CWE-306
AllowedMissing Authentication for Critical Function
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
4625 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-8F9F-5JJH-XCJQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:22 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:22An issue was discovered in /bin/goahead on D-Link DIR-823G devices with firmware 1.02B03. There is incorrect access control allowing remote attackers to hijack the DNS service configuration of all clients in the WLAN, without authentication, via the SetWanSettings HNAP API.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-7390"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-02-05T00:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in /bin/goahead on D-Link DIR-823G devices with firmware 1.02B03. There is incorrect access control allowing remote attackers to hijack the DNS service configuration of all clients in the WLAN, without authentication, via the SetWanSettings HNAP API.",
"id": "GHSA-8f9f-5jjh-xcjq",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:22:49Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:22:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7390"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/leonW7/D-Link/blob/master/Vul_5.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/106855"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8FJW-GV37-439Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-16 00:00 – Updated: 2022-10-27 19:00Unauthenticated Arbitrary Options Update vulnerability leading to full website compromise discovered in Image Hover Effects Ultimate (versions <= 9.6.1) WordPress plugin.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-36888"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-12-15T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Unauthenticated Arbitrary Options Update vulnerability leading to full website compromise discovered in Image Hover Effects Ultimate (versions \u003c= 9.6.1) WordPress plugin.",
"id": "GHSA-8fjw-gv37-439q",
"modified": "2022-10-27T19:00:29Z",
"published": "2021-12-16T00:00:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36888"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/image-hover-effects-ultimate/wordpress-image-hover-effects-ultimate-plugin-9-6-1-unauthenticated-arbitrary-options-update-leading-to-full-website-compromise"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/image-hover-effects-ultimate/#developers"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8FWW-64WC-46PF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-21 12:30 – Updated: 2026-08-21 12:30Improper authentication in the agent receiver of Checkmk <2.5.0p10 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass mutual TLS client certificate verification of relay endpoints by supplying a fixed placeholder identity in the request URL, resulting in limited impact on integrity and availability. Only the Cloud, Ultimate and Ultimate MT editions are affected, as other editions do not expose relay endpoints.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-15576"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-21T11:17:04Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper authentication in the agent receiver of Checkmk \u003c2.5.0p10 allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass mutual TLS client certificate verification of relay endpoints by supplying a fixed placeholder identity in the request URL, resulting in limited impact on integrity and availability. Only the Cloud, Ultimate and Ultimate MT editions are affected, as other editions do not expose relay endpoints.",
"id": "GHSA-8fww-64wc-46pf",
"modified": "2026-08-21T12:30:32Z",
"published": "2026-08-21T12:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15576"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://checkmk.com/werk/20174"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8FXC-329R-9P4V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-27 09:30 – Updated: 2026-03-09 18:31Insufficient protection mechanisms in the Health Module may lead to partial information disclosure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-15567"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-27T07:17:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insufficient protection mechanisms in the Health Module may lead to partial information disclosure.",
"id": "GHSA-8fxc-329r-9p4v",
"modified": "2026-03-09T18:31:36Z",
"published": "2026-02-27T09:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-15567"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vivo.com/en/support/security-advisory-detail?id=19"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8G2F-G3GQ-5RJV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 13:49 – Updated: 2026-09-16 13:49Impact
djust's observability endpoints expose live view/session state and a remote method-invocation surface (eval_handler). The localhost restriction was an opt-in middleware that the documented setup omits; the views themselves enforced only DEBUG. In the misconfigured-but-documented scenario (DEBUG on, middleware not installed) a non-localhost client could read live application state and invoke handlers remotely.
Patches
Fixed in djust 1.0.7. The localhost restriction is enforced in-view on every observability endpoint (no longer dependent on a separately-installed middleware), and eval_handler is restricted; gated requests receive a non-disclosing response.
Workarounds
Ensure DEBUG=False in production, and do not expose the observability endpoints to untrusted networks.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "djust"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-61590"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-668"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-16T13:49:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\ndjust\u0027s observability endpoints expose live view/session state and a remote method-invocation surface (`eval_handler`). The localhost restriction was an **opt-in middleware that the documented setup omits**; the views themselves enforced only `DEBUG`. In the misconfigured-but-documented scenario (DEBUG on, middleware not installed) a non-localhost client could read live application state and invoke handlers remotely.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **djust 1.0.7**. The localhost restriction is enforced **in-view** on every observability endpoint (no longer dependent on a separately-installed middleware), and `eval_handler` is restricted; gated requests receive a non-disclosing response.\n\n### Workarounds\nEnsure `DEBUG=False` in production, and do not expose the observability endpoints to untrusted networks.",
"id": "GHSA-8g2f-g3gq-5rjv",
"modified": "2026-09-16T13:49:19Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T13:49:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/security/advisories/GHSA-8g2f-g3gq-5rjv"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/releases/tag/v1.0.7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "djust\u0027s observability endpoints are network-exposed: the localhost gate is an opt-in middleware the docs omit, and the views enforce only DEBUG"
}
GHSA-8G3V-WWHQ-2R48
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-17 00:32 – Updated: 2024-07-17 00:32Vulnerability in the Oracle Trade Management product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: GL Accounts). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.13. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Trade Management. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all Oracle Trade Management accessible data as well as unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle Trade Management accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.1 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-21146"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-16T23:15:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Trade Management product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: GL Accounts). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.13. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Trade Management. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all Oracle Trade Management accessible data as well as unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle Trade Management accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.1 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).",
"id": "GHSA-8g3v-wwhq-2r48",
"modified": "2024-07-17T00:32:55Z",
"published": "2024-07-17T00:32:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21146"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2024.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8G48-F3XJ-WJWV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-16 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-16 18:31During an internal security assessment, a potential improper access control vulnerability was discovered in Lenovo Smart Connect for Windows that could allow a local authenticated user to access files owned by a different user on the same system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-6511"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-16T17:16:58Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "During an internal security assessment, a potential improper access control vulnerability was discovered in Lenovo Smart Connect for Windows that could allow a local authenticated user to access files owned by a different user on the same system.",
"id": "GHSA-8g48-f3xj-wjwv",
"modified": "2026-07-16T18:31:34Z",
"published": "2026-07-16T18:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6511"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/LEN-218281"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.lenovo.com/us/en/software/smart-connect"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8G4W-4FFG-8VGX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-17 21:58 – Updated: 2026-08-17 21:58Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the 9Router dashboard via the /api/auth/oidc/test endpoint. The application accepts a user-controlled URL string through the issuerUrl parameter and performs an outbound HTTP request without validating if the destination IP belongs to a restricted internal network range.
Notably, this endpoint can be accessed without active session authentication (Unauthenticated), allowing any remote actor with network visibility to the dashboard API endpoints to trigger outbound infrastructure connections.
Depending on the state and response of the internal port targeted, this flaw exhibits two distinct behaviors:
- Port Scanning / Blind SSRF (Non-OIDC structures): Probing internal ports that are closed or running non-HTTP/non-OIDC services (e.g., SSH, Databases) forces predictable application behavior changes (e.g., structural timeout or clear JSON parsing error messages like "Unexpected token..."), allowing internal network reconnaissance.
- Full Data Feed Manipulation (OIDC matching structures): If the targeted internal service responds with a valid OpenID configuration document structure, the backend successfully processes, parses, and reflects the internal properties back to the client, confirming partial data control.
Vulnerable Code Details
- Classification: VE-Class 4 — OIDC SSRF via issuerUrl (Unauthenticated)
- File Path:
src/app/api/auth/oidc/test/route.js - Vulnerable Logic: The endpoint accepts the parameter directly from the client request and passes it directly into the network client routine without prior sanitization or middleware authentication wrapper checks.
// Vulnerable implementation wrapper inside the route handler
const discovery = await fetchOidcDiscovery(issuerUrl);
// Behind the scenes, this executes a direct dynamic outbound request:
// -> fetch(`${issuerUrl}/.well-known/openid-configuration`)
An unauthenticated user can point this at any internal URL to probe internal services that respond with JSON. The discovery JSON fields (token_endpoint, jwks_uri) are then processed by the internal application logic for further operations, enabling a multi-step SSRF chain.
Affected Endpoints
- Endpoint:
/api/auth/oidc/test - Method:
POST - Parameter:
issuerUrl - Impacted Feature: OIDC Authentication Configuration Test
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can abuse this behavior to use the 9Router instance as a proxy to:
- Conduct internal network topology discovery and port scanning against the hosting infrastructure (
127.0.0.1,10.0.0.0/8,192.168.0.0/16). - Expose internal application error states or feed malicious configuration structures back into the dashboard component logic without needing prior valid session tokens.
Proof of Concept & Reproducing Steps
Step 1: Set up the Verification Environment
Utilize a local mock listener on an internal port (e.g., Port 80).
Run the following PowerShell script with Administrative privileges to launch the mock listener:
$port = 80
$listener = New-Object System.Net.HttpListener
$listener.Prefixes.Add("http://127.0.0.1:$port/")
try {
$listener.Start()
Write-Host "=======================================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host " MOCK OIDC SERVER RUNNING ON PORT 80" -ForegroundColor Green
Write-Host "=======================================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
while ($listener.IsListening) {
$context = $listener.GetContext()
$request = $context.Request
Write-Host "[+] SSRF Request received for URL: $($request.Url)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
$jsonPayload = '{"issuer":"http://127.0.0.1","authorization_endpoint":"http://127.0.0.1/oauth/auth","token_endpoint":"http://127.0.0.1/oauth/token","userinfo_endpoint":"EVIDENCE_SSRF_CONFIRMED_SUCCESSFULLY","jwks_uri":"http://127.0.0.1/oauth/keys"}'
$response = $context.Response
$response.StatusCode = 200
$response.ContentType = "application/json"
$buffer = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($jsonPayload)
$response.ContentLength64 = $buffer.Length
$response.OutputStream.Write($buffer, 0, $buffer.Length)
$response.Close()
Write-Host "[*] JSON payload sent back to 9router" -ForegroundColor Green
}
} catch {
Write-Host "Error starting server on port 80" -ForegroundColor Red
} finally {
if ($listener.IsListening) { $listener.Stop() }
}
Step 2: Triggering the Vulnerability via Burp Suite
Send the following raw HTTP request to the 9Router instance (Notice no Cookie header is required):
POST /api/auth/oidc/test HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:3000
Content-Type: application/json
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 54
{
"issuerUrl": "http://127.0.0.1:80",
"clientId": "probe_only"
}
Step 3: Objective Analysis of Results
Scenario A: Targeting an Unmatched/Plain Text Port (e.g., Port returning raw strings like "check vul")
The server connects to the port, receives a non-JSON response, and errors out during parsing. The application response explicitly leaks the parsing failure:
{"error":"Unexpected token 'c', \"check vul\" is not valid JSON"}
Analysis: This confirms the backend successfully completed an outbound TCP handshake and read the payload from the internal resource, verifying an Error-based/Blind SSRF context without any user credentials.
Scenario B: Targeting the Valid Mock Port (Port 80 with the script active)
The backend connects to the mock listener, successfully fetches the fake configuration data, maps the internal endpoints, and replies with an HTTP 200 OK:
{
"ok": true,
"discoveryOk": true,
"issuerUrl": "http://127.0.0.1:80",
"authorizationEndpoint": "http://127.0.0.1/oauth/auth",
"tokenEndpoint": "http://127.0.0.1/oauth/token",
"jwksUri": "http://127.0.0.1/oauth/keys"
}
Analysis: This confirms a Full Data Feed SSRF. The internal properties parsed directly from the mock script are completely reflected back in the public client response body.
Root Cause Analysis
The application logic handles network requests initiated by user input inside /api/auth/oidc/test without validating the host destination. Additionally, the route handler lacks proper authentication middleware checks to safeguard the functionality, allowing anonymous requests to safely reach internal server loops or private IP subnets.
Suggested Fix
-
Implement Access Control: Protect the
/api/auth/oidc/testhandler with authentication middleware to enforce valid user sessions. -
Enforce Protocol Controls: Validate that
issuerUrlstrictly uses thehttps://protocol scheme before performing the fetch operation. -
Implement Network Blocklists: Resolve the hostname within
issuerUrlon the server-side before initiating the connection. Validate the resolved IP address and explicitly drop requests pointing to loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8,::1) or internal private addresses (10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "9router"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.5.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-56677"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-17T21:58:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the 9Router dashboard via the `/api/auth/oidc/test` endpoint. The application accepts a user-controlled URL string through the `issuerUrl` parameter and performs an outbound HTTP request without validating if the destination IP belongs to a restricted internal network range.\n\nNotably, this endpoint can be accessed without active session authentication (Unauthenticated), allowing any remote actor with network visibility to the dashboard API endpoints to trigger outbound infrastructure connections.\n\nDepending on the state and response of the internal port targeted, this flaw exhibits two distinct behaviors:\n\n1. **Port Scanning / Blind SSRF (Non-OIDC structures):** Probing internal ports that are closed or running non-HTTP/non-OIDC services (e.g., SSH, Databases) forces predictable application behavior changes (e.g., structural timeout or clear JSON parsing error messages like \"Unexpected token...\"), allowing internal network reconnaissance.\n2. **Full Data Feed Manipulation (OIDC matching structures):** If the targeted internal service responds with a valid OpenID configuration document structure, the backend successfully processes, parses, and reflects the internal properties back to the client, confirming partial data control.\n\n---\n\n### Vulnerable Code Details\n\n- **Classification:** VE-Class 4 \u2014 OIDC SSRF via issuerUrl (Unauthenticated)\n- **File Path:** `src/app/api/auth/oidc/test/route.js`\n- **Vulnerable Logic:** The endpoint accepts the parameter directly from the client request and passes it directly into the network client routine without prior sanitization or middleware authentication wrapper checks.\n\n```javascript\n// Vulnerable implementation wrapper inside the route handler\nconst discovery = await fetchOidcDiscovery(issuerUrl);\n// Behind the scenes, this executes a direct dynamic outbound request:\n// -\u003e fetch(`${issuerUrl}/.well-known/openid-configuration`)\n```\n\nAn unauthenticated user can point this at any internal URL to probe internal services that respond with JSON. The discovery JSON fields (`token_endpoint`, `jwks_uri`) are then processed by the internal application logic for further operations, enabling a multi-step SSRF chain.\n\n---\n\n### Affected Endpoints\n\n- **Endpoint:** `/api/auth/oidc/test`\n- **Method:** `POST`\n- **Parameter:** `issuerUrl`\n- **Impacted Feature:** OIDC Authentication Configuration Test\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can abuse this behavior to use the 9Router instance as a proxy to:\n\n- Conduct internal network topology discovery and port scanning against the hosting infrastructure (`127.0.0.1`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `192.168.0.0/16`).\n- Expose internal application error states or feed malicious configuration structures back into the dashboard component logic without needing prior valid session tokens.\n\n---\n\n### Proof of Concept \u0026 Reproducing Steps\n\n#### Step 1: Set up the Verification Environment\n\nUtilize a local mock listener on an internal port (e.g., Port 80).\n\nRun the following PowerShell script with Administrative privileges to launch the mock listener:\n\n```powershell\n$port = 80\n$listener = New-Object System.Net.HttpListener\n$listener.Prefixes.Add(\"http://127.0.0.1:$port/\")\n\ntry {\n $listener.Start()\n Write-Host \"=======================================================\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n Write-Host \" MOCK OIDC SERVER RUNNING ON PORT 80\" -ForegroundColor Green\n Write-Host \"=======================================================\" -ForegroundColor Cyan\n\n while ($listener.IsListening) {\n $context = $listener.GetContext()\n $request = $context.Request\n Write-Host \"[+] SSRF Request received for URL: $($request.Url)\" -ForegroundColor Yellow\n \n $jsonPayload = \u0027{\"issuer\":\"http://127.0.0.1\",\"authorization_endpoint\":\"http://127.0.0.1/oauth/auth\",\"token_endpoint\":\"http://127.0.0.1/oauth/token\",\"userinfo_endpoint\":\"EVIDENCE_SSRF_CONFIRMED_SUCCESSFULLY\",\"jwks_uri\":\"http://127.0.0.1/oauth/keys\"}\u0027\n\n $response = $context.Response\n $response.StatusCode = 200\n $response.ContentType = \"application/json\"\n \n $buffer = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($jsonPayload)\n $response.ContentLength64 = $buffer.Length\n $response.OutputStream.Write($buffer, 0, $buffer.Length)\n $response.Close()\n Write-Host \"[*] JSON payload sent back to 9router\" -ForegroundColor Green\n }\n} catch {\n Write-Host \"Error starting server on port 80\" -ForegroundColor Red\n} finally {\n if ($listener.IsListening) { $listener.Stop() }\n}\n```\n\n#### Step 2: Triggering the Vulnerability via Burp Suite\n\nSend the following raw HTTP request to the 9Router instance (Notice no Cookie header is required):\n\n```http\nPOST /api/auth/oidc/test HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:3000\nContent-Type: application/json\nConnection: keep-alive\nContent-Length: 54\n\n{\n \"issuerUrl\": \"http://127.0.0.1:80\",\n \"clientId\": \"probe_only\"\n}\n```\n\n#### Step 3: Objective Analysis of Results\n\n**Scenario A: Targeting an Unmatched/Plain Text Port** (e.g., Port returning raw strings like `\"check vul\"`)\n\nThe server connects to the port, receives a non-JSON response, and errors out during parsing. The application response explicitly leaks the parsing failure:\n\n```json\n{\"error\":\"Unexpected token \u0027c\u0027, \\\"check vul\\\" is not valid JSON\"}\n```\n\n\u003e **Analysis:** This confirms the backend successfully completed an outbound TCP handshake and read the payload from the internal resource, verifying an Error-based/Blind SSRF context without any user credentials.\n\n---\n\n**Scenario B: Targeting the Valid Mock Port** (Port 80 with the script active)\n\nThe backend connects to the mock listener, successfully fetches the fake configuration data, maps the internal endpoints, and replies with an HTTP 200 OK:\n\n```json\n{\n \"ok\": true,\n \"discoveryOk\": true,\n \"issuerUrl\": \"http://127.0.0.1:80\",\n \"authorizationEndpoint\": \"http://127.0.0.1/oauth/auth\",\n \"tokenEndpoint\": \"http://127.0.0.1/oauth/token\",\n \"jwksUri\": \"http://127.0.0.1/oauth/keys\"\n}\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1513\" height=\"651\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6621f418-7a0d-4660-b301-ad37468d8d7a\" /\u003e\n\n\u003e **Analysis:** This confirms a Full Data Feed SSRF. The internal properties parsed directly from the mock script are completely reflected back in the public client response body.\n\n---\n\n### Root Cause Analysis\n\nThe application logic handles network requests initiated by user input inside `/api/auth/oidc/test` without validating the host destination. Additionally, the route handler lacks proper authentication middleware checks to safeguard the functionality, allowing anonymous requests to safely reach internal server loops or private IP subnets.\n\n---\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\n1. **Implement Access Control:** Protect the `/api/auth/oidc/test` handler with authentication middleware to enforce valid user sessions.\n\n2. **Enforce Protocol Controls:** Validate that `issuerUrl` strictly uses the `https://` protocol scheme before performing the fetch operation.\n\n3. **Implement Network Blocklists:** Resolve the hostname within `issuerUrl` on the server-side before initiating the connection. Validate the resolved IP address and explicitly drop requests pointing to loopback addresses (`127.0.0.0/8`, `::1`) or internal private addresses (`10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`).",
"id": "GHSA-8g4w-4ffg-8vgx",
"modified": "2026-08-17T21:58:43Z",
"published": "2026-08-17T21:58:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/security/advisories/GHSA-8g4w-4ffg-8vgx"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "9Router: Authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via OIDC Provider Test Endpoint"
}
GHSA-8G5X-WGWR-8JWP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 00:32 – Updated: 2026-08-28 00:32Ebyte gateway product's vendor configuration utility does not require authentication before allowing certain disruptive administrative actions when default credentials remain configured. An unauthenticated attacker on the adjacent network could reboot the device or restore factory settings, resulting in a loss of configuration and service availability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-77977"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-28T00:18:15Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Ebyte gateway product\u0027s vendor configuration utility does not require authentication before \nallowing certain disruptive administrative actions when default \ncredentials remain configured. An unauthenticated attacker on the \nadjacent network could reboot the device or restore factory settings, \nresulting in a loss of configuration and service availability.",
"id": "GHSA-8g5x-wgwr-8jwp",
"modified": "2026-08-28T00:32:04Z",
"published": "2026-08-28T00:32:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77977"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-237-06.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-237-06"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8G64-6M2C-QGXH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-15 21:31 – Updated: 2025-07-15 21:31Vulnerability in the Oracle WebLogic Server product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Core). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0, 14.1.1.0.0 and 14.1.2.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via T3, IIOP to compromise Oracle WebLogic Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle WebLogic Server accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.5 (Confidentiality impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-30762"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-15T20:15:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle WebLogic Server product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Core). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0, 14.1.1.0.0 and 14.1.2.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via T3, IIOP to compromise Oracle WebLogic Server. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle WebLogic Server accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.5 (Confidentiality impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N).",
"id": "GHSA-8g64-6m2c-qgxh",
"modified": "2025-07-15T21:31:40Z",
"published": "2025-07-15T21:31:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30762"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2025.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
- Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
- In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
- In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].
CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier
This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.
CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values
An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.
CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation
An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.