Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-345

Discouraged

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.

1410 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-RPJ7-HR7H-W6P9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 20:46 – Updated: 2026-06-19 20:46
VLAI
Summary
CoreWCF: SamlSerializer skips SignatureValue verification when SAML signing token is not an X.509 certificate
Details

Impact

When a service is configured to validate SAML tokens using a method other than X.509 certificate signing, the final signature verification is skipped.

Preconditions

The service is configured to authenticate using SAML tokens and an out of band token resolver (commonly the IssuerTokenResolver of IssuedTokenServiceCredential) holds a non-X.509 SecurityToken whose key identifier the attacker can reference in the assertion’s <KeyInfo> - for example a BinarySecretSecurityToken representing the symmetric proof key issued by a WS-Trust symmetric-key holder-of-key STS.

Patches

Fixed in CoreWCF v1.8.1 and v1.9.1

Workarounds

None

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "CoreWCF.Primitives"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "CoreWCF.Primitives"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.9.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54774"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T20:46:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nWhen a service is configured to validate SAML tokens using a method other than X.509 certificate signing, the final signature verification is skipped.\n\n#### Preconditions\nThe service is configured to authenticate using SAML tokens and an out of band token resolver (commonly the IssuerTokenResolver of IssuedTokenServiceCredential) holds a non-X.509 SecurityToken whose key identifier the attacker can reference in the assertion\u2019s `\u003cKeyInfo\u003e` - for example a `BinarySecretSecurityToken` representing the symmetric proof key issued by a WS-Trust symmetric-key holder-of-key STS.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in CoreWCF v1.8.1 and v1.9.1\n\n### Workarounds\nNone",
  "id": "GHSA-rpj7-hr7h-w6p9",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T20:46:46Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T20:46:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF/security/advisories/GHSA-rpj7-hr7h-w6p9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/CoreWCF/CoreWCF"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CoreWCF: SamlSerializer skips SignatureValue verification when SAML signing token is not an X.509 certificate"
}

GHSA-RPX2-P6HP-X5GJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-23 18:38 – Updated: 2026-10-23 18:38
VLAI
Summary
SiYuan: Missing consistency check between packageName and repoURL/repoHash in bazaar package install allows overwriting an existing, trusted plugin
Details

Summary

installBazaarPlugin (and the equivalent endpoints for widgets/icons/templates/themes) accept packageName, repoURL, and repoHash as independent request fields with no validation that they refer to the same package. packageName alone determines the install destination; repoURL/repoHash alone determine what content gets downloaded and written there. A request can name an already-installed, already-enabled plugin as packageName while pointing repoURL/ repoHash at different, attacker-influenced content, silently overwriting the existing plugin's files.

Affected code

kernel/api/bazaar.go:

util.BindJsonArg("packageName", &packageName, true, true)
util.BindJsonArg("repoURL", &repoURL, true, true)
util.BindJsonArg("repoHash", &repoHash, true, true)
err := model.InstallBazaarPackage("plugins", repoURL, repoHash, packageName, 0)

kernel/model/bazaar.go:

func getPackageInstallPath(pkgType, packageName string) (string, string, error) {
    case "plugins":
        return filepath.Join(util.DataDir, "plugins", packageName), "plugin.json", nil

kernel/bazaar/install.go:

func installPackage(data []byte, installPath string) (err error) {
    ...
    if err = filelock.Copy(srcPath, installPath); err != nil { return }
    return
}

installPath is derived solely from packageName; the downloaded data is derived solely from repoURL/repoHash; nothing cross-validates them, and installPackage performs no check for whether installPath already contains an existing package before copying into it. The same pattern applies to the widget/icon/template/theme install endpoints, which share getPackageInstallPath.

This does not involve path traversal — installPath always resolves inside DataDir/plugins/ (or the corresponding directory for other package types), so this is not an instance of "arbitrary file write outside the workspace path" (excluded by this project's SECURITY.md). The issue is that the write lands in the wrong, existing location within the intended directory, not outside it — an authorization/identity-verification gap, not a path traversal.

Reachability / why this is not trivially remote

The bazaar endpoints are gated by model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly. When no lock-screen password is configured (the common desktop default), CheckAuth still enforces a same-origin check:

if !localhost || ... || ("" != origin && !util.IsLocalOrigin(origin)) || ... {
    // reject with 401
}

I verified IsLocalOrigin/IsLocalHostname correctly parse the Origin header via url.Parse and check exact hostname / loopback IP:

func IsLocalOrigin(origin string) bool {
    if u, err := url.Parse(origin); err == nil {
        return IsLocalHostname(u.Hostname())
    }
    return false
}
func IsLocalHostname(hostname string) bool {
    if "localhost" == hostname || strings.HasSuffix(hostname, ".localhost") {
        return true
    }
    if ip := net.ParseIP(hostname); nil != ip {
        return ip.IsLoopback()
    }
    return false
}

This was tested against common bypass patterns (subdomain-suffix tricks like localhost.attacker.com, and Origin: null as sent by sandboxed iframes) and found no bypass — this is a correctly-implemented check. This means a purely remote attacker (e.g. a malicious website) cannot invoke this endpoint via CSRF; a request must originate from SiYuan's own renderer origin.

Realistic impact

Given SiYuan runs as an Electron app with nodeIntegration: true (per prior advisories in this repository), a same-origin script-execution primitive (e.g. an XSS bug in the renderer, of which several have been fixed in this repository recently) is typically already sufficient for direct code execution. This bug's marginal value is persistence: a transient XSS-driven compromise can use this endpoint to overwrite an existing, trusted, already-enabled plugin's index.js, converting a one-time compromise into code that runs on every future launch of the application, surviving after the original XSS vector is closed.

The overwrite does not effect immediately, via this specific endpoint. PushReloadPlugin (the websocket event that triggers frontend hot-reload without restart) is only called from the batch-update path (InstallBazaarPackages, used by batchUpdatePackage), which explicitly checks if petal != nil && petal.Enabled before forcing a reload via SetPetalEnabled. The single-package install endpoint (installBazaarPlugin) does not call PushReloadPlugin at all — it only pushes a generic success toast. So an overwrite via this endpoint activates on the next app restart or manual plugin toggle, rather than instantly still a realistic and frequent event for a desktop application, but not an instant hot-reload.

Suggested fix

Verify that packageName matches the package name declared in the downloaded package's own plugin.json/theme.json/etc. before copying into installPath, and/or refuse to install over an existing, non-empty destination directory unless the request is explicitly an update of that same package (matching by source repo identity, not just by request-supplied name).

Verification notes

Confirmed via static source review of kernel/api/bazaar.go, kernel/model/bazaar.go, kernel/bazaar/install.go, kernel/model/session.go (CheckAuth), kernel/util/net.go (IsLocalOrigin/IsLocalHostname), and kernel/model/push_reload.go / app/src/plugin/loader.ts (reload trigger wiring). I do not have a running SiYuan instance in this environment to execute an end-to-end proof of concept; findings are based on tracing the actual, unmodified control flow across these files rather than assumption.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260808010544-26ccb40d390e"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-62204"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-668"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-23T18:38:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`installBazaarPlugin` (and the equivalent endpoints for widgets/icons/templates/themes) accept\n`packageName`, `repoURL`, and `repoHash` as independent request fields with no validation that\nthey refer to the same package. `packageName` alone determines the install destination;\n`repoURL`/`repoHash` alone determine what content gets downloaded and written there. A request\ncan name an already-installed, already-enabled plugin as `packageName` while pointing `repoURL`/\n`repoHash` at different, attacker-influenced content, silently overwriting the existing plugin\u0027s\nfiles.\n\n## Affected code\n\n`kernel/api/bazaar.go`:\n```go\nutil.BindJsonArg(\"packageName\", \u0026packageName, true, true)\nutil.BindJsonArg(\"repoURL\", \u0026repoURL, true, true)\nutil.BindJsonArg(\"repoHash\", \u0026repoHash, true, true)\nerr := model.InstallBazaarPackage(\"plugins\", repoURL, repoHash, packageName, 0)\n```\n\n`kernel/model/bazaar.go`:\n```go\nfunc getPackageInstallPath(pkgType, packageName string) (string, string, error) {\n    case \"plugins\":\n        return filepath.Join(util.DataDir, \"plugins\", packageName), \"plugin.json\", nil\n```\n\n`kernel/bazaar/install.go`:\n```go\nfunc installPackage(data []byte, installPath string) (err error) {\n    ...\n    if err = filelock.Copy(srcPath, installPath); err != nil { return }\n    return\n}\n```\n\n`installPath` is derived solely from `packageName`; the downloaded `data` is derived solely from\n`repoURL`/`repoHash`; nothing cross-validates them, and `installPackage` performs no check for\nwhether `installPath` already contains an existing package before copying into it. The same\npattern applies to the widget/icon/template/theme install endpoints, which share\n`getPackageInstallPath`.\n\nThis does not involve path traversal \u2014 `installPath` always resolves inside\n`DataDir/plugins/` (or the corresponding directory for other package types), so this is not an\ninstance of \"arbitrary file write outside the workspace path\" (excluded by this project\u0027s\nSECURITY.md). The issue is that the write lands in the *wrong, existing* location within the\nintended directory, not outside it \u2014 an authorization/identity-verification gap, not a path\ntraversal.\n\n## Reachability / why this is not trivially remote\n\nThe bazaar endpoints are gated by `model.CheckAuth`, `model.CheckAdminRole`, `model.CheckReadonly`.\nWhen no lock-screen password is configured (the common desktop default), `CheckAuth` still\nenforces a same-origin check:\n```go\nif !localhost || ... || (\"\" != origin \u0026\u0026 !util.IsLocalOrigin(origin)) || ... {\n    // reject with 401\n}\n```\nI verified `IsLocalOrigin`/`IsLocalHostname` correctly parse the `Origin` header via `url.Parse`\nand check exact hostname / loopback IP:\n```go\nfunc IsLocalOrigin(origin string) bool {\n    if u, err := url.Parse(origin); err == nil {\n        return IsLocalHostname(u.Hostname())\n    }\n    return false\n}\nfunc IsLocalHostname(hostname string) bool {\n    if \"localhost\" == hostname || strings.HasSuffix(hostname, \".localhost\") {\n        return true\n    }\n    if ip := net.ParseIP(hostname); nil != ip {\n        return ip.IsLoopback()\n    }\n    return false\n}\n```\nThis was tested against common bypass patterns (subdomain-suffix tricks like\n`localhost.attacker.com`, and `Origin: null` as sent by sandboxed iframes) and found no bypass \u2014\nthis is a correctly-implemented check. This means a purely remote attacker (e.g. a malicious\nwebsite) cannot invoke this endpoint via CSRF; a request must originate from SiYuan\u0027s own\nrenderer origin.\n\n## Realistic impact\n\nGiven SiYuan runs as an Electron app with `nodeIntegration: true` (per prior advisories in this\nrepository), a same-origin script-execution primitive (e.g. an XSS bug in the renderer, of which\nseveral have been fixed in this repository recently) is typically already sufficient for direct\ncode execution. This bug\u0027s marginal value is **persistence**: a transient XSS-driven compromise\ncan use this endpoint to overwrite an existing, trusted, already-enabled plugin\u0027s `index.js`,\nconverting a one-time compromise into code that runs on every future launch of the application,\nsurviving after the original XSS vector is closed.\n\nThe overwrite does not effect immediately, via this specific\nendpoint. `PushReloadPlugin` (the websocket event that triggers frontend hot-reload without\nrestart) is only called from the batch-update path (`InstallBazaarPackages`, used by\n`batchUpdatePackage`), which explicitly checks `if petal != nil \u0026\u0026 petal.Enabled` before forcing\na reload via `SetPetalEnabled`. The single-package install endpoint (`installBazaarPlugin`) does\nnot call `PushReloadPlugin` at all \u2014 it only pushes a generic success toast. So an overwrite via\nthis endpoint activates on the next app restart or manual plugin toggle, rather than instantly \nstill a realistic and frequent event for a desktop application, but not an instant hot-reload.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nVerify that `packageName` matches the package name declared in the downloaded package\u0027s own\n`plugin.json`/`theme.json`/etc. before copying into `installPath`, and/or refuse to install over\nan existing, non-empty destination directory unless the request is explicitly an update of that\nsame package (matching by source repo identity, not just by request-supplied name).\n\n## Verification notes\n\nConfirmed via static source review of `kernel/api/bazaar.go`, `kernel/model/bazaar.go`,\n`kernel/bazaar/install.go`, `kernel/model/session.go` (CheckAuth), `kernel/util/net.go`\n(IsLocalOrigin/IsLocalHostname), and `kernel/model/push_reload.go` /\n`app/src/plugin/loader.ts` (reload trigger wiring). I do not have a running SiYuan instance\nin this environment to execute an end-to-end proof of concept; findings are based on tracing\nthe actual, unmodified control flow across these files rather than assumption.",
  "id": "GHSA-rpx2-p6hp-x5gj",
  "modified": "2026-10-23T18:38:25Z",
  "published": "2026-10-23T18:38:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-rpx2-p6hp-x5gj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62204"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/26ccb40d390eb7d9b04673629a58ab1d69cc7e53"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.8.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-plugin-overwrite-via-bazaar-install"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan: Missing consistency check between packageName and repoURL/repoHash in bazaar package install allows overwriting an existing, trusted plugin"
}

GHSA-RQHP-QXW5-GR5X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-10 12:31
VLAI
Details

Our payment integration with Adyen did not properly validate payment status responses. An attacker could use a successful payment status response from one payment and supply it to the system for a different payment, gaining access to multiple valid tickets with only one payment.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-101275"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-10T12:17:16Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Our payment integration with Adyen did not properly validate payment status responses. An attacker could use a successful payment status response from one payment and supply it to the system for a different payment, gaining access to multiple valid tickets with only one payment.",
  "id": "GHSA-rqhp-qxw5-gr5x",
  "modified": "2026-11-10T12:31:48Z",
  "published": "2026-11-10T12:31:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101275"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pretix.eu/about/en/blog/20261110-adyen"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RR9J-X6Q5-Q5PF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 15:34 – Updated: 2026-09-02 15:34
VLAI
Details

The WP Express Checkout WordPress plugin before 2.4.9 does not verify server-side that a payment was actually completed before marking an order as paid, allowing unauthenticated users to forge a completed order without paying.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-83533"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-02T15:17:45Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The WP Express Checkout WordPress plugin before 2.4.9 does not verify server-side that a payment was actually completed before marking an order as paid, allowing unauthenticated users to forge a completed order without paying.",
  "id": "GHSA-rr9j-x6q5-q5pf",
  "modified": "2026-09-02T15:34:51Z",
  "published": "2026-09-02T15:34:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83533"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/8ffb76d6-fda5-4819-ab07-d8c086169110"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RRH7-6J2W-CRGW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-02 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-02 12:31
VLAI
Details

Zebra (zebrad) 4.5.0 before 6.3.0 discards which peer supplied the block hashes in FindBlocks responses, then assigns 100 misbehavior points, the ban threshold, to whichever peer serves a requested block more than 50,000 heights above the tip. A remote peer can return real far-ahead hashes to a syncing node so that honest peers get banned, eroding its peer set and raising eclipse risk.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-104419"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-02T12:17:11Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Zebra (zebrad) 4.5.0 before 6.3.0 discards which peer supplied the block hashes in FindBlocks responses, then assigns 100 misbehavior points, the ban threshold, to whichever peer serves a requested block more than 50,000 heights above the tip. A remote peer can return real far-ahead hashes to a syncing node so that honest peers get banned, eroding its peer set and raising eclipse risk.",
  "id": "GHSA-rrh7-6j2w-crgw",
  "modified": "2026-10-02T12:31:14Z",
  "published": "2026-10-02T12:31:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-qhr3-cvch-5fh2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104419"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/zebra-before-6.3.0-honest-peer-banning-via-far-ahead-findblocks-hashes"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RRXX-CC32-QFVP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:44 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:44
VLAI
Details

IBM DataPower Gateways 7.1, 7,2, 7.5, and 7.6 could allow an attacker using man-in-the-middle techniques to spoof DNS responses to perform DNS cache poisoning and redirect Internet traffic. IBM X-Force ID: 136817.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-1773"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-01-31T15:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM DataPower Gateways 7.1, 7,2, 7.5, and 7.6 could allow an attacker using man-in-the-middle techniques to spoof DNS responses to perform DNS cache poisoning and redirect Internet traffic. IBM X-Force ID: 136817.",
  "id": "GHSA-rrxx-cc32-qfvp",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T03:44:32Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T03:44:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1773"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/136817"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg22012758"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RV63-4MWF-QQC2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 14:32 – Updated: 2026-07-21 15:26
VLAI
Summary
hono: Body Limit Middleware can be bypassed on AWS Lambda by understating `Content-Length`
Details

Summary

The Body Limit Middleware trusts the request's Content-Length header to decide whether a body is within the limit. On AWS Lambda (API Gateway v1/v2, ALB, VPC Lattice, and Lambda@Edge) the body is delivered fully buffered and the adapter builds the request with the client-declared Content-Length, which need not match the actual payload. A client can declare a tiny Content-Length while sending a much larger body, slipping past the limit.

Details

When Content-Length is present and Transfer-Encoding is absent, the middleware compares the declared value against the limit and passes the request through if it is small enough. On standards-based runtimes the transport enforces that Content-Length matches the body, so this is safe. The Lambda adapters instead reconstruct the request from a buffered payload and copy the client's Content-Length verbatim, so the declared length and the real body size are decoupled.

This issue affects applications deployed on AWS Lambda that rely on the Body Limit Middleware to cap request body size.

Impact

The declared body-size limit can be bypassed: a handler reads a payload larger than the configured maximum. Processing the oversized payload (large JSON, multipart, etc.) consumes additional CPU and memory per request. The payload remains bounded by the platform's request size limits, and Lambda isolates invocations, so the impact is increased per-request resource usage rather than full denial of service. This affects applications deployed on AWS Lambda that use the Body Limit Middleware.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "hono"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.12.25"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54288"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T14:32:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T19:17:19Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe Body Limit Middleware trusts the request\u0027s `Content-Length` header to decide whether a body is within the limit. On AWS Lambda (API Gateway v1/v2, ALB, VPC Lattice, and Lambda@Edge) the body is delivered fully buffered and the adapter builds the request with the client-declared `Content-Length`, which need not match the actual payload. A client can declare a tiny `Content-Length` while sending a much larger body, slipping past the limit.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen `Content-Length` is present and `Transfer-Encoding` is absent, the middleware compares the declared value against the limit and passes the request through if it is small enough. On standards-based runtimes the transport enforces that `Content-Length` matches the body, so this is safe. The Lambda adapters instead reconstruct the request from a buffered payload and copy the client\u0027s `Content-Length` verbatim, so the declared length and the real body size are decoupled.\n\nThis issue affects applications deployed on AWS Lambda that rely on the Body Limit Middleware to cap request body size.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe declared body-size limit can be bypassed: a handler reads a payload larger than the configured maximum. Processing the oversized payload (large JSON, multipart, etc.) consumes additional CPU and memory per request. The payload remains bounded by the platform\u0027s request size limits, and Lambda isolates invocations, so the impact is increased per-request resource usage rather than full denial of service. This affects applications deployed on AWS Lambda that use the Body Limit Middleware.",
  "id": "GHSA-rv63-4mwf-qqc2",
  "modified": "2026-07-21T15:26:52Z",
  "published": "2026-06-16T14:32:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-rv63-4mwf-qqc2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54288"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "hono: Body Limit Middleware can be bypassed on AWS Lambda by understating `Content-Length`"
}

GHSA-RVJ2-JR49-7HC2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:47 – Updated: 2022-05-14 02:47
VLAI
Details

Intel Driver Update Utility before 2.4 retrieves driver updates in cleartext, which makes it easier for man-in-the-middle attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted file.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2016-1493"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2016-01-29T20:59:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Intel Driver Update Utility before 2.4 retrieves driver updates in cleartext, which makes it easier for man-in-the-middle attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted file.",
  "id": "GHSA-rvj2-jr49-7hc2",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T02:47:00Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T02:47:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-1493"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security-center.intel.com/advisory.aspx?intelid=INTEL-SA-00048\u0026languageid=en-fr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/135314/Intel-Driver-Update-Utility-2.2.0.5-Man-In-The-Middle.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2016/Jan/56"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/intel-driver-update-utility-mitm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/537327/100/0/threaded"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RVQR-HRCC-J9VV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-26 19:50 – Updated: 2026-04-10 19:38
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: Bonjour/DNS-SD TXT metadata steers CLI routing after failed service resolution
Details

Summary

Bonjour and DNS-SD TXT metadata could still steer CLI routing even when actual service resolution failed, allowing unresolved hints to influence the chosen target.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected: < 2026.3.22
  • Fixed: >= 2026.3.22
  • Latest released tag checked: v2026.3.23-2 (630f1479c44f78484dfa21bb407cbe6f171dac87)
  • Latest published npm version checked: 2026.3.23-2

Fix Commit(s)

  • deecf68b59a9b7eea978e40fd3c2fe543087b569

Release Status

The fix shipped in v2026.3.22 and remains present in v2026.3.23 and v2026.3.23-2.

Code-Level Confirmation

  • src/infra/bonjour-discovery.ts now resolves and returns only concrete endpoints instead of falling back to unresolved TXT host and port hints.
  • src/cli/gateway-cli/discover.ts consumes only the fail-closed resolved endpoint path.

OpenClaw thanks @nexrin for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35659"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-642"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-26T19:50:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-10T17:17:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nBonjour and DNS-SD TXT metadata could still steer CLI routing even when actual service resolution failed, allowing unresolved hints to influence the chosen target.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: \u003c 2026.3.22\n- Fixed: \u003e= 2026.3.22\n- Latest released tag checked: `v2026.3.23-2` (`630f1479c44f78484dfa21bb407cbe6f171dac87`)\n- Latest published npm version checked: `2026.3.23-2`\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `deecf68b59a9b7eea978e40fd3c2fe543087b569`\n\n## Release Status\nThe fix shipped in `v2026.3.22` and remains present in `v2026.3.23` and `v2026.3.23-2`.\n\n## Code-Level Confirmation\n- src/infra/bonjour-discovery.ts now resolves and returns only concrete endpoints instead of falling back to unresolved TXT host and port hints.\n- src/cli/gateway-cli/discover.ts consumes only the fail-closed resolved endpoint path.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @nexrin for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-rvqr-hrcc-j9vv",
  "modified": "2026-04-10T19:38:24Z",
  "published": "2026-03-26T19:50:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-rvqr-hrcc-j9vv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35659"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/630f1479c44f78484dfa21bb407cbe6f171dac87"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/deecf68b59a9b7eea978e40fd3c2fe543087b569"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-unresolved-service-metadata-routing-via-bonjour-and-dns-sd-discovery"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Bonjour/DNS-SD TXT metadata steers CLI routing after failed service resolution"
}

GHSA-RW32-GHJC-99G6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-21 09:30 – Updated: 2023-03-24 18:30
VLAI
Details

A CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability exists in the Data Server that could cause manipulation of dashboard files in the IGSS project report directory, when an attacker sends specific crafted messages to the Data Server TCP port, this could lead to remote code execution when a victim eventually opens a malicious dashboard file. Affected Products: IGSS Data Server(IGSSdataServer.exe)(V16.0.0.23040 and prior), IGSS Dashboard(DashBoard.exe)(V16.0.0.23040 and prior), Custom Reports(RMS16.dll)(V16.0.0.23040 and prior).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-27982"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-21T07:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability exists in the Data Server that could cause manipulation of dashboard files in the IGSS project report directory, when an attacker sends specific crafted messages to the Data Server TCP port, this could lead to remote code execution when a victim eventually opens a malicious dashboard file. Affected Products: IGSS Data Server(IGSSdataServer.exe)(V16.0.0.23040 and prior), IGSS Dashboard(DashBoard.exe)(V16.0.0.23040 and prior), Custom Reports(RMS16.dll)(V16.0.0.23040 and prior).",
  "id": "GHSA-rw32-ghjc-99g6",
  "modified": "2023-03-24T18:30:20Z",
  "published": "2023-03-21T09:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27982"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2023-073-04\u0026p_enDocType=Security+and+Safety+Notice\u0026p_File_Name=SEVD-2023-073-04.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)

An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.

CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning

An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.

CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning

A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.

CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing

An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.

CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages

An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.

CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.

CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation

An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.

CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.

CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content

An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.

CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.

CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)

An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.