Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-306

Allowed

Missing Authentication for Critical Function

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.

5256 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-QXG6-89MG-RQV8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-21 19:54 – Updated: 2026-10-21 19:54
VLAI
Summary
Vitest: Code injection via unauthenticated manual mock registration
Details

Summary

@vitest/mocker's interceptorPlugin accepts mock registrations on Vite's dev-server WebSocket with no authentication, and interpolates the mock's url into generated module source without escaping. A client that can reach the dev server can make it serve arbitrary JavaScript in place of any project module, which then runs in the developer's browser on the dev-server origin.

Same handler and same unauthenticated caller as GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9; that fix (8ff9b9a9efca7c6cfd5243569440de8d7a33aec4, PR #10972) hardened only the redirect branch and left the manual branch reaching the unescaped generator.

Patches

Fixed in @vitest/mocker 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. createManualModuleSource now serializes the module URL and the export names with JSON.stringify, so a registered mock cannot change the generated code.

Projects that call mockerPlugin() or interceptorPlugin() directly need @vitest/mocker 4.1.12 or 5.0.3.

Details

packages/mocker/src/utils.ts:6-9 builds module source by string interpolation:

export function createManualModuleSource(moduleUrl: string, exports: string[], globalAccessor = '"__vitest_mocker__"'): string {
  const source = `
const __factoryModule__ = await globalThis[${globalAccessor}].getFactoryModule("${moduleUrl}");
`

moduleUrl lands inside a double-quoted JavaScript string with no escaping or validation.

packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts:66-93 feeds it straight from the socket:

configureServer(server) {
  if (options.registerWebSocketEvents === false) { return }
  server.ws.on('vitest:interceptor:register', (event: MockedModuleSerialized) => {
    if (event.type === 'manual') {
      const module = ManualMockedModule.fromJSON(event, async () => {
        const keys = await getFactoryExports(event.url)
        return Object.fromEntries(keys.map(key => [key, null]))
      })
      registry.add(module)                       // no validation of `id` or `url`
    }
    else {
      if (event.type === 'redirect') { /* fs allowlist check added in #10972 */ }

event.id chooses which module is hijacked; event.url is what gets interpolated. The load hook (interceptorPlugin.ts:30-44) then returns createManualModuleSource(mock.url, exports, accessor) for that id.

With url = 'x"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void("' a request for /src/app.js is answered with valid, executable JavaScript:

const __factoryModule__ = await globalThis["__vitest_mocker__"].getFactoryModule("x"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void("");

getFactoryExports (interceptorPlugin.ts:103-117) also takes the export-name array from the same socket, and those names are interpolated unescaped too — but each name is emitted into __factoryModule__["X"], export { __0 as "X" } and resolvedModule["X"], and no payload tested parses in all three positions (all nine candidates were rejected by the parser). It is a hardening gap, not a second usable vector; url is the exploited one.

Who can reach the socket. Vite 8 answers HTTP 400 to any HMR upgrade carrying an Origin header it does not own, so a cross-origin browser page cannot open it — the PoC asserts this for https://evil.example and http://localhost:3000. The reachable attacker is a non-browser WebSocket client with access to the dev server's port, the same prerequisite under which GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 was published.

PoC

poc/mocker-manual-mock-injection/ — repro.sh (exit 0 = vulnerable), poc.mjs, expected.txt, env.txt. Everything lives under a fresh mktemp directory deleted on exit, the dev server binds to 127.0.0.1 on an ephemeral port, no external host is contacted, and the payload is only inspected as text — the script never evaluates it.

Environment: commit 9e1166959e14bd32298d8a0e85352431c769ec7a, @vitest/mocker 5.0.0, Node v22.23.1, Vite 8.0.11, ws 8.21.3, pnpm 11.24.0, Linux x86_64.

git clone https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest && cd vitest
git checkout 9e1166959e14bd32298d8a0e85352431c769ec7a
pnpm install && pnpm build
REPO=$(pwd) bash /path/to/poc/mocker-manual-mock-injection/repro.sh

Required configuration — the public setup documented in packages/mocker/EXPORTS.md, which the harness reproduces (mockerPlugin() wires interceptorPlugin the same way):

import { interceptorPlugin } from '@vitest/mocker/node'
export default defineConfig({ plugins: [interceptorPlugin()] })   // or mockerPlugin()

The attack is one WebSocket message to ws://<host>:<port>/ with subprotocol vite-hmr:

{ "type": "custom", "event": "vitest:interceptor:register",
  "data": { "type": "manual", "raw": "", "id": "<abs path of a served module>",
            "url": "x\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\"" } }

then answering the server's vitest:interceptor:resolve with {"type":"custom","event":"vitest:interceptor:resolved","data":{"url":"<same url>","keys":["a"]}}. The module id can be obtained from the same socket via vitest:mocks:resolveId when mockerPlugin() is used.

Observed output:

PASS  precondition: Vite rejects a WebSocket upgrade sent with Origin https://evil.example  result=400
PASS  precondition: Vite rejects a WebSocket upgrade sent with Origin http://localhost:3000  result=400
PASS  negative control: with no mock registered the real module is served
PASS  negative control: a mock with a harmless url replaces the module but injects nothing
--- module served for /src/app.js ---
    const __factoryModule__ = await globalThis["__vitest_mocker__"].getFactoryModule("x"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void("");

    let __0 = __factoryModule__["a"]
    export { __0 as "a" }
    if (__factoryModule__.__factoryPromise != null) {
      __factoryModule__.__factoryPromise.then((resolvedModule) => {
        __0 = resolvedModule["a"];
      })
    }
PASS  attacker statement is present in the module the dev server serves
PASS  the real module body was replaced
PASS  the injected module parses as JavaScript (Vite import analysis accepted it)

RESULT: VULNERABLE
  • Positive control — with no mock registered, /src/app.js is served with its real body, so the harness demonstrably works.
  • Negative control — the same registration with a harmless url replaces the module but injects nothing, attributing the injection to the payload rather than to mock registration.
  • Precondition controls — the two Origin probes record the boundary honestly.
  • Vite's import analysis rejects malformed output (an earlier deliberately-broken payload failed with "content contains invalid JS syntax"), so acceptance proves the injected module is valid, executable JavaScript.

Reproduced three times from a clean mktemp fixture, exit 0 each time.

Impact

Code injection (CWE-94) by an unauthenticated client. The attacker picks any module id the project serves and replaces its body with arbitrary JavaScript, which executes in the developer's browser on the dev-server origin: reading source through the dev server, reading that origin's storage and cookies, driving further same-origin requests, and persisting across reloads while the mock stays registered. Nothing is written to disk, so it leaves no trace in the repository. Impacts developers who use the public mockerPlugin()/interceptorPlugin() API documented in packages/mocker/EXPORTS.md. Node runs do not register these handlers. Development-only — configureServer does not run for vite build or vite preview.

Credits

  • Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)

Disclosure per CONTRIBUTING.md: the analysis and proof of concept were assisted by Claude (Claude Code). The findings were reviewed by the reporter above, who is submitting this report.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@vitest/mocker"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.1.0-beta.7"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@vitest/mocker"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0-beta.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-112949"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-21T19:54:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T16:17:05Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`@vitest/mocker`\u0027s `interceptorPlugin` accepts mock registrations on Vite\u0027s dev-server WebSocket with no authentication, and interpolates the mock\u0027s `url` into generated module source without escaping. A client that can reach the dev server can make it serve arbitrary JavaScript in place of any project module, which then runs in the developer\u0027s browser on the dev-server origin.\n\nSame handler and same unauthenticated caller as GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9; that fix (`8ff9b9a9efca7c6cfd5243569440de8d7a33aec4`, PR #10972) hardened only the `redirect` branch and left the `manual` branch reaching the unescaped generator.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.3, released on 2026-09-30 (PR #11377), and backported to 4.1.12. `createManualModuleSource` now serializes the module URL and the export names with `JSON.stringify`, so a registered mock cannot change the generated code.\n\nProjects that call `mockerPlugin()` or `interceptorPlugin()` directly need `@vitest/mocker` 4.1.12 or 5.0.3.\n\n### Details\n\n`packages/mocker/src/utils.ts:6-9` builds module source by string interpolation:\n\n```ts\nexport function createManualModuleSource(moduleUrl: string, exports: string[], globalAccessor = \u0027\"__vitest_mocker__\"\u0027): string {\n  const source = `\nconst __factoryModule__ = await globalThis[${globalAccessor}].getFactoryModule(\"${moduleUrl}\");\n`\n```\n\n`moduleUrl` lands inside a double-quoted JavaScript string with no escaping or validation.\n\n`packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts:66-93` feeds it straight from the socket:\n\n```ts\nconfigureServer(server) {\n  if (options.registerWebSocketEvents === false) { return }\n  server.ws.on(\u0027vitest:interceptor:register\u0027, (event: MockedModuleSerialized) =\u003e {\n    if (event.type === \u0027manual\u0027) {\n      const module = ManualMockedModule.fromJSON(event, async () =\u003e {\n        const keys = await getFactoryExports(event.url)\n        return Object.fromEntries(keys.map(key =\u003e [key, null]))\n      })\n      registry.add(module)                       // no validation of `id` or `url`\n    }\n    else {\n      if (event.type === \u0027redirect\u0027) { /* fs allowlist check added in #10972 */ }\n```\n\n`event.id` chooses which module is hijacked; `event.url` is what gets interpolated. The `load` hook (`interceptorPlugin.ts:30-44`) then returns `createManualModuleSource(mock.url, exports, accessor)` for that id.\n\nWith `url = \u0027x\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\"\u0027` a request for `/src/app.js` is answered with valid, executable JavaScript:\n\n```js\nconst __factoryModule__ = await globalThis[\"__vitest_mocker__\"].getFactoryModule(\"x\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\"\");\n```\n\n`getFactoryExports` (`interceptorPlugin.ts:103-117`) also takes the export-name array from the same socket, and those names are interpolated unescaped too \u2014 but each name is emitted into `__factoryModule__[\"X\"]`, `export { __0 as \"X\" }` and `resolvedModule[\"X\"]`, and no payload tested parses in all three positions (all nine candidates were rejected by the parser). It is a hardening gap, not a second usable vector; `url` is the exploited one.\n\n**Who can reach the socket.** Vite 8 answers HTTP 400 to any HMR upgrade carrying an `Origin` header it does not own, so a cross-origin browser page cannot open it \u2014 the PoC asserts this for `https://evil.example` and `http://localhost:3000`. The reachable attacker is a non-browser WebSocket client with access to the dev server\u0027s port, the same prerequisite under which GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9 was published.\n\n### PoC\n\n`poc/mocker-manual-mock-injection/` \u2014 `repro.sh` (exit 0 = vulnerable), `poc.mjs`, `expected.txt`, `env.txt`. Everything lives under a fresh `mktemp` directory deleted on exit, the dev server binds to `127.0.0.1` on an ephemeral port, no external host is contacted, and the payload is only inspected as text \u2014 the script never evaluates it.\n\nEnvironment: commit `9e1166959e14bd32298d8a0e85352431c769ec7a`, `@vitest/mocker` 5.0.0, Node v22.23.1, Vite 8.0.11, ws 8.21.3, pnpm 11.24.0, Linux x86_64.\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest \u0026\u0026 cd vitest\ngit checkout 9e1166959e14bd32298d8a0e85352431c769ec7a\npnpm install \u0026\u0026 pnpm build\nREPO=$(pwd) bash /path/to/poc/mocker-manual-mock-injection/repro.sh\n```\n\nRequired configuration \u2014 the public setup documented in `packages/mocker/EXPORTS.md`, which the harness reproduces (`mockerPlugin()` wires `interceptorPlugin` the same way):\n\n```ts\nimport { interceptorPlugin } from \u0027@vitest/mocker/node\u0027\nexport default defineConfig({ plugins: [interceptorPlugin()] })   // or mockerPlugin()\n```\n\nThe attack is one WebSocket message to `ws://\u003chost\u003e:\u003cport\u003e/` with subprotocol `vite-hmr`:\n\n```json\n{ \"type\": \"custom\", \"event\": \"vitest:interceptor:register\",\n  \"data\": { \"type\": \"manual\", \"raw\": \"\", \"id\": \"\u003cabs path of a served module\u003e\",\n            \"url\": \"x\\\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\\\"\" } }\n```\n\nthen answering the server\u0027s `vitest:interceptor:resolve` with `{\"type\":\"custom\",\"event\":\"vitest:interceptor:resolved\",\"data\":{\"url\":\"\u003csame url\u003e\",\"keys\":[\"a\"]}}`. The module id can be obtained from the same socket via `vitest:mocks:resolveId` when `mockerPlugin()` is used.\n\nObserved output:\n\n```\nPASS  precondition: Vite rejects a WebSocket upgrade sent with Origin https://evil.example  result=400\nPASS  precondition: Vite rejects a WebSocket upgrade sent with Origin http://localhost:3000  result=400\nPASS  negative control: with no mock registered the real module is served\nPASS  negative control: a mock with a harmless url replaces the module but injects nothing\n--- module served for /src/app.js ---\n    const __factoryModule__ = await globalThis[\"__vitest_mocker__\"].getFactoryModule(\"x\"); globalThis.ARES_INJECTED = 1; void(\"\");\n\n    let __0 = __factoryModule__[\"a\"]\n    export { __0 as \"a\" }\n    if (__factoryModule__.__factoryPromise != null) {\n      __factoryModule__.__factoryPromise.then((resolvedModule) =\u003e {\n        __0 = resolvedModule[\"a\"];\n      })\n    }\nPASS  attacker statement is present in the module the dev server serves\nPASS  the real module body was replaced\nPASS  the injected module parses as JavaScript (Vite import analysis accepted it)\n\nRESULT: VULNERABLE\n```\n\n* **Positive control** \u2014 with no mock registered, `/src/app.js` is served with its real body, so the harness demonstrably works.\n* **Negative control** \u2014 the same registration with a harmless `url` replaces the module but injects nothing, attributing the injection to the payload rather than to mock registration.\n* **Precondition controls** \u2014 the two `Origin` probes record the boundary honestly.\n* Vite\u0027s import analysis rejects malformed output (an earlier deliberately-broken payload failed with \"content contains invalid JS syntax\"), so acceptance proves the injected module is valid, executable JavaScript.\n\nReproduced three times from a clean `mktemp` fixture, exit 0 each time.\n\n### Impact\n\nCode injection (CWE-94) by an unauthenticated client. The attacker picks any module id the project serves and replaces its body with arbitrary JavaScript, which executes in the developer\u0027s browser on the dev-server origin: reading source through the dev server, reading that origin\u0027s storage and cookies, driving further same-origin requests, and persisting across reloads while the mock stays registered. Nothing is written to disk, so it leaves no trace in the repository. Impacts developers who use the public `mockerPlugin()`/`interceptorPlugin()` API documented in `packages/mocker/EXPORTS.md`. Node runs do not register these handlers. Development-only \u2014 `configureServer` does not run for `vite build` or `vite preview`.\n\n### Credits\n\n- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R\u0026D)\n\nDisclosure per CONTRIBUTING.md: the analysis and proof of concept were assisted by Claude (Claude Code). The findings were reviewed by the reporter above, who is submitting this report.",
  "id": "GHSA-qxg6-89mg-rqv8",
  "modified": "2026-10-21T19:54:26Z",
  "published": "2026-10-21T19:54:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/security/advisories/GHSA-qxg6-89mg-rqv8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112949"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/15cc006aa9f8683dc5f7e895d011fa7dc751ce35"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/b825313243dc55757e8d7c0f9e7a792135e13473"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v4.1.12"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v5.0.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vitest: Code injection via unauthenticated manual mock registration"
}

GHSA-QXJJ-2J7H-CQH2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-19 18:31 – Updated: 2025-11-20 18:31
VLAI
Details

An authentication bypass issue was discovered in Dasan Switch DS2924 web based interface, firmware versions 1.01.18 and 1.02.00, allowing attackers to gain escalated privileges via storing crafted cookies in the web browser.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-63206"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-19T18:15:48Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An authentication bypass issue was discovered in Dasan Switch DS2924 web based interface, firmware versions 1.01.18 and 1.02.00, allowing attackers to gain escalated privileges via storing crafted cookies in the web browser.",
  "id": "GHSA-qxjj-2j7h-cqh2",
  "modified": "2025-11-20T18:31:00Z",
  "published": "2025-11-19T18:31:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-63206"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/shiky8/my--cve-vulnerability-research/tree/main/CVE-2025-63206_Dasan%20Switch%20DS2924%20Authentication%20Bypass"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://dasansmc.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QXPC-XP35-7G95

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-19 06:31 – Updated: 2025-03-19 06:31
VLAI
Details

Missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in the webapi component in Synology Drive Server before 3.0.4-12699, 3.2.1-23280, 3.5.0-26085 and 3.5.1-26102 allows remote attackers to obtain administrator credentials via unspecified vectors.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-50630"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-19T06:15:15Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in the webapi component in Synology Drive Server before 3.0.4-12699, 3.2.1-23280, 3.5.0-26085 and 3.5.1-26102 allows remote attackers to obtain administrator credentials via unspecified vectors.",
  "id": "GHSA-qxpc-xp35-7g95",
  "modified": "2025-03-19T06:31:54Z",
  "published": "2025-03-19T06:31:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50630"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_21"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QXVG-H7Q2-HCXH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 18:53 – Updated: 2026-06-23 18:53
VLAI
Summary
motionEye: LFI → pass‑the‑hash admin → unsafe restore → unauth action exec (RCE)
Details

Summary

A multi‑stage chain in motionEye leads to remote code execution. The chain combines:

  1. Arbitrary file read (LFI) via the picture download endpoint for local motion cameras using absolute paths.
  2. Pass‑the‑hash admin auth due to accepting request signatures computed with password hashes.
  3. Unsafe config restore that extracts attacker‑controlled tarballs into CONF_PATH.
  4. Unauthenticated action execution via /action/<id>/<action>.

If the normal user password is unset, the chain becomes unauthenticated RCE. If a normal password exists, a normal user can still achieve admin escalation and RCE.


Affected Code (motionEye repo)

1) LFI (absolute path) — picture/<id>/download

Files: - motioneye/motioneye/handlers/picture.py → download() (local motion camera branch) - motioneye/motioneye/mediafiles.py → get_media_content()

Issue: get_media_content() only blocks .. and then joins target_dir with path. Absolute paths (e.g. /etc/hosts) bypass the join and are read directly.

2) Pass‑the‑hash admin auth

File: motioneye/motioneye/handlers/base.py → get_current_user()

Issue: The signature check allows signatures computed using the admin password hash (SHA1) as the key. If the hash is leaked (via LFI), admin access can be obtained without the plaintext password.

3) Unsafe restore (tar extraction)

File: motioneye/motioneye/config.py → restore()

Issue: tar zxC CONF_PATH is used on user‑supplied data without sanitizing entries. A crafted tar can drop executable files into CONF_PATH.

4) Unauthenticated action execution

File: motioneye/motioneye/handlers/action.py → post()

Issue: No authentication decorator is present. It executes <action>_<camera_id> found in CONF_PATH with subprocess.Popen.


Exploit Chain (Detailed)

  1. Create or find a local motion camera id (local motion cameras are required for the vulnerable LFI path).
  2. LFI via picture download:
  3. Request: /picture/<id>/download/<absolute_path>
  4. Example: /picture/1/download/%2Fetc%2Fhosts
  5. Result: Arbitrary file read.
  6. Read admin hash from /etc/motioneye/motion.conf:
  7. Contains @admin_password <SHA1_HASH>.
  8. Pass‑the‑hash admin:
  9. Compute signature for /config/restore?_username=admin using the hash as key.
  10. Admin access is accepted with hash‑based signatures.
  11. Restore malicious tar:
  12. Upload a tar containing lock_<id> (or any action) as an executable.
  13. File is written into CONF_PATH by restore.
  14. Trigger unauth action:
  15. POST /action/<id>/lock
  16. The server executes the injected file.

Proof of Execution (Observed Output)

In local testing, the injected action created a marker file:

/tmp/meye_rce_ok

Verification command:

docker exec -it motioneye ls -la /tmp | grep meye_rce_ok

Example output:

-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 ... /tmp/meye_rce_ok

Preconditions / Requirements

  • At least one local motion camera exists (e.g., netcam_url, videodevice).
  • picture/<id>/download is reachable:
  • Unauth if @normal_password is empty (default in some installs).
  • Auth required if normal password is set (attacker needs normal creds).

Impact

  • Unauth RCE (normal password unset).
  • Authenticated RCE (normal user → admin → RCE).
  • Arbitrary file read on server filesystem.
  • Full compromise of motionEye process account.

Suggested Fixes

  1. Block absolute paths in get_media_content() and get_media_path().
  2. Remove hash‑based signature acceptance; only accept signatures computed with plaintext passwords.
  3. Harden restore: reject absolute paths, .., symlinks, non‑regular files.
  4. Require authentication on ActionHandler (admin‑only).
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "motioneye"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.44.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-347",
      "CWE-434"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T18:53:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nA multi\u2011stage chain in motionEye leads to remote code execution. The chain combines:\n\n1. **Arbitrary file read (LFI)** via the picture download endpoint for **local motion cameras** using absolute paths.\n2. **Pass\u2011the\u2011hash admin auth** due to accepting request signatures computed with password hashes.\n3. **Unsafe config restore** that extracts attacker\u2011controlled tarballs into `CONF_PATH`.\n4. **Unauthenticated action execution** via `/action/\u003cid\u003e/\u003caction\u003e`.\n\nIf the **normal user password is unset**, the chain becomes **unauthenticated RCE**. If a normal password exists, a **normal user** can still achieve **admin escalation and RCE**.\n\n---\n\n## Affected Code (motionEye repo)\n\n### 1) LFI (absolute path) \u2014 `picture/\u003cid\u003e/download`\n**Files:**\n- `motioneye/motioneye/handlers/picture.py` \u2192 `download()` (local motion camera branch)\n- `motioneye/motioneye/mediafiles.py` \u2192 `get_media_content()`\n\n**Issue:** `get_media_content()` only blocks `..` and then joins `target_dir` with `path`. Absolute paths (e.g. `/etc/hosts`) bypass the join and are read directly.\n\n### 2) Pass\u2011the\u2011hash admin auth\n**File:** `motioneye/motioneye/handlers/base.py` \u2192 `get_current_user()`\n\n**Issue:** The signature check allows signatures computed using the **admin password hash** (SHA1) as the key. If the hash is leaked (via LFI), admin access can be obtained without the plaintext password.\n\n### 3) Unsafe restore (tar extraction)\n**File:** `motioneye/motioneye/config.py` \u2192 `restore()`\n\n**Issue:** `tar zxC CONF_PATH` is used on user\u2011supplied data without sanitizing entries. A crafted tar can drop executable files into `CONF_PATH`.\n\n### 4) Unauthenticated action execution\n**File:** `motioneye/motioneye/handlers/action.py` \u2192 `post()`\n\n**Issue:** No authentication decorator is present. It executes `\u003caction\u003e_\u003ccamera_id\u003e` found in `CONF_PATH` with `subprocess.Popen`.\n\n---\n\n## Exploit Chain (Detailed)\n\n1. **Create or find a local motion camera id** (local motion cameras are required for the vulnerable LFI path).\n2. **LFI via picture download**:\n   - Request: `/picture/\u003cid\u003e/download/\u003cabsolute_path\u003e`\n   - Example: `/picture/1/download/%2Fetc%2Fhosts`\n   - Result: Arbitrary file read.\n3. **Read admin hash** from `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf`:\n   - Contains `@admin_password \u003cSHA1_HASH\u003e`.\n4. **Pass\u2011the\u2011hash admin**:\n   - Compute signature for `/config/restore?_username=admin` using the **hash** as key.\n   - Admin access is accepted with hash\u2011based signatures.\n5. **Restore malicious tar**:\n   - Upload a tar containing `lock_\u003cid\u003e` (or any action) as an executable.\n   - File is written into `CONF_PATH` by restore.\n6. **Trigger unauth action**:\n   - POST `/action/\u003cid\u003e/lock`\n   - The server executes the injected file.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Execution (Observed Output)\nIn local testing, the injected action created a marker file:\n\n```\n/tmp/meye_rce_ok\n```\n\nVerification command:\n```\ndocker exec -it motioneye ls -la /tmp | grep meye_rce_ok\n```\nExample output:\n```\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 ... /tmp/meye_rce_ok\n```\n\n---\n\n## Preconditions / Requirements\n\n- At least **one local motion camera** exists (e.g., `netcam_url`, `videodevice`).\n- `picture/\u003cid\u003e/download` is reachable:\n  - **Unauth** if `@normal_password` is empty (default in some installs).\n  - **Auth required** if normal password is set (attacker needs normal creds).\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n- **Unauth RCE** (normal password unset).\n- **Authenticated RCE** (normal user \u2192 admin \u2192 RCE).\n- Arbitrary file read on server filesystem.\n- Full compromise of motionEye process account.\n\n---\n\n## Suggested Fixes\n1. **Block absolute paths** in `get_media_content()` and `get_media_path()`.\n2. **Remove hash\u2011based signature acceptance**; only accept signatures computed with plaintext passwords.\n3. **Harden restore**: reject absolute paths, `..`, symlinks, non\u2011regular files.\n4. **Require authentication** on `ActionHandler` (admin\u2011only).",
  "id": "GHSA-qxvg-h7q2-hcxh",
  "modified": "2026-06-23T18:53:04Z",
  "published": "2026-06-23T18:53:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-qxvg-h7q2-hcxh"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "motionEye: LFI \u2192 pass\u2011the\u2011hash admin \u2192 unsafe restore \u2192 unauth action exec (RCE)"
}

GHSA-QXX2-5VRP-RQ3M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-22 00:31
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in Oracle GoldenGate (component: Distribution Server executable). Supported versions that are affected are 21.3-21.21 and 23.4-23.26.1. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via HTTPS to compromise Oracle GoldenGate. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle GoldenGate. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.2 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-60396"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-21T22:17:42Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in Oracle GoldenGate (component: Distribution Server executable).  Supported versions that are affected are 21.3-21.21 and  23.4-23.26.1. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with network access via HTTPS to compromise Oracle GoldenGate.  Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle GoldenGate. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.2 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
  "id": "GHSA-qxx2-5vrp-rq3m",
  "modified": "2026-07-22T00:31:38Z",
  "published": "2026-07-22T00:31:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60396"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2026.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R24R-7CXR-HMCP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-29 00:30 – Updated: 2022-12-02 00:30
VLAI
Details

The /device/acceptBind end-point for Ourphoto App version 1.4.1 does not require authentication or authorization. The user_token header is not implemented or present on this end-point. An attacker can send a request to bind their account to any users picture frame, then send a POST request to accept their own bind request, without the end-users approval or interaction.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-24190"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-11-28T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The /device/acceptBind end-point for Ourphoto App version 1.4.1 does not require authentication or authorization. The user_token header is not implemented or present on this end-point. An attacker can send a request to bind their account to any users picture frame, then send a POST request to accept their own bind request, without the end-users approval or interaction.",
  "id": "GHSA-r24r-7cxr-hmcp",
  "modified": "2022-12-02T00:30:25Z",
  "published": "2022-11-29T00:30:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24190"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.scrawledsecurityblog.com/2022/11/automating-unsolicited-richard-pics.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R25F-8M5Q-7W4W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-21 00:33 – Updated: 2026-10-21 00:33
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in the Oracle Service Bus product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Core). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0 and 14.1.2.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Service Bus. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Service Bus. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-87419"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T22:20:20Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Service Bus product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Core).  Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0 and  14.1.2.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Service Bus.  Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Service Bus. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
  "id": "GHSA-r25f-8m5q-7w4w",
  "modified": "2026-10-21T00:33:11Z",
  "published": "2026-10-21T00:33:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87419"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2026.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R277-62XF-9V4G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-09 18:30 – Updated: 2025-10-09 18:30
VLAI
Details

A Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in Juniper Networks Security Director Policy Enforcer allows an unauthenticated, network-based attacker to replace legitimate vSRX images with malicious ones.

If a trusted user initiates deployment, Security Director Policy Enforcer will deliver the attacker's uploaded image to VMware NSX instead of a legitimate one.

This issue affects Security Director Policy Enforcer:  

  • All versions before 23.1R1 Hotpatch v3.

This issue does not affect Junos Space Security Director Insights.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-11198"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-09T16:15:44Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in Juniper Networks Security Director Policy Enforcer allows an unauthenticated, network-based attacker to replace legitimate vSRX images with malicious ones.\n\n\n\nIf a trusted user initiates deployment, Security Director Policy Enforcer will deliver the attacker\u0027s uploaded image to VMware NSX instead of a legitimate one.\n\n\n\n\n\nThis issue affects\u00a0Security Director Policy Enforcer:\u00a0\u00a0\n\n\n\n  *  All versions before 23.1R1 Hotpatch v3.\n\n\nThis issue does not affect Junos Space Security Director Insights.",
  "id": "GHSA-r277-62xf-9v4g",
  "modified": "2025-10-09T18:30:36Z",
  "published": "2025-10-09T18:30:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11198"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://supportportal.juniper.net/JSA103437"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:Y/R:U/V:C/RE:M/U:Red",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R28P-R669-W3H4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 21:32 – Updated: 2026-08-18 21:32
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in the Oracle Hyperion Calculation Manager product of Oracle Hyperion (component: Security). The supported version that is affected is 11.2.25.0.000. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Hyperion Calculation Manager. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Hyperion Calculation Manager. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-60858"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-18T21:16:45Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Hyperion Calculation Manager product of Oracle Hyperion (component: Security).   The supported version that is affected is 11.2.25.0.000. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Hyperion Calculation Manager.  Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Hyperion Calculation Manager. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
  "id": "GHSA-r28p-r669-w3h4",
  "modified": "2026-08-18T21:32:03Z",
  "published": "2026-08-18T21:32:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60858"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cspuaug2026.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R2CF-J5W6-4J3C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-29 21:30 – Updated: 2025-10-09 18:30
VLAI
Details

Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host prior to version 22.0.1049 and Application prior to version 20.0.2786 (VA/SaaS deployments) expose a set of PHP scripts under the console_release directory without requiring authentication. An unauthenticated remote attacker can invoke these endpoints to re‑configure networked printers, add or delete RFID badge devices, or otherwise modify device settings. This vulnerability has been identified by the vendor as: V-2024-029 — No Authentication to Modify Devices.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-34224"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-29T21:15:36Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host prior to version 22.0.1049\u00a0and Application prior to version 20.0.2786\u00a0(VA/SaaS deployments) expose\u00a0a set of PHP scripts under the `console_release` directory without requiring authentication.  An unauthenticated remote attacker can invoke these endpoints to re\u2011configure networked printers, add or delete RFID badge devices, or otherwise modify device settings.\u00a0This vulnerability has been identified by the vendor as: V-2024-029 \u2014 No Authentication to Modify Devices.",
  "id": "GHSA-r2cf-j5w6-4j3c",
  "modified": "2025-10-09T18:30:27Z",
  "published": "2025-09-29T21:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34224"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://help.printerlogic.com/saas/Print/Security/Security-Bulletins.htm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://help.printerlogic.com/va/Print/Security/Security-Bulletins.htm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2025-04-08-vasion-printerlogic-83-vulnerabilities.html#va-lack-of-auth-manage-printers"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vasion-print-printerlogic-unauth-device-modification"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
  • Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
  • In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
  • In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
Implementation System Configuration Operation

When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].

CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier

This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.

CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values

An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.

CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation

An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.

CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality

An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.

CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery

An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.