings may intentionally support regular expressions, header-supplied mappings should be treated as literal path prefixes.\n\nThe issue is only exploitable when untrusted `X-Accel-Mapping` headers can reach Rack. One realistic case is a reverse proxy configuration that intends to set `X-Accel-Mapping` itself, but fails to do so on some routes, allowing a client-supplied header to pass through unchanged.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications using `Rack::Sendfile` with `x-accel-redirect` may be affected if the backend accepts attacker-controlled `X-Accel-Mapping` headers.\n\nIn affected deployments, an attacker may be able to control the `X-Accel-Redirect` response header and cause nginx to serve files from internal locations that were not intended to be reachable through the application. This can lead to unauthorized file disclosure.\n\nThe practical impact depends on deployment architecture. If the proxy always strips or overwrites `X-Accel-Mapping`, or if the application uses explicit configured mappings instead of the request header, exploitability may be eliminated.\n\n## Mitigation\n\n* Update to a patched version of Rack that treats header-supplied `X-Accel-Mapping` values as literal strings rather than regular expressions.\n* Strip or overwrite inbound `X-Accel-Mapping` headers at the reverse proxy so client-supplied values never reach Rack.\n* Prefer explicit application-configured sendfile mappings instead of relying on request-header mappings.\n* Review proxy sub-locations and inherited header settings to ensure `X-Accel-Mapping` is consistently set on all backend routes.",
  "id": "GHSA-qv7j-4883-hwh7",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T16:18:57Z",
  "published": "2026-04-02T20:35:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-qv7j-4883-hwh7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34830"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rack/rack"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/rack/CVE-2026-34830.yml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Rack::Sendfile header-based X-Accel-Mapping regex injection enables unauthorized X-Accel-Redirect"
}

GHSA-R7HQ-Q2XM-6C5M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-12 23:21 – Updated: 2026-11-12 23:21
VLAI
Summary
@grpc/grpc-js: safe_regex incorrectly applies partial string matching for patterns with alternation
Details

Summary

The StringMatcher/PathMatcher for safe_regex builds its RE2 as ^${regex}$ with no surrounding group. Because alternation has the lowest precedence, a pattern "a|b|c" compiles to /^a|b|c$/ -- "starts with a" OR "contains b" OR "ends with c" instead of a full match of the whole value. Configurations with safe_regex matchers that use a regex alternation (a natural way to list methods or service identities) therefore apply partial string matches. This impacts route selection, xDS credentials, and RBAC.

Details

src/matcher.ts: SafeRegexValueMatcher and PathSafeRegexValueMatcher both do

this.targetRegexImpl = new RE2(`^${targetRegex}$`, 'u');

and apply() returns targetRegexImpl.test(value). With a top-level alternation the anchors bind only to the first/last branch.

https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/e742b11bd8039f3dbea4cd29afdf5d95a8ba6b92/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/matcher.ts#L59

https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/e742b11bd8039f3dbea4cd29afdf5d95a8ba6b92/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/matcher.ts#L232

src/route.ts (getPredicateForStringMatcher / getPredicateForHeaderMatcher) builds these for every safe_regex StringMatcher/HeaderMatcher, and src/rbac.ts uses them for RBAC url_path permissions/principals, authenticated.principal_name (mTLS SAN/CN), requested_server_name and header rules. So an ALLOW rule written with an alternation grants access to method names, certificate identities or header values that extend an intended one. DENY policies only become broader (fail-safe).

https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/e742b11bd8039f3dbea4cd29afdf5d95a8ba6b92/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/route.ts#L28

https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/e742b11bd8039f3dbea4cd29afdf5d95a8ba6b92/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/route.ts#L47

Proof of concept

In a scratch directory:

npm init -y
npm i @grpc/grpc-js-xds@1.14.1 @grpc/grpc-js
node poc.cjs

poc.cjs calls the exported RBAC engine directly (the functions grpc-js uses to make the authorization decision); no server or network:

const { parseConfig } = require('@grpc/grpc-js-xds/build/src/rbac.js')
const { SafeRegexValueMatcher } = require('@grpc/grpc-js-xds/build/src/matcher.js')
const { Metadata } = require('@grpc/grpc-js')

console.log(new SafeRegexValueMatcher('admin|editor').toString()) // SafeRegex(/^admin|editor$/u)

const sr = regex => ({ match_pattern: 'safe_regex', safe_regex: { regex } })
const info = urlPath => ({ urlPath, headers: new Metadata(), tls: true, peerCertificate: null,
  destinationIp: '10.0.0.1', destinationPort: 443, sourceIp: '10.0.0.2' })
const g = parseConfig({ action: 'ALLOW', policies: { p: {
  permissions: [{ rule: 'url_path', url_path: { path: sr('/acme.Users/GetUser|/acme.Users/ListUsers') } }],
  principals: [{ identifier: 'any', any: true }] } } })

console.log('GetUser       ', g.apply(info('/acme.Users/GetUser')))       // true  (intended)
console.log('DeleteUser    ', g.apply(info('/acme.Users/DeleteUser')))    // false (control)
console.log('GetUserSecrets', g.apply(info('/acme.Users/GetUserSecrets'))) // true <-- BYPASS

Observed (grpc-js-xds 1.14.1, grpc-js 1.14.6):

matcher "admin|editor" -> SafeRegex(/^admin|editor$/u);
    apply("administrator")=true, apply("not-an-editor")=true
ALLOW url_path /acme.Users/GetUser|/acme.Users/ListUsers:
    /acme.Users/GetUser         -> ALLOWED (intended)
    /acme.Users/DeleteUser      -> denied  (control)
    /acme.Users/GetUserSecrets  -> ALLOWED <-- bypass (policy intends deny)
control, same regex as (?:...|...): /acme.Users/GetUserSecrets -> denied
ALLOW authenticated principal_name spiffe://prod/ns/web/sa/frontend|...ops/sa/admin:
    spiffe://prod/ns/web/sa/frontend-batch -> ALLOWED <-- bypass

Impact

Users of @grpc/grpc-js-xds who are using safe_regex matchers with alternation for route selection, xDS credentials SAN matchers, or RBAC rules may see incorrectly permissive behavior.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@grpc/grpc-js-xds"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.14.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.14.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@grpc/grpc-js-xds"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.13.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-126367"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-625",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-12T23:21:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe StringMatcher/PathMatcher for `safe_regex` builds its RE2 as `^${regex}$` with no surrounding group. Because alternation has the lowest precedence, a pattern `\"a|b|c\"` compiles to `/^a|b|c$/` -- \"starts with a\" OR \"contains b\" OR \"ends with c\" instead of a full match of the whole value. Configurations with `safe_regex` matchers that use a regex alternation (a natural way to list methods or service identities) therefore apply partial string matches. This impacts route selection, xDS credentials, and RBAC.\n\n### Details\n\n`src/matcher.ts`: `SafeRegexValueMatcher` and `PathSafeRegexValueMatcher` both do\n```ts\nthis.targetRegexImpl = new RE2(`^${targetRegex}$`, \u0027u\u0027);\n```\n\nand `apply()` returns `targetRegexImpl.test(value)`. With a top-level alternation the anchors bind only to the first/last branch.\n\nhttps://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/e742b11bd8039f3dbea4cd29afdf5d95a8ba6b92/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/matcher.ts#L59\n\nhttps://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/e742b11bd8039f3dbea4cd29afdf5d95a8ba6b92/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/matcher.ts#L232\n\n`src/route.ts` (`getPredicateForStringMatcher` / `getPredicateForHeaderMatcher`) builds these for every `safe_regex` `StringMatcher`/`HeaderMatcher`, and src/rbac.ts uses them for RBAC `url_path` `permissions`/`principals`, `authenticated.principal_name` (mTLS SAN/CN), `requested_server_name` and `header rules`. So an ALLOW rule written with an alternation grants access to method names, certificate identities or header values that extend an intended one. DENY policies only become broader (fail-safe).\n\nhttps://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/e742b11bd8039f3dbea4cd29afdf5d95a8ba6b92/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/route.ts#L28\n\nhttps://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/e742b11bd8039f3dbea4cd29afdf5d95a8ba6b92/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/route.ts#L47\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nIn a scratch directory:\n\n```\nnpm init -y\nnpm i @grpc/grpc-js-xds@1.14.1 @grpc/grpc-js\nnode poc.cjs\n```\n\n`poc.cjs` calls the exported RBAC engine directly (the functions grpc-js uses to make the authorization decision); no server or network:\n\n```js\nconst { parseConfig } = require(\u0027@grpc/grpc-js-xds/build/src/rbac.js\u0027)\nconst { SafeRegexValueMatcher } = require(\u0027@grpc/grpc-js-xds/build/src/matcher.js\u0027)\nconst { Metadata } = require(\u0027@grpc/grpc-js\u0027)\n\nconsole.log(new SafeRegexValueMatcher(\u0027admin|editor\u0027).toString()) // SafeRegex(/^admin|editor$/u)\n\nconst sr = regex =\u003e ({ match_pattern: \u0027safe_regex\u0027, safe_regex: { regex } })\nconst info = urlPath =\u003e ({ urlPath, headers: new Metadata(), tls: true, peerCertificate: null,\n  destinationIp: \u002710.0.0.1\u0027, destinationPort: 443, sourceIp: \u002710.0.0.2\u0027 })\nconst g = parseConfig({ action: \u0027ALLOW\u0027, policies: { p: {\n  permissions: [{ rule: \u0027url_path\u0027, url_path: { path: sr(\u0027/acme.Users/GetUser|/acme.Users/ListUsers\u0027) } }],\n  principals: [{ identifier: \u0027any\u0027, any: true }] } } })\n\nconsole.log(\u0027GetUser       \u0027, g.apply(info(\u0027/acme.Users/GetUser\u0027)))       // true  (intended)\nconsole.log(\u0027DeleteUser    \u0027, g.apply(info(\u0027/acme.Users/DeleteUser\u0027)))    // false (control)\nconsole.log(\u0027GetUserSecrets\u0027, g.apply(info(\u0027/acme.Users/GetUserSecrets\u0027))) // true \u003c-- BYPASS\n```\n\nObserved (grpc-js-xds 1.14.1, grpc-js 1.14.6):\n\n```\nmatcher \"admin|editor\" -\u003e SafeRegex(/^admin|editor$/u);\n    apply(\"administrator\")=true, apply(\"not-an-editor\")=true\nALLOW url_path /acme.Users/GetUser|/acme.Users/ListUsers:\n    /acme.Users/GetUser         -\u003e ALLOWED (intended)\n    /acme.Users/DeleteUser      -\u003e denied  (control)\n    /acme.Users/GetUserSecrets  -\u003e ALLOWED \u003c-- bypass (policy intends deny)\ncontrol, same regex as (?:...|...): /acme.Users/GetUserSecrets -\u003e denied\nALLOW authenticated principal_name spiffe://prod/ns/web/sa/frontend|...ops/sa/admin:\n    spiffe://prod/ns/web/sa/frontend-batch -\u003e ALLOWED \u003c-- bypass\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nUsers of `@grpc/grpc-js-xds` who are using `safe_regex` matchers with alternation for route selection, xDS credentials SAN matchers, or RBAC rules may see incorrectly permissive behavior.",
  "id": "GHSA-r7hq-q2xm-6c5m",
  "modified": "2026-11-12T23:21:57Z",
  "published": "2026-11-12T23:21:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/security/advisories/GHSA-r7hq-q2xm-6c5m"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/commit/3fc3b0ebf7a89d64843a73679951142d33b40cb1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/commit/57a67e96babcb29b6eabc1833221ccf2fa152d43"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/releases/tag/@grpc/grpc-js-xds@1.13.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/releases/tag/@grpc/grpc-js-xds@1.14.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@grpc/grpc-js: safe_regex incorrectly applies partial string matching for patterns with alternation"
}

Mitigation
Implementation

When applicable, ensure that the regular expression marks beginning and ending string patterns, such as "/^string$/" for Perl.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.