CWE-306
AllowedMissing Authentication for Critical Function
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
5243 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-VQ55-X4QG-PQGJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 21:31 – Updated: 2026-03-13 21:31Missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in ABB AWIN GW100 rev.2, ABB AWIN GW120.This issue affects AWIN GW100 rev.2: 2.0-0, 2.0-1; AWIN GW120: 1.2-0, 1.2-1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-13778"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-13T19:53:49Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in ABB AWIN GW100 rev.2, ABB AWIN GW120.This issue affects AWIN GW100 rev.2: 2.0-0, 2.0-1; AWIN GW120: 1.2-0, 1.2-1.",
"id": "GHSA-vq55-x4qg-pqgj",
"modified": "2026-03-13T21:31:45Z",
"published": "2026-03-13T21:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13778"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://search.abb.com/library/Download.aspx?DocumentID=4JNO000329\u0026LanguageCode=en\u0026DocumentPartId=\u0026Action=Launch"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-VQ9P-W6WV-CR25
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-12 20:46 – Updated: 2026-11-12 20:46Summary
Every pg_hba.conf generated by the pgEdge Control Plane begins with a hard-coded block of trust entries covering Unix-socket and loopback connections. Any operating-system account that can reach the Postgres socket or the loopback interface on a database host can authenticate as any Postgres role, including the superuser, without presenting a credential.
Details
The generated file opens with the following six entries:
local all all trust
host all all 127.0.0.1/32 trust
host all all ::1/128 trust
local replication all trust
host replication all 127.0.0.1/32 trust
host replication all ::1/128 trust
Postgres evaluates pg_hba.conf top-down and stops at the first matching rule. Because these entries are emitted at the top of the file, they also pre-empt every rule below them — including entries supplied by an operator through the pg_hba_conf field of a database node specification, which are appended lower in the file and are therefore never reached for local or loopback connections.
Both supported orchestrators emit these entries, but exposure differs by deployment model:
- systemd — the database runs on a shared multi-user host. Any local account on that host can connect as the Postgres superuser. This is the higher-severity case and the one the CVSS score below reflects.
- Docker Swarm — the Unix socket and the loopback interface belong to the
Postgres container, so reaching these entries requires code execution inside
that container. Publishing the Postgres port to the host does not change this:
such connections are not seen by Postgres as originating from
127.0.0.1or::1, so they do not match the entries above. The practical exposure is correspondingly narrower.
An operator who verifies their own deployment can confirm the issue by inspecting the generated pg_hba.conf on a database node for the entries above.
Impact
An unprivileged local operating-system account on an affected database host obtains full control of every Postgres database on that host: read of all data, modification or destruction of all data, and any action available to a Postgres superuser. Under the systemd orchestrator this converts any local account into a database superuser with no additional prerequisites.
Affected versions
pgEdge Control Plane v0.1.0 through v0.10.1, inclusive.
Patches
Fixed in v0.11.0. Generated pg_hba.conf files no longer contain trust entries, and operator-supplied local authentication rules take effect. Upgrading to v0.11.0 or later is the recommended and, on v0.9.0 and later, the only complete remedy.
Workarounds
The available mitigation differs by version, and no mitigation is complete on current releases.
v0.1.0 – v0.8.1. An operator could take the authentication files out of Patroni's control entirely: copy the generated pg_hba.conf and pg_ident.conf, edit the copies, and point the hba_file and ident_file settings at them through node-level postgresql_conf. This is effective but must be repeated per instance, including for every node added afterwards.
v0.9.0 – v0.10.1. The above no longer applies. API validation rejects the hba_file and ident_file settings, and entries supplied through the pg_hba_conf specification array are appended below the hard-coded block rather than overriding it, so they do not take effect for local or loopback connections. The only partial mitigation available is to restrict the Unix socket: set unix_socket_permissions to 0700, or to 0770 with the intended accounts placed in the postgres group. This closes the socket path only. No supported configuration closes the loopback path on these versions. Operators on v0.9.0 – v0.10.1 should upgrade to v0.11.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.10.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/pgEdge/control-plane"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.11.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-125323"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188",
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-12T20:46:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-10T18:17:33Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nEvery `pg_hba.conf` generated by the pgEdge Control Plane begins with a hard-coded block of `trust` entries covering Unix-socket and loopback connections. Any operating-system account that can reach the Postgres socket or the loopback interface on a database host can authenticate as any Postgres role, including the superuser, without presenting a credential.\n\n### Details\n\nThe generated file opens with the following six entries:\n\n```\nlocal all all trust\nhost all all 127.0.0.1/32 trust\nhost all all ::1/128 trust\nlocal replication all trust\nhost replication all 127.0.0.1/32 trust\nhost replication all ::1/128 trust\n```\n\nPostgres evaluates `pg_hba.conf` top-down and stops at the first matching rule. Because these entries are emitted at the top of the file, they also pre-empt every rule below them \u2014 including entries supplied by an operator through the `pg_hba_conf` field of a database node specification, which are appended lower in the file and are therefore never reached for local or loopback connections.\n\nBoth supported orchestrators emit these entries, but exposure differs by deployment model:\n\n* **systemd** \u2014 the database runs on a shared multi-user host. Any local account\n on that host can connect as the Postgres superuser. This is the\n higher-severity case and the one the CVSS score below reflects.\n* **Docker Swarm** \u2014 the Unix socket and the loopback interface belong to the\n Postgres container, so reaching these entries requires code execution inside\n that container. Publishing the Postgres port to the host does not change this:\n such connections are not seen by Postgres as originating from `127.0.0.1` or\n `::1`, so they do not match the entries above. The practical exposure is\n correspondingly narrower.\n\nAn operator who verifies their own deployment can confirm the issue by inspecting the generated `pg_hba.conf` on a database node for the entries above.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn unprivileged local operating-system account on an affected database host obtains full control of every Postgres database on that host: read of all data, modification or destruction of all data, and any action available to a Postgres superuser. Under the systemd orchestrator this converts any local account into a database superuser with no additional prerequisites.\n\n### Affected versions\n\npgEdge Control Plane v0.1.0 through v0.10.1, inclusive.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **v0.11.0**. Generated `pg_hba.conf` files no longer contain `trust` entries, and operator-supplied local authentication rules take effect. Upgrading to v0.11.0 or later is the recommended and, on v0.9.0 and later, the only complete remedy.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThe available mitigation differs by version, and no mitigation is complete on current releases.\n\n**v0.1.0 \u2013 v0.8.1.** An operator could take the authentication files out of Patroni\u0027s control entirely: copy the generated `pg_hba.conf` and `pg_ident.conf`, edit the copies, and point the `hba_file` and `ident_file` settings at them through node-level `postgresql_conf`. This is effective but must be repeated per instance, including for every node added afterwards.\n\n**v0.9.0 \u2013 v0.10.1.** The above no longer applies. API validation rejects the `hba_file` and `ident_file` settings, and entries supplied through the `pg_hba_conf` specification array are appended below the hard-coded block rather than overriding it, so they do not take effect for local or loopback connections. The only partial mitigation available is to restrict the Unix socket: set `unix_socket_permissions` to `0700`, or to `0770` with the intended accounts placed in the `postgres` group. **This closes the socket path only. No supported configuration closes the loopback path on these versions.** Operators on v0.9.0 \u2013 v0.10.1 should upgrade to v0.11.0.",
"id": "GHSA-vq9p-w6wv-cr25",
"modified": "2026-11-12T20:46:03Z",
"published": "2026-11-12T20:46:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pgEdge/control-plane/security/advisories/GHSA-vq9p-w6wv-cr25"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-125323"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pgEdge/control-plane/pull/470"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pgEdge/control-plane/commit/88659f7388fc6c86125e60475aa83810171145b7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pgEdge/control-plane"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pgEdge/control-plane/blob/main/changes/v0.11.0.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pgEdge/control-plane/releases/tag/v0.11.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "pgEdge Control Plane generates pg_hba.conf with trust authentication for local and loopback connections"
}
GHSA-VRXG-GM77-7Q5G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 16:46 – Updated: 2026-07-09 21:06HTTP transports expose unauthenticated PowerShell control with wildcard CORS
There is an issue in the SSE and Streamable HTTP transport modes. The default stdio mode is not affected, but the documented HTTP modes expose the MCP control plane without authentication and add wildcard CORS handling around it. The same server exposes the PowerShell tool, which executes caller-controlled commands as the Windows user running Windows-MCP.
Relevant source:
src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:37-42:_http_middleware()installsOptionsMiddlewareandCORSMiddlewarewithallow_origins=["*"],allow_methods=["*"], andallow_headers=["*"].src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:45-72:OptionsMiddlewareresponds to everyOPTIONSrequest with wildcardAccess-Control-Allow-Origin,Access-Control-Allow-Methods, andAccess-Control-Allow-Headers.src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:75-113:_build_mcp()constructsFastMCP(name="windows-mcp", ...)without an auth provider.src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:139-151: bothsseandstreamable-httpcallmcp.run(...)with that middleware and no application-level auth/security settings.src/windows_mcp/tools/shell.py:10-24: registers thePowerShelltool and passes caller-controlledcommandtoPowerShellExecutor.execute_command.src/windows_mcp/desktop/powershell.py:176-204: executes that command through PowerShell-EncodedCommand.README.md:421-424and433-434: documents the HTTP transports and describes Streamable HTTP as network-accessible HTTP streaming.
In an affected configuration, a client that can reach http://localhost:8000/mcp can initialize an MCP session and invoke tools/call for PowerShell. The issue is not just that PowerShell is powerful; it is that the HTTP control plane around that tool is unauthenticated and configured with wildcard CORS.
Root cause
The HTTP transport entry points compose two independent design decisions that fail-open together: the FastMCP instance is built without any authentication provider, and the middleware stack installs blanket wildcard CORS (allow_origins=*, allow_methods=*, allow_headers=*) that explicitly permits cross-origin browsers and any non-browser HTTP client to reach the MCP control plane. Either one alone would be a partial defense; together, the unauthenticated control plane is reachable from arbitrary origins, with no host-validation, no token check, and no DNS-rebinding mitigation between an attacker's request and the registered PowerShell tool. The structural fix is to require an auth provider (token, mTLS, or local-only secret handshake) on the HTTP transports and to scope CORS to a specific operator-configured allowlist rather than applying wildcard policy to a tool surface that includes shell execution.
Auth boundary violated
Boundary: Network trust domain (an unauthenticated remote/cross-origin caller is treated as if it were a trusted local MCP client with rights to invoke privileged shell tools).
Respected at: stdio transport path (src/windows_mcp/__main__.py stdio branch) — the default transport relies on parent-process pipe ownership for caller identity, which is a real OS-level boundary.
Violated at: src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:139-151 (SSE and Streamable HTTP branches call mcp.run(...) with the wildcard-CORS middleware installed at :37-42 and no auth provider attached at :75-113). The boundary is silently dropped: there is no code path between the inbound HTTP request and tools/call for PowerShell (src/windows_mcp/tools/shell.py:10-24 → src/windows_mcp/desktop/powershell.py:176-204) that asserts caller identity or origin.
Minimal protocol proof from a matching FastMCP 3.2.4 harness with the same middleware posture:
$ curl -i -s -X OPTIONS 'http://127.0.0.1:18123/mcp/' \
-H 'Origin: https://attacker.example' \
-H 'Access-Control-Request-Method: POST' \
-H 'Access-Control-Request-Headers: content-type,mcp-session-id'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
access-control-allow-origin: *
access-control-allow-methods: *
access-control-allow-headers: *
$ curl -i -s 'http://127.0.0.1:18123/mcp' \
-H 'Origin: https://attacker.example' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
--data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"evil-page","version":"1"}}}'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: text/event-stream
mcp-session-id: c67be0098b7643eb961b2fd0185ee043
access-control-allow-origin: *
$ curl -i -s 'http://127.0.0.1:18123/mcp' \
-H 'Origin: https://attacker.example' \
-H 'Mcp-Session-Id: c67be0098b7643eb961b2fd0185ee043' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
--data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"PowerShell","arguments":{"command":"calc.exe","timeout":30}}}'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: text/event-stream
mcp-session-id: c67be0098b7643eb961b2fd0185ee043
access-control-allow-origin: *
event: message
data: {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"result":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"executed: calc.exe"}],"structuredContent":{"result":"executed: calc.exe"},"isError":false}}
Impact
For affected HTTP-transport deployments, successful exploitation gives arbitrary PowerShell execution as the user running Windows-MCP. There is an important browser caveat: current Chrome/Edge Local Network Access / Private Network Access behavior may block or prompt for public-site-to-localhost requests because this middleware does not return Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network: true. The exposure still applies to same-origin/private-origin contexts, browsers or apps without that enforcement, user-approved local-network prompts, browser extensions, and non-browser HTTP clients.
Suggested fix: require authentication for HTTP transports, remove wildcard CORS from MCP control endpoints, restrict origins to explicit trusted clients, and enable/propagate transport security settings such as host validation. If unauthenticated HTTP is retained for development, I would make it an explicit unsafe flag and add regression tests for cross-origin OPTIONS, initialize, and tools/call.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "windows-mcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.7.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48989"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-21T16:46:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-17T22:16:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "HTTP transports expose unauthenticated PowerShell control with wildcard CORS\n\nThere is an issue in the SSE and Streamable HTTP transport modes. The default stdio mode is not affected, but the documented HTTP modes expose the MCP control plane without authentication and add wildcard CORS handling around it. The same server exposes the `PowerShell` tool, which executes caller-controlled commands as the Windows user running Windows-MCP.\n\nRelevant source:\n\n- `src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:37-42`: `_http_middleware()` installs `OptionsMiddleware` and `CORSMiddleware` with `allow_origins=[\"*\"]`, `allow_methods=[\"*\"]`, and `allow_headers=[\"*\"]`.\n- `src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:45-72`: `OptionsMiddleware` responds to every `OPTIONS` request with wildcard `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`, `Access-Control-Allow-Methods`, and `Access-Control-Allow-Headers`.\n- `src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:75-113`: `_build_mcp()` constructs `FastMCP(name=\"windows-mcp\", ...)` without an auth provider.\n- `src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:139-151`: both `sse` and `streamable-http` call `mcp.run(...)` with that middleware and no application-level auth/security settings.\n- `src/windows_mcp/tools/shell.py:10-24`: registers the `PowerShell` tool and passes caller-controlled `command` to `PowerShellExecutor.execute_command`.\n- `src/windows_mcp/desktop/powershell.py:176-204`: executes that command through PowerShell `-EncodedCommand`.\n- `README.md:421-424` and `433-434`: documents the HTTP transports and describes Streamable HTTP as network-accessible HTTP streaming.\n\nIn an affected configuration, a client that can reach `http://localhost:8000/mcp` can initialize an MCP session and invoke `tools/call` for `PowerShell`. The issue is not just that PowerShell is powerful; it is that the HTTP control plane around that tool is unauthenticated and configured with wildcard CORS.\n\n## Root cause\n\nThe HTTP transport entry points compose two independent design decisions that fail-open together: the FastMCP instance is built without any authentication provider, and the middleware stack installs blanket wildcard CORS (`allow_origins=*`, `allow_methods=*`, `allow_headers=*`) that explicitly permits cross-origin browsers and any non-browser HTTP client to reach the MCP control plane. Either one alone would be a partial defense; together, the unauthenticated control plane is reachable from arbitrary origins, with no host-validation, no token check, and no DNS-rebinding mitigation between an attacker\u0027s request and the registered `PowerShell` tool. The structural fix is to require an auth provider (token, mTLS, or local-only secret handshake) on the HTTP transports and to scope CORS to a specific operator-configured allowlist rather than applying wildcard policy to a tool surface that includes shell execution.\n\n## Auth boundary violated\n\n**Boundary:** Network trust domain (an unauthenticated remote/cross-origin caller is treated as if it were a trusted local MCP client with rights to invoke privileged shell tools).\n\n**Respected at:** stdio transport path (`src/windows_mcp/__main__.py` stdio branch) \u2014 the default transport relies on parent-process pipe ownership for caller identity, which is a real OS-level boundary.\n\n**Violated at:** `src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:139-151` (SSE and Streamable HTTP branches call `mcp.run(...)` with the wildcard-CORS middleware installed at `:37-42` and no auth provider attached at `:75-113`). The boundary is silently dropped: there is no code path between the inbound HTTP request and `tools/call` for `PowerShell` (`src/windows_mcp/tools/shell.py:10-24` \u2192 `src/windows_mcp/desktop/powershell.py:176-204`) that asserts caller identity or origin.\n\nMinimal protocol proof from a matching FastMCP 3.2.4 harness with the same middleware posture:\n\n```text\n$ curl -i -s -X OPTIONS \u0027http://127.0.0.1:18123/mcp/\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Origin: https://attacker.example\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Access-Control-Request-Method: POST\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Access-Control-Request-Headers: content-type,mcp-session-id\u0027\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\naccess-control-allow-origin: *\naccess-control-allow-methods: *\naccess-control-allow-headers: *\n\n$ curl -i -s \u0027http://127.0.0.1:18123/mcp\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Origin: https://attacker.example\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Accept: application/json, text/event-stream\u0027 \\\n --data \u0027{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{\"protocolVersion\":\"2025-06-18\",\"capabilities\":{},\"clientInfo\":{\"name\":\"evil-page\",\"version\":\"1\"}}}\u0027\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\ncontent-type: text/event-stream\nmcp-session-id: c67be0098b7643eb961b2fd0185ee043\naccess-control-allow-origin: *\n\n$ curl -i -s \u0027http://127.0.0.1:18123/mcp\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Origin: https://attacker.example\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Mcp-Session-Id: c67be0098b7643eb961b2fd0185ee043\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Accept: application/json, text/event-stream\u0027 \\\n --data \u0027{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":2,\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"PowerShell\",\"arguments\":{\"command\":\"calc.exe\",\"timeout\":30}}}\u0027\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\ncontent-type: text/event-stream\nmcp-session-id: c67be0098b7643eb961b2fd0185ee043\naccess-control-allow-origin: *\n\nevent: message\ndata: {\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":2,\"result\":{\"content\":[{\"type\":\"text\",\"text\":\"executed: calc.exe\"}],\"structuredContent\":{\"result\":\"executed: calc.exe\"},\"isError\":false}}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nFor affected HTTP-transport deployments, successful exploitation gives arbitrary PowerShell execution as the user running Windows-MCP. There is an important browser caveat: current Chrome/Edge Local Network Access / Private Network Access behavior may block or prompt for public-site-to-localhost requests because this middleware does not return `Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network: true`. The exposure still applies to same-origin/private-origin contexts, browsers or apps without that enforcement, user-approved local-network prompts, browser extensions, and non-browser HTTP clients.\n\nSuggested fix: require authentication for HTTP transports, remove wildcard CORS from MCP control endpoints, restrict origins to explicit trusted clients, and enable/propagate transport security settings such as host validation. If unauthenticated HTTP is retained for development, I would make it an explicit unsafe flag and add regression tests for cross-origin `OPTIONS`, `initialize`, and `tools/call`.",
"id": "GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g",
"modified": "2026-07-09T21:06:20Z",
"published": "2026-05-21T16:46:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/CursorTouch/Windows-MCP/security/advisories/GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48989"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/CursorTouch/Windows-MCP"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/CursorTouch/Windows-MCP/releases/tag/v0.7.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Windows-MCP: HTTP transports expose unauthenticated PowerShell control with wildcard CORS"
}
GHSA-VV3C-V9JV-69WX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-14 21:32NVIDIA TensorRT-LLM for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause missing authentication for a critical function. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, data tampering, and information disclosure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24259"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T21:16:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "NVIDIA TensorRT-LLM for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause missing authentication for a critical function. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, data tampering, and information disclosure.",
"id": "GHSA-vv3c-v9jv-69wx",
"modified": "2026-07-14T21:32:21Z",
"published": "2026-07-14T21:32:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24259"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-24259"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VV44-HJM2-QW2F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-16 20:08Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-w5f2-9q9c-ff4h. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
LMCache multiprocess mode, also called distributed mode, opens an unauthenticated ZeroMQ ROUTER so worker processes can register and share KV cache blocks. Messages on that socket are msgpack. Extension code 1 is passed to DeviceIPCWrapper.Deserialize, which calls pickle.loads, while the server is still decoding request arguments and before the handler runs. A single unauthenticated ZMQ DEALER message to the transport port (default 5555) therefore executes code as the user the LMCache process runs as. Official container images run that process as root. The transport binds to localhost unless the operator sets a routable address with --host, which is how multi-node deployments let peers connect.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 0.5.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "lmcache"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.3.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-16T20:08:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-07T10:17:32Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of\u00a0GHSA-w5f2-9q9c-ff4h. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nLMCache multiprocess mode, also called distributed mode, opens an unauthenticated ZeroMQ ROUTER so worker processes can register and share KV cache blocks. Messages on that socket are msgpack. Extension code 1 is passed to DeviceIPCWrapper.Deserialize, which calls pickle.loads, while the server is still decoding request arguments and before the handler runs. A single unauthenticated ZMQ DEALER message to the transport port (default 5555) therefore executes code as the user the LMCache process runs as. Official container images run that process as root. The transport binds to localhost unless the operator sets a routable address with --host, which is how multi-node deployments let peers connect.",
"id": "GHSA-vv44-hjm2-qw2f",
"modified": "2026-10-16T20:08:50Z",
"published": "2026-10-07T12:31:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105192"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/LMCache/LMCache"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/LMCache/LMCache/blob/v0.3.9/lmcache/v1/multiprocess/custom_types.py"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/LMCache/LMCache/blob/v0.5.5/lmcache/v1/platform/base/ipc_wrapper.py"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/lmcache"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Remote code execution via unsafe deserialization in multiprocess mode transport",
"withdrawn": "2026-10-16T20:08:50Z"
}
GHSA-VV62-XM44-43PW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-22 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-28 00:00Multiple vulnerabilities in Cisco Nexus Dashboard could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands, read or upload container image files, or perform a cross-site request forgery attack. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-20858"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-21T04:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Multiple vulnerabilities in Cisco Nexus Dashboard could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands, read or upload container image files, or perform a cross-site request forgery attack. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.",
"id": "GHSA-vv62-xm44-43pw",
"modified": "2022-07-28T00:00:41Z",
"published": "2022-07-22T00:00:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20858"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ndb-mhcvuln-vpsBPJ9y"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VVCR-J24Q-WC29
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-20 03:31 – Updated: 2026-02-20 03:31Sensitive data disclosure and manipulation due to missing authentication. The following products are affected: Acronis Cyber Protect Cloud Agent (Linux, macOS, Windows) before build 39870, Acronis Cyber Protect 16 (Linux, macOS, Windows) before build 39938, Acronis Cyber Protect 15 (Linux, macOS, Windows) before build 41800.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-30410"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-20T01:15:59Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Sensitive data disclosure and manipulation due to missing authentication. The following products are affected: Acronis Cyber Protect Cloud Agent (Linux, macOS, Windows) before build 39870, Acronis Cyber Protect 16 (Linux, macOS, Windows) before build 39938, Acronis Cyber Protect 15 (Linux, macOS, Windows) before build 41800.",
"id": "GHSA-vvcr-j24q-wc29",
"modified": "2026-02-20T03:31:39Z",
"published": "2026-02-20T03:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30410"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security-advisory.acronis.com/advisories/SEC-8641"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VVFF-6WRR-4G7Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-24 00:00 – Updated: 2023-02-08 22:41An authorization flaw was found in Foreman Ansible. An authenticated attacker with certain permissions to create and run Ansible jobs can access hosts through job templates. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "foreman_ansible"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-3589"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-03-29T20:01:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-23T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An authorization flaw was found in Foreman Ansible. An authenticated attacker with certain permissions to create and run Ansible jobs can access hosts through job templates. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.",
"id": "GHSA-vvff-6wrr-4g7q",
"modified": "2023-02-08T22:41:33Z",
"published": "2022-03-24T00:00:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3589"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theforeman/foreman_ansible/commit/a5e0827bc3ec6c8ab82f968907857a15646305d5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2021-3589"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1969265"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/foreman_ansible/CVE-2021-3589.yml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/theforeman/foreman_ansible"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Missing Authentication for Critical Function in Foreman Ansible"
}
GHSA-VVW2-CWRQ-MPRR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-02 12:00 – Updated: 2022-11-02 19:00Insufficient validation of untrusted input in VPN in Google Chrome on ChromeOS prior to 106.0.5249.62 allowed a local attacker to bypass managed device restrictions via physical access to the device. (Chrome security severity: Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-3312"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-11-01T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insufficient validation of untrusted input in VPN in Google Chrome on ChromeOS prior to 106.0.5249.62 allowed a local attacker to bypass managed device restrictions via physical access to the device. (Chrome security severity: Medium)",
"id": "GHSA-vvw2-cwrq-mprr",
"modified": "2022-11-02T19:00:24Z",
"published": "2022-11-02T12:00:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3312"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2022/09/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_27.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://crbug.com/1303306"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VVW4-VX69-CV5H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-02 15:30 – Updated: 2026-02-02 15:30A unauthenticated adjacent attacker could potentially disrupt operations by switching between multiple configuration presets via CAN.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-50980"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-02T15:16:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A unauthenticated adjacent attacker could potentially disrupt operations by switching between multiple configuration presets via CAN.",
"id": "GHSA-vvw4-vx69-cv5h",
"modified": "2026-02-02T15:30:34Z",
"published": "2026-02-02T15:30:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-50980"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.innomic.com/.well-known/csaf/white/2026/ids-2026-0001.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.innomic.com/.well-known/csaf/white/2026/ids-2026-0001.json"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
- Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
- In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
- In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].
CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier
This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.
CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values
An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.
CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation
An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.