CWE-250
AllowedExecution with Unnecessary Privileges
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product performs an operation at a privilege level that is higher than the minimum level required, which creates new weaknesses or amplifies the consequences of other weaknesses.
651 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-7P7C-646P-56RG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-15 15:30 – Updated: 2025-10-15 15:30A potential vulnerability was reported in PC Manager that could allow a local authenticated user to execute code with elevated privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-8486"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-250"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-15T15:16:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A potential vulnerability was reported in PC Manager that could allow a local authenticated user to execute code with elevated privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-7p7c-646p-56rg",
"modified": "2025-10-15T15:30:29Z",
"published": "2025-10-15T15:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8486"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://iknow.lenovo.com.cn/detail/432378"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-7PG5-V792-9XV2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-11 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 00:32The www-data user can elevate its privileges because sudo is configured to allow the execution of the mount command as root without a password. Therefore, the privileges can be escalated to the root user. The risk has been accepted by the vendor and won't be fixed in the near future.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-28139"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-250"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-11T16:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The www-data user can elevate its privileges because sudo is configured to allow the execution of the mount command as root without a password. Therefore, the privileges can be escalated to the root user. The risk has been accepted by the vendor and won\u0027t be fixed in the near future.",
"id": "GHSA-7pg5-v792-9xv2",
"modified": "2025-11-04T00:32:09Z",
"published": "2024-12-11T18:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-28139"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://r.sec-consult.com/imageaccess"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Dec/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7PJR-QPVH-M339
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 20:17 – Updated: 2026-06-10 18:42Summary
Before the round-1 security sweep, pkg/builder/builder.go passed Environment.spec.builder.command directly into exec.Command(...) after a strings.Fields split, with no validation of the executable path or its arguments. A user who could create or update Environment CRDs in a namespace observed by the buildermgr could thereby point the builder pod at any executable inside the builder image (e.g. /bin/sh -c '...') and execute arbitrary code in the builder pod context.
Affected component
pkg/builder/builder.go:254— call site (exec.Command(buildCmd, buildArgs...)).pkg/builder/builder.go:106— input source:buildCmd, buildArgs = strings.Fields(req.BuildCommand)[0], strings.Fields(req.BuildCommand)[1:].
Impact
A subject with create / update privilege on Environment objects could:
- Cause the builder pod for any package using that environment to execute arbitrary code.
- Read whatever files the builder pod has access to inside its
/packagesshared volume (deployment archive payloads for that package). - Write arbitrary content into the
/packagesshared volume, which the fetcher subsequently uploads as the package deployment archive.
The builder pod runs in the user's namespace with the fission-builder SA (not the more-privileged executor SA), so the impact is bounded to that namespace's package contents and the builder pod's own filesystem. PR:H reflects that creating / modifying Environment CRDs is typically restricted to cluster admins or platform operators.
Root cause
pkg/builder/builder.go's build-command parser did not validate the resulting executable path. Although exec.Command does not invoke a shell, it does locate the executable via $PATH, and strings.Fields splitting allowed multiple flags / sub-arguments to be passed.
Fix
Released in v1.23.0:
- PR #3364 (commit
0f45c911) introducesBuilder.resolveBuildCommandinpkg/builder/builder.go, which: - Accepts an empty string (treated as the default
/build). - Accepts the literal
/build. - Accepts any absolute path that survives
filepath.Cleanand contains no..segments. - Rejects anything containing whitespace metacharacters or relative paths.
exec.Commandstill receives only the validated absolute path; sub-arguments continue to come fromstrings.Fieldsof the original string but are now passed positionally with no shell expansion.
Mitigation (until upgrade)
- Restrict who can create / update
EnvironmentCRDs to trusted operators only. - Audit
Environment.spec.builder.commandvalues for any non-/buildpaths. - Run the buildermgr with a tightened ServiceAccount that has no secret access in the builder namespace.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.22.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/fission/fission"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.23.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46618"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-250",
"CWE-269",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-21T20:17:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T18:17:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nBefore the round-1 security sweep, `pkg/builder/builder.go` passed `Environment.spec.builder.command` directly into `exec.Command(...)` after a `strings.Fields` split, with no validation of the executable path or its arguments. A user who could create or update `Environment` CRDs in a namespace observed by the buildermgr could thereby point the builder pod at any executable inside the builder image (e.g. `/bin/sh -c \u0027...\u0027`) and execute arbitrary code in the builder pod context.\n\n### Affected component\n\n- `pkg/builder/builder.go:254` \u2014 call site (`exec.Command(buildCmd, buildArgs...)`).\n- `pkg/builder/builder.go:106` \u2014 input source: `buildCmd, buildArgs = strings.Fields(req.BuildCommand)[0], strings.Fields(req.BuildCommand)[1:]`.\n\n### Impact\n\nA subject with `create` / `update` privilege on `Environment` objects could:\n\n1. Cause the builder pod for any package using that environment to execute arbitrary code.\n2. Read whatever files the builder pod has access to inside its `/packages` shared volume (deployment archive payloads for that package).\n3. Write arbitrary content into the `/packages` shared volume, which the fetcher subsequently uploads as the package deployment archive.\n\nThe builder pod runs in the user\u0027s namespace with the `fission-builder` SA (not the more-privileged executor SA), so the impact is bounded to that namespace\u0027s package contents and the builder pod\u0027s own filesystem. `PR:H` reflects that creating / modifying `Environment` CRDs is typically restricted to cluster admins or platform operators.\n\n### Root cause\n\n`pkg/builder/builder.go`\u0027s build-command parser did not validate the resulting executable path. Although `exec.Command` does not invoke a shell, it does locate the executable via `$PATH`, and `strings.Fields` splitting allowed multiple flags / sub-arguments to be passed.\n\n### Fix\n\nReleased in [v1.23.0](https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.23.0):\n\n- **PR #3364** (commit `0f45c911`) introduces `Builder.resolveBuildCommand` in `pkg/builder/builder.go`, which:\n 1. Accepts an empty string (treated as the default `/build`).\n 2. Accepts the literal `/build`.\n 3. Accepts any absolute path that survives `filepath.Clean` and contains no `..` segments.\n 4. Rejects anything containing whitespace metacharacters or relative paths.\n- `exec.Command` still receives only the validated absolute path; sub-arguments continue to come from `strings.Fields` of the original string but are now passed positionally with no shell expansion.\n\n### Mitigation (until upgrade)\n\n1. Restrict who can create / update `Environment` CRDs to trusted operators only.\n2. Audit `Environment.spec.builder.command` values for any non-`/build` paths.\n3. Run the buildermgr with a tightened ServiceAccount that has no secret access in the builder namespace.",
"id": "GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339",
"modified": "2026-06-10T18:42:10Z",
"published": "2026-05-21T20:17:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/security/advisories/GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46618"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3364"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fission/fission"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.23.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Fission builder accepts arbitrary buildcmd strings from Environment.spec.builder.command, allowing the builder pod to invoke arbitrary executables"
}
GHSA-7RVM-XJPP-63R9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-08 18:21 – Updated: 2026-06-12 21:59Summary
A electron run as node vulnerability was identified in actual (macOS application, version 25.x (Electron 39.2.7)).
Vulnerability Type: Electron Run As Node
Description
ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE fuse enabled (Electron 39.2.7) — app can be converted to Node.js REPL for arbitrary code execution
Impact
An attacker who can place a file on disk or control command-line arguments can invoke the signed Actual.app binary with ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1 to execute arbitrary Node.js code inheriting the apps entitlements and code signature. This bypasses macOS Gatekeeper review of the payload: the Node.js script runs as Actual, under Actuals bundle ID and signed identity, and has access to any entitlements the app carries (network, file access, keychain, automation). Combined with any downloader (browser, mail attachment, Slack link) this becomes a signed-binary-abuse primitive on every Mac with Actual installed.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "actual"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "26.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42890"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-250",
"CWE-693",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-08T18:21:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-12T20:16:45Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA electron run as node vulnerability was identified in `actual` (macOS application, version `25.x (Electron 39.2.7)`).\n\n**Vulnerability Type:** Electron Run As Node\n\n## Description\n\nELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE fuse enabled (Electron 39.2.7) \u2014 app can be converted to Node.js REPL for arbitrary code execution\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can place a file on disk or control command-line arguments can invoke the signed Actual.app binary with ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1 to execute arbitrary Node.js code inheriting the apps entitlements and code signature. This bypasses macOS Gatekeeper review of the payload: the Node.js script runs as Actual, under Actuals bundle ID and signed identity, and has access to any entitlements the app carries (network, file access, keychain, automation). Combined with any downloader (browser, mail attachment, Slack link) this becomes a signed-binary-abuse primitive on every Mac with Actual installed.",
"id": "GHSA-7rvm-xjpp-63r9",
"modified": "2026-06-12T21:59:55Z",
"published": "2026-06-08T18:21:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/actualbudget/actual/security/advisories/GHSA-7rvm-xjpp-63r9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://actualbudget.org/blog/release-26.5.0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/actualbudget/actual"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "actual Allows Electron to Run As Node"
}
GHSA-7V9F-F4QV-FCXH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-13 18:31 – Updated: 2026-02-13 18:31Local privilege escalation in Genetec Sipelia Plugin. An authenticated low-privileged Windows user could exploit this vulnerability to gain elevated privileges on the affected system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-1790"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-250"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-13T17:16:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Local privilege escalation in Genetec Sipelia Plugin. An authenticated low-privileged Windows user could exploit this vulnerability to gain elevated privileges on the affected system.",
"id": "GHSA-7v9f-f4qv-fcxh",
"modified": "2026-02-13T18:31:25Z",
"published": "2026-02-13T18:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1790"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://techdocs.genetec.com/r/en-US/Security-Updates-for-SipeliaTM-2.14"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:U/CR:H/IR:H/AR:H/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:H/MVI:H/MVA:H/MSC:X/MSI:H/MSA:H/S:P/AU:N/R:X/V:C/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-82VG-P6H3-HR69
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-06 00:30 – Updated: 2022-12-08 18:30A remote code execution vulnerability in EdgeRouters (Version 2.0.9-hotfix.4 and earlier) allows a malicious actor with an operator account to run arbitrary administrator commands.This vulnerability is fixed in Version 2.0.9-hotfix.5 and later.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-43553"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-250"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-05T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A remote code execution vulnerability in EdgeRouters (Version 2.0.9-hotfix.4 and earlier) allows a malicious actor with an operator account to run arbitrary administrator commands.This vulnerability is fixed in Version 2.0.9-hotfix.5 and later.",
"id": "GHSA-82vg-p6h3-hr69",
"modified": "2022-12-08T18:30:50Z",
"published": "2022-12-06T00:30:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-43553"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.ui.com/releases/Security-Advisory-Bulletin-026-026/07697c65-30b3-4c06-a158-35e06534480d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-83XV-2Q8M-F6C3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-14 06:30 – Updated: 2024-09-26 03:30This vulnerability allows local attackers to escalate privileges on affected installations of PaperCut NG. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the pc-pdl-to-image process. The process loads an executable from an unsecured location. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code in the context of SYSTEM.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-6006"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-250",
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-14T04:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "This vulnerability allows local attackers to escalate privileges on affected installations of PaperCut NG. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.\nThe specific flaw exists within the pc-pdl-to-image process. The process loads an executable from an unsecured location. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code in the context of SYSTEM.",
"id": "GHSA-83xv-2q8m-f6c3",
"modified": "2024-09-26T03:30:40Z",
"published": "2023-11-14T06:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6006"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.papercut.com/kb/Main/CommonSecurityQuestions"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.papercut.com/kb/Main/Security-Bulletin-November-2023"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8429-J533-FQ73
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-30 21:31 – Updated: 2025-04-30 21:31Tesla Model S oFono Unnecessary Privileges Sandbox Escape Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows local attackers to escape the sandbox on affected Tesla Model S vehicles. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute code within the sandbox on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the oFono process. The process allows an attacker to modify interfaces. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to bypass the iptables network sandbox. Was ZDI-CAN-23200.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-6030"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-250"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-30T20:15:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Tesla Model S oFono Unnecessary Privileges Sandbox Escape Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows local attackers to escape the sandbox on affected Tesla Model S vehicles. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute code within the sandbox on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.\n \nThe specific flaw exists within the oFono process. The process allows an attacker to modify interfaces. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to bypass the iptables network sandbox. Was ZDI-CAN-23200.",
"id": "GHSA-8429-j533-fq73",
"modified": "2025-04-30T21:31:49Z",
"published": "2025-04-30T21:31:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6030"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-25-263"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-84QJ-W5F9-C492
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-31 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:20An Execution with Unnecessary Privileges vulnerability in the Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories SEL-5037 SEL Grid Configurator could allow an attacker to run system commands with the highest level privilege on the system.
See Instruction Manual Appendix A and Appendix E dated 20230615 for more details.
This issue affects SEL-5037 SEL Grid Configurator: before 4.5.0.20.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-31175"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-250",
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-31T16:15:09Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "\nAn Execution with Unnecessary Privileges vulnerability in the Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories SEL-5037 SEL Grid Configurator could allow an attacker to run system commands with the highest level privilege on the system.\n\n\n\n\n\nSee Instruction Manual Appendix A and Appendix E dated 20230615 for more details.\n\n\nThis issue affects SEL-5037 SEL Grid Configurator: before 4.5.0.20.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-84qj-w5f9-c492",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:20:49Z",
"published": "2023-08-31T18:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-31175"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://selinc.com/support/security-notifications/external-reports"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nozominetworks.com/blog"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-85G2-PMRX-R49Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 20:16 – Updated: 2026-07-21 13:54Summary
Fission runtime pods were created with ServiceAccountName: fission-fetcher, and the fission-fetcher ServiceAccount was granted namespace-wide get on secrets and configmaps (it needs that to load function code, env vars, and config). The runtime pod's automounted token was reachable from inside the user's function container at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token, so user-supplied function code inherited the same Kubernetes API privileges and could read any secret or configmap in the function's namespace — far beyond the Function.spec.secrets allowlist that the function specification suggests.
Affected component
pkg/executor/executortype/poolmgr/gp_deployment.go:154-156— pool-manager runtime podServiceAccountName.pkg/executor/executortype/newdeploy/newdeploy.go:225-227— new-deploy runtime podServiceAccountName.pkg/utils/serviceaccount.go:51-64—fission-fetcherRBAC: namespace-widegetonsecrets/configmaps.
Impact
A user able to deploy or update a function in any namespace where Fission runtime pods are scheduled could:
- Read every secret in that namespace (TLS keys, OIDC client secrets, database credentials, cloud provider credentials).
- Read every configmap in that namespace.
- Use those credentials to pivot to other Kubernetes resources or external systems the secrets unlock.
This violates the principle that Function.spec.secrets is the authoritative declaration of which secrets a function can read.
Root cause
The fetcher sidecar legitimately needs the SA token to call the Fission control plane and fetch package archives. Setting ServiceAccountName: fission-fetcher on the pod gives every container in the pod (including the user container) the automounted token. Kubernetes does not provide per-container service-account scoping inside a single pod, so the user container has to be moved into a separate identity / token-mount scheme.
Fix
Released in v1.23.0:
- PR #3366 (commit
fe1842ef): - The user function container now sets
AutomountServiceAccountToken: falseat the container level (via projected-volume token suppression), so the user container no longer sees the pod's SA token even though the fetcher sidecar still does. - The fetcher sidecar retains its existing token mount (separate projected volume) since it needs cluster API access for its own work.
- For the few legitimate use cases where a function needs its own Kubernetes API access, the user is expected to mount a different ServiceAccount via
Function.spec.podspecwith the minimum necessary RBAC (documented separately).
Mitigation (until upgrade)
- Restrict who can create / update
FunctionandPackageCRDs in your cluster — treat the ability to ship function code as equivalent to namespace-wide secret read. - Reduce the
fission-fetcherClusterRole / Role scope where possible (e.g. constrain it to specific named secrets via separate Role bindings). - Add NetworkPolicy egress rules denying function pods access to the Kubernetes API server (this blunts the token even if it leaks).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.22.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/fission/fission"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.23.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46617"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-250",
"CWE-269",
"CWE-538"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-21T20:16:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T18:17:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nFission runtime pods were created with `ServiceAccountName: fission-fetcher`, and the `fission-fetcher` ServiceAccount was granted namespace-wide `get` on `secrets` and `configmaps` (it needs that to load function code, env vars, and config). The runtime pod\u0027s automounted token was reachable from inside the user\u0027s function container at `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`, so user-supplied function code inherited the same Kubernetes API privileges and could read any secret or configmap in the function\u0027s namespace \u2014 far beyond the `Function.spec.secrets` allowlist that the function specification suggests.\n\n### Affected component\n\n- `pkg/executor/executortype/poolmgr/gp_deployment.go:154-156` \u2014 pool-manager runtime pod `ServiceAccountName`.\n- `pkg/executor/executortype/newdeploy/newdeploy.go:225-227` \u2014 new-deploy runtime pod `ServiceAccountName`.\n- `pkg/utils/serviceaccount.go:51-64` \u2014 `fission-fetcher` RBAC: namespace-wide `get` on `secrets` / `configmaps`.\n\n### Impact\n\nA user able to deploy or update a function in any namespace where Fission runtime pods are scheduled could:\n\n1. Read every secret in that namespace (TLS keys, OIDC client secrets, database credentials, cloud provider credentials).\n2. Read every configmap in that namespace.\n3. Use those credentials to pivot to other Kubernetes resources or external systems the secrets unlock.\n\nThis violates the principle that `Function.spec.secrets` is the authoritative declaration of which secrets a function can read.\n\n### Root cause\n\nThe fetcher sidecar legitimately needs the SA token to call the Fission control plane and fetch package archives. Setting `ServiceAccountName: fission-fetcher` on the pod gives every container in the pod (including the user container) the automounted token. Kubernetes does not provide per-container service-account scoping inside a single pod, so the user container has to be moved into a separate identity / token-mount scheme.\n\n### Fix\n\nReleased in [v1.23.0](https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.23.0):\n\n- **PR #3366** (commit `fe1842ef`):\n - The user function container now sets `AutomountServiceAccountToken: false` at the container level (via projected-volume token suppression), so the user container no longer sees the pod\u0027s SA token even though the fetcher sidecar still does.\n - The fetcher sidecar retains its existing token mount (separate projected volume) since it needs cluster API access for its own work.\n - For the few legitimate use cases where a function needs its own Kubernetes API access, the user is expected to mount a different ServiceAccount via `Function.spec.podspec` with the minimum necessary RBAC (documented separately).\n\n### Mitigation (until upgrade)\n\n1. Restrict who can create / update `Function` and `Package` CRDs in your cluster \u2014 treat the ability to ship function code as equivalent to namespace-wide secret read.\n2. Reduce the `fission-fetcher` ClusterRole / Role scope where possible (e.g. constrain it to specific named secrets via separate Role bindings).\n3. Add NetworkPolicy egress rules denying function pods access to the Kubernetes API server (this blunts the token even if it leaks).",
"id": "GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q",
"modified": "2026-07-21T13:54:09Z",
"published": "2026-05-21T20:16:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/security/advisories/GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46617"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3366"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fission/fission"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.23.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Fission runtime pods automount the fission-fetcher service-account token into the user function container, granting function code namespace-wide secret / configmap read"
}
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-18
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
Identify the functionality that requires additional privileges, such as access to privileged operating system resources. Wrap and centralize this functionality if possible, and isolate the privileged code as much as possible from other code [REF-76]. Raise privileges as late as possible, and drop them as soon as possible to avoid CWE-271. Avoid weaknesses such as CWE-288 and CWE-420 by protecting all possible communication channels that could interact with the privileged code, such as a secondary socket that is only intended to be accessed by administrators.
Mitigation MIT-18
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Identify the functionality that requires additional privileges, such as access to privileged operating system resources. Wrap and centralize this functionality if possible, and isolate the privileged code as much as possible from other code [REF-76]. Raise privileges as late as possible, and drop them as soon as possible to avoid CWE-271. Avoid weaknesses such as CWE-288 and CWE-420 by protecting all possible communication channels that could interact with the privileged code, such as a secondary socket that is only intended to be accessed by administrators.
Mitigation
Perform extensive input validation for any privileged code that must be exposed to the user and reject anything that does not fit your strict requirements.
Mitigation MIT-19
When dropping privileges, ensure that they have been dropped successfully to avoid CWE-273. As protection mechanisms in the environment get stronger, privilege-dropping calls may fail even if it seems like they would always succeed.
Mitigation
If circumstances force you to run with extra privileges, then determine the minimum access level necessary. First identify the different permissions that the software and its users will need to perform their actions, such as file read and write permissions, network socket permissions, and so forth. Then explicitly allow those actions while denying all else [REF-76]. Perform extensive input validation and canonicalization to minimize the chances of introducing a separate vulnerability. This mitigation is much more prone to error than dropping the privileges in the first place.
Mitigation MIT-37
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Ensure that the software runs properly under the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) [REF-199] or an equivalent hardening configuration guide, which many organizations use to limit the attack surface and potential risk of deployed software.
CAPEC-104: Cross Zone Scripting
An attacker is able to cause a victim to load content into their web-browser that bypasses security zone controls and gain access to increased privileges to execute scripting code or other web objects such as unsigned ActiveX controls or applets. This is a privilege elevation attack targeted at zone-based web-browser security.
CAPEC-470: Expanding Control over the Operating System from the Database
An attacker is able to leverage access gained to the database to read / write data to the file system, compromise the operating system, create a tunnel for accessing the host machine, and use this access to potentially attack other machines on the same network as the database machine. Traditionally SQL injections attacks are viewed as a way to gain unauthorized read access to the data stored in the database, modify the data in the database, delete the data, etc. However, almost every data base management system (DBMS) system includes facilities that if compromised allow an attacker complete access to the file system, operating system, and full access to the host running the database. The attacker can then use this privileged access to launch subsequent attacks. These facilities include dropping into a command shell, creating user defined functions that can call system level libraries present on the host machine, stored procedures, etc.
CAPEC-69: Target Programs with Elevated Privileges
This attack targets programs running with elevated privileges. The adversary tries to leverage a vulnerability in the running program and get arbitrary code to execute with elevated privileges.