CWE-348
AllowedUse of Less Trusted Source
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product has two different sources of the same data or information, but it uses the source that has less support for verification, is less trusted, or is less resistant to attack.
209 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-RVMH-678C-2F4F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-14 18:31 – Updated: 2024-05-14 18:31A Use Of Less Trusted Source [CWE-348] vulnerability in Fortinet FortiPortal version 7.0.0 through 7.0.6 and version 7.2.0 through 7.2.1 allows an unauthenticated attack to bypass IP protection through crafted HTTP or HTTPS packets.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-23105"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-348"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-14T17:15:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A Use Of Less Trusted Source [CWE-348] vulnerability in Fortinet FortiPortal version 7.0.0 through 7.0.6 and version 7.2.0 through 7.2.1 allows an unauthenticated attack to bypass IP protection through crafted HTTP or HTTPS packets.",
"id": "GHSA-rvmh-678c-2f4f",
"modified": "2024-05-14T18:31:02Z",
"published": "2024-05-14T18:31:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23105"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-021"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-V4V4-55GM-P3CP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-30 18:32PipesHub before 0.10.0 contains a rate limit bypass vulnerability in getClientIp() that allows unauthenticated attackers to evade per-IP throttling by spoofing X-Forwarded-For or X-Real-IP headers. Attackers can rotate header values to obtain fresh rate-limit buckets on authentication endpoints, enabling password spraying and OTP or password-reset email flooding.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-119711"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-348"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-30T16:17:54Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "PipesHub before 0.10.0 contains a rate limit bypass vulnerability in getClientIp() that allows unauthenticated attackers to evade per-IP throttling by spoofing X-Forwarded-For or X-Real-IP headers. Attackers can rotate header values to obtain fresh rate-limit buckets on authentication endpoints, enabling password spraying and OTP or password-reset email flooding.",
"id": "GHSA-v4v4-55gm-p3cp",
"modified": "2026-10-30T18:32:41Z",
"published": "2026-10-30T18:32:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pipeshub-ai/pipeshub-ai/security/advisories/GHSA-78gw-g2h7-xvjj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119711"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pipeshub-ai/pipeshub-ai/commit/84614464bb120e9f8e8c85420001260e709d99bb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pipeshub-ai/pipeshub-ai"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pipeshub-ai/pipeshub-ai/blob/v0.9.1/backend/nodejs/apps/src/libs/middlewares/rate-limit.middleware.ts"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pipeshub-ai/pipeshub-ai/releases/tag/v0.10.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/pipeshub-before-0.10.0-rate-limit-bypass-via-spoofed-x-forwarded-for-header"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-V88M-G39W-9RGH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-02 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-02 15:31Szafir SDK Web is a browser plug-in that can run SzafirHost application which download the necessary files when launched.
In Szafir SDK Web it is possible to change the URL (HTTP Origin) of the application call location. An unauthenticated attacker can craft a website that is able to launch SzafirHost application with arbitrary arguments via Szafir SDK Web browser addon. No validation will be performed to check whether the address specified in document_base_url parameter is in any way related to the actual address of the calling web application. The URL address specified in document_base_url parameter is then shown in the application confirmation prompt. When a victim confirms the execution of the application, it will be called in the context of attacker's website URL and might download additional files and libraries from that website. When victim accepts the application execution for the URL showed in the confirmation prompt with the "remember" option before, the prompt won't be shown and the application will be called in the context of URL provided by the attacker without any interaction.
This issue was fixed in version 0.0.17.4.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26927"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-348"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-02T14:16:25Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Szafir SDK Web is a browser plug-in that can run SzafirHost application which download the necessary files when launched.\nIn Szafir SDK Web it is possible to change the URL (HTTP Origin) of the application call location. An unauthenticated attacker can craft a website that is able to launch SzafirHost application with arbitrary arguments via\u00a0Szafir SDK Web browser addon.\u00a0No validation will be performed to check whether the address specified in `document_base_url` parameter is in any way related to the actual address of the calling web application. The URL address specified in `document_base_url` parameter is then shown\u00a0in the application confirmation prompt. When a victim confirms the execution of the application, it will be called in the context of attacker\u0027s website URL and might download additional files and libraries from that website. When victim accepts the application execution for the URL showed in the confirmation prompt with the \"remember\" option before, the prompt won\u0027t be shown and the application will be called in the context of URL provided by the attacker\u00a0without any interaction.\n\nThis issue was fixed in version 0.0.17.4.",
"id": "GHSA-v88m-g39w-9rgh",
"modified": "2026-04-02T15:31:39Z",
"published": "2026-04-02T15:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26927"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert.pl/posts/2026/04/CVE-2026-26927"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.elektronicznypodpis.pl"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-V9RJ-XJFV-XJ9R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 22:07 – Updated: 2026-09-16 22:07Impact
The WebSocket handle_mount and ViewRuntime._build_request rebuild an HttpRequest via RequestFactory().get(...) with no HTTP_HOST, so request.get_host() defaulted to "testserver" on the live path. Host/subdomain/domain TenantResolvers then misresolved the tenant — None on the live path while the HTTP path resolved correctly. With STRICT_MODE=False the tenant-scoped managers returned unscoped rows (cross-tenant disclosure); with the default they returned an empty queryset (broken tenancy).
Patches
Fixed in djust 1.0.7. The handshake Host is extracted from the ASGI scope, validated against ALLOWED_HOSTS (the same logic as the CSWSH Origin gate, parsed with Django's split_domain_port so malformed Hosts are rejected at the boundary), and propagated — with the TLS scheme — into the reconstructed request, so live-path tenant resolution matches HTTP exactly.
Workarounds
No workaround on the live path short of upgrading. Most exposed when combined with STRICT_MODE=False.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "djust"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-61589"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-348",
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-16T22:07:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe WebSocket `handle_mount` and `ViewRuntime._build_request` rebuild an `HttpRequest` via `RequestFactory().get(...)` with no `HTTP_HOST`, so `request.get_host()` defaulted to `\"testserver\"` on the live path. Host/subdomain/domain `TenantResolver`s then misresolved the tenant \u2014 `None` on the live path while the HTTP path resolved correctly. With `STRICT_MODE=False` the tenant-scoped managers returned unscoped rows (**cross-tenant disclosure**); with the default they returned an empty queryset (broken tenancy).\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **djust 1.0.7**. The handshake Host is extracted from the ASGI scope, validated against `ALLOWED_HOSTS` (the same logic as the CSWSH Origin gate, parsed with Django\u0027s `split_domain_port` so malformed Hosts are rejected at the boundary), and propagated \u2014 with the TLS scheme \u2014 into the reconstructed request, so live-path tenant resolution matches HTTP exactly.\n\n### Workarounds\nNo workaround on the live path short of upgrading. Most exposed when combined with `STRICT_MODE=False`.",
"id": "GHSA-v9rj-xjfv-xj9r",
"modified": "2026-09-16T22:07:52Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T22:07:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/security/advisories/GHSA-v9rj-xjfv-xj9r"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/releases/tag/v1.0.7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "djust: WebSocket/runtime reconstructed request omits the client Host, causing host/subdomain TenantResolvers to misresolve the tenant on the live path"
}
GHSA-VJH7-5R6X-XH6G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-17 14:36 – Updated: 2024-12-12 22:29Impact
Unauthenticated attackers can execute arbitrary commands as root on CasaOS instances.
Patches
The problem was addressed by improving the detection of client IP addresses in 391dd7f. This patch is part of CasaOS 0.4.4.
Workarounds
Users should upgrade to CasaOS 0.4.4. If they can't, they should temporarily restrict access to CasaOS to untrusted users, for instance by not exposing it publicly.
References
- 391dd7f
- https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/security-vulnerabilities-in-casaos/
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/IceWhaleTech/CasaOS-Gateway"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-37265"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-348"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-17T14:36:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-17T21:15:09Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated attackers can execute arbitrary commands as `root` on CasaOS instances.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe problem was addressed by improving the detection of client IP addresses in 391dd7f. This patch is part of CasaOS 0.4.4.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUsers should upgrade to CasaOS 0.4.4. If they can\u0027t, they should temporarily restrict access to CasaOS to untrusted users, for instance by not exposing it publicly. \n\n### References\n\n- 391dd7f\n- https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/security-vulnerabilities-in-casaos/",
"id": "GHSA-vjh7-5r6x-xh6g",
"modified": "2024-12-12T22:29:30Z",
"published": "2023-07-17T14:36:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/IceWhaleTech/CasaOS-Gateway/security/advisories/GHSA-vjh7-5r6x-xh6g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37265"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/IceWhaleTech/CasaOS-Gateway/commit/391dd7f0f239020c46bf057cfa25f82031fc15f7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/IceWhaleTech/CasaOS-Gateway"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2023-1932"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/security-vulnerabilities-in-casaos"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CasaOS Gateway vulnerable to incorrect identification of source IP addresses"
}
GHSA-VQ2R-G3R6-RF8M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-13 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-13 12:31Password Pusher from 1.49.0 before 2.17.0 contains an IP spoofing vulnerability that allows remote clients to forge the recorded request IP via unanchored trusted-proxy regular expressions. Clients in 110.0.0.0/8 or 210.0.0.0/8, or connecting directly, can supply X-Forwarded-For values to falsify audit log entries and shift password generator rate limits.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-126400"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-348"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-13T10:17:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Password Pusher from 1.49.0 before 2.17.0 contains an IP spoofing vulnerability that allows remote clients to forge the recorded request IP via unanchored trusted-proxy regular expressions. Clients in 110.0.0.0/8 or 210.0.0.0/8, or connecting directly, can supply X-Forwarded-For values to falsify audit log entries and shift password generator rate limits.",
"id": "GHSA-vq2r-g3r6-rf8m",
"modified": "2026-11-13T12:31:22Z",
"published": "2026-11-13T12:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pglombardo/PasswordPusher/security/advisories/GHSA-p2xh-x263-68qc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-126400"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/password-pusher-1.49.0-before-2.17.0-ip-spoofing-via-unanchored-trusted-proxy-regex"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-VQQ3-G95X-FPMR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 15:31 – Updated: 2026-07-24 15:32In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.6.2 up to and including 1.25.1, when Unbound is configured with the 'respip' module in front of the validator together with a 'response-ip' redirect rule or an RPZ file with an RPZ-IP trigger, the rewriting handler does not check the security status of the upstream answer and can instead rewrite a BOGUS A/AAAA answer to point to an operator's configured IP. If the validator finds an expired or otherwise invalid RRSIG on an answer whose A record falls within a 'response-ip'/RPZ configuration, the answer is still rewritten and given a hard coded security level of INSECURE. This results in the client receiving an INSECURE NOERROR reply rewritten by the operator's configured IP. A malicious actor can exploit the possible poisonous effect by spoofing a BOGUS A/AAAA answer that falls inside the operator's configured subnet rewrites. Such DNSSEC protected answers are then insecurely redirected to the operator's configured target.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-50243"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-348"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-22T14:17:20Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.6.2 up to and including 1.25.1, when Unbound is configured with the \u0027respip\u0027 module in front of the validator together with a \u0027response-ip\u0027 redirect rule or an RPZ file with an RPZ-IP trigger, the rewriting handler does not check the security status of the upstream answer and can instead rewrite a BOGUS A/AAAA answer to point to an operator\u0027s configured IP. If the validator finds an expired or otherwise invalid RRSIG on an answer whose A record falls within a \u0027response-ip\u0027/RPZ configuration, the answer is still rewritten and given a hard coded security level of INSECURE. This results in the client receiving an INSECURE NOERROR reply rewritten by the operator\u0027s configured IP. A malicious actor can exploit the possible poisonous effect by spoofing a BOGUS A/AAAA answer that falls inside the operator\u0027s configured subnet rewrites. Such DNSSEC protected answers are then insecurely redirected to the operator\u0027s configured target.",
"id": "GHSA-vqq3-g95x-fpmr",
"modified": "2026-07-24T15:32:55Z",
"published": "2026-07-22T15:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50243"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2026-50243.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-VXPP-M9VW-RJCX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-03 18:30 – Updated: 2025-02-20 00:32PVWA (Password Vault Web Access) in CyberArk Privileged Access Manager Self-Hosted before 14.4 does not properly address environment issues that can contribute to Host header injection.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-54840"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-348"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-03T18:15:36Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "PVWA (Password Vault Web Access) in CyberArk Privileged Access Manager Self-Hosted before 14.4 does not properly address environment issues that can contribute to Host header injection.",
"id": "GHSA-vxpp-m9vw-rjcx",
"modified": "2025-02-20T00:32:02Z",
"published": "2025-02-03T18:30:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-54840"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.cyberark.com/pam-self-hosted/latest/en/content/release%20notes/rn-whatsnew14-4.htm#Securitybugfixes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/Hurdano/8244855ef8ec364fd98a2693de6e30c5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W38V-JXMP-5HF2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-18 15:30 – Updated: 2025-03-10 21:31Unitronics Unistream Unilogic – Versions prior to 1.35.227 -
CWE-348: Use of Less Trusted Source may allow RCE
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-27773"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-348"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-18T14:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Unitronics Unistream Unilogic \u2013 Versions prior to 1.35.227 -\n\nCWE-348: Use of Less Trusted Source may allow RCE",
"id": "GHSA-w38v-jxmp-5hf2",
"modified": "2025-03-10T21:31:08Z",
"published": "2024-03-18T15:30:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27773"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://claroty.com/team82/blog/new-critical-vulnerabilities-in-unitronics-unistream-devices-uncovered"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.gov.il/en/departments/dynamiccollectors/cve_advisories_listing?skip=0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WCHH-MRV2-5H4Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-09 21:51 – Updated: 2026-11-09 21:51Summary
A remote attacker from any IP address defeats the operator-configured source-IP allowlist (mcp_allowed_remote_ips / api_token_allowed_remote_ips) by sending a single X-Forwarded-For: <allowlisted-ip> header. The router is created with gin.New() and never calls SetTrustedProxies, so gin trusts every proxy by default and c.ClientIP() returns the attacker-supplied header verbatim. The same forged value is also written to Transaction.CreatedIp and the access log, so the attacker's real IP never appears in any record.
Details
cmd/webserver.go:104 builds the router with gin.New(). A grep of cmd/ and pkg/ confirms SetTrustedProxies is never called, leaving gin's default trusted-proxy range of 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0. WebContext (pkg/core/context_web.go:39) embeds *gin.Context and does not override ClientIP().
Both allowlist middlewares match the operator allowlist against this attacker-controlled value:
// pkg/middlewares/mcp_server_ip_limit.go:19
if config.MCPAllowedRemoteIPs[i].Match(c.ClientIP()) { c.Next(); return }
The identical c.ClientIP() is consumed by the audit trail at pkg/api/transactions.go:1078 (createNewTransactionModel(..., c.ClientIP()) → CreatedIp) and the access log (pkg/middlewares/request_log.go:28), so one header both bypasses the gate and forges attribution.
PoC
Runtime PoC (no live deployment required) — pkg/middlewares/xff_bypass_runtime_test.go, pkg/middlewares/xff_chain_runtime_test.go:
go test ./pkg/middlewares/ -run 'TestACCESSCONTROL001_XFFBypass|TestCHAIN_AllowlistBypass' -v
Output:
[control] no XFF, RemoteAddr=1.2.3.4 -> status=400 (correctly blocked)
[exploit] XFF=10.0.0.1, RemoteAddr=1.2.3.4 -> status=200, ClientIP=10.0.0.1 (bypassed)
gate status = 200 | created_ip that would be persisted = "10.0.0.1"
Against a live instance with mcp_allowed_remote_ips=10.0.0.1:
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://target/mcp # 403 (blocked)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" -H "X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.1" https://target/mcp # passes IP gate
Impact
Defeats an explicitly advertised, operator-configured security control on the MCP and API-token surfaces, from any source IP, with a single header and no authentication to the gate itself. It also destroys non-repudiation: every action is logged under the spoofed allowlisted IP, so audit trails point at the trusted host instead of the attacker. (The MCP/API actions themselves still require a valid token — this neutralizes the compensating IP control, not the JWT layer.)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.10.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-86041"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-348"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-09T21:51:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-04T23:17:58Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA remote attacker from any IP address defeats the operator-configured source-IP allowlist (`mcp_allowed_remote_ips` / `api_token_allowed_remote_ips`) by sending a single `X-Forwarded-For: \u003callowlisted-ip\u003e` header. The router is created with `gin.New()` and never calls `SetTrustedProxies`, so gin trusts every proxy by default and `c.ClientIP()` returns the attacker-supplied header verbatim. The same forged value is also written to `Transaction.CreatedIp` and the access log, so the attacker\u0027s real IP never appears in any record.\n\n### Details\n`cmd/webserver.go:104` builds the router with `gin.New()`. A grep of `cmd/` and `pkg/` confirms `SetTrustedProxies` is never called, leaving gin\u0027s default trusted-proxy range of `0.0.0.0/0` and `::/0`. `WebContext` (`pkg/core/context_web.go:39`) embeds `*gin.Context` and does not override `ClientIP()`.\n\nBoth allowlist middlewares match the operator allowlist against this attacker-controlled value:\n\n```go\n// pkg/middlewares/mcp_server_ip_limit.go:19\nif config.MCPAllowedRemoteIPs[i].Match(c.ClientIP()) { c.Next(); return }\n```\n\nThe identical `c.ClientIP()` is consumed by the audit trail at `pkg/api/transactions.go:1078` (`createNewTransactionModel(..., c.ClientIP())` \u2192 `CreatedIp`) and the access log (`pkg/middlewares/request_log.go:28`), so one header both bypasses the gate and forges attribution.\n\n### PoC\nRuntime PoC (no live deployment required) \u2014 `pkg/middlewares/xff_bypass_runtime_test.go`, `pkg/middlewares/xff_chain_runtime_test.go`:\n\n```\ngo test ./pkg/middlewares/ -run \u0027TestACCESSCONTROL001_XFFBypass|TestCHAIN_AllowlistBypass\u0027 -v\n```\n\nOutput:\n```\n[control] no XFF, RemoteAddr=1.2.3.4 -\u003e status=400 (correctly blocked)\n[exploit] XFF=10.0.0.1, RemoteAddr=1.2.3.4 -\u003e status=200, ClientIP=10.0.0.1 (bypassed)\ngate status = 200 | created_ip that would be persisted = \"10.0.0.1\"\n```\n\nAgainst a live instance with `mcp_allowed_remote_ips=10.0.0.1`:\n```\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\\n\" https://target/mcp # 403 (blocked)\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\\n\" -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.1\" https://target/mcp # passes IP gate\n```\n\n### Impact\nDefeats an explicitly advertised, operator-configured security control on the MCP and API-token surfaces, from any source IP, with a single header and no authentication to the gate itself. It also destroys non-repudiation: every action is logged under the spoofed allowlisted IP, so audit trails point at the trusted host instead of the attacker. (The MCP/API actions themselves still require a valid token \u2014 this neutralizes the compensating IP control, not the JWT layer.)",
"id": "GHSA-wchh-mrv2-5h4q",
"modified": "2026-11-09T21:51:28Z",
"published": "2026-11-09T21:51:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping/security/advisories/GHSA-wchh-mrv2-5h4q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86041"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping/commit/d79a5beb8037e529dc4dc64a6d22bd2d02b2e986"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mayswind/ezbookkeeping/releases/tag/v1.6.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "ezBookkeeping: Source-IP allowlist (MCP \u0026 API token) is bypassable via a spoofed `X-Forwarded-For` header"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-73: User-Controlled Filename
An attack of this type involves an adversary inserting malicious characters (such as a XSS redirection) into a filename, directly or indirectly that is then used by the target software to generate HTML text or other potentially executable content. Many websites rely on user-generated content and dynamically build resources like files, filenames, and URL links directly from user supplied data. In this attack pattern, the attacker uploads code that can execute in the client browser and/or redirect the client browser to a site that the attacker owns. All XSS attack payload variants can be used to pass and exploit these vulnerabilities.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-85: AJAX Footprinting
This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.