CWE-294
AllowedAuthentication Bypass by Capture-replay
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
A capture-replay flaw exists when the design of the product makes it possible for a malicious user to sniff network traffic and bypass authentication by replaying it to the server in question to the same effect as the original message (or with minor changes).
440 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-R8J8-HMFC-5QH8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:21 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:54Tinxy Door Lock with firmware before 3.2 allow attackers to unlock a door by replaying an Unlock request that occurred when the attacker was previously authorized. In other words, door-access revocation is mishandled.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-9438"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-294"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-06-23T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Tinxy Door Lock with firmware before 3.2 allow attackers to unlock a door by replaying an Unlock request that occurred when the attacker was previously authorized. In other words, door-access revocation is mishandled.",
"id": "GHSA-r8j8-hmfc-5qh8",
"modified": "2024-04-04T02:54:27Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:21:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-9438"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://medium.com/%40avishek_75733/smart-products-are-always-not-that-smart-tinxy-smart-door-lock-vulnerability-97f91e435e06"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://medium.com/@avishek_75733/smart-products-are-always-not-that-smart-tinxy-smart-door-lock-vulnerability-97f91e435e06"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R9Q5-C7QC-P26W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 23:08 – Updated: 2026-03-19 21:18Summary
When Nextcloud Talk webhook signing was valid, replayed requests could be accepted without durable replay suppression, allowing duplicate inbound processing after replay-window expiry or process restart.
Details
OpenClaw's Nextcloud Talk webhook path verified HMAC(secret, random + body) but previously lacked durable replay state tied to webhook events. This allowed replay of a previously valid signed request in some operational conditions.
The fix on main adds:
- persistent per-account replay dedupe for Nextcloud Talk webhook events,
- replay checks before webhook side effects (onMessage),
- backend-origin validation against configured account base URL (when configured).
Impact
A captured valid signed webhook request could be replayed to trigger duplicate inbound handling. This is an integrity/availability issue (duplicate actions/noise), scoped to deployments using Nextcloud Talk webhook integration.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected:
<= 2026.2.24 - Patched in release:
2026.2.25
Fix Commit(s)
d512163d686ad6741783e7119ddb3437f493dbbc
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set to the release (2026.2.25) so once npm release 2026.2.25 is published, advisory is now published.
OpenClaw thanks @aristorechina for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.24"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.25"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-28449"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-294"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T23:08:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nWhen Nextcloud Talk webhook signing was valid, replayed requests could be accepted without durable replay suppression, allowing duplicate inbound processing after replay-window expiry or process restart.\n\n### Details\nOpenClaw\u0027s Nextcloud Talk webhook path verified `HMAC(secret, random + body)` but previously lacked durable replay state tied to webhook events. This allowed replay of a previously valid signed request in some operational conditions.\n\nThe fix on `main` adds:\n- persistent per-account replay dedupe for Nextcloud Talk webhook events,\n- replay checks before webhook side effects (`onMessage`),\n- backend-origin validation against configured account base URL (when configured).\n\n### Impact\nA captured valid signed webhook request could be replayed to trigger duplicate inbound handling. This is an integrity/availability issue (duplicate actions/noise), scoped to deployments using Nextcloud Talk webhook integration.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.2.24`\n- Patched in release: `2026.2.25`\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `d512163d686ad6741783e7119ddb3437f493dbbc`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the release (`2026.2.25`) so once npm release `2026.2.25` is published, advisory is now published.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @aristorechina for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-r9q5-c7qc-p26w",
"modified": "2026-03-19T21:18:54Z",
"published": "2026-03-03T23:08:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-r9q5-c7qc-p26w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28449"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/d512163d686ad6741783e7119ddb3437f493dbbc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-webhook-replay-attack-via-missing-durable-replay-suppression"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s Nextcloud Talk webhook replay could trigger duplicate inbound processing"
}
GHSA-RC3W-3H77-HJ5Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-26 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-27 21:31An issue in Vanderbilt Industries, Acre Security SPC5300.000 Main Board v.3.14.1 allows a physically proximate attacker to cause a denial of service via spoofed TCP FIN packets without validating the sequence or acknowledgment numbers.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-61480"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-294"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-26T21:16:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue in Vanderbilt Industries, Acre Security SPC5300.000 Main Board v.3.14.1 allows a physically proximate attacker to cause a denial of service via spoofed TCP FIN packets without validating the sequence or acknowledgment numbers.",
"id": "GHSA-rc3w-3h77-hj5q",
"modified": "2026-08-27T21:31:25Z",
"published": "2026-08-26T21:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61480"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nva.sikt.no/registration/019c9145712a-8c458dda-4473-488c-9a20-b9e8938f24d5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RC6V-5RMX-W5MV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-15 18:13 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:34Summary
Three medium-severity issues in arnika affecting the UDP key-rotation protocol, PQC key file handling, and KMS TLS client. All require specific preconditions to exploit and do not allow direct code execution or immediate key extraction. A self-contained PoC is attached.
Details
1) ACK timestamp not validated: udpserver.go:185
udpClient() verifies HMAC and packet type but never checks ackPkt.Timestamp. A MITM can capture one ACK, drop all subsequent DATA packets, and replay the stale ACK indefinitely. Primary advances PSK each rotation, backup stays on key 1, tunnel breaks. No PSK knowledge needed. The server side already has this check, the client does not.
Fix: mirror the timestamp check already present on the server side.
2) Empty PQC key file silently accepted: repositories/pqc.go:29
os.ReadFile follows symlinks. Empty file to base64.Decode("") = []byte{}, nil. HKDF runs on the QKD key alone while arnika logs [OK] HKDF derivation completed for QKD+PQC key. Requires write access to the directory containing PQC_PSK_FILE.
Fix: validate decoded key is non-empty before derivation; enforce parent directory permissions in SECURITY.md.
3) InsecureSkipVerify: true hardcoded: repositories/kms.go:61
KMS HTTP client unconditionally sets InsecureSkipVerify: true, overriding RootCAs. CA_CERTIFICATE is loaded but never consulted (dead code). Requires MITM between arnika and the KMS endpoint, which in typical deployments are co-located.
Fix: remove the flag; RootCAs already holds the correct pool when CA_CERTIFICATE is configured.
PoC
See arnika_exploit.tar.gz. PoC shows observable behavior for each attack; the third one (KMS MITM) needs no custom code, any HTTPS proxy with a self-signed cert is enough.
Impact
Issues require network MITM or local directory write access to exploit. No direct key extraction or code execution. Primary impact is tunnel desync and silent security downgrade in hybrid QKD+PQC mode.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/arnika-project/arnika"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-294",
"CWE-295",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-15T18:13:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThree medium-severity issues in arnika affecting the UDP key-rotation protocol, PQC key file handling, and KMS TLS client. All require specific preconditions to exploit and do not allow direct code execution or immediate key extraction. A self-contained PoC is attached.\n\n### Details\n1) ACK timestamp not validated: `udpserver.go:185`\n`udpClient()` verifies HMAC and packet type but never checks `ackPkt.Timestamp`. A MITM can capture one ACK, drop all subsequent DATA packets, and replay the stale ACK indefinitely. Primary advances PSK each rotation, backup stays on key 1, tunnel breaks. No PSK knowledge needed. The server side already has this check, the client does not.\n**Fix**: mirror the timestamp check already present on the server side.\n\n2) Empty PQC key file silently accepted: `repositories/pqc.go:29`\n`os.ReadFile` follows symlinks. Empty file to `base64.Decode(\"\") = []byte{}, nil`. HKDF runs on the QKD key alone while arnika logs `[OK] HKDF derivation completed for QKD+PQC key`. Requires write access to the directory containing `PQC_PSK_FILE`.\n**Fix**: validate decoded key is non-empty before derivation; enforce parent directory permissions in `SECURITY.md`.\n\n3) `InsecureSkipVerify: true` hardcoded: `repositories/kms.go:61`\nKMS HTTP client unconditionally sets `InsecureSkipVerify: true`, overriding `RootCAs`. `CA_CERTIFICATE` is loaded but never consulted (dead code). Requires MITM between arnika and the KMS endpoint, which in typical deployments are co-located.\n**Fix**: remove the flag; `RootCAs` already holds the correct pool when `CA_CERTIFICATE` is configured.\n\n### PoC\nSee [arnika_exploit.tar.gz](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27585454/arnika_exploit.tar.gz). PoC shows observable behavior for each attack; the third one (KMS MITM) needs no custom code, any HTTPS proxy with a self-signed cert is enough.\n\n### Impact\nIssues require network MITM or local directory write access to exploit. No direct key extraction or code execution. Primary impact is tunnel desync and silent security downgrade in hybrid QKD+PQC mode.",
"id": "GHSA-rc6v-5rmx-w5mv",
"modified": "2026-06-09T10:34:05Z",
"published": "2026-05-15T18:13:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/arnika-project/arnika/security/advisories/GHSA-rc6v-5rmx-w5mv"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/arnika-project/arnika/commit/efbd980d8b636cb59f60f2d6ece1b80a9cf36535"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/arnika-project/arnika"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/arnika-project/arnika/releases/tag/v1.0.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "arnika is affected by medium-severity issues in UDP rotation, PQC handling, and KMS TLS"
}
GHSA-RJM3-978X-473M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:16 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:16SAGA1-L8B with any firmware versions prior to A0.10 are vulnerable to a replay attack and command forgery.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-17903"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-294"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-10-24T22:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "SAGA1-L8B with any firmware versions prior to A0.10 are vulnerable to a replay attack and command forgery.",
"id": "GHSA-rjm3-978x-473m",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:16:09Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:16:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-17903"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-18-296-02"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/105729"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RP7W-4XXF-CQ5W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:03 – Updated: 2026-06-02 21:30In Omron PLC CJ series, all versions, and Omron PLC CS series, all versions, an attacker could monitor traffic between the PLC and the controller and replay requests that could result in the opening and closing of industrial valves.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-13533"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-294"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-12-16T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In Omron PLC CJ series, all versions, and Omron PLC CS series, all versions, an attacker could monitor traffic between the PLC and the controller and replay requests that could result in the opening and closing of industrial valves.",
"id": "GHSA-rp7w-4xxf-cq5w",
"modified": "2026-06-02T21:30:30Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:03:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-13533"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/advisories/icsa-19-346-02"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RQG8-XJP2-PG9W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:48 – Updated: 2024-09-30 16:45LinOTP is prone to a replay attack with activated automatic resynchronization. This vulnerability may allow an attacker to successfully log in with OTP values recorded at a previous point in time.
This attack is only possible if automatic resynchronization is enabled for the TOTP token type. The automatic resynchronization is deactivated by default. All other tokens are unaffected.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "LinOTP"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-12887"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-294"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-29T09:47:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-06-27T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "LinOTP is prone to a replay attack with activated automatic resynchronization. This vulnerability may allow an attacker to successfully log in with OTP values recorded at a previous point in time.\n\nThis attack is only possible if automatic resynchronization is enabled for the TOTP token type. The automatic resynchronization is deactivated by default. All other tokens are unaffected.",
"id": "GHSA-rqg8-xjp2-pg9w",
"modified": "2024-09-30T16:45:35Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:48:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-12887"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/LinOTP/LinOTP/commit/6d28d93af59d2ce0d844a6a3282148064efc6ad8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/LinOTP/LinOTP"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/linotp/PYSEC-2019-103.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://linotp.org/linotp-hotfix-autoresync.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.linotp.org/CVE-2019-12887.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "LinOTP replay vulnerability with auto resynchronization enabled for TOTP token"
}
GHSA-RW3P-8PM8-F7WF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:19 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:19A replay issue was discovered on Neato Botvac Connected 2.2.0 devices. Manual control mode requires authentication, but once recorded, the authentication (always transmitted in cleartext) can be replayed to /bin/webserver on port 8081. There are no nonces, and timestamps are not checked at all.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-17176"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-294"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-09-18T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A replay issue was discovered on Neato Botvac Connected 2.2.0 devices. Manual control mode requires authentication, but once recorded, the authentication (always transmitted in cleartext) can be replayed to /bin/webserver on port 8081. There are no nonces, and timestamps are not checked at all.",
"id": "GHSA-rw3p-8pm8-f7wf",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:19:24Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:19:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-17176"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://media.ccc.de/v/2018-124-pinky-brain-are-taking-over-the-world-with-vacuum-cleaners"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-V2JF-442R-6MJH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 21:01 – Updated: 2026-06-26 21:01internal/api/pop/nonce.go:25,40,86 + internal/api/server.go:38 — the signed-poll nonce cache is an in-process LRU sized at 65,536 entries. internal/api/updates.go:31 sets pollClockSkew = 5 * time.Minute as the replay window.
Affected
All released versions through v0.3.0 that have shipped the ADR 0004 signed-poll path. (If this is gated behind a feature flag, on a side branch, or not yet on a release tag, please flag — this advisory may not apply to the released artifact yet.)
Threat model
A captured signed-poll request can be replayed:
- After any process restart — the in-memory LRU is wiped, so the original nonce becomes "unseen" again. Replay succeeds if the original timestamp is still within the 5-minute skew.
- After forced eviction — an attacker with control of any single host can flood >65,536 nonces under their own host_id, driving the global LRU to evict the victim's recorded nonce. Replay then succeeds.
Impact is bounded: a replayed poll fetches the /api/v1/agent/updates body. That body can include a freshly-minted enrollment token if a rekey is pending (updates.go:249-260) — at which point the attacker holds a single-use token they can redeem under their own keypair.
Suggested fix
Two options, either acceptable:
- Persist nonces in SQLite keyed by
(host_id, nonce)withON CONFLICT DO NOTHING, retained for the timestamp-skew window. Adds one transactional INSERT per poll; bounded by the skew window (~5 min worth of rows server-wide). - Per-host cap on the LRU instead of a global 65k cap, so one host cannot evict another's records. Combined with shorter skew (≤30s) to bound the post-restart replay window.
Option 1 is more robust; option 2 is lower-implementation-effort.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.3.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/juev/nebula-mesh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-294"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T21:01:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "`internal/api/pop/nonce.go:25,40,86` + `internal/api/server.go:38` \u2014 the signed-poll nonce cache is an in-process LRU sized at 65,536 entries. `internal/api/updates.go:31` sets `pollClockSkew = 5 * time.Minute` as the replay window.\n\n## Affected\nAll released versions through v0.3.0 that have shipped the ADR 0004 signed-poll path. (If this is gated behind a feature flag, on a side branch, or not yet on a release tag, please flag \u2014 this advisory may not apply to the released artifact yet.)\n\n## Threat model\nA captured signed-poll request can be replayed:\n\n1. **After any process restart** \u2014 the in-memory LRU is wiped, so the original nonce becomes \"unseen\" again. Replay succeeds if the original timestamp is still within the 5-minute skew.\n2. **After forced eviction** \u2014 an attacker with control of any single host can flood \u003e65,536 nonces under their own host_id, driving the global LRU to evict the victim\u0027s recorded nonce. Replay then succeeds.\n\nImpact is bounded: a replayed poll fetches the `/api/v1/agent/updates` body. That body can include a freshly-minted enrollment token if a rekey is pending (`updates.go:249-260`) \u2014 at which point the attacker holds a single-use token they can redeem under their own keypair.\n\n## Suggested fix\nTwo options, either acceptable:\n\n1. Persist nonces in SQLite keyed by `(host_id, nonce)` with `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`, retained for the timestamp-skew window. Adds one transactional INSERT per poll; bounded by the skew window (~5 min worth of rows server-wide).\n2. Per-host cap on the LRU instead of a global 65k cap, so one host cannot evict another\u0027s records. Combined with shorter skew (\u226430s) to bound the post-restart replay window.\n\nOption 1 is more robust; option 2 is lower-implementation-effort.",
"id": "GHSA-v2jf-442r-6mjh",
"modified": "2026-06-26T21:01:09Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T21:01:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-v2jf-442r-6mjh"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "nebula-mesh: Signed-poll nonce LRU is in-memory and bounded; replay survives restart + eviction"
}
GHSA-V334-55HV-WVC6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-30 09:30 – Updated: 2024-01-30 09:30Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in Mitsubishi Electric Corporation MELSEC WS Series WS0-GETH00200 all serial numbers allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to bypass authentication by capture-replay attack and illegally login to the affected module. As a result, the remote attacker who has logged in illegally may be able to disclose or tamper with the programs and parameters in the modules.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-6374"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-294"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-30T09:15:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in Mitsubishi Electric Corporation MELSEC WS Series WS0-GETH00200 all serial numbers allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to bypass authentication by capture-replay attack and illegally login to the affected module. As a result, the remote attacker who has logged in illegally may be able to disclose or tamper with the programs and parameters in the modules.",
"id": "GHSA-v334-55hv-wvc6",
"modified": "2024-01-30T09:30:34Z",
"published": "2024-01-30T09:30:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6374"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/vu/JVNVU99497477"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-24-030-03"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mitsubishielectric.com/en/psirt/vulnerability/pdf/2023-019_en.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Utilize some sequence or time stamping functionality along with a checksum which takes this into account in order to ensure that messages can be parsed only once.
Mitigation
Since any attacker who can listen to traffic can see sequence numbers, it is necessary to sign messages with some kind of cryptography to ensure that sequence numbers are not simply doctored along with content.
CAPEC-102: Session Sidejacking
Session sidejacking takes advantage of an unencrypted communication channel between a victim and target system. The attacker sniffs traffic on a network looking for session tokens in unencrypted traffic. Once a session token is captured, the attacker performs malicious actions by using the stolen token with the targeted application to impersonate the victim. This attack is a specific method of session hijacking, which is exploiting a valid session token to gain unauthorized access to a target system or information. Other methods to perform a session hijacking are session fixation, cross-site scripting, or compromising a user or server machine and stealing the session token.
CAPEC-509: Kerberoasting
Through the exploitation of how service accounts leverage Kerberos authentication with Service Principal Names (SPNs), the adversary obtains and subsequently cracks the hashed credentials of a service account target to exploit its privileges. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. As an authenticated user, the adversary may request Active Directory and obtain a service ticket with portions encrypted via RC4 with the private key of the authenticated account. By extracting the local ticket and saving it disk, the adversary can brute force the hashed value to reveal the target account credentials.
CAPEC-555: Remote Services with Stolen Credentials
This pattern of attack involves an adversary that uses stolen credentials to leverage remote services such as RDP, telnet, SSH, and VNC to log into a system. Once access is gained, any number of malicious activities could be performed.
CAPEC-561: Windows Admin Shares with Stolen Credentials
An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows administrator credentials (e.g. userID/password) to access Windows Admin Shares on a local machine or within a Windows domain.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-644: Use of Captured Hashes (Pass The Hash)
An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows domain credential hash values to access systems within the domain that leverage the Lan Man (LM) and/or NT Lan Man (NTLM) authentication protocols.
CAPEC-645: Use of Captured Tickets (Pass The Ticket)
An adversary uses stolen Kerberos tickets to access systems/resources that leverage the Kerberos authentication protocol. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. An adversary can obtain any one of these tickets (e.g. Service Ticket, Ticket Granting Ticket, Silver Ticket, or Golden Ticket) to authenticate to a system/resource without needing the account's credentials. Depending on the ticket obtained, the adversary may be able to access a particular resource or generate TGTs for any account within an Active Directory Domain.
CAPEC-652: Use of Known Kerberos Credentials
An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Kerberos credentials (e.g. Kerberos service account userID/password or Kerberos Tickets) with the goal of achieving authenticated access to additional systems, applications, or services within the domain.
CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)
An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.
CAPEC-94: Adversary in the Middle (AiTM)
An adversary targets the communication between two components (typically client and server), in order to alter or obtain data from transactions. A general approach entails the adversary placing themself within the communication channel between the two components.