CWE-400
DiscouragedUncontrolled Resource Consumption
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
6465 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-Q5J5-6P94-4GWC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-10 15:09 – Updated: 2026-09-10 15:09Streaming GetRows row-bound bypass causes attacker-controlled allocation
Summary
Excelize's prior row-bound fix for GHSA-h69g / CVE-2026-54063 protects the checked worksheet parser, but the streaming worksheet reader used by Rows and GetRows does not enforce the same TotalRows bound on the row r attribute. A small XLSX file can set a row number above Excelize's maximum row (1048576) and omit the cell coordinate. GetRows then appends empty rows up to the attacker-controlled row index and returns success.
This was reproduced on the current default branch commit 1213a8bd7c5ab360554603ac5c995ccaf6eb4314 and the latest release tag v2.10.1 (5ad5ab3af0054c55bdce09f1530085600e9f2e45).
Affected package
- Package:
github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 - Tested affected versions: current default branch at
1213a8bd7c5ab360554603ac5c995ccaf6eb4314, and releasev2.10.1 - Fixed version: none known at the time of this report
Impact
An attacker who can provide an XLSX file to an application that calls GetRows can cause memory and CPU usage to scale with an attacker-controlled row number, even though the file itself is tiny. This is an availability issue and appears to be an incomplete coverage variant of the GHSA-h69g row-index allocation class.
In the conservative PoC, row r="2000000" returned a [][]string with length 2,000,000 and allocated about 46 MB. Larger row numbers scale the allocation further.
Root cause
The checked parser path validates row numbers:
excelize.go:checkRowNum(r int)rejects negative rows and rows greater thanTotalRows.excelize.go:checkSheet()callscheckRowNum(r.R)before allocating sheet rows.workSheetReader()invokescheckSheet()/checkRow()before returning a cached worksheet.
The streaming path does not use that checked parser:
rows.go:Rows(sheet)opens an XML decoder directly.Rows.Next()accepts the rowrattribute and assigns it to the iterator's current row without applyingcheckRowNum().Rows.Columns()also assigns rowrto the iterator state without applyingcheckRowNum().GetRows()appends empty row slices for the gap between the previous row and the current row.
Because a cell without an r coordinate can still contain a value, the worksheet can avoid cell-coordinate row validation while still causing GetRows() to materialize rows up to the out-of-range row number.
Minimal worksheet payload
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<worksheet xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main">
<sheetData>
<row r="2000000"><c t="s"><v>0</v></c></row>
</sheetData>
</worksheet>
The workbook also contains a normal sharedStrings.xml with one string (ok).
Reproduction
A minimal Go harness creates the XLSX in memory and calls GetRows("Sheet1"):
rows, err := f.GetRows("Sheet1")
fmt.Println("rows_len:", len(rows))
if len(rows) > 0 {
fmt.Println("last_row:", rows[len(rows)-1])
}
fmt.Printf("returned error: %T %v\n", err, err)
Observed output on current default branch commit 1213a8bd7c5ab360554603ac5c995ccaf6eb4314:
== streaming GetRows row r=2000000 cell without r ==
rows_len: 2000000
last_row: [ok]
returned error: <nil> <nil>
elapsed=21ms alloc_delta=46MB
Observed output on latest release tag v2.10.1:
== streaming GetRows row r=2000000 cell without r ==
rows_len: 2000000
last_row: [ok]
returned error: <nil> <nil>
elapsed=14ms alloc_delta=46MB
A control using the checked parser with row r="1048577" and c r="A1048577" correctly returns row number exceeds maximum limit, confirming this report is about inconsistent enforcement in the streaming path rather than a missing global constant.
Expected behavior
Rows / GetRows should reject row numbers greater than TotalRows with the same error behavior as the checked parser path.
Suggested remediation
- Apply the same row-bound validation in the streaming reader immediately after parsing a row
rattribute. - Preserve and return row parsing errors from
GetRows()instead of silently continuing or returning onlyRows.Close()errors. - Add regression tests for
GetRows()on a worksheet containingrow r="1048577"with a cell value but no cellrcoordinate.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/xuri/excelize/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/xuri/excelize"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59161"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-10T15:09:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T17:17:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Streaming GetRows row-bound bypass causes attacker-controlled allocation\n\n## Summary\n\nExcelize\u0027s prior row-bound fix for GHSA-h69g / CVE-2026-54063 protects the checked worksheet parser, but the streaming worksheet reader used by `Rows` and `GetRows` does not enforce the same `TotalRows` bound on the row `r` attribute. A small XLSX file can set a row number above Excelize\u0027s maximum row (`1048576`) and omit the cell coordinate. `GetRows` then appends empty rows up to the attacker-controlled row index and returns success.\n\nThis was reproduced on the current default branch commit `1213a8bd7c5ab360554603ac5c995ccaf6eb4314` and the latest release tag `v2.10.1` (`5ad5ab3af0054c55bdce09f1530085600e9f2e45`).\n\n## Affected package\n\n- Package: `github.com/xuri/excelize/v2`\n- Tested affected versions: current default branch at `1213a8bd7c5ab360554603ac5c995ccaf6eb4314`, and release `v2.10.1`\n- Fixed version: none known at the time of this report\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can provide an XLSX file to an application that calls `GetRows` can cause memory and CPU usage to scale with an attacker-controlled row number, even though the file itself is tiny. This is an availability issue and appears to be an incomplete coverage variant of the GHSA-h69g row-index allocation class.\n\nIn the conservative PoC, `row r=\"2000000\"` returned a `[][]string` with length 2,000,000 and allocated about 46 MB. Larger row numbers scale the allocation further.\n\n## Root cause\n\nThe checked parser path validates row numbers:\n\n- `excelize.go`: `checkRowNum(r int)` rejects negative rows and rows greater than `TotalRows`.\n- `excelize.go`: `checkSheet()` calls `checkRowNum(r.R)` before allocating sheet rows.\n- `workSheetReader()` invokes `checkSheet()` / `checkRow()` before returning a cached worksheet.\n\nThe streaming path does not use that checked parser:\n\n- `rows.go`: `Rows(sheet)` opens an XML decoder directly.\n- `Rows.Next()` accepts the row `r` attribute and assigns it to the iterator\u0027s current row without applying `checkRowNum()`.\n- `Rows.Columns()` also assigns row `r` to the iterator state without applying `checkRowNum()`.\n- `GetRows()` appends empty row slices for the gap between the previous row and the current row.\n\nBecause a cell without an `r` coordinate can still contain a value, the worksheet can avoid cell-coordinate row validation while still causing `GetRows()` to materialize rows up to the out-of-range row number.\n\n## Minimal worksheet payload\n\n```xml\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?\u003e\n\u003cworksheet xmlns=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main\"\u003e\n \u003csheetData\u003e\n \u003crow r=\"2000000\"\u003e\u003cc t=\"s\"\u003e\u003cv\u003e0\u003c/v\u003e\u003c/c\u003e\u003c/row\u003e\n \u003c/sheetData\u003e\n\u003c/worksheet\u003e\n```\n\nThe workbook also contains a normal `sharedStrings.xml` with one string (`ok`).\n\n## Reproduction\n\nA minimal Go harness creates the XLSX in memory and calls `GetRows(\"Sheet1\")`:\n\n```go\nrows, err := f.GetRows(\"Sheet1\")\nfmt.Println(\"rows_len:\", len(rows))\nif len(rows) \u003e 0 {\n fmt.Println(\"last_row:\", rows[len(rows)-1])\n}\nfmt.Printf(\"returned error: %T %v\\n\", err, err)\n```\n\nObserved output on current default branch commit `1213a8bd7c5ab360554603ac5c995ccaf6eb4314`:\n\n```text\n== streaming GetRows row r=2000000 cell without r ==\nrows_len: 2000000\nlast_row: [ok]\nreturned error: \u003cnil\u003e \u003cnil\u003e\nelapsed=21ms alloc_delta=46MB\n```\n\nObserved output on latest release tag `v2.10.1`:\n\n```text\n== streaming GetRows row r=2000000 cell without r ==\nrows_len: 2000000\nlast_row: [ok]\nreturned error: \u003cnil\u003e \u003cnil\u003e\nelapsed=14ms alloc_delta=46MB\n```\n\nA control using the checked parser with `row r=\"1048577\"` and `c r=\"A1048577\"` correctly returns `row number exceeds maximum limit`, confirming this report is about inconsistent enforcement in the streaming path rather than a missing global constant.\n\n## Expected behavior\n\n`Rows` / `GetRows` should reject row numbers greater than `TotalRows` with the same error behavior as the checked parser path.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\n- Apply the same row-bound validation in the streaming reader immediately after parsing a row `r` attribute.\n- Preserve and return row parsing errors from `GetRows()` instead of silently continuing or returning only `Rows.Close()` errors.\n- Add regression tests for `GetRows()` on a worksheet containing `row r=\"1048577\"` with a cell value but no cell `r` coordinate.",
"id": "GHSA-q5j5-6p94-4gwc",
"modified": "2026-09-10T15:09:09Z",
"published": "2026-09-10T15:09:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/security/advisories/GHSA-q5j5-6p94-4gwc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59161"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/pull/2331"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/commit/93f0b3caed37f21ef5079e3259c6c21dcfe68453"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/qax-os/excelize"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qax-os/excelize/releases/tag/v2.11.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Excelize: Streaming GetRows row-bound bypass causes attacker-controlled allocation"
}
GHSA-Q5J8-8QF2-XPQ9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-26 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-27 21:31An issue in Vanderbilt Industries, Acre Security SPC5300.000 Main Board v.3.14.1 allows a physically proximate attacker to cause a denial of service via Spoofed SYN packets.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-61478"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-26T21:16:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue in Vanderbilt Industries, Acre Security SPC5300.000 Main Board v.3.14.1 allows a physically proximate attacker to cause a denial of service via Spoofed SYN packets.",
"id": "GHSA-q5j8-8qf2-xpq9",
"modified": "2026-08-27T21:31:25Z",
"published": "2026-08-26T21:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61478"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nva.sikt.no/registration/019c9145712a-8c458dda-4473-488c-9a20-b9e8938f24d5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q5MW-FJRJ-6QMH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-10 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-10 21:31Consul and Consul Enterprise are vulnerable to a denial of service in the native RPC listener that may allow an authenticated client to exhaust server memory before ACL authorization is evaluated. A client that can complete the internal RPC mTLS handshake may exploit this issue without holding a valid ACL token. This vulnerability (CVE-2026-87106) is fixed in Consul 2.0.4 and Consul Enterprise 1.21.18, 1.22.12 and 2.0.4.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-87106"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-10T19:17:37Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Consul and Consul Enterprise are vulnerable to a denial of service in the native RPC listener that may allow an authenticated client to exhaust server memory before ACL authorization is evaluated. A client that can complete the internal RPC mTLS handshake may exploit this issue without holding a valid ACL token. This vulnerability (CVE-2026-87106) is fixed in Consul 2.0.4 and Consul Enterprise 1.21.18, 1.22.12 and 2.0.4.",
"id": "GHSA-q5mw-fjrj-6qmh",
"modified": "2026-09-10T21:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-09-10T21:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87106"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://discuss.hashicorp.com/t/hcsec-2026-35-consul-vulnerable-to-a-denial-of-service-in-the-native-rpc-listener/77737"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q5PR-72PQ-83V3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-23 21:44 – Updated: 2026-09-30 23:46Summary
The setChunkedCookie() and deleteChunkedCookie() functions in h3 trust the chunk count parsed from a user-controlled cookie value (__chunked__N) without any upper bound validation. An unauthenticated attacker can send a single request with a crafted cookie header (e.g., Cookie: h3=__chunked__999999) to any endpoint using sessions, causing the server to enter an O(n²) loop that hangs the process.
Details
The chunked cookie system stores large cookie values by splitting them into numbered chunks. The main cookie stores a sentinel value __chunked__N indicating how many chunks exist. When setting a new chunked cookie, the code cleans up any previous chunks that are no longer needed.
The vulnerability is in getChunkedCookieCount() at src/utils/cookie.ts:244-249:
function getChunkedCookieCount(cookie: string | undefined): number {
if (!cookie?.startsWith(CHUNKED_COOKIE)) {
return Number.NaN;
}
return Number.parseInt(cookie.slice(CHUNKED_COOKIE.length));
// No upper bound check — attacker controls this value
}
This value is consumed without validation in the cleanup loop of setChunkedCookie() at src/utils/cookie.ts:182-190:
const previousCookie = getCookie(event, name); // reads from request headers
if (previousCookie?.startsWith(CHUNKED_COOKIE)) {
const previousChunkCount = getChunkedCookieCount(previousCookie);
if (previousChunkCount > chunkCount) {
for (let i = chunkCount; i <= previousChunkCount; i++) {
deleteCookie(event, chunkCookieName(name, i), options);
// Each deleteCookie → setCookie → scans ALL existing set-cookie headers
}
}
}
The same issue exists in deleteChunkedCookie() at src/utils/cookie.ts:227-232:
const chunksCount = getChunkedCookieCount(mainCookie);
if (chunksCount >= 0) {
for (let i = 0; i < chunksCount; i++) {
deleteCookie(event, chunkCookieName(name, i + 1), serializeOptions);
}
}
The exploit chain through sessions:
- Attacker sends
Cookie: h3=__chunked__999999to any session-using endpoint getSession()(src/utils/session.ts:83) callsgetChunkedCookie(event, "h3")(line 124)getChunkedCookie()returnsundefined— the early return at line 153 fires because no actual chunk cookies (e.g.,h3.1) exist in the request- Since
sealedSessionis undefined,session.idremains empty (line 140), triggeringupdateSession()(line 143) updateSession()callssetChunkedCookie()with the newly sealed session value (line 179)- Inside
setChunkedCookie(),getCookie(event, name)re-reads the original request cookie__chunked__999999at line 182 previousChunkCount= 999999,chunkCount= 1 (new sealed session is small)- The cleanup loop runs 999,998 iterations, each calling
deleteCookie()→setCookie() - Each
setCookie()call reads ALL existingset-cookieresponse headers viagetSetCookie()(line 91) and iterates through them for deduplication (lines 100-106) - This creates O(n²) complexity — approximately 10¹² operations for n=999999
Key observation: While getChunkedCookie() has an early-return optimization (line 153) that prevents it from looping on missing chunks, the cleanup loops in setChunkedCookie() and deleteChunkedCookie() have no such protection and run unconditionally for the full claimed chunk count.
PoC
Prerequisites: An h3 application with any endpoint using getSession() or useSession().
Example minimal server:
import { H3 } from "h3";
import { getSession } from "h3";
const app = new H3();
app.get("/dashboard", async (event) => {
const session = await getSession(event, {
password: "my-secret-password-at-least-32-chars-long!",
});
return { user: session.data.user || "anonymous" };
});
export default app;
Attack (single request, no authentication):
# This single request will hang the server process
curl -H 'Cookie: h3=__chunked__999999' http://localhost:3000/dashboard
For a less extreme but still impactful test:
# ~100K iterations — will take several seconds and block all other requests
curl -H 'Cookie: h3=__chunked__100000' http://localhost:3000/dashboard
The deleteChunkedCookie() path is exploitable via clearSession():
app.post("/logout", async (event) => {
await clearSession(event, {
password: "my-secret-password-at-least-32-chars-long!",
});
return { ok: true };
});
curl -X POST -H 'Cookie: h3=__chunked__999999' http://localhost:3000/logout
Impact
- Complete Denial of Service: A single unauthenticated request with a 27-byte cookie header can hang the server process indefinitely. Node.js is single-threaded, so this blocks all request handling.
- No authentication required: The attack only requires the ability to send HTTP requests with a crafted cookie header.
- Minimal attacker effort: The payload is trivially small (
Cookie: h3=__chunked__999999), making it easy to automate or repeat. - Wide attack surface: Any endpoint in the application that uses
getSession(),useSession(), orclearSession()is vulnerable. Session usage is extremely common in web applications. - Amplification: The ratio of attacker input (27 bytes) to server work (billions of operations) is extreme.
Recommended Fix
Add a maximum chunk count constant and validate in getChunkedCookieCount():
const MAX_CHUNKED_COOKIE_COUNT = 100;
function getChunkedCookieCount(cookie: string | undefined): number {
if (!cookie?.startsWith(CHUNKED_COOKIE)) {
return Number.NaN;
}
const count = Number.parseInt(cookie.slice(CHUNKED_COOKIE.length));
if (Number.isNaN(count) || count < 0 || count > MAX_CHUNKED_COOKIE_COUNT) {
return Number.NaN;
}
return count;
}
This clamps the parsed count at a safe maximum. Since each chunk can hold ~4000 bytes and 100 chunks would allow ~400KB of cookie data (far beyond any practical limit), MAX_CHUNKED_COOKIE_COUNT = 100 is generous while eliminating the DoS vector.
Additionally, the callers should be updated to handle NaN safely. The cleanup loop in setChunkedCookie() already handles this correctly since NaN > chunkCount is false, so the loop won't execute. The deleteChunkedCookie() loop also handles it since NaN >= 0 is false.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "h3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0-beta.4"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.1-rc.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-86250"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-23T21:44:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `setChunkedCookie()` and `deleteChunkedCookie()` functions in h3 trust the chunk count parsed from a user-controlled cookie value (`__chunked__N`) without any upper bound validation. An unauthenticated attacker can send a single request with a crafted cookie header (e.g., `Cookie: h3=__chunked__999999`) to any endpoint using sessions, causing the server to enter an O(n\u00b2) loop that hangs the process.\n\n## Details\n\nThe chunked cookie system stores large cookie values by splitting them into numbered chunks. The main cookie stores a sentinel value `__chunked__N` indicating how many chunks exist. When setting a new chunked cookie, the code cleans up any previous chunks that are no longer needed.\n\nThe vulnerability is in `getChunkedCookieCount()` at `src/utils/cookie.ts:244-249`:\n\n```typescript\nfunction getChunkedCookieCount(cookie: string | undefined): number {\n if (!cookie?.startsWith(CHUNKED_COOKIE)) {\n return Number.NaN;\n }\n return Number.parseInt(cookie.slice(CHUNKED_COOKIE.length));\n // No upper bound check \u2014 attacker controls this value\n}\n```\n\nThis value is consumed without validation in the cleanup loop of `setChunkedCookie()` at `src/utils/cookie.ts:182-190`:\n\n```typescript\nconst previousCookie = getCookie(event, name); // reads from request headers\nif (previousCookie?.startsWith(CHUNKED_COOKIE)) {\n const previousChunkCount = getChunkedCookieCount(previousCookie);\n if (previousChunkCount \u003e chunkCount) {\n for (let i = chunkCount; i \u003c= previousChunkCount; i++) {\n deleteCookie(event, chunkCookieName(name, i), options);\n // Each deleteCookie \u2192 setCookie \u2192 scans ALL existing set-cookie headers\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe same issue exists in `deleteChunkedCookie()` at `src/utils/cookie.ts:227-232`:\n\n```typescript\nconst chunksCount = getChunkedCookieCount(mainCookie);\nif (chunksCount \u003e= 0) {\n for (let i = 0; i \u003c chunksCount; i++) {\n deleteCookie(event, chunkCookieName(name, i + 1), serializeOptions);\n }\n}\n```\n\n**The exploit chain through sessions:**\n\n1. Attacker sends `Cookie: h3=__chunked__999999` to any session-using endpoint\n2. `getSession()` (`src/utils/session.ts:83`) calls `getChunkedCookie(event, \"h3\")` (line 124)\n3. `getChunkedCookie()` returns `undefined` \u2014 the early return at line 153 fires because no actual chunk cookies (e.g., `h3.1`) exist in the request\n4. Since `sealedSession` is undefined, `session.id` remains empty (line 140), triggering `updateSession()` (line 143)\n5. `updateSession()` calls `setChunkedCookie()` with the newly sealed session value (line 179)\n6. Inside `setChunkedCookie()`, `getCookie(event, name)` re-reads the original request cookie `__chunked__999999` at line 182\n7. `previousChunkCount` = 999999, `chunkCount` = 1 (new sealed session is small)\n8. The cleanup loop runs 999,998 iterations, each calling `deleteCookie()` \u2192 `setCookie()`\n9. Each `setCookie()` call reads ALL existing `set-cookie` response headers via `getSetCookie()` (line 91) and iterates through them for deduplication (lines 100-106)\n10. This creates O(n\u00b2) complexity \u2014 approximately 10\u00b9\u00b2 operations for n=999999\n\n**Key observation:** While `getChunkedCookie()` has an early-return optimization (line 153) that prevents it from looping on missing chunks, the cleanup loops in `setChunkedCookie()` and `deleteChunkedCookie()` have no such protection and run unconditionally for the full claimed chunk count.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** An h3 application with any endpoint using `getSession()` or `useSession()`.\n\nExample minimal server:\n\n```typescript\nimport { H3 } from \"h3\";\nimport { getSession } from \"h3\";\n\nconst app = new H3();\n\napp.get(\"/dashboard\", async (event) =\u003e {\n const session = await getSession(event, {\n password: \"my-secret-password-at-least-32-chars-long!\",\n });\n return { user: session.data.user || \"anonymous\" };\n});\n\nexport default app;\n```\n\n**Attack (single request, no authentication):**\n\n```bash\n# This single request will hang the server process\ncurl -H \u0027Cookie: h3=__chunked__999999\u0027 http://localhost:3000/dashboard\n```\n\nFor a less extreme but still impactful test:\n\n```bash\n# ~100K iterations \u2014 will take several seconds and block all other requests\ncurl -H \u0027Cookie: h3=__chunked__100000\u0027 http://localhost:3000/dashboard\n```\n\nThe `deleteChunkedCookie()` path is exploitable via `clearSession()`:\n\n```typescript\napp.post(\"/logout\", async (event) =\u003e {\n await clearSession(event, {\n password: \"my-secret-password-at-least-32-chars-long!\",\n });\n return { ok: true };\n});\n```\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST -H \u0027Cookie: h3=__chunked__999999\u0027 http://localhost:3000/logout\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Complete Denial of Service**: A single unauthenticated request with a 27-byte cookie header can hang the server process indefinitely. Node.js is single-threaded, so this blocks all request handling.\n- **No authentication required**: The attack only requires the ability to send HTTP requests with a crafted cookie header.\n- **Minimal attacker effort**: The payload is trivially small (`Cookie: h3=__chunked__999999`), making it easy to automate or repeat.\n- **Wide attack surface**: Any endpoint in the application that uses `getSession()`, `useSession()`, or `clearSession()` is vulnerable. Session usage is extremely common in web applications.\n- **Amplification**: The ratio of attacker input (27 bytes) to server work (billions of operations) is extreme.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd a maximum chunk count constant and validate in `getChunkedCookieCount()`:\n\n```typescript\nconst MAX_CHUNKED_COOKIE_COUNT = 100;\n\nfunction getChunkedCookieCount(cookie: string | undefined): number {\n if (!cookie?.startsWith(CHUNKED_COOKIE)) {\n return Number.NaN;\n }\n const count = Number.parseInt(cookie.slice(CHUNKED_COOKIE.length));\n if (Number.isNaN(count) || count \u003c 0 || count \u003e MAX_CHUNKED_COOKIE_COUNT) {\n return Number.NaN;\n }\n return count;\n}\n```\n\nThis clamps the parsed count at a safe maximum. Since each chunk can hold ~4000 bytes and 100 chunks would allow ~400KB of cookie data (far beyond any practical limit), `MAX_CHUNKED_COOKIE_COUNT = 100` is generous while eliminating the DoS vector.\n\nAdditionally, the callers should be updated to handle `NaN` safely. The cleanup loop in `setChunkedCookie()` already handles this correctly since `NaN \u003e chunkCount` is false, so the loop won\u0027t execute. The `deleteChunkedCookie()` loop also handles it since `NaN \u003e= 0` is false.",
"id": "GHSA-q5pr-72pq-83v3",
"modified": "2026-09-30T23:46:51Z",
"published": "2026-03-23T21:44:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/h3js/h3/security/advisories/GHSA-q5pr-72pq-83v3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86250"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/h3js/h3/commit/399257cb406fbeda313d88c1e288a15124fc82af"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/h3js/h3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/h3js/h3/releases/tag/v2.0.1-rc.18"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/h3-before-2.0.1-rc.18-denial-of-service-via-unbounded-chunked-cookie"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "H3: Unbounded Chunked Cookie Count in Session Cleanup Loop may Lead to Denial of Service"
}
GHSA-Q5QX-CVHV-QFQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-18 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:13The Rockwell Automation Kinetix 5700 DC Bus Power Supply Series A is vulnerable to CIP fuzzing. The new ENIP connections cannot be established if impacted by this vulnerability, which prohibits operational capabilities of the device resulting in a denial-of-service attack.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-2263"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-18T16:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "\nThe Rockwell Automation Kinetix 5700 DC Bus Power Supply Series A is vulnerable to CIP fuzzing. \u00a0The new ENIP connections cannot be established if impacted by this vulnerability, \u00a0which prohibits operational capabilities of the device resulting in a denial-of-service attack.\n\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-q5qx-cvhv-qfq2",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:13:52Z",
"published": "2023-07-18T18:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-2263"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rockwellautomation.custhelp.com/app/answers/answer_view/a_id/1140029"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q5QX-VC88-69HW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-16 15:30 – Updated: 2026-08-16 15:30Scriban before 7.0.0 contains three distinct denial-of-service vulnerabilities in expression evaluation that bypass existing safety controls through unbounded string multiplication, uncontrolled BigInteger shift operations, and LoopLimit bypass via range enumeration in builtin functions. Attackers who can supply templates can cause out-of-memory exceptions or CPU exhaustion, typically terminating the entire host process.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-74785"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-16T14:16:56Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Scriban before 7.0.0 contains three distinct denial-of-service vulnerabilities in expression evaluation that bypass existing safety controls through unbounded string multiplication, uncontrolled BigInteger shift operations, and LoopLimit bypass via range enumeration in builtin functions. Attackers who can supply templates can cause out-of-memory exceptions or CPU exhaustion, typically terminating the entire host process.",
"id": "GHSA-q5qx-vc88-69hw",
"modified": "2026-08-16T15:30:26Z",
"published": "2026-08-16T15:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/scriban/scriban/security/advisories/GHSA-xw6w-9jjh-p9cr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74785"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/scriban-before-denial-of-service-via-unbounded-resource-consumption"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q5R6-9QWQ-G2WJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-09 22:15 – Updated: 2025-10-09 22:15Summary
Amazon.IonDotnet is a library for the Dotnet language that is used to read and write Amazon Ion data. An issue exists where, under certain circumstances, the library could an infinite loop, resulting in denial of service. As of August 20, 2025, this library has been deprecated and will not receive further updates.
Impact
An infinite loop issue in Amazon.IonDotnet library versions <v1.3.2 may allow a threat actor to cause a denial of service through a specially crafted text input. This invalid input triggered an error condition in the parser that was handled improperly, resulting in an infinite loop.
Impacted versions:
<1.3.2
Patches
This issue has been addressed in Amazon.IonDotnet version 1.3.2. We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.
Workarounds
Only accept data from trusted sources, written using a supported Ion library.
References
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, we ask that you contact AWS Security via our vulnerability reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Amazon.IonDotnet"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-11573"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1286",
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-09T22:15:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-09T18:15:49Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAmazon.IonDotnet is a library for the Dotnet language that is used to read and write Amazon Ion data. An issue exists where, under certain circumstances, the library could an infinite loop, resulting in denial of service. As of August 20, 2025, this library has been deprecated and will not receive further updates.\n\n### Impact\nAn infinite loop issue in Amazon.IonDotnet library versions \u003cv1.3.2 may allow a threat actor to cause a denial of service through a specially crafted text input. This invalid input triggered an error condition in the parser that was handled improperly, resulting in an infinite loop.\n\n### Impacted versions:\n\u003c1.3.2\n\n### Patches\nThis issue has been addressed in Amazon.IonDotnet version [1.3.2](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Amazon.IonDotnet/1.3.2). We recommend upgrading to the latest version and ensuring any forked or derivative code is patched to incorporate the new fixes.\n\n### Workarounds\nOnly accept data from trusted sources, written using a supported Ion library.\n\n### References\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, we ask that you contact AWS Security via our [vulnerability reporting page](https://aws.amazon.com/security/vulnerability-reporting) or directly via email to [aws-security@amazon.com](mailto:aws-security@amazon.com). Please do not create a public GitHub issue.",
"id": "GHSA-q5r6-9qwq-g2wj",
"modified": "2025-10-09T22:15:57Z",
"published": "2025-10-09T22:15:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/amazon-ion/ion-dotnet/security/advisories/GHSA-q5r6-9qwq-g2wj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11573"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/amazon-ion/ion-dotnet/pull/160"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/amazon-ion/ion-dotnet/commit/edaff75fe5abbb71e647bed812c608c0c5e2fbab"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/AWS-2025-022"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/amazon-ion/ion-dotnet"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/amazon-ion/ion-dotnet/releases/tag/v1.3.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Amazon.IonDotnet is vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks"
}
GHSA-Q5RJ-FMG6-P6R6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-02 18:32A vulnerability was found in ntegrals openbrowser up to 067fc45d649baa961750da8e2f4a75d87c5c75c8. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file packages/core/src/agent/agent.ts of the component Browser Agent Message Construction. Performing a manipulation results in resource consumption. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. This product is using a rolling release to provide continious delivery. Therefore, no version details for affected nor updated releases are available. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-84833"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-02T18:21:33Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in ntegrals openbrowser up to 067fc45d649baa961750da8e2f4a75d87c5c75c8. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file packages/core/src/agent/agent.ts of the component Browser Agent Message Construction. Performing a manipulation results in resource consumption. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. This product is using a rolling release to provide continious delivery. Therefore, no version details for affected nor updated releases are available. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-q5rj-fmg6-p6r6",
"modified": "2026-09-02T18:32:31Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T18:32:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84833"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/outlookgp/CVE/tree/main/OpenBrowser_Message_Budget_DoS_Report"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-84833"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/885464"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/398080"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/398080/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q5V7-7R3X-M7HG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32A Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the file upload feature of imartinez/privategpt version v0.6.2. The vulnerability is due to improper handling of form-data with a large filename in the file upload request. An attacker can exploit this by sending a payload with an excessively large filename, causing the server to become overwhelmed and unavailable to legitimate users.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-12063"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:26Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the file upload feature of imartinez/privategpt version v0.6.2. The vulnerability is due to improper handling of form-data with a large filename in the file upload request. An attacker can exploit this by sending a payload with an excessively large filename, causing the server to become overwhelmed and unavailable to legitimate users.",
"id": "GHSA-q5v7-7r3x-m7hg",
"modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:42Z",
"published": "2025-03-20T12:32:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12063"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/7db0091f-cb53-4cde-aad7-7ce491dfd8d9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q632-7V8J-586G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-19 06:30 – Updated: 2024-08-28 15:31ida64.dll in Hex-Rays IDA Pro through 8.4 crashes when there is a section that has many jumps linked, and the final jump corresponds to the payload from where the actual entry point will be invoked. NOTE: in many use cases, this is an inconvenience but not a security issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-44083"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-19T04:15:04Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "ida64.dll in Hex-Rays IDA Pro through 8.4 crashes when there is a section that has many jumps linked, and the final jump corresponds to the payload from where the actual entry point will be invoked. NOTE: in many use cases, this is an inconvenience but not a security issue.",
"id": "GHSA-q632-7v8j-586g",
"modified": "2024-08-28T15:31:13Z",
"published": "2024-08-19T06:30:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-44083"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Azvanzed/CVE-2024-44083"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Azvanzed/IdaMeme"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation
Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-227: Sustained Client Engagement
An adversary attempts to deny legitimate users access to a resource by continually engaging a specific resource in an attempt to keep the resource tied up as long as possible. The adversary's primary goal is not to crash or flood the target, which would alert defenders; rather it is to repeatedly perform actions or abuse algorithmic flaws such that a given resource is tied up and not available to a legitimate user. By carefully crafting a requests that keep the resource engaged through what is seemingly benign requests, legitimate users are limited or completely denied access to the resource.
CAPEC-492: Regular Expression Exponential Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression(Regex) implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size. This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton(NFA) state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions.